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1 Introduction 
Without any doubt, the proliferation and expansion of social policies over the 
last hundred years has been a macro-political phenomenon of enormous social, 
economic, and political importance for Latin American societies. But while the 
rapid growth of social programs in industrialized countries received growing 
scientific attention from the 1970s on, similar processes in Latin America were 
subject to a comparatively limited number of studies until the early 2000s.1 
When in the late 1970s Ian Gough (1979, 1) went as far as to say of the indus-
trialized countries that the “twentieth century, and in particular the period since 
the Second World War, can fairly be described as the era of the welfare state,” 
several Latin American countries could look back at over seven decades of 
social insurance development and even surpassed the United States and other 
industrialized countries in programs such as health-maternity insurance and 
family allowances (Mesa-Lago 1989, XV). When Esping-Andersen ([1990] 
1998, 1) observed for the industrialized countries that what “once were night-
watchman states, law-and-order states, militarist states, or even repressive or-
gans of totalitarian rule, are now institutions predominantly preoccupied with 
the production and distribution of social well-being,” many Latin American 
states devoted about 40% of their expenditures to social policies and in some 
countries, such as Argentina, Uruguay, and Costa Rica, this number even as-
cended to 50% or 60% (Segura-Ubiergo 2007, 14).2 The importance of the 
expansion of social policies, however, not only rested on the devotion of sig-
nificant resources to providing such elemental things as access to health care, 
education, food, and income security. It rested as much on shaping the social 
stratification of the society, family and gender relations, the distribution of po-
litical power and the basic dynamics and rules of the economy (e.g., Barrientos 
2004; Esping-Andersen [1990] 1998; Filgueira 2005; Huber and Stephens 
2001; Lewis 1992; Martínez Franzoni 2008; Orloff 1996). 
Already towards the end of the 20th century, Carmelo Mesa-Lago (1989, 
XV) had concluded that “in terms of social security […] Latin America is a 
leader in the Third World.” 
 
1  A significant growth of studies on Latin American social policy commenced with the 
proliferation of neoliberal privatization and retrenchment measures during the 1990s 
and further intensified with the political left-turn in the region during the 2000s.  
2  According to Segura-Ubiergo (2007, 14), during the 1973–2000 period only four indus-
trialized countries devoted a higher share of their public expenditure to social policies: 
the Netherlands, Switzerland, France and Germany. 
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A Latin American Paradox: Significant Social Expenditure Without 
Significant Redistribution 
In the context of high world market prices for Latin American commodity ex-
ports, high economic growth rates and the election of left-of-center govern-
ments in a significant proportion of the region, social policy expansion re-
ceived another decisive push during the first one and a half decades of the 21st 
century. Many of the reform initiatives during this period, such as the expan-
sion of social services, universal cash transfers, targeted social assistance pro-
grams, and the easing of access criteria for social insurance benefits, had a 
clearly redistributive orientation (Barrientos and Santibáñiez 2009;  
Cruz-Martínez 2019; Lustig 2015; Lustig, Pessino and Scott 2014). In 2015, 
the average public social expenditure in the region reached 14.6% of GDP and 
was hence not far from the 19.0% average spent by OECD countries.3 Some 
countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, and Costa Rica, even spent over 23% of 
their GDP and surpassed, in relative terms, highly developed welfare states, 
such as the Netherlands, the United Kingdom or Iceland (OECD 2019; CEPAL 
2017a, 123). 
However, despite this stunning expansion of social policies and the pro-
gressive character of the recent reform cycle, Latin America is still character-
ized by extreme inequalities.4 These concern not only the distribution of in-
comes but pervade nearly every aspect of social and economic life, such as 
access to health care, education, labor markets, land, housing, and sewage 
treatment (Burchardt 2012; Ferranti et al. 2004; Peters 2013; Tittor 2012). In-
equality expert Nora Lustig (2015, 14) recently pointed out that while Latin 
America is home to about “5 percent of the world’s billionaires, the poor are 
strikingly poor. Infant mortality and malnutrition in rural areas and shanty-
towns, and among disadvantaged groups in Latin American middle-income 
countries, are much the same as in notably poorer nations.” Hence, there is a 
pressing question: How can Latin America be at the same time leader in the 
Third World in terms of social policy and in terms of inequality? 
An important part of the answer lies in the way social policy systems 
evolved in Latin America. While social policy transfers and taxes in OECD 
countries reduced income inequalities measured with the Gini coefficient by 
an estimated average of 36% during the early 2010s, they did so by a meager 
 
3  The numbers are simple un-weighted country averages. The average provided by  
CEPAL (2017a, 123) for Latin America and the Caribbean covers only central govern-
ment spending for many of the countries. Therefore, the already considerable social 
spending share of 14.6% of GDP constitutes still an underestimation of the true overall 
public social expenditure. 
4  As a socialist country, Cuba constitutes an exception to this as well as to the following 
observations regarding the relationship between social policies and inequality. 
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6% in Latin America (Hanni, Podestá and Martner 2015, 13).5 Of course, nei-
ther among Latin American countries nor among industrialized countries are 
social policy regimes uniform. Since the publication of Gøsta Esping-Ander-
sen’s influential book The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism in 1990, a 
growing number of comparative studies have clustered welfare regimes ac-
cording to a range of aspects, such as their effects on social stratification, labor 
markets, gender relations, and income inequality .6 However, even if we com-
pare leading countries of the most developed and redistributive social policy 
regime types in Latin America, such as Argentina, Uruguay, and Costa Rica, 
with countries of the least egalitarian liberal regime type in the industrialized 
countries, such as Australia, Canada or the United Kingdom, the latter achieve 
significantly stronger redistributive effects. Around 2010, social policy trans-
fers reduced income inequality measured with the Gini coefficient by approx-
imately 9% in Argentina, 5% in Costa Rica and 11% in Uruguay (Hanni, Po-
destá and Martner 2015, 11). In comparison, the same effect was about 18% in 
Australia, 14% in Canada, and 21% in the United Kingdom (Joumard, Pisu and 
Bloch 2012, 13). Significantly, Argentina, Costa Rica, and Uruguay actually 
devoted bigger shares of their GDPs to social spending than did Australia, 
Canada and the United Kingdom.7 
This stunning paradox of significant social spending without comparably 
significant redistribution raises at least two important technical and political 
questions: First, what are the peculiarities in the design and the rules of Latin 
American social policy regimes that explain this paradox? And second, what 
are the underlying social, economic, and political reasons that led to the devel-
opment of these peculiarities?  
The first question has motivated the undertaking of several technical stud-
ies with detailed analyses of the redistributive effects of virtually all major so-
cial policies in Latin America (e.g., Ferranti et al. 2004; Goñi, López and Ser-
vén 2008; Lindert, Skoufias and Shapiro 2006). The findings show that the key 
reason for the lack of redistribution is the truncated character of most social 
programs, which means that they either exclude or strongly disadvantage low-
 
5  The numbers refer to simple un-weighted country averages. In both regions cash trans-
fers had a significantly stronger impact on income inequality than taxation (OECD 
2007, 53). In Latin America, Hanni, Podestá and Martner (2015, 13) estimate that cash 
transfers account for over 60% of reduction of the Gini coefficient.  
6  For an overview of different social policy systems in Latin America see e.g., Barrientos 
(2004); Burchardt, Tittor and Weinmann (2012); Filgueira (2005); Gough (2013); 
Gough and Wood (2004); and Martínez Franzoni (2008). For an overview of different 
social policy systems in industrialized countries see e.g., Ebbinghaus (2012), Esping-
Andersen ([1990] 1998); Huber and Stephens (2001); and Orloff (1996). 
7  According to CEPAL (2013, 174) Argentina spent 27.8%, Costa Rica 22.7% and 
Uruguay 24.2% of their GDPs on social policies, while according to the OECD (2019) 
Australia spent 16.6%, Canada 17.5% and the United Kingdom 22.4%. 
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income earners, precisely those who suffer from the most urgent social needs.8 
While big shares of the social spending are used to finance occupationally 
based social insurance schemes, most Latin American low-income earners are 
peasants, informal workers or unemployed workers and are therefore deprived 
of access to these programs. In practice, this often means exclusion from a 
whole range of social protections, such as family allowances, pensions, unem-
ployment allowances, health care, work accident compensation, and wage pay-
ment during sickness. According to the International Labor Organization 
(ILO), in 2015, approximately 140 million persons or 53% of all workers in 
Latin America were informal workers (Salazar-Xirinachs and Chacaltana 
2018, 22). Furthermore, social insurance systems are highly fragmented in 
most Latin American countries, which implies that, within the population of 
formal workers, members of high-income groups often receive disproportion-
ally better benefits than members of low-income groups. Even spending on 
non-contributory social policies, such as public health care and education, of-
ten benefits the better-off more than poorer sectors, as the latter often live in 
rural or marginalized urban areas in which public social services are either 
lacking or provided in inferior quality (Burchardt 2012; Ferranti et al. 2004; 
Goñi, López and Servén 2008; Lindert, Skoufias and Shapiro 2006).  
The Research Focus 
While several of the above mentioned studies contain detailed analyses of the 
social policy designs that disadvantage or exclude low-income earners and 
elaborate recommendations for rendering Latin American social policy re-
gimes more inclusionary (Barrientos and Hulme 2008; Ferranti et al. 2004; 
Goñi, López and Servén 2008; Lindert, Skoufias and Shapiro 2006), we know 
much less about the politics that led to the proliferation of such inegalitarian 
regulations. Social policies do not simply develop out of technical debates and 
recommendations but are always the outcome of political processes. This does 
not mean that such recommendations do not influence social policy develop-
ment, but rather that whether and what recommendations are made at a certain 
moment and even more so which of them enter the governmental agenda-set-
ting process and are implemented depends decisively on political factors. 
The main goal of this book is, therefore, to contribute to a better under-
standing of the politics of social protection for low-income earners in Latin 
America and to examine the underlying structures, constellations of actors, and 
mechanisms. To do so, it engages in a profound long-term analysis of the 
paradigmatic Argentinian case. 
 
8  For the purpose of this study, the group of low-income earners is defined as the 40% of 
the population with the lowest income. 
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Understanding the Politics of Social Protection for Low-Income Earners 
in Latin America: Existing Literature, Empirical Gaps, and Remaining 
Theoretical Puzzles 
While some recent studies have focused on the political processes underlying 
the expansion of social protections for low-income earners during the 2000s 
(Garay 2010; Pribble 2013), there are still important gaps regarding the pre-
ceding decades. So far, no study has explicitly focused on the long-term poli-
tics of social protection for low-income earners. This means that we lack not 
only empirical information on many reform processes but also a coherent the-
oretical framework that takes into account the influence of major economic, 
social and political transformations that unfold over longer periods of time. 
Most studies that adopted a long-term perspective, in turn, focused their 
attention on general social policy regime development. This way, they pro-
vided significant insights into the history and political economy of social pol-
icy in Latin America. Carmelo Mesa-Lago (1978; 1989) argued that social pol-
icy expansion during the 20th century was a gradual process in response to the 
growing power of occupationally based pressure groups, such as military men, 
civil servants, and formal workers. Alex Segura-Ubiergo (2007) found that 
economic development, Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI), the power 
of left and labor movements, and democracy fostered the growth of social 
spending. In addition to these factors, Fernando Filgueira (2005) and Stephan 
Haggard and Robert Kaufman (2008) showed that social policy regime devel-
opment in Latin America was also often shaped by critical realignments during 
which powerful elites sought to co-opt or control labor movements, which be-
sides repression usually involved significant social policy concessions.9 Eve-
lyne Huber and John D. Stephens (2012) and James McGuire (2010) further 
contributed to the literature by showing that democracy and the power of the 
political left historically contributed to the implementation of more redistribu-
tive social policies.10 However, all these studies compared a relatively large 
number of countries and did not focus on the evolution of social protections 
for low-income earners. Thus, existing studies have improved our understand-
ing of the overall growth of social policy systems in Latin America, but we 
still lack a deeper understanding of why these systems evolved in a truncated 
way that disadvantages or even excludes low-income groups from social pro-
tection. 
 
9  Although not focused on welfare regime development, Ruth and David Collier ([1991] 
2009) formulated a similar argument in their book on critical junctures and labor incor-
poration in Latin America. 
10  In congruence with these arguments, Haggard and Kaufman (2008, 79–113) observed 
that democratic governments in Latin America between 1945 and 1980 were more 
likely to expand social protections to hitherto uncovered groups while authoritarian 
governments tended to increase benefits for already protected groups. 
22   
Notwithstanding, it is possible to derive a range of hypotheses from the 
existing literature. Most of the cited historical studies of social policy develop-
ment in Latin America either explicitly or implicitly assumed that the expan-
sion of social programs was biased towards the middle and formal working 
classes, because these sectors were better organized, occupied strategically 
more important positions in the state and the economy and were hence more 
powerful than low-income groups, such as peasants, the unemployed and in-
formal workers (Barrientos and Santibáñez 2009; Filgueira 2005; Haggard and 
Kaufman 2008; Mesa-Lago 1978; 1989; Segura-Ubiergo 2007). If we con-
sider, however, that it is also true in most industrialized countries that low-
income groups were weakly organized and lacked political power (Huber and 
Stephens 2001, 18–19), it becomes evident that the weakness of social protec-
tions for low-income earners in Latin America cannot solely be explained by 
the unequal distribution of power between different popular classes.11 Further-
more, this line of argument has difficulties in explaining why governments in 
several countries indeed undertook strong efforts to introduce and expand so-
cial protections for low-income earners during certain periods. In Argentina, 
for example, the Peronist governments of the 1940s, 1950s, and 1970s mas-
sively expanded social assistance policies, eased access criteria so that most 
elderly low-income earners could access relatively generous pensions, and 
built up a universal and free public health system . In Costa Rica, the PLN 
governments during the 1970s nearly universalized health insurance coverage, 
significantly extended pension coverage, and set into motion massive social 
assistance programs (Martinez Franzoni and Sánchez-Ancochea 2013). Under 
the governments of Eduardo Frei and Salvador Allende in the 1960s and 1970s, 
Chile massively strengthened the provision of basic health services, education, 
and housing policies in favor of low-income groups (Arellano 1985). Similar 
processes also took place in other Latin American countries (Huber and  
Stephens 2012, 73–102). What were the underlying factors and political dy-
namics that enabled the expansion of social protections for low-income earners 
during these periods? And what were the reasons why these processes were 
unable to lastingly transform the respective social policy regimes into inclu-
sionary institutions?  
In their pathbreaking book Democracy and the Left: Social Policy and In-
equality in Latin America, Evelyne Huber and John D. Stephens (2012) make 
an important contribution to the effort to resolve these puzzles. Through a mix-
ture of statistical methods and five compact case studies they test a large vari-
ety of hypotheses and provide strong evidence in support of the key argument 
 
11  Largely in accordance with Collier and Collier ([1991] 2009, 788) the term popular 
classes refers to the urban and rural lower classes, including formal and informal labor, 
precarious self-employed workers, peasants, the unemployed and the lower middle 
class. The lower middle class has been included as in Argentina their members often 
form part of the organized labor movement. 
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of the power resources approach by showing that left-of-center political parties 
were pivotal promoters of redistributive social policy. Huber and Stephens 
(2012) furthermore show that the length of democracy decisively influenced 
the redistributive characteristics of social policy regimes, as it provided a cru-
cial condition for the development of left party strength and electoral compe-
tition for low-income voters. In contrast, right-wing political actors and eco-
nomic elites pursued more regressive social policy agendas and repeatedly 
stopped processes of progressive change or even reversed them through poste-
rior retrenchment and privatization. An expansion of social protections for 
low-income earners can hence be assumed most likely under democratic rule, 
when left parties attain governmental power or when they are strong enough 
to generate legislative pressures and to cause significant electoral competition 
for the vote of low-income earners.  
Despite these significant advances for our understanding of the politics of 
social protection for low-income earners in Latin America, there nevertheless 
remain several theoretically puzzling questions. One first and broad theoretical 
puzzle regards the involved constellations of actors and interests, in general, 
and the formation of popular class identities and actors, in particular. Based on 
the analysis of industrialized countries, power resources theorists have argued 
that redistributive and inclusionary welfare states are crucially the outcome of 
strong working classes represented by trade unions and left-of-center parties. 
While Huber and Stephens (2012) and Pribble (2013) indeed found clear evi-
dence for a similar role of left-of-center parties in Latin America, the role of 
trade union movements and non-left popular class-based parties remains still 
far less clear. McGuire (2010) found that Latin American unions played a ra-
ther ambiguous role, at times supporting social policy expansion to low-in-
come earners and at times opposing it. Mesa-Lago (1978) and Haggard and 
Kaufman (2008) even argued that trade unions mostly defended specific group 
interests and therefore contributed to the development of exclusionary social 
policy. In a similar vein, non-left popular class-based parties, such as the Par-
tido Justicialista (PJ) in Argentina or the Partido Revolucionario Institucional 
(PRI) in Mexico, have led both the progressive expansion of social protections 
and the posterior regressive retrenchment and privatization (Levitsky 2003). 
The fact that such non-left parties were the dominant political representation 
of labor and other popular classes during prolonged periods in several Latin 
American countries raises the question of whether or in what way the left–right 
divide can explain the development of social protection in countries where the 
main parties organized primarily around other divides, such as for example 
Peronism and Anti-Peronism in Argentina. Furthermore, economically mar-
ginalized sectors, such as peasants, informal and unemployed workers are 
much more numerous in Latin America than in the industrialized countries, yet 
their role and that of actors representing them remain largely unclear. Regard-
ing the recent process of social policy expansion, Garay (2010) argued that 
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protests and movements of the lower popular classes12 were indeed important 
drivers. This puts into doubt the hypothesis that these sectors were generally 
powerless and unable to influence social policy-making. At the same time, it 
raises questions regarding their role in earlier processes of inclusionary social 
policy reform. How can we make sense of these complex constellations of ac-
tors and interests and their relations to social protections for low-income earn-
ers? Which actors supported and which opposed such policies? Why and under 
what conditions did they do so? 
A second major puzzle concerns the role of contextual factors in the poli-
tics of social protections for low-income earners. Here we can identify hypoth-
eses concerning the effects of specific factors in the wider literature, but we 
lack a coherent theoretical framework which ties together the most relevant 
factors and points out how these interact and shape the political process. Re-
garding the politico-institutional context, the controversy turns mainly around 
the effects of regime types and path dependencies. Huber and Stephens (2012) 
and McGuire (2010) found that democracy has significant long-run positive 
effects on the progressiveness and inclusiveness of social policy, while semi-
authoritarian   and authoritarian regimes favor retrenchment or the develop-
ment of regressive insurance-based systems.13 In a similar direction, Garay 
(2010) and Pribble (2013) argued that democracy was a decisive precondition 
for the recent expansion of social protections for low-income earners during 
the 2000s. In contrast, Hans-Jürgen Burchardt (2008; 2010) directed our atten-
tion to the fact that this relation cannot be observed during the 1980s and 1990s 
as formal re-democratization did not coincide with more progressive social 
policy nor a reduction of inequality. The question of why democracy was as-
sociated with redistributive policies during some periods while not during oth-
ers remains a puzzle. 
The role of different structural factors is also contested. Based on Huber 
and Stephens (2012) it could be assumed that industrialization had a positive 
indirect effect on social protection for low-income earners, as it facilitated the 
growth of labor unions and left parties which then pressed for redistributive 
policies. In contrast, Barrientos and Santibáñez (2009) and Mesa-Lago (1978) 
argued that industrialization in Latin America led to the development of labor 
movements that represented only small portions of the overall population and 
hence contributed to the development of truncated, exclusionary social policy 
regimes. Huber and Stephens (2012) furthermore argued that higher degrees 
of globalization and bad economic performance restricted the capacities of 
governments to implement progressive social policies. High degrees of 
 
12  The term lower popular classes refers to the economically marginalized segments of the 
popular classes, which have usually not been represented by the organizations of the 
trade union movement. These segments include urban and rural informal workers, pre-
carious self-employed workers, peasants and the unemployed. 
13  A discussion and definition of different regime types can be found in chapter 2. 
  25 
globalization, it is argued, strengthen capital vis-à-vis labor and the state, while 
bad economic performance limits the resources available for redistribution.14 
At the same time, however, the recent phase of social policy expansion for low-
income groups took place in a context of relatively open markets. While Huber 
and Stephens (2012) also argued that a high dependence on primary goods ex-
ports has negative indirect effects because it strengthens an often aggressively 
anti-redistributive landed oligarchy , countervails industrialization and in-
creases external economic vulnerabilities; a variety of recent studies that fo-
cused on the political and social consequences of resource extraction in Latin 
America argued that the expansion of social protections for low-income earn-
ers during the 2000s was closely related to the increase of primary goods pro-
duction and exports, which both generated fiscal revenues and required popu-
lar legitimization (Burchardt 2016; Gudynas 2012; Peters 2016).  
Although these controversies allow for identifying a range of potentially 
important contextual factors, so far there exists no study that systematically 
analyzes whether and how these different factors influenced the politics of so-
cial protection for low-income earners in the long run, which of the many con-
textual factors were decisive and how they interacted. Even the few studies that 
explicitly examine the politics of social protection for low-income earners 
were limited in their dealing with contextual factors (Garay 2010; Pribble 
2013). Due to their focus on the recent phase of social policy expansion, their 
relatively short timeframes did not allow them to evaluate the effects of insti-
tutional, structural, and discursive transformations that occurred over longer 
periods. Hence, making sense of this multiplicity of potentially influential fac-
tors and evaluating their empirical importance still requires substantial re-
search and theory development. What were the contextual factors that con-
tributed to the expansion of social protections for low-income earners during 
certain periods? What factors allowed for their posterior retrenchment? Which 
contextual factors were common to different periods of expansion? Which fac-
tors consistently differentiated periods of expansion from periods of stagnation 
or retrenchment? And in what ways did these factors interact and matter in 
concrete political processes of social policy reform? 
The third theoretical puzzle concerns the main mechanisms that character-
ize the politics of social protections for low-income earners in Latin America. 
Due to the broad focus on social policy regimes in general and the comparison 
of a high number of cases, existing long-term studies did not engage in detailed 
and systematic analyses of the political processes that led to the expansion or 
retrenchment of social protections for low-income earners (e.g., Filgueira 
2005; Haggard and Kaufman 2008; Huber and Stephens 2012; Mesa-Lago 
1978; 1989; Segura-Ubiergo 2007). However, such analyses are necessary if 
 
14  Haggard and Kaufmann (2008) and Segura-Ubiergo (2007) make similar arguments 
with regard to the overall level of social spending, yet without focusing on the specific 
issues of redistribution and social protection for low-income earners.  
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we want to refine our theoretical understanding of how different factors shape 
the political struggle and the subsequent social policy outcomes for the poorest 
sectors. In contrast, the recent short- and medium-term studies of Jennifer Prib-
ble (2013) and Candelaria Garay (2010) explicitly focused on the expansions 
of social protections for low-income earners and identified several mechanisms 
that structured these processes. They agree that democracy was an important 
driver behind the expansion. The first mechanism was that democracy allowed 
for the emergence of significant electoral competition for low-income voters 
and hence provided incentives even for non-left parties to respond, although 
with minor concessions, to demands for social protection. A second mecha-
nism observed by Pribble (2013) was that democracy provided opportunities 
for a strengthening of the political left, which in several cases enabled progres-
sive coalitions to reach majorities in parliaments, to lead governments and on 
that basis implement inclusionary social programs.15 Pribble (2013) further-
more found that programmatic left parties with close ties to base-level social 
movements more consistently expanded universal social policies than prag-
matic and personalistic left parties. The key mechanism identified here was 
that binding programs and strong civil society linkages reinforce the party’s 
ideological commitment to equality and protect it from erosion in the face of 
countervailing political and economic pressures. Garay (2010) identified the 
growth of lower popular class protests and movements as another key driver 
behind the expansion of social protection for low-income earners. Thereby she 
observed two main mechanisms. One mechanism was that governments re-
sponded to these pressures from below with social policy concessions in order 
to re-establish social peace or to co-opt, divide or weaken the protesting move-
ments. The other mechanism was that the formation of low-income earners’ 
movements enabled these sectors to participate in the policy-making process 
through alliances with partisan political forces. Despite these advances in iden-
tifying political mechanisms related to the expansion of social protections for 
low-income earners, there remain puzzling questions. To what extent did such 
mechanisms also characterize earlier processes of social policy expansion? 
How did major societal transformations, such as the expansion and decline of 
industrial employment or the rise and fall of neoliberal thinking, affect the op-
eration of such mechanisms? What mechanisms operated when social protec-
tions were not expanded but dismantled or retrenched? And why did several of 
the above-mentioned mechanisms not work during the 1990s when left or pop-
ular class-based parties were strong in several countries and democracy con-
solidated? 
In sum, a variety of hypotheses can be drawn from the existing literature. 
But there remain puzzling questions and, most importantly, there is still a need 
for the development of a coherent and empirically sustained theoretical frame-
 
15  Huber and Stephens (2012) make a similar argument regarding the mechanisms that 
shaped general welfare policy expansion in Latin America. 
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work that ties together the roles and interactions of the main actors, contextual 
factors and mechanisms shaping the long-term politics of social protection for 
low-income earners in Latina America. 
Why, How and What We Can Learn from the Argentinian Case:  
Case Selection and Research Strategy 
Comparative studies on Latin American social policy regimes have been strong 
in testing hypotheses derived from existing welfare state theories and in gen-
eralizing the findings by showing which arguments possess explanatory power 
throughout the region and over time (Haggard and Kaufman 2008; Huber and 
Stephens 2012; Mesa-Lago 1978; Segura-Ubiergo 2007). However, as Esping-
Andersen (1990, 2) pointed out, the trade-off related to this effectiveness in 
theory testing and generalizability is that large-scale comparisons “prohibit de-
tailed treatments of individual countries.” Considering that most welfare state 
theories were once developed based on European experiences, and hence 
against the background of significantly different historical, economic, social, 
cultural and political contexts, it is not surprising that after testing these theo-
ries in Latin America there remain several puzzling questions and mismatches. 
In order to solve these puzzles and to overcome these mismatches, it is neces-
sary to move from theory testing to theory building, modification, and specifi-
cation. This is even more the case for the specific issue of social protection for 
low-income earners, as this aspect of social policy regime development has not 
been the explicit focus of any of those theories.  
For the aim of theory building, modification, and specification, the in-
depth analysis of a single but paradigmatic country-case can provide important 
advantages. While such studies face clear limitations regarding the generaliza-
bility of their findings, they can draw great strength from their close focus on 
and the rich treatment of political processes, which facilitates the discovery of 
novel explanations, the testing of complex arguments and the refining of exist-
ing theoretical claims (Collier and Collier [1991] 2009, 20; Mahoney and 
Rueschemeyer 2003, 13; Rueschemeyer 2003, 305–336). Theoretically puz-
zling questions like why labor unions and popular class-based parties sup-
ported or opposed social protections for low-income earners at different his-
torical moments, why democracy was in the long-run associated with more 
inclusionary social policy but why such effects could not be observed during 
the 1980s and 1990s, and how different ideational influences entered and 
shaped political processes, can be dealt with much better in a single country 
study that permits a detailed qualitative analysis of such phenomena. In con-
trast to large-scale comparisons, the present study will be able to closely trace 
political processes of social policy reform by reconstructing how events un-
folded over time, how different factors and actors triggered or influenced such 
events and how these were in the end causally related to increases or reductions 
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of the level of social protection for low-income earners. A long timeframe fur-
thermore permits comparisons of different reform periods and discovery of the 
contextual factors, constellations of actors and political mechanisms that were 
common to periods of expansion and which consistently differentiated them 
from periods of retrenchment. Thus, by focusing on one country, Argentina, 
over a long period of time, 1943 to 2015, the present study aims to further 
develop and modify existing theories—in particular the power resources ap-
proach—and to construct a consistent theoretical framework for the analysis 
of the politics of social protection for low-income earners in Latin America 
that can subsequently inform future research on other countries as well as com-
parative studies. 
The Argentinian case is particularly well suited to serve this aim due to 
both methodological and theoretical reasons. The high frequency and intensity 
of change regarding social protections for low-income earners and the related 
political struggles provide a fertile basis for the identification of patterns and 
causal relations through the application of process tracing and period compar-
ison methods.16 At the same time, Argentina constitutes a paradigmatic case 
concerning the theoretical puzzles identified above and is therefore especially 
suited to contribute to the academic controversy. 
First, the political landscape of Argentina contains constellations of actors 
and social policy interest that cannot be entirely understood with existing wel-
fare state theories and therefore serve to solve a range of related puzzling ques-
tions. The Peronist PJ constitutes an emblematic example for a programmati-
cally flexible and ideologically heterogeneous popular class-based party, and 
therefore Argentina is well suited to explore the role of such parties and to 
conceptualize the conditions and influences under which these tend to support 
or to oppose social protections for low-income earners.17 Argentina further-
more has a strong trade union movement that was frequently involved in social 
policy reform processes and shares with most of its Latin American counter-
parts that its social bases are nearly exclusively composed of formal workers. 
Therefore, Argentina allows for digging into the question under which condi-
tions Latin American union movements tended to support or to oppose social 
protections for low-income earners. Similarly, the country has seen the devel-
opment of social movements representing non-unionized lower popular clas-
ses, such as peasants, the unemployed, and informal workers. The fact that 
such social movements have been actively or passively involved in social pol-
icy reform processes at several historical moments provides a fertile ground 
 
16  A detailed description of the methodological approach can be found in chapter 3. 
17  According to Levitsky (2003) and Levitsky and Roberts (2011) other examples of such 
programmatically flexible and ideologically heterogeneous popular class-based parties 
in Latin America are the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) in Bolivia, 
the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) in Mexico and the Alianza Popular 
Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) in Peru. 
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for the analysis and conceptualization of their role in the politics of social pro-
tection for low-income earners. The repeated installation of military govern-
ments furthermore allows us to not only contrast the effects of democratic and 
authoritarian regime types but to also explore the role of the military itself as 
an active participant in social policy-making. 
Second, Argentina can be considered an emblematic case to explore the 
role of a range of contextual factors that are either still subject to academic 
controversy or have so far remained outside the scope of research. The country 
is one of the leading economies of the region, has reached among the highest 
levels of industrialization and developed extensive state structures which com-
prise an ample and cost-intensive set of social policies. Therefore, based on 
existing welfare state theories, Argentina could be considered one of those 
countries in Latin America in which due to a range of contextual factors broad 
social protections for low-income earners were most likely to develop. Never-
theless, despite significant progress since the beginning of the 21st century, Ar-
gentinian social policies severely disadvantage low-income earners in their ac-
cess to cash transfers and essential social services, such as health care and ed-
ucation. At the same time, Argentina shares a broad range of contextual factors 
with the rest of the region, such as widespread informal employment, high in-
equality, dependence on primary goods exports, the application of ISI devel-
opment strategies and repeated military coups, among others (Burchardt 2006; 
Collier and Collier [1991] 2009). Such contextual factors distinguish the region 
from the industrialized countries that informed existing welfare state theories. 
Hence, the Argentine case allows us to explore whether and how these specific 
characteristics of Latin American societies shaped the politics of social protec-
tion for low-income earners in order to modify existing theories and to develop 
new theoretical arguments. The fact that Argentine society experienced com-
paratively dramatic transformations regarding most of these contextual factors 
makes the country a particularly favorable case to observe and trace whether 
and how these transformations affected actors, interests, and political dynam-
ics.  
And third, the extraordinarily high number of social policy reform pro-
cesses that profoundly affected the level of social protection for low-income 
earners, the intensity of the associated political disputes and the comparatively 
broad mediatic and academic documentation provide a fertile base for the iden-
tification of political mechanisms. The Argentine case is therefore not only 
well suited to improve our understanding of what factors and actors influenced 
the level of social protection for low-income earners, but also to explore how 
and why they did so. 
In addition to the contribution to the theoretical debate, the present study 
aims to close an important empirical gap in the literature on Argentine social 
policy. There exists a high number of excellent studies on social policy devel-
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opment in the country.18 The large majority concentrate on single reform pro-
cesses, specific policy areas or short timeframes. Rubén Lo Vuolo and Alberto 
Barbeito (1998a), Aldo Isuani (2008) and Laura Golbert (2010) provide out-
standing accounts of the long-term evolution of the Argentinian social policy 
regime. However, as has been shown above, general social policy regime de-
velopment did not linearly correlate with the evolution of social protections for 
low-income earners. Indeed, the paradox of social policy expansion during the 
20th century in Latin America lies in the fact that social policy expanded with-
out improving the level of social protections for low-income earners in any 
comparable measure. However, a detailed empirical account of both the evo-
lution of the level of social protections for low-income earners in Argentina as 
well as the underlying political processes is still missing—a gap that the pre-
sent study aims to fill. 
The Structure of the Study 
Chapter 2 starts with an extended theoretical literature review, which comple-
ments the short overview given in the introduction by providing additional de-
tail and incorporating theoretically relevant literature on non-Latin American 
countries. In its main section, the chapter develops a theoretical framework for 
the analysis of the politics of social protection for low-income earners in Latin 
America. Chapter 3 describes the methodological approach, the application of 
process tracing and period comparison, as well as the main sources of primary 
and secondary information. Chapter 4 constitutes an extensive and systematic 
reconstruction of the politics of social protection for low-income earners in 
Argentina between 1943 and 2015. The text follows a coherent structure spe-
cifically designed to reveal and analyze contextual factors, constellations of 
actors, and political mechanisms related to changing levels of social protection 
for low-income earners. For this reason, the chapter is divided into seven sub-
chapters that each deal with a period of expansion or retrenchment. Each sub-
chapter, in turn, is divided into different sections that outline the economic, 
social and political context of the period, trace the political processes of social 
policy change and assess the resulting policy outcomes regarding social pro-
tections for low-income earners. Chapter 5 engages in a structured comparison 
of the different subperiods and reform processes and thereby works out recur-
rent patterns, causal relations, and political mechanisms. And finally, chapter 
6 provides an overview of the main findings, a concise assessment of the initial 
hypotheses outlined in chapter 2 and a discussion of the implications of these 
 
18  Given the high number of studies and authors I refrain from citing them here, because 
any selection would unavoidably appear arbitrary. However, as the present study heav-
ily draws on the empirical information provided by this ample spectrum of secondary 
literature, a look into the literature list at the end of the book will suffice to grasp the 
extensive work done mostly by Argentine researchers. 
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findings for the wider theoretical debate and future research on social policy 
in Latin America.19 
  
 
19  The whole study benefits from and draws on my own previous research on social policy 
development in Argentina (Bossert 2011) as well as on two articles that have been writ-
ten in parallell to working on the present study and that present some of the information 
and arguments of the present study in a somewhat different and much more compressed 
form (Bossert 2016; Weinmann, Bossert and Hecker 2016). 
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2 Theorizing the Politics of Social Protection for 
Low-Income Earners in Latin America 
The political processes behind the inclusion of the lowest income sectors in 
policies of social protection in Latin America, and, more often, their exclusion 
from such policies, has seldom been an explicit focus of academic discussion. 
Further empirical research and theory development are therefore needed to im-
prove our understanding of these processes. 
Several studies on Latin American welfare states and political economies 
have, in fact, dealt with the issue indirectly. Furthermore, different causal 
claims regarding the level of social protection for low-income earners can be 
identified in the theoretical debates on both the state and welfare policy in the 
industrialized countries. These claims are often implicit and not extensively 
elaborated. In the following chapter, a variety of relevant theoretical ap-
proaches will be reviewed. These approaches can be roughly grouped into four 
categories: actor-centered, structuralist, institutionalist, and ideational ap-
proaches. 
On that basis, a concrete theoretical framework for the analysis of the po-
litical economy of social protection for low-income earners will be established. 
This theoretical framework elaborates on the main causal assumptions and an-
alytical categories made before the systematic historical analysis of the Argen-
tine case. These assumptions and categories are in part derived from the pre-
ceding review of the relevant theoretical literature, but also include proposals 
for theoretical innovation inspired by contrasting existent theoretical ap-
proaches with previous empirical knowledge stemming from several years of 
studying welfare states in Latin America and Europe. 
2.1 Review: Welfare State Theory and Social Protection for 
Low-Income Earners 
The following review of welfare state theories focuses on relevant arguments 
regarding the level of social protection for low-income earners in Latin Amer-
ica. It will be organized according to the various emphases of different theo-
retical schools.20 Due to their influential position in the debate about the 
 
20  Several authors have previously elaborated overviews of the academic debate on the 
political economy of the welfare state and distinguished different schools of thought 
(Bossert 2011; Schmidt et al. 2007; Siegel 2006; Starke 2006). The following review 
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political economy of Latin American social policy, the review will start with 
actor-centered approaches. Then approaches emphasizing the role of social and 
economic structures, institutions and ideas will be discussed.  
Actor-Centered Approaches 
One of the first and best known systematically comparative studies on Latin 
American social policy is Carmelo Mesa-Lago’s (1978) Social Security in 
Latin America. This account argues that the unequal access to social security 
has been historically shaped by the differing influences of a variety of pressure 
groups. The main actors in his analysis are five different occupational groups: 
military men, civil servants, white-collar workers, blue-collar workers, and 
peasants. Like other pluralist accounts (see Smith 2006, 23–24), Carmelo 
Mesa-Lago (1978, 333) assumes that modernization and industrialization pro-
cesses led to pluralist and increasingly complex societies in Latin America. 
These socio-economic developments then constituted the social basis for the 
emergence of multiple pressure groups in the field of social policy. The socio-
economic structure of the society is thereby assumed to shape the power of 
these groups, and therefore, their ability to attain social protection. Hence, as 
will be seen later, the pluralist pressure group perspective implicitly builds on 
socio-economic arguments similar to those made by proponents of the Logic 
of Industrialism.21 From this perspective, scarce social protections for the low-
est income sectors are the result of the lack of power of those subgroups of the 
labor force that have been weakly organized, work in sectors of low strategic 
importance and have faced restrictions on electoral rights over prolonged peri-
ods (Mesa-Lago 1978, 14). However, the pressure group perspective lacks a 
broader theoretical argument about the constellations of power and interest in 
the field of social policy. One of the most problematic aspects of Mesa-Lago’s 
pressure group perspective is that it does not consider the role of capital own-
ers, such as big landowners and the industrial bourgeoisie, in the development 
of welfare states. In fact, these groups appear to be very powerful and historical 
evidence from Latin America suggests that they played an important role in 
welfare state development.22 Furthermore, in practice, the pressure groups 
identified by Mesa-Lago seldom acted as independent actors in the politics of 
social protection. More often they were involved in broader alliances with 
other groups of workers or even other social classes. 
 
draws on these texts, but elaborates a significantly different perspective that is specifi-
cally focused on the issue of social protection for low-income earners in Latin America. 
21  The main arguments associated with the Logic of Industrialism will be reviewed in the 
following subchapter. 
22  See the following subchapter for the different economic and political functions of the 
welfare state for different social and economic interests. 
34   
A variety of approaches based on Marxist premises, in contrast, regard the 
politics of social policy as crucially shaped by the dynamics of class struggle 
(Block 1977; Huber 1996; Huber and Stephens 2001; Korpi 1983; Piven and 
Cloward [1971] 1972; Poulantzas [1978] 2000; Stephens 1979) Frances Fox 
Piven and Richard A. Cloward ([1971] 1972, XIII–XIV) argue that the initia-
tion or expansion of social policies can be understood as a consequence of civil 
disorder and popular mobilization. Claus Offe (1972a; 1984; see also Borchert 
and Lessenich 2006, 18–19) relates the expansion of social policy to the ne-
cessity of state actors to achieve a certain level of legitimacy in the eyes of the 
popular masses and Nicos Poulantzas ([1978] 2000, 184–185) writes that so-
cial policies “directly depend, both for their existence and for their rhythms 
and modalities, on the intensity of popular mobilization: whether as the effect 
of struggles or as an attempt to defuse struggles on the part of the state.” As a 
middle-range theory focused mainly on the political economy of social policy, 
proponents of the power resources approach have elaborated in more detail on 
the question of how class struggle affects welfare state development and also 
presented extensive empirical evidence (e.g., Korpi 1983; Huber 1996; Huber 
and Stephens 2001; Huber and Stephens 2012; Stephens 1979). Therefore, in 
the following, I will focus on this approach. 
Unlike the pluralist approaches, which assume that pressure groups com-
pete on a roughly leveled playing field, the plural society, power resources 
theorists contend that politics has to be analyzed against the background of 
structures that provide very unequal initial conditions for the development of 
power and influence. Due to the dynamics of capitalist systems and the con-
centration of wealth and the control over the means of production in the hands 
of a relatively small economic elite, capitalist interests have a decisive ad-
vantage and depend much less on organization for political articulation than 
do the interests of other classes (Huber and Stephens 2001, 13). 
Different strands of Marxist literature have theoretically elaborated in 
more detail on this structural advantage of capitalist interests in shaping state 
policy. Three main factors can be identified in this literature. First, the exist-
ence of close social ties and networks between the economic and political elites 
provides direct and non-transparent channels for interest articulation (e.g., 
Miliband 1969).23 Second, the institutional forms of the state and its apparat-
uses contain biases that favor the prevalence of capital interests over those of 
other social classes (e.g., Offe 1972a; 1984; Poulantzas [1978] 2000; Jessop 
1990; 1999).24 And third, state managers, including both politicians and bu-
 
23  It should be noted here, that although Miliband pays close attention to the close ties 
between political and economic elites, his argument is not limited to this channel of 
influence. In several parts of the book The State in Capitalist Society he also mentions 
the role of ideological biases and structural constraints. 
24  Examples might be the institutional rules for campaign financing or the control of mass 
media. 
  35 
reaucrats, have self-interests in facilitating capital accumulation and economic 
growth because state revenues—and in the last instance also public support—
depend to a significant degree on these (e.g., Block 1977, 15; Hay 2006).25 
For power resources theorists, the varying degrees of advantage of capi-
talist interests are importantly related to the varying success of labor and other 
subordinate classes in maximizing their power through organization and the 
long term effects that this has on the structuring of the state and the economy 
(Huber and Stephens 2001; Korpi 1983; Stephens 1979). The relationship be-
tween the economic and the political elite, the institutional forms of the state 
and the role of the state in the economy are all importantly related to the ca-
pacities of the working class and other subordinate classes to organize and, 
through this means, to exercise influence on the long term evolution of politi-
cal, economic and social structures. Hence, through the organization of the 
subordinate classes, state action becomes “less dependent on dominant, and 
more responsive to subordinate class interests” (Rueschemeyer, Huber Ste-
phens, and Stephens 1992, 65). 
Because the power resources approach assumes that welfare states play a 
major role in shaping the distribution of wealth and power in society, it is the 
political strength of the popular classes, and particularly the working class, vis-
à-vis the economic elite, that is related to the development of extensive and 
redistributive welfare states which provide egalitarian access to social protec-
tion (Esping-Andersen [1990] 1998). The political power of the working class 
is thereby associated with the construction of strong left parties, a centralized 
union movement and high degrees of unionization. Union centralization ap-
pears to be of particular importance for the development of social protection 
for low-income groups as according to power resources theorists (Huber and 
Stephens 2001; Stephens 1979) it not only concentrates the resources of the 
labor movement  but also forces the leadership to take a more class-wide view, 
and hence to demand rather egalitarian social policies that favor the broader 
working class and their allies and not just certain particularly well-organized 
or structurally powerful sectors. In contrast, inegalitarian, fragmented and 
highly stratified welfare systems are assumed to be related to politically 
weaker, divided working classes and a relative strength of conservative parties 
and ideologies (Esping-Andersen [1990] 1998). The division of the working 
 
25  Nevertheless, the advantage of capital may differ significantly over time and country. 
So, for example, might the strength of the social ties between economic and political 
elites vary under governments of different colors. The biases of institutions might fur-
thermore vary because of different rules for campaign financing, lobbying, and so on. 
In addition, the dependence of state revenues on private sector capital accumulation can 
be lower in countries where historical developments have resulted in a wide range of 
industries and services under public control and tight capital flow regulations. The same 
might be said about states that were able to retain control over the exploitation of valu-
able natural resources such as oil. 
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class and other subordinate classes into different, competing pressure groups, 
as assumed by Mesa-Lago (1978), is interpreted from this perspective as the 
result of a lack of popular class solidarity and organization, and therefore as 
part of a wider balance of class power favorable to capital. 
While recent comparative studies of Latin American welfare states have 
provided considerable evidence in support of the power resources approach 
(Huber et al. 2006; Huber, Mustillo and Stephens 2008; Huber and Stephens 
2012), other studies have questioned the approach on the grounds that trade 
unions and labor-based parties often played an ambiguous role with regard to 
social protection for low-income earners (McGuire 2010). 
Feminist welfare state research has emphasized that social policy not only 
affects class relations and income distributions but also gender relations (e.g., 
Lewis 1992; Orloff 1996; Sainsbury 1996). The work of Jane Lewis shows that 
different welfare states influence gender relations in different ways and that 
some welfare states fulfill a stronger role in reproducing the male breadwinner 
model than others (Lewis 1992). Furthermore, feminist scholars have argued 
that welfare state development itself is shaped by gendered relations of power 
and feminist mobilization. Several empirical studies provide empirical lever-
age for this argument. Dana Hill’s and Leann Tigges’ (1995) quantitative study 
indicates that popular class power is positively related to women’s access to 
welfare benefits, and that gender egalitarian social policy is additionally en-
hanced by a high share of women in labor unions.26 Barbara Hobson’s and 
Marika Lindholm’s (1997) qualitative analysis of social policy during the 
1930s in Sweden shows that the successful mobilization of power resources by 
feminist actors, both within and outside the labor movement, was crucial to the 
implementation of gender egalitarian policy during that decade. And Merika 
Blofield (2006, 10–16) provides evidence for South American and Southern 
European countries that indicates that left parties are much more likely to be-
come driving forces for the implementation of gender egalitarian policy when 
feminist movements are strong. Furthermore, women’s movements have been 
found to be overwhelmingly progressive regarding social protection for low-
income groups (Huber and Stephens 2001, 21). This has been related to the 
circumstance that gender egalitarian social policies, such as universal income 
transfers, health care, and childcare provision, also benefit the lowest income 
sectors (Arza 2012c: 11; Huber 2006, 301; Huber and Stephens 2001, 21; 
Sainsbury 1996, 127–169). Hence, a variety of feminist approaches to welfare 
state analysis indicate that the level of social protection for low-income earners 
depends not only on the balance of class but also of gender power, and on the 
particular relation between popular class and feminist actors.27 
 
26  Based on qualitative research, Diane Sainsbury (1999, 268) comes to similar conclu-
sions. 
27  The relations between popular class and feminist actors might take different forms: a) 
an actor might be both at the same time, b) popular class and feminist actors might be 
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Structuralist Approaches 
A variety of theoretical approaches from different academic traditions empha-
size the role of economic and social structures in the analysis of the political 
economy of the welfare state. Despite the common emphasis on structural fac-
tors, the literature within this strand is very diverse, ranging from pluralist ac-
counts, such as Harold Wilensky’s (1975) The Welfare State and Equality, to 
Marxist accounts, such as James O’Connor’s ([1973] 2002) The Fiscal Crisis 
of the State, contemporary contributions to the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) 
literature (e.g., Hall and Soskice 2001) and arguments about the effects of glob-
alization processes on the welfare state (e.g., Scharpf 2000; Segura-Ubiergo 
2007). Many of these accounts assume a more or less direct determination of 
social policy by social and economic structures and hence represent a rather 
functionalist logic. In the following, I will briefly outline these theoretical po-
sitions and discuss the importance of some of their arguments for the analysis 
of the political economy of social protection for the lowest income groups in 
Latin America. 
One of the most influential strands of structural-functionalist thinking in 
welfare state research up to the 1970s was the so-called Logic of Industrialism. 
Theorists adhering to this line of argument interpreted social policy as a more 
or less automatic response to the socio-economic development of the underly-
ing society (Wilensky 1975; for reviews, see Myles and Quadagno 2002; 
Quadagno 1987). While economic growth and industrialization create new so-
cial needs through demographic change and the weakening of traditional fam-
ily structures, they also generate new wealth and therefore increase the capac-
ity of the state to provide public social security (Schmidt and Ostheim 2007a, 
29 – 39). Harold Wilensky (1975), at that time one of the most important ad-
vocates of this argument, found in his very influential quantitative comparison 
of 64 countries a strong correlation between the level of economic develop-
ment, the relative size of the aged population, the age of the social security 
system and the level of social spending. On this basis, he argued that the “eco-
nomic level is the root cause of welfare-state development” (Wilenksy 1975, 
47). The state is thereby seen as a neutral entity responding quasi-automatically 
to the demands of the pressure groups that emerge in the process of economic 
development due to the spreading of new social risks (Quadagno 1987). This 
argument stands in sharp contrast to the findings of numerous analyses of Latin 
American welfare states, which show that these tend to exclude particularly 
those parts of the population that face the most severe social risks (Goñi, 
López, and Servén 2008; Lindert, Skoufias and Shapiro 2006; Mesa-Lago 
1978; 1989). Hence, the causal logic proposed by Harold Wilensky seems to 
 
largely independent from each other but cooperate closely or c) they might be inde-
pendent actors without closer ties.  
38   
contribute little to our understanding of social protection for the poorest in 
Latin America. 
The analyses of informality undertaken by PREALC, the regional employ-
ment program of the ILO, contain a different theoretical argument establishing 
a direct causal relationship between the level of industrialization and the level 
of social protection for the lowest income groups in Latin America. According 
to PREALC’s dualistic perspective on informality, the expansion of urban in-
dustrial employment in Latin America was insufficient to absorb the rapid 
growth of the workforce due to the accelerated migration of workers from the 
countryside. This, so the argument goes, led to a persistent surplus of labor in 
the urban centers and the emergence of a dual economy with a capital-intensive 
high-productivity formal sector guided by the logic of capital accumulation 
and an informal sector in which the marginal masses produce with scarce cap-
ital and low productivity in order to secure their own survival. The earnings in 
the low-productivity sector, it is argued, are so low that social security, and 
hence the vast part of public social protections, is commonly not accessible to 
these workers (Portes and Schauffler 1993; Tokman 1987). Hence, from this 
perspective, the level of industrial employment appears to be directly related 
to the coverage of the systems of social protection. Although this presents a 
more plausible argument for a direct causal relation between industrialization 
and social protection for the lowest income groups, it continues to be problem-
atic. More recent studies show that in Latin America workers in big industrial 
enterprises also often lack access to social security systems (e.g., Beccaria and 
Groisman 2009a). Furthermore, a comparison of different countries shows 
that, depending on the precise rules of access, social security coverage among 
workers in non-industrial sectors varies significantly (CEPAL 2006, 45; Rof-
man, Lucchetti and Ourens 2008). Governments are theoretically able to intro-
duce universal social policies that facilitate access considerably. Hence, there 
is no automatism that directly links the level of industrial employment to the 
level of social protection for the lowest income sectors. Coverage depends im-
portantly on governmental efforts to formalize employment relations and on 
the concrete design and implementation of social policies. In light of this, it 
appears more fruitful to consider the plausible indirect social policy effects that 
stem from the level of industrialization due to its role in shaping the constella-
tions of power and interest between influential actors. 
While the Logic of Industrialism assumes a functional fit between the so-
cio-economic structure and the welfare state, some early Marxist (e.g., J. R. 
O’Connor [1973] 2000; Offe 1972b) and several contemporary VoC (Iversen 
and Soskice 2001; Mares 2001; Schneider and Soskice 2009) analyses of social 
policy assume a relative functional fit between the structure of the capitalist 
economy and the welfare state. It must be mentioned that neither of these 
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authors proposed a purely structural-functionalist argument. Both Offe 
(1972b)28 and J. R. O’Connor ([1973] 2000) acknowledge a certain importance 
and contingency of class struggle and politics when analyzing the legitimizing 
role of the welfare state. Iversen and Soskice (2001) and Schneider and Soskice 
(2009), in turn, consider the role of different electoral systems and voter pref-
erences. Nevertheless, a functionalist logic prevails in the conceptual frame-
works of these studies.29 
Early Marxist structural-functionalist accounts argued that social policy 
fulfills several necessary functions for the process of capital accumulation (J. 
R. O’Connor [1973] 2000; Offe 1972b). James O’Connor ([1973] 2000, 138) 
went so far as to argue that “the fundamental intent and effect of social security 
is to expand productivity, production, and profits.” Among others, these func-
tions include the assurance of the existence of a future workforce through the 
maintenance and regulation of the non-working and poor population, the legit-
imization of the process of capital accumulation and the equipment of the 
workforce with the required skills (Blau 1989, 33–35). If these are necessary 
functions, then we might ask why different states fulfill these functions to very 
different degrees and in very different ways. And why do Latin American wel-
fare states provide much less access to public social protection to the unem-
ployed and poor populations than most European welfare states do? A possible 
hypothesis stemming from these arguments would be that capital accumulation 
in most Latin American countries is less dependent on social policies that pro-
tect low-income earners due to the greater reliance on the exploitation of nat-
ural resources, a structural over-supply of labor and lower skill requirements 
of most Latin American industries.  
In this regard, recent contributions to the VoC literature appear interesting. 
While the outlined Marxist approaches analyze the role of social policy from 
a macro-perspective centered on the requirements of the wider process of cap-
ital accumulation, the VoC literature is more micro-level oriented and focuses 
on the requirements and preferences of different firms and economic sectors. 
Isabela Mares (2001) and Ben Ross Schneider (2009) argued that different eco-
nomic sectors and types of firms have significantly different interests with re-
gard to social policy. Skill-dependent business sectors require extensive edu-
cational systems, and generous social security systems provide the necessary 
incentives for employees to invest in specific skills that might be significantly 
devalued in the case of job loss (Hall and Soskice 2001; Iversen and Stephens 
2008). Furthermore, the reduction of social inequality through egalitarian wel-
fare states has positive indirect effects on the skill levels of the population, 
particularly regarding lower income groups (Huber and Stephens 2001). As a 
 
28  In later essays Offe moved towards a stronger emphasis on the role of class struggle 
(see e.g. Offe 1984). 
29  For similar assessments made by other authors, see Myles and Quadagno (2002, 37) 
and Quadagno (1987, 114). 
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result, economic sectors and types of firms that depend on an extensive skilled 
workforce might benefit more from social protection for the poorest parts of 
the population than those with low skill requirements. On the basis of such 
arguments, it could be assumed that different economic structures and posi-
tions in the global division of labor are related to considerably different con-
stellations of capitalist requirements with regard to social policy. Ben Ross 
Schneider’s (2009) attempt to apply the VoC approach to the Latin American 
context supports this assumption. He argues that the compositions of Latin 
American economies, as well as the ways firms relate to each other and to the 
world market, are associated with considerably lower skill requirements than 
in Europe, North America, and East Asia. Considering moreover the persistent 
excess of labor (Portés and Schauffler 1993; Tokman 1987), Latin American 
capitalism seems to depend much less on welfare state functions such as the 
provision of quality education, health care and income maintenance to the low-
est income groups in order to ensure the maintenance of a sufficiently abundant 
and skilled workforce. 
The capital-analytical perspectives of the mentioned neo-Marxist scholars 
and the VoC approach provide some important insights into the role of social 
policy for the process of capital accumulation. Interestingly, with regard to 
Latin America, recent studies seem to coincide with the power resources ap-
proach in assuming that employers tend to have interests opposed to egalitarian 
social policies (Esping-Andersen [1990] 1998; Schneider 2009). However, due 
to their strong focus on the functioning of capitalism, they tend to underesti-
mate the ability of popular struggles to influence state policy (Poulantzas 
[1978] 2000; Stephens 1979). Furthermore, because of the neglect of agency, 
the functionalist approaches lack convincing arguments of how the functional 
requirements of capitalism translate into concrete policy decisions (Quadagno 
1987, 115). 
Another heterogeneous strand of literature, which could also be broadly 
labeled capital-analytical, has focused on economic globalization and its ef-
fects on social policy. Economic globalization has commonly been associated 
with three main processes: increases in international trade, increases in the mo-
bility of production, and increases in international financial flows (Green-
Pedersen 2004). These processes, it has been argued, have led to a growing 
exposure of national economies to international competition. This, in turn, has 
been supposed to generate pressures on national governments to adapt their 
welfare states to the new context of more globalized forms of capital accumu-
lation in order to not endanger economic growth. However, there is striking 
disagreement on whether and how welfare states affect the standing of national 
economies in the global markets (Gough 2000). Some authors have argued that 
globalization made generous and redistributive welfare states unsustainable. 
According to their logic, welfare states increase costs for firms and therefore 
reduce the competitiveness of locally produced goods and services; they 
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provide incentives to move production to cheaper countries; and they poten-
tially contribute to unbalanced budgets, which are associated with negative re-
actions on the global financial markets (e.g., Rhodes 2000; Scharpf 2000; 
Strange 2003). Others have, however, claimed the opposite to be the case. Eco-
nomic openness, it has been asserted, tends to increase economic insecurity for 
workers, and hence potentially fosters social conflict and strengthens the ap-
peal of trade unions and left parties (Green-Pedersen 2004). Therefore, in order 
to sustain the necessary stability of both work relations and consumption, open 
economies have to invest more in social policy than relatively closed, domestic 
market-oriented economies. Furthermore, international competitiveness, par-
ticularly on the technological and reliability levels, benefits from investment 
in education and social security. It is thus argued that it is no coincidence that 
the open Scandinavian economies possess generous and egalitarian welfare 
states and are at the same time highly successful on the world market. Another 
group of scholars has argued that there is no conclusive empirical evidence for 
either of the two arguments outlined above (Kite 2004; Swank 2003). Refer-
ring directly to Latin America, Alex Segura-Ubiergo (2007, 264–265) observes 
a direct negative relationship between the level of foreign trade and the level 
of social spending. In his theoretical interpretation of this observation, he 
largely supports the first of the arguments outlined above, claiming that in the 
face of globalization generous welfare states have become increasingly diffi-
cult to sustain in Latin America. I am, however, highly skeptical about his 
quantitative analysis and the interpretation of the results. First, his quantitative 
analysis includes only a limited number of control variables and covers a pe-
riod (1973–2003) for which a variety of alternative variables constitute likely 
causes of the decline or stagnation of social expenditure. It would be equally 
plausible to relate the stagnation of social spending during this period to, for 
example, the hegemonic status of neoliberal thought, the reiterated economic 
crises, or the pressures of International Financial Institutions. Second, his re-
gression analysis might possibly have yielded very different results had it been 
undertaken a few years later, as during the last decade both social expenditure 
and foreign trade increased significantly in most Latin American countries.30 
The contradictory evidence regarding the relationship between various 
quantitative measures of trade and financial openness, on the one hand, and 
social expenditure, on the other, indicates that the relationship between glob-
alization and the welfare state might be too complex to grasp by simply putting 
quantitative measures in relation to each other. It is plausible that it is the qual-
itative aspect of world market participation, meaning the kind of integration 
into the international division of labor, that influences political processes in 
different ways and thereby leads to social policies of different kinds and mag-
nitudes. Increases in foreign trade might have completely different effects on 
 
30  See CEPALSTAT and World Development Indicators. 
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the political economy of social policy when they are based on high-tech ex-
ports and primary good imports, as has for example been the case in Sweden, 
than when they are based on the export of primary products and the import of 
industrial goods, as has been the case in several Latin American countries. Alt-
hough dependency theorists have not been interested so much in the political 
economy of social policy, they have explicitly dealt with the qualitative nature 
of the international division of labor and their political, economic and social 
consequences in Latin America (e.g., Cardoso and Faletto [1969] 1977; Sen-
ghaas 1974; Serra and Cardoso 1978). Their arguments inspire therefore a 
more complex understanding of the relationship between global economy and 
national social policy towards the lowest income groups. The different kinds 
of insertion into the international division of labor of Latin American and of 
countries of the center has been associated with the development in these coun-
tries of very different socio-economic structures and sectoral compositions of 
their economies (Cardoso and Faletto [1969] 1977; Senghaas 1974). These 
structural differences are in turn likely to result in different constellations of 
power and interest regarding social protections for low-income earners. The 
arguments of the dependency approach can be combined with the previously 
discussed arguments of structuralist Marxist and power resources theories, 
thereby helping to overcome the limitation to the national level. On the one 
hand, economic sectors focused on the extraction of primary goods and low-
tech consumer industries have a bigger weight in peripheral economies than in 
countries of the center, which might reduce pressures on peripheral country 
governments to extend social policies aimed at the maintenance and education 
of the labor force. On the other hand, in part due to their role as primary goods 
suppliers on the international level and their correspondingly limited degrees 
of industrialization, peripheral countries tend towards an over-supply of labor 
and a high level of fragmentation of the popular classes, which constitutes a 
significant barrier to the construction of popular class power and solidarity be-
tween different segments of it (Senghaas 1974). 
State- and Institution-Centered Approaches 
A variety of different theoretical accounts emphasize the role of institutions 
and state actors in shaping the politics of social policy. Influential arguments 
have been formulated regarding the role of institutional veto points (Immergut 
1990; 2010), the role of regime type (Burchardt 2008; 2010; Haggard and 
Kaufman 2008; Huber and Stephens 2012; Segura-Ubiergo 2007), the role of 
past policies in path dependent social policy trajectories (Collier and Collier 
[1991] 2009; Pierson 2001), and the role of state bureaucracies as actors in 
shaping the direction of social policy (Martínez-Franzoni and Sánchez-An-
conchea 2012; Rosenberg 1979; 1983). 
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That the number of institutional veto points plays a central role in the pol-
itics of the welfare state has become a widespread argument in the literature. 
The original argument, developed by Ellen M. Immergut (1990), was that dif-
ferent institutional structures in France, Sweden and Switzerland provided 
medical organizations with varying capacities to veto healthcare reform. 
Hence, due to different institutional structures, certain actors were able to ef-
fectively veto reform in some countries but not in others. Evelyne Huber, 
Charles Ragin and John D. Stephens (1993) shortly later incorporated variables 
for potential veto points, such as federalism and bicameralism, in their quanti-
tative analysis and attempted to develop on this ground more general argu-
ments about the role of the number of veto points in the politics of social pol-
icy. Their regression analysis indicated that the considered veto point variables 
were associated with a slower expansion of social policies in the long run. This 
finding was explained with the causal argument that the more veto opportuni-
ties the institutional structure provides, the more difficult is the passing of so-
cial legislation. Following this argument, the lack of social protection for the 
lowest income sectors in Latin America could potentially be the result of a high 
number of veto points. However, the opposite might also be assumed to be the 
case: veto points could also slow down or impede cutbacks and regressive re-
structuring of social policy. In a newer article, Ellen M. Immergut (2010, 240) 
states that during the last two decades veto points have weakened or slowed 
down welfare state retrenchment in Latin America but not in Europe. It is my 
position that these general arguments are not particularly helpful for the subject 
of this study. It is theoretically meaningful that more veto points tend to slow 
down political change. But without an argument regarding the kind of bias 
produced through these veto points, there is little reason to assume that they 
are in the long-term associated with either more or less social protection for 
the lowest income groups. Indeed, quantitative estimates of Jennifer Pribble 
(2008, 57) indicate that federalism and bicameralism have no significant effect 
on social protection for the lowest income groups in Latin America. This sup-
ports the argument that what matters is not simply the number of potential and 
actual veto points but how concrete institutional settings influence the constel-
lations of power and interest and the choices of actors with regard to social 
policy. It is thus the question of which institutional structures and practices 
systematically favor or disadvantage actors and interests associated with an 
extension of social protection to the poorest sectors that we must look at. 
More theoretically meaningful in this sense is what has been referred to as 
regime type in Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman’s (2008) book about 
welfare state development in 22 developing countries. Regime type refers to 
the basic question of whether a political regime is democratic, authoritarian or 
something in between. There are several theoretical reasons why democratic 
regimes can be assumed to be more likely to respond to the social policy inter-
ests of the lowest income groups than their authoritarian equivalents. Democ-
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racy is commonly associated with the existence of certain civil liberties that 
provide opportunities for underprivileged sectors to legally organize in parties, 
trade unions, and social movements. These organizational structures then in-
crease the capacities of the subordinate classes to pressure for the expansion of 
social protection. Even in the case that such processes of organization do not 
occur to a bigger extent, democracy nevertheless provides incentives for poli-
ticians to use the extension of social policies to win the votes of the numerically 
strong poor sectors of the population (Haggard and Kaufman 2008, 362; Prib-
ble 2008, 36). As Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens, and Stephens (1992, 66) 
point out, whether a government is legitimate or not in the eyes of the popular 
classes only makes a difference to those who rule to the degree that the subor-
dinate classes possess some power. The popular classes can achieve such 
power through organization, but also through democratic institutions that pro-
vide them with a certain political weight due to their numerical strength. How-
ever, due to the varying preconditions for organization, associational power 
tends to be unequally distributed among and within the popular classes in Latin 
America. Industrial and public sector workers have reached considerable asso-
ciational strength in most countries while informal, unemployed, and agricul-
tural workers have most often lacked strong organizational representation. In 
the face of these imbalances of power within the popular classes, authoritarian 
regimes in Latin America felt the need to achieve a certain degree of legitimi-
zation only in the eyes of some segments of the working class. This was often 
pursued through the implementation or deepening of social insurance policies 
covering those segments. At the same time, authoritarian governments usually 
felt little need to legitimize their rule in the eyes of weakly organized low-
income groups, and hence these segments remained frequently excluded from 
the fruits of these social policy concessions (Pribble 2008, 36–38). While such 
imbalances of organizational power tend to persist under democratic rule, the 
right to vote provides the lower income groups with at least a certain degree of 
electoral power. Furthermore, democracy provides organized labor with addi-
tional incentives to seek the support of other popular classes, such as peasants 
and self-employed workers, and less organized segments of the working class 
in order to increase their chances of reaching a majority of the votes (Esping-
Andersen [1990] 1998, 67; Przeworski 1985, 74–75).31 
In sum, there are important theoretical reasons to assume that democracy 
affects both the constellations of power and the constellations of interest in 
ways favorable for the expansion of social protection for the lowest income 
groups. Empirical findings from Latin America are nevertheless mixed. On the 
 
31  As Esping-Andersen ([1990] 1998, 67) argues, it is no coincidence that the break-
through of democracy and the pursuit of universalist social policy on the part of labor 
parties coincided in many Western countries. My previous research on the Argentine 
welfare state also indicates that democracy increases the probability that labor move-
ments will try to win the support of the lowest income groups (Bossert 2011). 
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one hand, several long-term quantitative and qualitative studies found empiri-
cal evidence that democratic governments in Latin America were on average 
considerably more responsive to the social policy interests of the lowest in-
come groups (Haggard and Kaufman 2008; Huber et al. 2006; Huber, Mustillo, 
and Stephens 2008; Huber and Stephens 2012; Pribble 2008; Segura-Ubiergo 
2007). On the other hand, Hans-Jürgen Burchardt (2008; 2010) points out 
rightly that the spread of liberal democracies in Latin America during the 
1980s did not coincide with a reduction of social inequality nor a significant 
expansion of social protection for the lowest income groups. As a consequence 
of neoliberal adjustment policies, inequality even increased in most countries 
during the 1980s and 1990s and social insurance coverage tended to decline. 
Only from the early 2000s on can a significant reduction of income inequalities 
be observed. Hence, there is at least no automatism that links formal democ-
racy to an expansion of social protection for low-income groups. It is therefore 
necessary to further specify under what conditions democracy tends to lead to 
more egalitarian social policies and under what conditions such effects might 
be blocked or outplayed by cross-cutting pressures. 
Path dependency approaches form another influential line of arguments 
with an important emphasis on institutions and policy legacies in the politics 
of social policy. The larger path dependence argument, as developed in David 
and Ruth Berin Collier’s ([1991] 2009) influential book Shaping the Political 
Arena, focused on the broader long-term transformations of the political arenas 
in eight Latin American countries that were related to the political incorpora-
tion of labor during the first half of the 20th century. In more general terms, the 
argument is that periods of intense political change, so-called critical junctures 
that comprise both specific state policies and the reactions of different actors 
to it, can significantly shape long-term political developments. Therefore, pol-
itics cannot be considered as “simply fluid, constantly responding to socioec-
onomic change” (Collier and Collier [1991] 2009, 11). Rather, politics is also 
driven by “an autonomous logic and vested interests” that “may be resistant to 
such change over significant periods of time” (Collier and Collier [1991] 2009: 
11). Hence, while Collier and Collier clearly acknowledge the importance of 
the economic system and the inherent class contradictions in shaping interest 
and power constellations, they emphasize the role of state policies and histori-
cal experiences of actors in determining the historically and spatially specific 
forms of class formations and political systems. Some scholars of the political 
economy of social policy in and outside Latin America took up these argu-
ments and provided significant evidence that social policy development has a 
strong tendency towards path dependency. The central argument in the welfare 
state literature is that social policies, and in particular social insurance 
schemes, create powerful vested interests that significantly increase the politi-
cal costs of diverging from the current social policy path for governments 
(Haggard and Kaufman 2008, 196–197; Huber and Stephens 2001, 22; Pierson 
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2001, 447; Pribble 2008, 5). Furthermore, as Christopher Abel and Colin Lewis 
(1993, 15) argue, social policies in Latin America have often had significant 
influence on the formation of the popular classes, and in particular the working 
classes, as political actors. 
Recent social protest movements illustrate the politically and socially divisive uses 
of social security legislation and welfare provision. The practice of selective incor-
poration inhibited the development of working-class consciousness and solidarity. 
Pre-existing differentials along lines of occupation and nationality could be exac-
erbated by differential access to housing, food subsidies and recreational facilities. 
Welfare provision has functioned both as an instrument of an offensive against 
labor and as a mechanism in processes of the reconstitution of the institutional base 
of labor. 
Hence, from the perspective of the path dependence approach, it can be hy-
pothesized that the legacy of fragmented and divisive social policies in most 
Latin American countries constitutes a significant difficulty for the realization 
of egalitarian reforms that would extend social protection to the lowest income 
groups. Recent qualitative comparative studies of Juliana Martínez Franzoni 
and Koen Voorend (2009) and Evelyne Huber and John D. Stephens (2012, 
255) find significant evidence in support of this hypothesis. 
Another frequent line of argument in the welfare state debate emphasizes 
the role of state bureaucracies, and particularly welfare state bureaucracies, as 
influential and relatively independent actors in the politics of social policy (for 
a short and critical overview see Huber and Stephens 2001, 21). Such argu-
ments have, for example, repeatedly been made regarding the expansion of 
social insurance coverage in Costa Rica (Martínez Franzoni and Sánchez-An-
conchea 2012, 34–35; Rosenberg 1979, 129–130; 1983: 183–187). In this case, 
it has been argued that the expansion of social policy has occurred largely in 
the absence of popular pressures. Instead, the social insurance bureaucracy it-
self acted repeatedly as a pressure group to promote the extension of social 
policy coverage (Rosenberg 1979, 30; 1983, 184). Juliana Martínez Franzoni 
and Diego Sánchez-Anconchea (2012, 34–35) have furthermore proposed an 
argument explaining why the influence of bureaucrats on policy-making is 
likely to be high. First, politicians seldom drive the design of policy proposals, 
but usually leave this task to bureaucrats. And second, bureaucracies concen-
trate abundant technical knowledge and possess direct access to political lead-
ers at the center of the policy-making process. Nevertheless, critics have ar-
gued that although bureaucrats might be present in the policy debate and un-
dertake the actual writing of policies, the extent to which they can influence 
the medium- and long-term development of policy should not be overesti-
mated. Factors such as the aims of the respective governments and the distri-
bution of seats in the parliament  profoundly limit the room for maneuver of 
bureaucracies. In addition to that, a central problem of these arguments for the 
analysis of the politics of social protection is that they lack a theoretical 
  47 
assumption with regard to the direction of the bureaucracies’ influence (Huber 
and Stephens 2001: 21). The specific biases of different welfare bureaucracies 
seem to be the product of the concrete historical development of the respective 
apparatuses and the resulting internal rules, routines, and personnel. Hence, the 
role played by bureaucracies might be an essentially empirical question with 
restricted possibilities of theoretical generalization. 
Ideational Approaches 
Arguments about the important role of ideas have recently become more fre-
quent in the academic debate on the political economy of the welfare state (e.g., 
Béland 2007; Bleses and Seeleib-Kaiser 2004; Blyth 2002; A. Deacon 2000; 
Wincott 2011).32 Ideas, so the argument goes, may have a very direct impact 
on social policies by shaping what governments consider appropriate. They 
may also have indirect effects on policy by influencing the wider public or 
other actors who can exercise pressure on the government. While more mate-
rialist approaches have usually emphasized the role of structural factors on 
welfare politics, authors adhering to ideational approaches have argued that the 
effects of structures are discursively mediated by ideas that shape how these 
structures are perceived and what kinds of responses are thought to be possible 
and desirable. A simple example will help to clarify the different positions. 
Materialist approaches have, for example, argued that structural changes in the 
economy such as a decline of growth and related fiscal constraints (Haggard 
and Kaufman 2008; Huber and Stephens 2001; Pierson 2001) or the increase 
of foreign trade (Segura-Ubiergo 2007) were the driving forces behind welfare 
state retrenchment. In contrast, authors who stress the importance of ideational 
factors have argued that the perceptions of governments and the wider public 
that such trends constitute problems that require solution, and even more so 
perceptions that welfare state retrenchment would be the adequate or even the 
only viable response, are not exogenous to politics (Hay 2002, 114–115). Such 
perceptions are not given by nature but related to certain ideas of how the econ-
omy and society work. An example of this is the idea that redistributive tax 
and welfare systems reduce the competitiveness of a national economy. Such 
ideas, in turn, are socially constructed and tend to change over time and differ 
across space. Therefore, proponents of ideational approaches for the study of 
welfare state change argue that the impact of relevant ideas should not be omit-
ted from the analysis. 
Two types of studies can be roughly distinguished with regard to the con-
sideration of ideational factors in welfare state politics. On the one hand, there 
is a variety of studies that were concerned with relatively specific ideas that 
 
32  The discussion of ideational factors here and later draws in parts on very similar argu-
ments made in my previous work (Bossert 2011).  
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influence policy-makers, such as politicians and bureaucrats, and the wider 
public with regard to the design of particular social policies. Alan Deacon, for 
example, analyzed the influence of different ideas on New Labour’s social pol-
icy agenda during the 1990s in the United Kingdom (2000). Two of these in-
fluences were the ideas of the conservative academic Charles Murray, who ar-
gued that income maintenance programs for unemployed persons and low-in-
come earners provided perverse incentives, meaning that these kinds of pro-
grams keep people from working, and the ideas of Lawrence Mead, who ar-
gued that long-term unemployment destroys the work ethic of the affected per-
sons and that therefore the state should tie social assistance to certain condi-
tions. Corina Rodríguez Enríquez and María Fernanda Reyes (2006, 8–9) find 
that very similar ideas have influenced social policy makers in Argentina and 
shaped most targeted social programs between the second half of the 1990s 
and the early 2000s. Contrary to these conservative ideas that dominated social 
policy during the 1990s in Argentina, Claudia Danani and Alejandra Beccaria 
(2011, 147) find that pension reform since 2004 was more strongly influenced 
by ideas that social security should be universal rather than targeted and con-
stitute a right rather than a premium for merit. In a similar vein, Juliana Mar-
tínez Franzoni, Diego Sánchez-Ancochea and Héctor Solano (2012, 35) argue 
that technocrats in several international organizations and a growing number 
of social security bureaucrats in Latin America have recently recognized the 
advantages of universalism. 
On the other hand, a number of analyses have focused on the role of ideas 
at a higher level of generality. Studies of this type have not concentrated on 
specific ideas but on wider overarching ideational frameworks (Wincott 2011, 
144). Such overarching frameworks have been referred to as policy paradigms 
(Hall 1993, 290) or discursive paradigms (Jessop 1999, 52). Paradigms func-
tion as lenses through which actors conceptualize their environment (Hay 
2001). While studies focusing on more specific ideas commonly concentrated 
on one or very few crucial actors, studies concerned with discursive paradigms 
are usually more interested in the broader consequences of paradigms for the 
political economy. Discursive paradigms influence usually not only govern-
ments and bureaucracies but tend to influence the views of a wide array of 
actors such as parties, trade unions, employers’ associations, and the media. 
The opinions and perceptions of the wider public are also subject to their in-
fluence, and hence discursive paradigms are likely to have a profound impact 
on electoral politics. Moreover, discursive paradigms are often not restricted 
to one policy area but provide logical frameworks for a variety of fields, such 
as economic, social and fiscal policy. A broad body of literature on Latin 
American social and economic policy suggests that discourses about develop-
ment constituted such discursive paradigms (e.g., Cortes and Marshall 1999; 
Haggard and Kaufman 2008; Lewis 1993; Lo Vuolo and Barbeito 1998a; 
Riesco 2007; Sikkink 1991; Sottoli 2000; Svampa 2005). Susana Sottoli (2000, 
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11), for example, found in her cross-national comparative study that neoliberal 
thinking guided both economic and social policy reform in Latin America. 
Specific ideas such as those dealt with by the first type of ideational studies are 
usually not entirely independent of such broader paradigmatic influences. The 
latter frequently provide the basic logic within which more specific ideas de-
velop. Many authors have argued, for example, that the particular ideas that 
influenced social policy reform in different areas during the 1990s, such as 
pension, health and assistance policies, have all been anchored in a wider ne-
oliberal economic logic (e.g., Cortes and Marshall 1999; B. Deacon 2005; Kay 
2000; Lloyd-Sherlock 2005; 2006; Lo Vuolo and Barbeito 1998a; López-Ruiz 
2008). Most of these accounts argue that neoliberal influence has pushed social 
policy in an even less redistributive and more exclusionary direction.33 
2.2 Theoretical Framework 
2.2.1 The Power Resources Approach and Latin America: 
Strengths, Weaknesses and Promising Modifications 
My theoretical framework draws on concepts from several of the above-re-
viewed theories. Nevertheless, the main theoretical contribution to the field of 
welfare state research will be to further develop, specify and modify the power 
resources approach. The theoretical propositions made in this part are inspired 
by both theoretical discussions and previous empirical work on social policy 
development in Latin America.34 
The Power Resources Approach: A Framework for Analyzing 
Distributive Struggles 
Due to several reasons, the power resources approach is particularly suitable 
for the purpose of my study. First, among the reviewed approaches, it is the 
one most directly concerned with the question of which kinds of constellations 
favor social policy inclusion of low-income earners and which tend to produce 
 
33  Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001, 247) argue in a similar vein for the USA that the 
dominance of a liberal worldview is one of the factors of crucial importance for under-
standing the lack of redistributive social policies. 
34  Important sources of inspiration in this regard have also been the various theoretical 
discussions with Hans-Jürgen Burchardt, Nico Weinmann, Paul Hecker, Ezquiel Bis-
toletti, Johanna Neuhauser, Philip Fehling, Jenny Jungehülsing and Sebastian Matthes 
at the Graduate School of Global Social Policies and Governance at the University of 
Kassel. 
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fragmented, inegalitarian outcomes. This is due to the strong focus of the 
power resources approach on explaining distributive and redistributive effects 
of social policy.35 Second, another strength of the approach is that it pays great 
attention to both the actors and the societal structures that shape the political 
processes of social policy change. Hence, the approach is able to integrate a 
variety of concepts from the above discussed theoretical schools and to provide 
a framework for a comprehensive analysis. And third, the approach has proven 
capable of operationalizing the theoretical claim that social policy develop-
ment is highly dependent on the balance of power in society. This implies a 
significant advantage over other power-centered approaches such as Poulan-
tzas’ state theory, which proposes similar arguments but contains few concrete 
instruments for an empirical analysis. 
While the power resources approach in welfare state research is mainly 
focused on the political economy of the redistributive character of social pol-
icy, and therefore constitutes a middle range theory, it can be linked to the 
wider state theoretical debate and shares a number of assumptions with broader 
theories. Hence, the adaptation of the approach to the Latin American context 
will prove useful not only for future social policy research but also for analyz-
ing a variety of other issues that are related to state policy and the distribution 
of resources and opportunities. In contrast to pluralist perspectives and in com-
monality with Marxist state theory, the approach assumes that politics in capi-
talism do not take place on a leveled playing field. Rather, the general dynam-
ics of capitalism and the related concentration of wealth and control over the 
means of production provide capitalists with a systemic advantage for devel-
oping influence on policy (Huber and Stephens 2001, 13; Miliband 1969; 
Wright 1994, 94–95). Yet, power resources theory does not conceive the state 
as an instrument of particular capitalists (Korpi 1983, 9). While it acknowl-
edges the significant capacity of capitalists and their representatives to mobi-
lize resources in order to influence public policy, the approach assumes that 
“the primary mechanisms by which the rule of capital” is secured is “through 
the structural dependence of the state on capital, that is, the dependence of state 
policy makers on capital’s willingness to invest, and through hegemony, ideo-
logical domination” (Huber and Stephens 2001, 327). At the same time, power 
resources theory argues that capital interests are by no means the only interests 
shaping public policy. Instead, it emphasizes that state policy is shaped by the 
relations of power between contending interests. This means that other inter-
ests, such as those of working-class organizations or women’s movements, can 
also influence public policy when they are able to develop and mobilize suffi-
cient power resources (Huber and Stephens 2001, 13). In this regard, the power 
 
35  By explicitly mentioning both distributive and redistributive effects, the approach refers 
to the fact that social policy not only shapes the way in which public expenditure is 
allocated but also the way labor markets function and the capacity of trade unions and 
individual workers to negotiate wages and other terms of the work relationship. 
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resources approach is largely congruent with Nicos Poulantzas’ ([1978] 2000, 
123–145) conceptualization of the state as “the condensation of a relationship 
of forces.” With regard to the distributive and redistributive characteristics of 
social policy, the power resources approach argues, as Nicos Poulantzas 
([1978] 2000, 184–185) and Fred Block (1977, 20–24) do, that it is the power 
and action of popular class actors and their allies that provide the major impe-
tus for the implementation and expansion of progressive welfare policies. 
Critique and Further Development of the Power Resources Approach 
There are also weaknesses of the approach that I will address with modifica-
tions. The first weakness to be addressed is the Eurocentric bias of the tradi-
tional power resources approach in welfare state research. This bias is in large 
part due to the fact that the approach originated from reflections on European 
experiences of social policy development (see e.g. Stephens 1979, Korpi 
1983). The European experience took place under structural and historical cir-
cumstances and with constellations of actors that were significantly different 
from those found in other parts of the world, and so several assumptions—
particularly about the role of different types of actors—should not be trans-
ferred uncritically to Latin America. 
Due to the peripheral and dependent character of most Latin American 
economies, formal working classes have usually constituted a considerably 
smaller part of the overall population. This comparatively stronger socio-eco-
nomic heterogeneity of the popular classes can be assumed to have impacted 
both the relative strength and the perceived interests of different popular class 
actors. In Latin America, labor organizations, particularly trade unions, have 
often represented only the formal working classes. Informal workers, and 
hence most of the low-income earners, have in contrast faced considerable dif-
ficulties in attaining trade union organization. Whereas social democratic or 
communist tendencies largely dominated working-class organization in Eu-
rope, these influences have been considerably weaker in many Latin American 
labor unions where different forms of populist movements often constituted 
the dominant force. In a comparative study, James McGuire (2010, 303–304) 
finds that most Latin American labor movements have in practice been rather 
contingent supporters of social policy expansion to low-income earners. 
Hence, the following theoretical framework will not assume that trade union 
movements per se support egalitarian social policy but elaborate on the condi-
tions under which they do so. 
The power resources approach faces a similar problem when dealing with 
Latin American party systems. Here, in contrast to most European cases, work-
ing and other lower classes were often represented by non-left populist parties. 
The case of Argentina is emblematic. The PJ traditionally captured most pop-
ular class support, yet ideologically speaking it cannot be categorized as a 
52   
genuinely left or center-left party. In a similar vein, the second major party, the 
Unión Cívica Radical (UCR), which traditionally captured important parts of 
the middle-class vote, also oscillated between a center-left and center-right ori-
entation. Hence, the framework will deal with the conditions under which these 
centrist parties tend to engage in welfare state expansion towards low-income 
groups. 
Another important issue is that the focus on working-class organization of 
the traditional power resources approach is too narrow for the Latin American 
context where organization around other identities often played a key role in 
expanding social protections. At times, unemployed, indigenous, and peasant 
movements where key drivers of progressive policy and hence their role will 
be taken into account in my analytical framework. 
 The more differentiated perspective on the role of working-class actors 
and the broadening of the view to consider other popular class actors also forms 
part of my attempt to address a second, more general critique that the approach 
deduces social policy interests too narrowly from the class structure and the 
general dynamics of the capitalist system (Kulawik 1996; Levitsky and Main-
waring 2006). Feminist scholars have rightly pointed out that the formation of 
working classes as political actors was frequently accompanied by exclusions 
along lines such as gender, race, nationality, religion, and skill (Kulawik 1996; 
O’Connor 1998; Orloff 2009; Rose 1997). Most labor organizations have been 
male-dominated, and at times, have pursued a gender-specific anti-universal-
ism in social policy (Kulawik 1996, 58). Institutionalist analyses have further-
more stressed that state policies have an important influence on the formation 
of actors and their interests (Collier and Collier [1991] 2009; Levitsky and 
Mainwaring 2006). In order to address these critiques, my theoretical frame-
work will consider a range of further factors that interact with class in the for-
mation of social policy interest constellations, such as cross-cutting cleavages 
(e.g. gender, race, nationality, religion, skill), institutions, path dependencies, 
and ideological influences. 
A third issue that I consider problematic is that the traditional power re-
sources approach implicitly views the state as a more or less unitary block 
whose actions depend on the forces that are controlling government and par-
liament (see e.g., Esping-Andersen [1990] 1998; Huber and Stephens 2001). 
This does not fit well with my observation that, for example, the ministries of 
labor and economy often pursued strongly diverging social policy agendas in 
Latin America. Poulantzas ([1978] 2000, 132–145) argued that the state is trav-
ersed by internal conflicts which often lead to contradictory actions being pur-
sued by different state apparatuses. Portantiero (1988, 113–114) developed a 
similar argument in his theoretical work on the specificities of the state in Latin 
America. The internal conflicts of the state, in turn, reflect societal conflicts 
and relations of power, yet not in an immediate and mechanical way. Due to 
path dependency effects, the adaptation of state apparatuses to changing soci-
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etal power relations can occur with a significant delay (Poulantzas [1978] 
2000, 134). I consider Portantiero’s and Poulantzas’ view as more accurate in 
this regard and hence propose to modify the power resources approach in this 
direction. 
Finally, a fourth important weakness of the traditional power resources 
approach in welfare state research is its very narrow focus on associational 
power resources, which has proven unable to adequately capture certain shifts 
in the relations of power that underlay the transition from welfare state expan-
sion to retrenchment in many countries from the 1970s onwards. Earlier studies 
by power resources theorists on post-war welfare states up to the late 1970s 
provided strong quantitative and qualitative support for the argument that la-
bor’s associational power resources in the form of a recurrent participation of 
left parties in governments constituted the key determinant of the distributional 
character of social policy (Huber, Ragin and Stephens 1993; Korpi 1983; Ste-
phens 1979). However, newer studies have found much more moderate or even 
no partisan effects for the period between 1970 and 2000 in both Latin America 
and the OECD countries (Huber and Stephens 2001; Huber, Mustillo and Ste-
phens 2008). Why is this so? My hypothesis is that there was a shift in power 
towards proponents of social policy retrenchment that was not merely based 
on the associational weakening of progressive actors, but also on a broader 
shift of the societal discourse towards neoliberalism, a shrinking of the indus-
trial sector and profound transformations of the labor markets in most coun-
tries. In order to address this issue and to capture such shifts in the power rela-
tions, I conceptualize four types of power resources instead of just one: discur-
sive, structural, institutional and associational power resources. This modifica-
tion is strongly inspired by theoretical innovations that took place in the fields 
of labor studies and feminist social policy analysis (Brinkmann et al. 2008; 
Dörre 2011; D. McGuire 2013; Hobson and Lindholm 1997; Schmalz and Dö-
rre 2013; 2014; Silver 2003; Urban 2010; 2013; Wright 2000).36 
Taken together, these modifications will improve both the explanatory ca-
pacity of the approach in general and its applicability to the Latin American 
context in particular. 
 
36  Hans-Jürgen Urban (2013) rightly points out that there is a surprising independence 
between the power resources approach in welfare state research and the power resources 
approach in trade union revitalization studies. One of the theoretical innovations of my 
approach will be to break this independence and to adapt and incorporate new insights 
and categories from union revitalization studies into the power resources approach in 
welfare state research. 
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2.2.2 The Main Argument: Power Resources and Governing 
Alliances 
In accordance with the traditional power resources approach (Esping-Andersen 
[1990] 1998; Huber and Stephens 2001; Korpi 1983) and one strand of Marxist 
state theory (Poulantzas [1978] 2000), I assume that the redistributive charac-
ter of public policy can be best understood as the outcome of relations of 
power. 
I assume that the expansion of social protections for the lower popular 
classes becomes more likely when these sectors achieve considerable power 
resources, which enable them to exert pressures on policy-makers or to become 
themselves participants in the design and implementation of social policy. 
Moreover, even in the absence of active pressures, their power resources pro-
vide political elites with incentives to seek a certain level of legitimacy in their 
eyes. Hence, the power resources of these sectors are also likely to stimulate 
attempts on the part of political elites to use social policy expansion as a tool 
to increase their legitimacy, to win or co-opt supporters, or to contain conflicts. 
However, the lower popular classes and their organizations alone have sel-
dom achieved enough power resources to generate far-reaching social policy 
change. Such change requires the formation of broader alliances with other 
political forces. In accordance with the power resources approach, I assume 
that the most likely allies in the political realm are left37 political parties, trade 
unions and social movements,38 which are inclined to support social policy ex-
pansion to low-income earners due to their egalitarian ideological orientation 
and their aspirations to organize these sectors. Non-left, populist labor-based 
parties and trade unions can also be inclined to such alliances, particularly in 
democracies, where the achievement of governmental control might be signif-
icantly facilitated through the electoral and associational support of the lower 
popular classes and their organizations. When such alliances are formed, the 
power resources of the lower popular classes and their organizations will in-
fluence their political weight compared to that of other allied forces. In sum, a 
significant extension of social protections towards low-income earners is as-
sumed to become most likely when an inclusionary alliance is formed, in which 
left-wing and lower popular class actors have influence on the agenda-setting 
process.  
 
37  A definition of the left-right political spectrum can be found in the subchapter on the 
ideological orientation of actors. 
38  As will be described later in this chapter, social movements interested in social policy 
expansion for low-income earners can be very varied, ranging from women’s, student, 
indigenous and unemployed workers’ movements to human rights organizations to pro-
gressive sections of the church. 
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Furthermore, it is assumed that alliances can influence social policy much 
more strongly when they control government.39 Strong oppositional alliances 
can also be able to extract significant social policy concessions through exter-
nal pressure, but governing alliances are much more effective in translating 
their power resources and interests into policies and assuring their implemen-
tation. Therefore, relatively limited changes in the distribution of power re-
sources can lead to significant changes in social policy when they enable the 
assumption of a new governing alliance. In the same way, it can be assumed 
that the incorporation or withdrawal of actors from alliances can lead to major 
changes in the direction of policy when it leads to a change of government. 
Truncated social policy systems are assumed to result from conservative 
governing alliances that aim at fostering middle-class support and at control-
ling trade union agitation. In their composition, these alliances are exclusion-
ary, meaning that they more often marginalize or exclude oppressed groups 
along lines such as social status, informality, gender, race and migratory back-
ground. Lower popular class, egalitarian left-wing and other progressive actors 
have little participation and influence in such alliances. 
Once implemented, inegalitarian social policies, especially exclusive so-
cial insurance schemes, are assumed to create vested interests and hence path 
dependency effects. It is expected that such path dependency effects pose ad-
ditional difficulties for progressive social policy reform as the resistance from 
employers and right-wing political actors might be reinforced by popular class 
actors who benefit from the respective policies. 
In situations where popular class forces lack power resources across the 
board, social policy expansion is assumed to be unlikely at all. 
2.2.3 Understanding Interest Constellations:  
An Analytical Framework 
The empirical literature on the role of different actors in the development of 
Latin American social policy regimes provides us with several theoretical puz-
zles. On the one hand, the array of actors participating in social politics in Latin 
American countries differs significantly from those of the industrialized, dem-
ocratic countries during the post-World War II period that provided the empir-
ical bases for most of the welfare state theories. In particular, the role of the 
military in shaping social policies in Latin America was significantly stronger 
due to recurrent military dictatorships. IFIs and social movements of peasants, 
indigenous communities and other marginalized groups have also played a 
 
39  An alliance that controls government will be referred to as governing alliance. In ac-
cordance with Guillermo O’Donnell (1977, 551), a governing alliance is defined as “an 
alliance that imposes, through the institutional system of the state, policies conforming 
to the orientations and demands of its members.” 
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much more important role in Latin America. What interests did these actors 
pursue in the politics of social protection for low-income earners? And why 
did they do so? Furthermore, actors that played a similarly important role in 
Latin America as in most industrialized countries, such as political parties, 
trade unions, and employers’ associations, developed quite distinct interests 
and agendas due to different structural, historical, and cultural contexts. For 
example, trade unions and labor-based parties in Latin America led processes 
of equality enhancing social policy reform in some periods, while during other 
periods they pursued particularistic social policy interests to the detriment of 
the lowest income sectors (Collier and Collier [1991] 2009; Golbert 2010; Hu-
ber and Stephens 2012; McGuire 2010).  
Hence, in order to improve our understanding of the dynamics of Latin 
American social politics, it is crucial to analyze the historically specific devel-
opment of interest constellations and the factors that exerted influence on 
whether actors tended to support the expansion of social protections for low-
income earners or not. 
In the following, five groups of potentially influential factors will be dis-
cussed. The discussion is inspired by both empirical research and the theoreti-
cal controversy summarized in the literature review. The first two groups of 
factors are linked to actor-centered and ideational approaches and refer to the 
ideological orientations and social bases of actors. The discussion of the third 
group is inspired by structuralist approaches and focuses on the impact of so-
cial and economic factors on the formation of actors and alliances in social 
politics. The fourth and the fifth group are inspired by historical institutionalist 
approaches. The discussion of the fourth group of factors deals with the way 
in which social policy legacies and state interventions may influence the role 
of different actors in social politics and thereby create path dependencies. Fi-
nally, the discussion of the fifth group focuses on the influence of different 
regime types in shaping interest constellations.  
The discussion of these five groups of potentially influential factors sub-
sequently serves as a theoretical foundation for the formulation of hypotheses 
regarding the role of different types of actors in the politics of social protection 
for low-income earners in Latin America. 
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The Ideological Orientation of Actors 
The ideological40 positions41 of actors are theoretically meaningful as these af-
fect their goals and their perceptions of what constitutes an issue that deserves 
action and which kind of action might be best suited. Based on several analyses 
of welfare states in western countries, power resources theorists provided am-
ple evidence that left, centrist, Christian democratic and right actors promote 
considerably different social policies. Left ideologies are related to egalitarian 
values and solidarity,42 and hence it is the left that is associated with the most 
progressive social policy agendas. Christian actors of the political center and 
center-right are often influenced by Christian Social Teaching and therefore 
tend to support relatively broad welfare states, yet favor less egalitarian, highly 
stratified, status conserving social security systems. Secular right-wing and 
(neo-)liberal actors, in contrast, are assumed to have stronger confidence in the 
market and to prefer private insurance and residual public social protection 
over broader public welfare systems (Esping-Andersen [1990] 1998, chaps. 2, 
3; Huber, Ragin, and Stephens 1993, 717–718; Huber and Stephens 2001, 19–
20). 
An extensive study, which Micheal Coppedge (1997) elaborated in collab-
oration with 53 country experts, shows that Latin American party systems are 
 
40  In accordance with Stuart Hall (1986, 29) I refer to ideologies as mental frameworks 
which social actors “deploy in order to make sense of, figure out and render intelligible 
the way society works.” As such frameworks, “ideologies allow people, as group mem-
bers, to organize the multitude of social beliefs about what is the case, good or bad, 
right or wrong, for them, and to act accordingly” (Van Dijk 1998, 8). 
41  With ideological positions I refer to the position of an actor’s ideology on the left-right 
spectrum. In accordance with Norberto Bobbio (1996) and Detlef Jahn (2011) I refer to 
the left-right divide as corresponding at its core to the difference between egalitarianism 
and inegalitarianism. The left considers inequality to be socially constructed, and hence 
its reduction or even elimination is perceived as being possible and desirable. The right 
in contrast considers inequality to be naturally given or an individual responsibility, so 
that a reduction or even elimination of inequality is seen as neither feasible nor desirable 
(Bobbio 1996, 67). Bobbio (1996, 66) also denotes that the terms left and right always 
describe a relation and are marked by gradual rather than absolute differences. There-
fore, “when we say the left has a greater tendency to reduce inequalities, we do not 
mean that it intends to eliminate all inequalities, or that the right wishes to preserve 
them all, but simply that the former is more egalitarian, and the latter more inegalitar-
ian” (Bobbio 1996, 66). 
42  Other authors on Latin American political economy have used similar conceptualiza-
tions of the left for the purpose of their analyses. Evelyne Huber and John D. Stephens 
(2012, 28): “What makes parties left or center-left in our assessment and in the assess-
ment of experts is their ideological commitment to the values of egalitarianism and sol-
idarity and their class appeals to subordinate classes.” Kurt Weyland (2010, 5) concep-
tualizes left organizations “in ideological terms” as “characterized by the determined 
pursuit of social equity, justice, and solidarity as an overriding priority.” And Diane 
Sainsbury (1999, 268) adds that this also applies to the dimension of gender relations. 
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very heterogeneous and differ from those of many western countries. Never-
theless, his and a variety of other studies also show that despite the manifold 
differences in the concrete party formations, Latin American political systems 
are also characterized by a left-right divide, with the left being more egalitarian 
and the right more inegalitarian (e.g., Alcántara Saez 2004; Colomer and Es-
catel 2005; Rosas 2005; Wiesehomeier and Doyle 2012; Zechmeister 2006; 
Zoco 2006). Hence, also for the study of Latin American welfare politics the 
left-right divide can be assumed to constitute a crucial category.  
Power resources theorists have, in practice, treated ideological position as 
a static characteristic of parties, trade unions or movements. However, ideo-
logical positions of actors are subject to social construction, and thus might 
change over time and differ across space. Neoliberal hegemony, for example, 
has had a considerable effect on positions of left and labor parties, trade unions 
and social movements around the globe. This influence has usually been highly 
unfavorable for low-income groups in terms of social policy. At the same time, 
these ideological shifts have been associated with internal struggles and it can 
be assumed that it makes a difference for their social policy agendas whether 
left currents or neoliberal factions within these actors gain power. Such strug-
gles might be of even greater importance in Latin America than in Europe, as 
many labor-based and populist parties as well as trade unions are ideologically 
very heterogeneous and lack long-standing ideological traditions (Levitsky 
2003, 22).  
Summing up, the hypothesis to be verified in the following empirical anal-
ysis is that left-of-center political actors are more likely to push for an expan-
sion of social protections for low-income earners and that right-of-center actors 
are more likely to promote retrenchment or regressive reform. However, as 
many influential actors in Latin American politics such as populist parties and 
trade unions cannot be clearly categorized as left or right and changed political 
orientation over time, this hypothesis must be complemented by a second as-
sumption. The second assumption is that the role of these actors in social policy 
reform processes also decisively depends on whether left or right internal cur-
rents manage to influence the agenda-setting on these issues. Again, the hy-
pothesis is that political actors are more likely to support an expansion of social 
protections for low-income earners when left internal currents are strong and 
influential. For the assessment of the political orientation of different actors 
and internal currents I combine expert assessments found in literature with in-
formation collected through expert interviews. 
The Social Bases and Organizational Structures of Actors 
Power resources theorists assume that the role of different organizations in so-
cial politics rests not only on their distinct ideological orientations but also on 
the different compositions of their social bases. It is assumed that the popular 
  59 
class bases of left parties and trade unions make it more likely that these actors 
support redistributive and egalitarian social policy than other actors which rely 
stronger on middle- and upper-class support. The same argument can be ex-
tended to social movements, which mostly represent socially and politically 
oppressed groups in Latin America. Christian democratic parties, it is argued, 
build on a cross-class constituency, mobilizing support from parts of the work-
ing class as well as from farmers and the middle and upper classes. The cross-
class character of these parties, in combination with the influence of Christian 
Social Teaching, is related to the less redistributive and more stratified charac-
ter of their social policy agendas. Secular center and right parties’ constituen-
cies are more concentrated among farmers and the middle and upper classes 
and are assumed to be more hostile to public welfare provision. The same is 
assumed for the employers’ associations due to their capitalist class bases 
(Esping-Andersen [1990] 1998; Huber, Ragin, and Stephens 1993, 741; Huber 
and Stephens 2001; Huber and Stephens 2012, 28; Korpi 1983). 
With regard to the organization of the trade union movement, power re-
sources theorists have developed another argument of theoretical importance 
for the question of social protection for the lowest income groups. While craft 
unions tend to fragment the working class and to pursue their own sectional 
interests, centralized union movements tend to represent the class as a whole. 
Moreover, centralized union movements tend to concentrate more resources 
on political issues, such as social policy, and to be more politically influential 
(Huber and Stephens 2001, 25; Stephens 1979, 45–46). Based on these argu-
ments, it could be assumed that trade union centralization is an important factor 
favoring the extension of social protection to the lowest income groups. Nev-
ertheless, concerning the situation in Latin America, this argument needs some 
qualifications. Trade union centralization can adopt different forms, and not all 
these forms seem to favor egalitarian social policy. First, centralized trade un-
ions do not necessarily represent the whole working class. Many Latin Amer-
ican trade unions organize only formal workers. In these cases, the centraliza-
tion of the union movement cannot necessarily be expected to improve the rep-
resentation of informal workers. Second, it depends very much on the ideolog-
ical orientation and internal structure of the centralized movement whether it 
tends to represent the lowest income sectors or not. Its ideological orientation 
and the organizational structure, in turn, depend very much on the initial pro-
cess of centralization, which was vastly different in Sweden, the crucial coun-
try of reference for power resources theorists, than in countries such as Argen-
tina. 
This brings us to an issue that has so far received limited attention from 
theorists of the power resources approach. Different popular class organiza-
tions differ from each other regarding non-class characteristics of their social 
bases (Silver 2003, 22–23), and these differences might have important conse-
quences for their role in the politics of social protection for low-income groups. 
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As has been emphasized by feminist scholars, the building of labor and other 
popular class movements has often been associated with active exclusions of 
groups such as low-skilled workers or women (Cook 1981, 9; Hobson and 
Lindholm 1997, 480; Rose 1997, 147). Low-income as such seldom constitutes 
an explicit criterion for non-class boundary drawing in popular class move-
ments, but exclusions along other lines such as gender, ethnicity, or skill often 
de facto operate as barriers against low-income groups. In Latin America, a 
formal work contract is often an “indispensable requirement for union affilia-
tion” (Marshall and Perelman 2008, 8), and thus, informal workers, who con-
stitute the vast majority of low-income earners, are frequently excluded from 
union organization. Such exclusions tend to result in narrowly defined organi-
zational identities and favor the pursuit of particularistic interests, such as those 
of relatively well-off, white, and male workers (Kulawik 1996, 58). Diane 
Sainsbury (1999: 268), Dana Hill and Leann Tigges (1995, 115) find that union 
density among female workers and the share of women of the total union mem-
bership are positively related to gender egalitarian social policy, and hence, 
that women’s influence within the labor movement has egalitarian effects. 
Similar positive effects can be expected from the involvement of informal 
workers and racially or ethnically oppressed groups. Organizations which ex-
clude or marginalize underprivileged groups along lines such as gender, race, 
migratory background or informality, and whose social bases mainly consist 
of relatively better-off segments of the popular classes, are therefore assumed 
to be less likely to push for the extension of social protection for low-income 
groups than more inclusive organizations. 
Furthermore, it must be considered that, in practice, the interests of the 
social bases of organizations do not translate into policy agendas on a one-to-
one basis. The question is not only whether and to what degree low-income 
earners, women and racially or ethnically oppressed groups are present in these 
organizations, but also whether and to what degree they can participate in the 
agenda-setting process. In this regard, the formal and informal organizational 
structures of parties, trade unions, and social movements play a decisive role. 
These structures partly determine how different sectors of the social base can 
influence the agenda. They constitute a particular relation between the leader-
ship and the rank and file and cannot be seen as neutral channels for participa-
tion in agenda setting and strategy formation. Rather, they often provide con-
siderable autonomy to the leadership, which can lead to the divergence of the 
interests of leaders from those of the rank and file. These self-interests of the 
leadership, in turn, can differ more strongly from the interests of one part of 
the constituency than another. Furthermore, these organizational structures and 
routines might favor some sectors and disadvantage others concerning the in-
ternal distribution of agenda-setting power. Hence, the organizational struc-
tures and routines of actors could be described as selective (Jessop 1990, 9–
10; 1999; Offe 1972a, 65–106). Recent empirical analyses provide evidence 
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regarding the relevance of these selectivities for the development of social pol-
icy towards the lowest income sectors in Latin America. Lapp (2004), Pribble 
(2008) and Bossert (2011) have analyzed the effects of party organizational 
structures on land and social policies towards low-income earners. All three 
authors found that party structures significantly affect the possibilities of low-
income groups to make a difference in politics. This point appears to be of 
particular importance with regard to major popular class-based parties in sev-
eral Latin American countries. The ideological positions of these parties have 
shown to be very flexible and their social bases tend to be very heterogeneous, 
including segments of the “urban and rural poor, the middle sectors, and, in 
some cases, the peasantry” (Levitsky 2003, 23). Bossert (2011) furthermore 
found that this also applies to trade unions and social movements involved in 
the politics of the welfare state. Democratic structures and bottom-up proce-
dural practices are important for the ability of the economically weakest sectors 
of the rank and file to convert their numerical strength into agenda-setting 
power and to reduce the danger of co-optation of the leadership by economic 
and political elites. In contrast, top-down organizational structures and proce-
dural practices provide considerable autonomy to the leadership and strengthen 
channels of direct influence that are mainly open to economic and political 
elites inside and outside the organization, such as lobbying, personal favors 
and co-optation (Bossert 2011). Although such kinds of internal structures se-
verely limit the agenda-setting power of the lowest income groups, their con-
tinued support for these organizations can nevertheless be assumed to require 
that their interests are considered to some, albeit lesser, degree (Rueschemeyer, 
Huber Stephens, and Stephens 1992, 55). 
In a similar vein, it can be assumed that the inclusion of low-income 
groups, such as unemployed and informal workers or peasants, in a broader 
political alliance makes it more likely that the respective alliance supports the 
implementation or expansion of social protections for low-income earners. The 
involvement of low-income earners can be assumed to require concessions 
from the other sectors of the alliance and to strengthen their capacity to partic-
ipate in the policy-making process. Their involvement may, nevertheless, take 
very different forms that can be assumed to have different effects on both the 
magnitude and the quality of these concessions and their capacities to partici-
pate in the policy-making process. For example, they may be involved via elec-
toral mobilization, membership in parties or trade unions, the formation of 
more or less independent social movements or a mixture of the aforementioned 
options. These different types of involvement may concede more active or pas-
sive roles and different levels of relative power to low-income sectors within 
the alliance. Due to their numerical strength, at least some kind of passive in-
volvement becomes very likely during democratic periods while complete ex-
clusion might prevail when authoritarian forms of government coincide with a 
lack of political organization and mobilization. 
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All in all, the hypothesis is that the political participation of the lower pop-
ular classes, women and ethnically oppressed groups in social movements, 
trade unions, parties, and political alliances increases the likeliness that these 
actors support the extension of social protections for low-income earners. This 
effect is furthermore assumed to be significantly greater when the formal and 
informal organizational and coalitional structures permit these groups to influ-
ence the agenda-setting process. 
Structural Context and the Social Construction of Actors 
The nature of concrete political actors, their overall strength, their unity, their 
racialized and gendered character, and whether and to what degree the lowest 
income groups form part of different organizations and political alliances is 
not only the result of these actors’ choices and active boundary drawing but is 
also importantly shaped by the significantly different material preconditions 
for organization encountered by different segments of the society. 
Based on Marxist premises, the power resources approach assumes that 
capitalism provides significantly unequal preconditions for the development of 
power in social politics. The control over the means of production provides the 
economic elite with important advantages regarding the incorporation of their 
interests into the social policy agendas of governments.43 Popular classes, in 
turn, depend much more on their ability to organize, to build parties, trade un-
ions, and social movements in order to effectively articulate their interests. 
Different social and economic structures across countries and periods have 
thereby provided different pre-conditions for processes of organization. 
Due to their role as primary goods suppliers on the international level and 
their correspondingly limited degrees of industrialization, peripheral countries 
have tended towards an over-supply of labor and a high level of fragmentation 
of the popular classes, which has constituted a significant barrier to the con-
struction of popular class power and the unity among different segments of it 
(Senghaas 1974). Power resources theorists have adapted their approach to the 
Latin American context in so far that they have considered that the structural 
preconditions were less favorable for the formation of strong labor movements 
than in most countries of the center (Huber and Stephens 2012, 24–25). Yet, 
the approach still requires specification concerning the question of how such 
structural differences might also have left their imprint on the nature of popular 
class formations that emerged in Latin America. My theoretical assumption is 
that the high level of heterogeneity of the popular sectors in Latin America has 
provided unfavorable conditions for the development of organizational unity 
 
43  See 2.1.1., Wright (1994), and Przeworski (1985, 139) for more detailed accounts of 
this argument.  
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and contributed to vastly different levels of organization among different seg-
ments of the popular classes.44 
One of the most salient characteristics distinguishing Latin American labor 
markets from those found in the center is the magnitude of informal employ-
ment. While formal wage-earners constituted only about 35% of the economi-
cally active population  in Latin America at the end of the 20th century, around 
45% of the economically active population worked in different kinds of infor-
mal employment (Portes and Hoffman 2003, 46–49). Portes and Hoffman 
(2003, 50) statistically define informal employment “as the sum total of own 
account workers (minus professionals and technicians), unpaid family work-
ers, domestic servants, and waged workers without social security and other 
legal protections in industry, services, and agriculture.” Approximately half of 
the informal workers, depending on the country, work as wage-earners. Many 
of them are employed in small enterprises which supply low-cost goods and 
services to consumers and cheap inputs to formal sector companies. However, 
informal wage-earners can also be found in big companies and the agricultural 
sector. The remaining half of informal workers are urban self-employed work-
ers or peasants (Portes and Hoffman 2003).45 
Formal employment is associated with significantly higher average wages 
(Gasparini and Tonarolli 2009, 16). Moreover, in contrast to informal wage-
earners, formal workers possess better access to the social security systems and 
union representation and their work conditions are regulated by labor laws, 
which implies a certain degree of de-commodification. 
The levels of organization have been extremely low in the informal econ-
omy, which means that most low-income earners have largely remained at the 
margins of traditional trade union organizations. In part, this can be linked to 
the much less favorable conditions for organization in the informal economy 
and certain barriers to interaction that are related to the formal-informal divide. 
Due to the structural oversupply of labor (Senghaas 1974, Tokman 1987), par-
ticularly in the segment with low education, informal wage-earners face fierce 
competition for jobs. The lack of access to de-commodifying social and labor 
policies further aggravates these competitive pressures, which makes them 
much easier to dismiss and limits their bargaining leverage vis-à-vis their em-
ployers. This ultimately makes participation in union organization and collec-
tive action appear much riskier. The shorter average duration of employment 
makes it furthermore difficult to establish organizational ties. Moreover, the 
vast majority of informal workers is dispersed among small enterprises with 
fewer than five workers, works in the agricultural sector or is self-employed 
 
44  The following subchapters will show that political and discursive factors were also im-
portant in this regard. 
45  According to data from CEPAL (2000, 65, 71), the peasantry constitutes around 10% 
of the Latin American workforce, which means slightly less than half of the total infor-
mal self-employed population (Portes and Hoffman 2003). 
64   
(Beccaria and Groisman 2009a; Gasparini and Tonarolli 2009). Compared to 
big industrial companies, which bring together “high concentrations of people 
with similar class interests and far-flung communications” (Rueschemeyer, 
Huber Stephens, and Stephens 1992, 58), these enterprises provide very unfa-
vorable conditions for organization.  
In addition to the different structural preconditions for organization en-
countered by formal and informal workers at their workplaces, joint organiza-
tion is also hampered by limitations on interaction and mobility between them 
stemming from the socio-economic cleavage often separating them. These lim-
itations do not affect all informal and formal workers in the same way. Empir-
ical analyses indicate that there is considerable mobility between informal and 
formal salaried employment (Perry et al. 2007, 54–55). However, such studies 
also indicate that the level of mobility depends strongly on the respective edu-
cational level of the informal worker. The better educated informal wage-earn-
ers have significantly better chances of eventually accessing formal employ-
ment (Pagés and Stampini 2009, 398). In contrast, those with lower educational 
degrees suffer from a high probability of durably remaining in informal em-
ployment (Gasparini and Tornarolli 2009, Groisman 2010). In turn, informality 
is associated with a considerably lower average income and more recurrent 
phases of unemployment compared to that of formal workers. This cleavage in 
income level and security often means that informal workers and their families 
cannot afford to live in the same neighborhoods as formal workers. This phe-
nomenon has been described as residential segregation, that is the perpetuation 
of poor neighborhoods in which there is a relative homogeneity of informal 
and unemployed workers and their families (Groisman 2010). Residential seg-
regation poses limits to the day-to-day interaction between formal and informal 
workers. Taken together with the significantly different consumption capaci-
ties this might constitute a structural barrier to the development of common 
class identities and joint organizations. 
This does not mean that the development of common political identities 
and trade union organizations nor that of autonomous social movements of in-
formal and unemployed workers is impossible, however. Trade unions can 
make strategic choices and some components of the labor movement have at 
times demanded more active strategies to organize these sectors (Palomino 
2005; Svampa and Pereyra 2003). Nevertheless, under such structural condi-
tions popular class unity seems to be more difficult to attain. 
At the same time, these structural preconditions might provide space for 
types of progressive popular class movements that are rarely observed in west-
ern countries. While residential segregation might reinforce barriers to infor-
mal workers’ participation in formal worker organizations such as trade un-
ions, it might at the same time constitute a precondition for organization based 
on the territorial dimension (Collier and Handlin 2009). The emergence of a 
variety of organizations of unemployed and informal workers in Argentina 
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might exemplify this (Merklen 2005; Svampa and Pereyra 2003). The MST 
movement in Brazil also shows that mobilization and organization of peasants 
and landless agricultural workers are possible (Carter 2010; Souza Martins 
2002). In countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Mexico, strong 
progressive social movements have been built around indigenous identity 
(Yashar 1998). The emergence of both rural and urban social movements that 
mostly organize groups belonging to the lowest income strata shows that de-
spite limitations imposed by social and economic structures, much depends on 
how agents react to these and what strategies they develop. Ruth Berins Collier 
and Samuel Handlin (2009, 6) even raise the question of whether these pro-
cesses of organization and mobilization and the associated governmental re-
sponses have led to a new critical juncture comparable to that of the incorpo-
ration of organized formal labor into the political systems in Latin America 
during the first half of the 20th century. 
The gendered and racialized nature of concrete class formations cannot be 
understood solely as a result of active boundary drawing by these organizations 
detached from the wider inequalities in the social and economic structure. Eve-
lyne Huber and John D. Stephens (2001, 47) argue that increasing participation 
of women in the paid labor force “increases the level of organization of women 
through unionization and thus the potential for women’s political mobilization. 
This process of economic and social mobilization of women also leads to in-
creased political mobilization of women, in existing parties, in women’s or-
ganizations, in new social movements, and so on.” In turn, female, and partic-
ularly feminist, actors have been decisive promoters of egalitarian social policy 
agendas within and apart from popular class organizations (Hill and Tigges 
1995, 115; Huber and Stephens 2001, 17; Huber et al. 2009, 31). As the pre-
conditions for organization vary significantly between different economic sec-
tors and types of employment, the power of women within the labor movement 
might furthermore be influenced by the economic sectors and kinds of employ-
ment in which female workers predominantly work. Amy Hite and Jocelyn 
Viterna (2005, 57, 78) argue that the weakening of largely male-dominated 
trade unions during the last quarter of the 20th century and the strengthening of 
new, often community-based social movements, has also changed the gendered 
nature of popular class mobilization in favor of a more influential role for 
women. 
To sum up, while we cannot deduce the strength and nature of historically 
concrete popular class formations from wider social and economic structures, 
the consideration of these structures together with other factors can help us to 
understand them. The hypothesis is that different sectors of the popular classes 
face significantly different pre-conditions for the construction of political or-
ganizations, which subsequently fosters a very unequal distribution of power, 
in particular between relatively well-organized formal workers and largely un-
organized informal workers. This inequality, in turn, is assumed to constitute 
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a difficulty for the construction of popular class unity and increases the likeli-
hood of exclusionary alliances. 
State Intervention, Path Dependency, and the Role of Different Actors  
in Social Politics 
In Latin America, state actors often played a decisive role in the constitution 
and transformation of political forces representing the popular classes (Levit-
sky 2003, 22–23; Portantiero 1988, 137–138). Governments such as those of 
Juan Domingo Perón in Argentina and Getúlio Dornelles Vargas in Brazil pro-
foundly shaped the party system and the labor movement. The effects of such 
state interventions tend to persist over time, and hence, to shape the long-term 
evolution of popular class actors, their identity, and their interests (Collier and 
Collier [1991] 2009). As Ben Ross Schneider (2004) argues, while state inter-
vention shaped the development of centralized business associations  in Mex-
ico, Chile, and Colombia, it however failed to create stable centralized associ-
ations in Brazil and Argentina. Peter Birle (1995) comes to a similar conclusion 
for Argentina. The focus of my analysis will therefore be to examine whether 
and how state interventions influenced the way in which different popular class 
actors participate in the politics of social protection for low-income earners. 
While theoretically all kinds of state policies can have such effects, social 
policy legacies are particularly pivotal for the politics of the welfare state for 
two reasons. First, as has been argued before, social policies shape not only the 
distribution of wealth but also the distribution of power. They can, for example, 
increase the independence of individuals from market participation and from 
other family members. Thus, social policies play a pivotal role in shaping 
power relations such as those related to gender and class. De-commodifying 
social policies increase the individual negotiation power of workers and the 
capacity of the subordinate classes to organize (Esping-Andersen [1990] 1998, 
22). However, as has been argued before, different segments of the popular 
classes have encountered very different preconditions for the development of 
collective power. Egalitarian social policies can theoretically reduce such dif-
ferences. However, as social policies in Latin America were often a reaction 
of political and economic elites to the growing strength of those segments of 
the popular classes that managed to organize, they had often limited coverage 
and tended to deepen asymmetries of power among and within the popular 
classes (Abel and Lewis 1993, 15). Indeed, fragmented social policies were 
often one of the means of conservative political and economic elites to divide 
and control the popular classes (Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens, and Stephens 
1992, 68; Segura-Ubiergo 2007, 260). 
Furthermore, social policy legacies not only influence the distribution of 
power but also intervene in the constitution and transformation of actors and 
their perceived interests and alliance preferences (Esping-Andersen [1990] 
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1998, 109). The welfare state, as Esping-Andersen ([1990] 1998, 23) argues, 
is “a system of stratification,” and hence, “an active force in the ordering of 
social relations.” Social policies shape lived experiences and patterns of inter-
action. Therefore, they are likely to have an imprint on the patterns of political 
mobilization. While fragmented social insurance policies that only cover the 
better off segments of the popular classes might reinforce barriers to common 
perceptions of interest between these and low-income earners, egalitarian so-
cial policies might significantly reduce them. 
Moreover, social policies tend to create vested interests. These include the 
beneficiaries, but also the administrators and contractors of a particular policy 
(Haggard and Kaufman 2008, 197; Pribble 2008, 62–63). Such groups are 
likely to defend the respective policy, and thereby make significant changes 
politically more difficult (Huber, Ragin and Stephens 1993, 722–723). By this 
means, vested interests contribute to the inertia of particular policy paths, 
which can be assumed to be the case for both egalitarian and exclusionary so-
cial policies. The kind of vested interests created by fragmented social insur-
ance policies plausibly reinforce the drawing of non-class boundaries by rela-
tively “privileged,” 46 often predominantly male and white popular class fac-
tions, and therefore constitute a significant barrier to the construction of polit-
ical alliances between different, unequally protected segments of the popular 
classes (Bossert 2011). 
The opposite process, the crumbling of “privileges,” can be assumed to 
increase the chances for a breakdown of such barriers. Beverly Silver (2003, 
134), for example, relates that in the late 19th and early 20th century the attack 
on craft standards in Britain, France, and the United States “chipped away at 
the ‘consent’ of the ‘labor aristocracy’” and induced “skilled workers to reach 
out to the growing ranks of unskilled workers.” 
For all these reasons, social policies have often served political purposes 
such as to construct and reinforce political alliances. While left governments 
have recurrently adopted universal social policy programs in order to mobilize 
support from different segments of the popular classes and to foster solidarity 
among them (Esping-Andersen [1990] 1998, 67), conservative governments 
have frequently used fragmented social policies to divide and control them 
(Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens, and Stephens 1992, 68; Segura-Ubiergo 
2007, 260). Government ambitions to extend control over popular class forces 
have also often influenced the particular design of social policies in a way that 
provided politicians with patronage  resources that facilitated the co-optation 
of trade union and social movement leaders (Haggard and Kaufman 2008, 60). 
To sum up, my empirical analysis will take into account the ways in which 
state policies affected the constitution and transformation of popular class 
 
46  I put the word privileges in quotes because while workers with access to social insur-
ance in Latin America might appear privileged compared to most informal workers, 
they are nevertheless exploited in the process of production. 
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actors and how this influenced their medium- and long-run participation in so-
cial politics. The hypothesis is that, once implemented, social policies create 
path dependencies, which means that they significantly affect the constella-
tions of interest in posterior reform processes. Fragmented social insurance 
legacies are assumed to constitute obstacles to later attempts to shift social pol-
icy in a more egalitarian direction, while universal policy legacies are assumed 
to facilitate the extension of social protection for low-income groups (Martínez 
Franzoni and Voorend 2009; Huber and Stephens 2012, 255). 
Regime Type and Popular Class Actors 
In his elaboration on the concept of the strategic selectivity of institutions, Bob 
Jessop (1990, 9–10; 1999) emphasizes that institutions not only grant differen-
tial access to the policy-making process but also have an impact on the process 
of identity, interest and strategy formation of actors.47 In this sense, theories on 
welfare state development have argued that regime type is of central im-
portance for the constitution of popular class actors and their coalition strate-
gies in social politics (Esping-Andersen [1990] 1998; Huber and Stephens 
2012; McGuire 2010). Regime type refers to the basic question of whether a 
political regime is democratic, authoritarian or something in between. 
As has been described earlier, associational power tends to be unequally 
distributed among and within the popular classes in Latin America. While for-
mal workers in certain industries have achieved considerable organizational 
strength, informal and unemployed workers, and hence most low-income earn-
ers, have most often lacked strong organizational representation. Democracy 
does not tend to radically alter this situation, but it nevertheless provides the 
lowest income groups with a certain degree of electoral power, and this signif-
icantly changes the attractiveness of different types of alliances. As electoral 
success requires broad support, democracy provides strong incentives to left 
and labor-based parties to conceptualize the working class in broad terms and 
“even to go beyond this broad concept by emphasizing similar life situations 
and ‘parallel interests’” (Przeworski 1985, 74–75). It is therefore no coinci-
dence that in most Western European labor movements the “principle of a 
broad popular universalism emerged in tandem with the extension and consol-
idation of democratic rights” (Esping-Andersen [1990] 1998, 67). In the Latin 
American context, this means that the possibility of participating in electoral 
 
47  Bob Jessop (1990, 10) writes: “Particular forms of state privilege some strategies over 
others, privilege the access of some forces over others, some interests over others, some 
time horizons over others, some coalition possibilities over others. A given type of state, 
a given state form, a given form of regime, will be more accessible to some forces than 
others according to the strategies they adopt to gain state power. And it will be more 
suited to the pursuit of some types of economic or political strategy than others because 
of the modes of intervention and resources which characterize that system.” 
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contests provides left and labor parties with strong reasons to appeal to the 
numerically strong group of weakly organized low-income earners. Advocat-
ing the extension of social protection to agricultural, unemployed, or informal 
workers is thereby one way of doing so. James McGuire’s (2010, 303–304) 
observation that in Latin America labor unions have tended to assume more 
favorable positions regarding the extension of health care services to low-in-
come groups in countries with a longer democratic history supports this argu-
ment. 
To sum up, my hypothesis is that democracy provides left and labor-based 
parties and alliances with additional incentives to seek the support of numeri-
cally strong low-income groups such as peasants and informal rural and urban 
workers in order to increase the chances of achieving majorities. Although this 
cannot be assumed to mechanically lead popular class organizations to adopt 
positions in favor of an extension of social protection to low-income groups, it 
can be assumed that it increases the likelihood of this happening. In semi-au-
thoritarian regimes these incentives are significantly weaker and in authoritar-
ian regimes they are largely absent, which increases the likelihood of popular 
class actors focusing on narrower social policy agendas in favor of their own 
associational bases. 
2.2.4 The Role of Different Actors: Hypotheses 
Based on the discussion above and in accordance with the traditional power 
resources approach, I assume that left parties are mostly supporters of an ex-
pansion of social protections for low-income earners due to their ideological 
orientation and their aspiration to mobilize lower popular class support 
(Esping-Andersen [1990] 1998; Huber and Stephens 2012). 
Non-left labor-based parties, such as the Argentine PJ, and centrist parties, 
such as the Argentine UCR, have usually been much less ideologically defined 
than social democratic or communist parties. Nevertheless, within such parties, 
left and right internal currents have coexisted and struggled for influence. I 
assume therefore, that these parties support an extension of social protections 
for low-income earners when left tendencies become influential and when 
democracy provides them with incentives to compete for the lower popular 
class vote. 
In accordance with the traditional power resources approach and the theo-
retical discussion above, I assume that right of center parties tend to oppose 
the extension of social protections for low-income earners. Christian conserva-
tive parties are assumed to support certain types of social policies due to the 
influence of Catholic Social Teaching, yet favor less egalitarian, stronger strat-
ified, and status conserving social security systems that result in unfavorable 
policies for most low-income earners. Secular conservative and liberal parties 
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are assumed to have stronger confidence in the market and to prefer private 
insurance and residual public social protection over broader public welfare sys-
tems (Esping-Andersen [1990] 1998; Huber, Ragin and Stephens 1993, 717–
718; Huber and Stephens 2001, 19–20). 
In contrast to the assumptions of the traditional power resources approach, 
trade unions have played an ambivalent role regarding social protections for 
low-income earners in Latin America. Based on the theoretical discussion 
above, my assumption is that this ambivalence is due to the fact that Latin 
American trade unions seldom organize or represent informal low-income 
workers and that their leaderships are in part centrist or conservative in politi-
cal orientation. However, I assume that trade unions pursue more inclusionary 
social policy agendas when left internal currents attain leadership. I also as-
sume that trade unions that organize significant numbers of low-income work-
ers, or which at least aspire to do so, are more likely to support such social 
policies. Yet, when a more conservative leadership dominates the organization, 
trade unions tend to concentrate on the improvement of social protections for 
their own organizational bases among formal workers, which at times even 
results in opposition to broader and more egalitarian policies. 
In agreement with the power resources approach (Esping-Andersen [1990] 
1998, Huber and Stephens 2001; Korpi 1983) and one strand of Marxist state 
theory (Poulantzas [1978] 2000), I assume that capitalists and big landowners 
tend to oppose the expansion of social protections for low-income earners be-
cause of two reasons. First, such policies tend to conflict with their economic 
interests. They require fiscal resources that can potentially result in higher tax 
levels. Furthermore, access to social protection tends to reduce the individual 
worker’s dependence on market income and hence it tends to provide the 
worker with additional bargaining power and potential space for emancipation. 
This, in turn, is likely to generate upward pressures on wage levels. Second, 
Latin America’s economic elite has traditionally been dominated by conserva-
tive and market liberal thinking. This does not mean that individual capitalists 
or employers’ associations cannot have an interest in such policies under cer-
tain circumstances; for example, when mass mobilization puts the viability of 
their businesses in danger (Paster 2013) or when a particular policy has results 
beneficial to certain capital factions (Swenson 2004). 
In accordance with most feminist social policy research, I assume that fem-
inist actors tend to favor the extension of social protections to low-income 
earners because many gender egalitarian social policies, such as the universal 
provision of child care, health care and access to legal and free abortion, benefit 
low-income earners and because most feminist organizations are left-of-center 
in their political orientation (Arza 2012, 11; Huber 2006, 301; Huber and Ste-
phens 2001, 21; Sainsbury 1996, 127–169). 
Furthermore, based on the theoretical arguments outlined above, I assume 
that indigenous, peasant, unemployed and informal workers’ movements favor 
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the extension of social protections for low-income groups, as their social bases 
are among the key beneficiaries of such policies and because their political 
orientation is overwhelmingly left-of-center. 
The Catholic church  is assumed to support stratified, status conserving 
social policies due to the influence of Catholic Social Teaching. Notwithstand-
ing, certain progressive base-level currents, such as those related to liberation 
theology, are assumed to support more redistributive social policies due to their 
left-of-center political orientation and their aspiration to empower and repre-
sent the lower popular classes. 
The social policy agenda of the military is assumed to include a preference 
for social security privileges for members of the armed forces and to depend 
on the ideological orientation of the military elite regarding the wider config-
uration of the welfare state. While leftist military factions are assumed to sup-
port egalitarian social policy, rightist factions are assumed to promote either 
status conserving or liberal market-oriented social policies. Since in most of 
the Latin American cases, military leaders have been right-wing, the overall 
influence of the military is assumed to be highly regressive. 
In accordance with Bob Deacon’s (1997; 2005) and Anne Tittor’s (2012) 
analyses, I assume that distinct international organizations have adopted dif-
ferent positions on social policy. IFIs, such as the IMF, World Bank, and 
IADB, have pushed a neoliberal agenda of privatization and marketization (B. 
Deacon 2005; Tittor 2012). While they promoted targeted and scarcely funded 
social assistance policies for particular low-income groups, they also promoted 
social insurance reforms which tended to reduce general coverage of low-in-
come earners significantly. Korpi and Palme (1998) related this kind of social 
policy agenda with the so-called paradox of redistribution, meaning that de-
spite increases in targeted social assistance expenditure, this kind of agenda 
rather reduces than increases the overall amount of progressive income redis-
tribution and hence produces unfavorable results for low-income earners. The 
WHO, and more recently the ILO as well, have in contrast shown interest in 
universal health care and income transfer policies which would benefit most 
low-income earners. 
2.2.5 (Re-)Conceptualizing Power Resources in Social 
Policy-Making: Associational, Structural, 
Institutional, and Discursive Power Resources 
In accordance with the traditional power resources approach in welfare state 
research, I assume that in the long run it depends crucially on the balance of 
power whether progressive actors and alliances are able to construct and de-
fend extensive and redistributive social policy systems that provide ample so-
cial protection to low-income earners. However, while the traditional power 
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resources approach focuses tightly on working-class power as the main enabler 
of redistributive social policy, I assume that this focus is too narrow for the 
Latin American context. Instead, I assume that the power of other popular clas-
ses, such as peasants, informal and unemployed workers, also plays an im-
portant role. Therefore, my approach will deal more broadly with popular class 
power. This implies that besides trade unions and left parties, a range of other 
social movements and associations, as well as progressive currents within pop-
ulist and centrist parties and the church, will be considered promotors or at 
least enablers of social protection for low-income earners. 
Definition of Power 
For the purpose of this study, I use Susan Strange’s (1996, 17) basic definition 
of power as “the ability of a person or group of persons so to affect outcomes 
that their preferences take precedence over the preferences of others.” Susan 
Strange’s definition resembles in many aspects the definition found in Max 
Weber’s classic Economy and Society, where he writes that power can be de-
fined as “the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a 
position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on 
which this probability rests” (Weber 1978, 53). However, Strange’s definition, 
as I interpret and use it in this study, is broader. While Max Weber emphasizes 
that power is the probability to enforce one’s own will despite resistance, 
Strange’s definition of power also encompasses situations where there is no 
resistance, such as those contemplated by Bachrach and Baratz (1962; 1975) 
and Lukes ([1974] 2006). Bachrach and Baratz (1962, 948) argue that power 
is also exercised when actors devote their “energies to creating or reinforcing 
social and political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the 
political process to public consideration of only those issues which are com-
paratively innocuous” to them. Lukes ([1974] 2006) furthermore considers that 
power can be exercised by manipulating others. Lukes ([1974] 2006) and 
Bachrach and Baratz (1962) thereby emphasize that the exercise of power is 
very much related to institutional, discursive, and structural factors.  
Four Types of Power Resources 
If power is defined as “the ability of a person or group of persons so to affect 
outcomes that their preferences take precedence over the preferences of others” 
(Strange 1996, 17), the question is what this ability depends on. The answer 
will inevitably vary with the subject under analysis and the range of actors that 
is involved. As discussed above, on the basis of a broad literature review and 
previous empirical research, the assumption of this study is that the introduc-
tion, expansion, and defense of social protections for low-income earners cru-
cially depends on the power of popular class actors and alliances, and hence, 
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on their ability to shape political outcomes in this policy area. In the following, 
I will argue that there are four crucially important power resources on which 
this ability depends.48  
The first power resource refers to associational strength and therefore fo-
cuses on empowering characteristics of these actors and alliances themselves. 
However, in addition to the assumptions of the traditional power resources ap-
proach, I assume that there are three more power resources that are crucial for 
understanding social policy change (Esping-Andersen [1990] 1998; Huber and 
Stephens 2001; 2012; Korpi 1983). In contrast to associational power re-
sources, these are less related to characteristics of these actors and alliances 
themselves and more strongly tied to the broader societal structures, institu-
tions and discourses surrounding them.  
In the following I will elaborate this argument and define four different 
types of power resources: a) associational power resources, b) structural power 
resources, c) institutional power resources and d) discursive power resources. 
Associational Power Resources 
Associational power resources stem from organization processes that enable 
formerly dispersed individuals to aggregate their resources and influence, to 
unite behind common goals, and to become able to act collectively. Due to the 
dynamics of capitalist systems and the concentration of wealth and the control 
over the means of production, economic elites depend much less on organiza-
tion as a means of political articulation than popular classes do (Huber and 
Stephens 2001, 13). On these grounds, the traditional power resources ap-
proach has focused on the associational power resources of the working class 
as the main explanatory variable for the redistributive character of the welfare 
state. Trade union density, trade union centralization, and left party strength 
measured as long-term vote, parliament and cabinet shares have been used as 
indicators (Esping-Andersen [1990] 1998; Huber and Stephens 2001; 2012; 
Korpi 1983; Stephens 1979). Although these indicators have been considered 
to be interdependent, the long-term partisan composition of governments has 
been found to be the indicator with the strongest effect on social policy 
(Esping-Andersen [1990] 1998; Huber and Stephens 2001; 2012). Esping-An-
dersen ([1990] 1998, 107) furthermore suggest that the effects of these indica-
tors of working-class power also depend on the relative strength and unity of 
center and right-wing parties and employers’ associations, as well as on the 
capacity of popular class organizations to build effective coalitions. 
 
48  Of course, the conceptualization of power resources cannot capture all aspects of power. 
As does any concept that is intended to be used for empirical research, it reduces com-
plexity and is developed for a specific historical and spatial context. Only in this way 
can it help us to analyze the crucial dynamics of the power struggles behind social pol-
icy making in Latin America. 
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These indicators are also useful in accounting for at least a part of the associa-
tional power resources of the popular classes in Latin America. Yet, as has 
been argued above, it is necessary to broaden the scope of the analysis to in-
clude also the associational strength of other actors, such as unemployed and 
informal workers’ movements, indigenous movements, peasant organizations, 
and progressive currents within populist and centrist parties as well as the 
church. As left parties, trade unions and social movements often represent dif-
ferent segments of the popular classes, I furthermore assume that not only the 
overall strength of popular class organization is decisive for explaining the 
level of social protection for low-income earners but also the relative strength 
of the different types of popular class organizations and the patterns of coali-
tion among them. As peasants’, indigenous peoples’, unemployed workers’, 
and informal workers’ movements often represent the most oppressed sections 
of the popular classes, the achievement of associational power resources on 
their part is considered to be particularly favorable for the expansion of social 
protections for low-income earners. 
Structural Power Resources 
Structural power resources stem from the characteristics of the economic sys-
tem and its current dynamic. Through the mainly private control and ownership 
of the means of production, capitalist systems confer ample structural power 
resources to capital (Korpi 1983, 16–17). As Erik Olin Wright (1994, 94–95) 
summarizes, such power resources can provide significant leverage in strug-
gles over public policy: 
Through a wide variety of concrete mechanisms—financing politicians, political 
parties, and policy think tanks; financially controlling the main organs of the mass 
media; offering lucrative jobs to high-level political officials after they leave state 
employment; extensive lobbying—capitalists are in a position to use their wealth 
to shape directly the direction of state policies.12 When combined with the dense 
pattern of personal networks which give capitalists easy access to the sites of im-
mediate political power, such use of financial resources gives the bourgeoisie 
vastly disproportionate direct leverage over politics. 
Furthermore, in capitalism, both state revenues and societal wealth are depend-
ent on the process of capital accumulation (Wright 1994, 100). As Adam Prze-
worski (1985, 139) argues, if “capitalists do not appropriate profit (…), pro-
duction falls, consumption decreases and no other group can satisfy its material 
interests.” Such a decline in wealth, in turn, threatens not only to undermine 
the financial bases of the state itself but also its popular support bases. State 
managers, such as politicians and high-level officials, have therefore strong 
incentives to implement policies that are assumed to generate a favorable in-
vestment climate. Hence, capital’s control over most of the investment consti-
tutes a strong systemic source of power. In this sense, Gregg Olson and Julia 
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O’Connor (1998, 21) argued that neoliberal globalization further strengthened 
the structural power resources of capital as it increased the mobility of goods 
and capital, and hence facilitated the exit option. 
While power resources theorists in the field of welfare state research 
acknowledge that capitalist systems tend to confer ample structural power re-
sources to capital, they have so far not considered that different dynamics of 
capitalism and positions in the international division of labor might also affect 
the structural power resources of the popular classes. The concept of structural 
power resources reached broader attention in the field of labor studies by virtue 
of Erik Olin Wright (2000, 962) who argued49 that workers’ structural power 
resources stem “from the location of workers within the economic system.” 
They can result “from tight labor markets or from the strategic location of a 
particular group of workers within a key industrial sector.” Beverly Silver 
(2003) elaborated further on the concept and used it as an analytical category 
in her influential book Forces of Labor. Silver (2003, 13) defines two subcat-
egories of structural power: marketplace bargaining power and workplace bar-
gaining power. Marketplace bargaining power arises from tight labor markets 
and “can take several forms including (1) the possession of scarce skills that 
are in demand by employers, (2) low levels of general unemployment, and (3) 
the ability of workers to pull out of the labor market entirely and survive on 
nonwage sources of income.” Workplace bargaining power stems from the lo-
cation of a group of workers in the wider system of production and “accrues to 
workers who are enmeshed in tightly integrated production processes, where a 
localized work stoppage in a key node can cause disruptions on a much wider 
scale than the stoppage itself.” So, for example, a strike of railway or port 
workers can force a wide array of industries to stop production due to the im-
possibility of obtaining necessary supplies or of transporting produced goods 
to their potential buyers. 
There are theoretically two levels on which the possession of different de-
grees of structural power resources can be supposed to affect the extent of pub-
lic social protection for low-income groups. On the level of the workplace, the 
distribution of structural power resources provides wage-earners with varying 
capacities to demand decent work contracts from employers, which might in-
clude the payment of contributions to social insurance systems. On the macro-
level of the political system, on which this study focuses, differing structural 
power resources are associated with different capacities to exercise pressure 
on the government and other actors in order to influence social policy. Even 
when pressures are not actively exercised, the capacity to use structural power 
resources generates incentives for governments and other actors to respond to 
 
49  In the concerned article, the author actually focusses on the effects of associational 
power resources and refers to structural power resources rather briefly. However, his 
distinction between associational and structural power resources was later taken up by 
several authors in the field of labor studies (e.g., Dörre 2011, 277; Silver 2003, 13). 
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the interests of the respective group in order to achieve a certain degree of 
legitimacy in their eyes or to prevent costly conflicts.50 
Conditions of low unemployment and underemployment and universal so-
cial security make it harder for employers to replace workers in the face of 
strikes , and hence the capacity of workers to impose costs on employers and 
the state increases. Furthermore, under such conditions, workers face lower 
risks of losing their jobs and incomes, which might reduce fears of undertaking 
collective action. In a similar vein, in more industrialized, capital intensive 
economies or sectors with tightly integrated production processes, wage earn-
ers tend to possess more power to impose significant economic costs on em-
ployers due to the high level of dependency of broader production networks on 
specific groups of workers. Thus, the distribution of both marketplace bargain-
ing power and workplace bargaining power affects the potential of workers to 
obstruct capital accumulation, and hence to exert economic pressure on both 
employers and governments. On these grounds, the power resources approach 
in the field of the welfare state can be importantly enriched by incorporating 
structural power resources as an analytical category. 
The distribution of structural power resources can vary significantly over 
time and between different countries with distinct positions in the global econ-
omy and different economic and socioeconomic structures. Therefore, when 
applying this concept to Latin American countries, it is important to consider 
their specific social and economic characteristics. Due to the lower degree of 
industrialization, lower average capital intensity and a structural surplus of la-
bor, popular classes in peripheral countries tend to possess significantly lower 
structural power resources than their counterparts in the center. Furthermore, 
structural power resources tend to be very unequally distributed among differ-
ent segments of the popular classes. Those with higher educational levels tend 
to possess relatively strong marketplace bargaining power while major parts of 
the populations tend to be exposed to an extremely competitive labor market. 
Whereas certain groups of industrial, transport and state workers have consid-
erable workplace bargaining power (Collier and Collier [1991] 2009, 41; Sil-
ver 2003, 170–171), ample parts of the labor force work in agriculture, small 
enterprises, or are self-employed, sectors in which the macro-economic effects 
of strikes tend to be much more limited. 
Institutional Power Resources 
In the field of welfare state research, approaches focusing on the role of polit-
ical institutions have usually been seen as alternatives to approaches that focus 
on the relationship of forces in the society (Schmidt and Ostheim 2007b, 63). 
 
50  Such responses to popular class power usually involve both material benefits as well as 
repression and divide and rule strategies. 
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This is, however, a short-sighted interpretation. Institutions are in several ways 
related to the distribution of power resources (Brinkmann et al. 2008; Dörre 
2011). Indeed, political institutions play a pivotal role in what Peter Bachrach 
and Morton S. Baratz (1962, 948) call the second face of power. According to 
these authors, actors can exercise power by creating or reinforcing institutions 
“that limit the scope of the political process to public consideration of only 
those issues which are comparatively innocuous” to them (Bachrach and Bar-
atz 1962, 948). The exercise of power is thus inscribed into specific selectivi-
ties of these institutions (Jessop 1990, 9–10; 1999; Offe 1972a: 65–106; Pou-
lantzas [1978] 2000, 123–145, 154–160). Once established, these institutions 
play an important role in shaping the distribution of power resources by provid-
ing some actors with more capacity to influence social policy than others. 
Comparative literature has analyzed the effects of a variety of institutional 
factors on social and distributive politics, but the majority of studies indicate 
that regime type is the most important institutional factor affecting the redis-
tributive character of the social policy systems in Latin America (Filgueira 
2005; Haggard and Kaufman 2008; Huber et al. 2006; Segura-Ubiergo 2007). 
This fits well with my assumption that an important mechanism through which 
institutions influence social policy outcomes is their impact on the distribution 
of power resources among contending actors and interests. As popular classes 
depend much more on collective action than do economic elites, the right to 
vote and to organize can be considered a decisive power resource for them. 
Although there is no automatism that guarantees that such strategies will be 
taken up (Hobson and Lindholm 1997), electoral appeals to the numerically 
strong group of low-income earners based on social policy promises constitute 
a plausible power strategy in democratic regimes, particularly for actors of the 
political left. Several empirical studies support these theoretical assumptions 
and find a positive association between democracy and social protection for 
low-income earners in Latin America (Haggard and Kaufman 2008; Huber et 
al. 2006; Huber and Stephens 2012; McGuire 2010; Segura-Ubiergo 2007). It 
will thus be assumed that the institutional power resources of the popular clas-
ses are more extensive in democracies than under authoritarian rule. 
Nevertheless, it must also be considered that in practice there has been no 
simple dichotomy between democracy and authoritarianism in Latin America. 
Rather authoritarian regimes have sometimes allowed a certain degree of elec-
toral competition and interest group organization, while rather democratic re-
gimes have often contained important limitations such as the proscription of 
major parties, the presence of non-elected representatives of the army in the 
Senate, or the limitation of the right to vote to only male citizens or those who 
are literate (Haggard and Kaufman 2008, 15; Pribble 2008, 30). In most cases, 
such formal restrictions on democracy gave the political system a bias that re-
duced the level of institutional power resources of the popular classes. Re-
strictions on the right to vote often excluded women and the poor. The parties 
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that were proscribed were usually those with left ideologies or considerable 
support from the working class and other popular classes. 
It is important for me to emphasize here that although democratic regimes 
provide opportunities for power strategies that are based on the electoral mo-
bilization of the popular classes in favor of an expansion of social protections 
for low-income earners, there is no guarantee that this will in fact occur or be 
successful. Hence, my argument runs against the widely used median voter 
model of Meltzer and Richard (1981), which postulates that democratic re-
gimes quasi automatically lead to redistributive public policy in societies with 
high levels of inequality. In contrast to Meltzer and Richard and in accordance 
with Burchardt (2010, 44) and Huber and Stephens (2012, 269), I argue that 
high levels of inequality tend to strengthen the political power of the economic 
elite rather than the power of the mass of low-income earners. While formal 
democracy provides the popular classes with institutional power resources, 
high levels of inequality provide the elite with additional structural power re-
sources and create difficulties for the construction of political unity among and 
within the popular classes. Hence, inequality is assumed to countervail rather 
than to strengthen the redistributive effects of democracy. 
One way in which high inequality might hinder the successful mobiliza-
tion of electoral power resources in favor of redistribution is that it tends to 
increase the elite’s capacity to shape widely shared discourses on the risks and 
supposedly negative consequences of redistributive policies. In the following, 
I will deal with this issue. 
Discursive Power Resources 
My definition of discursive power resources rests on the assumption that the 
ability of actors and alliances to affect social policy outcomes also depends on 
whether the wider discursive context allows them to frame their particular in-
terests as acceptable or even desirable for the society as a whole. Power re-
sources theorists in welfare state research have begun to acknowledge the im-
portance of discursive paradigms for the balance of power in society, but they 
have still not integrated this aspect into their analytical frameworks (e.g., Hu-
ber and Stephens 2001; Huber and Stephens 2012).51 The following elabora-
tion on the discursive power resources aims at closing this theoretical gap. 
The concept of discursive power resources builds heavily on ideational 
approaches that focus on the importance of broad paradigms (Béland and Cox 
2013; Hall 1993; Hay 2001; Hobson and Lindholm 1997; Wincott 2011). I 
 
51  “(...) since the neoliberal view of the world is highly congruent with the interests of 
capital, its rise to hegemony has further strengthened the leverage that capital has been 
gaining from globalization vis-à-vis governments and unions, by way of legitimizing 
the claims of capitalists regarding constraints on social policy in the eyes of the mass 
public.” (Huber and Stephens 2001, 40) 
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adopt Peter Hall’s (1993, 279) definition of a discursive paradigm as a “frame-
work of ideas and standards that specifies not only the goals of policy and the 
kind of instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of 
the problems they are meant to be addressing” (Hall 1993, 279). Although 
ideational contexts are always heterogeneous, different discursive paradigms 
tend to prevail in different historical moments and to become “widely shared 
ways of thinking about policy challenges that lead to broad consensus about 
the appropriateness of a policy response” (Béland and Cox 2013, 193). 
It is of crucial importance that these discursive paradigms are not neutral 
towards different actors and interests. They significantly shape the distribution 
of power by enabling certain actors but not others to successfully frame their 
preferences as desirable for the society as a whole.52 The ability to frame par-
ticular preferences as generally desirable, in turn, is heavily dependent on the 
extent to which these preferences are compatible with the logic of the prevalent 
discursive paradigm. 
In order to prepare the concept of discursive power resources for empirical 
use, it is necessary to first identify the relevant discursive paradigms regarding 
the policy field and the historical context of interest. As a second step, it is 
necessary to analyze the nature and logic of each paradigm and the degree to 
which it is compatible with different policy agendas. 
Based on the discussion of ideational approaches in the literature review 
above, I assume that development paradigms are the most important discursive 
paradigms in shaping the macro-political struggle over social policy in Latin 
America since the mid-20th century. As social policy has been most of the time 
subordinated to the overriding goal of economic development, the appropriate-
ness of different social policy options was frequently judged in terms of their 
supposed consequences for the economy. Thereby, these paradigms were not 
only influential among policy-makers but also among the wider public. 
The reviewed literature indicates that three different large-scale develop-
ment paradigms were prevalent during the last 70 years in Latin America: Im-
port Substitution Industrialization (ISI), neoliberalism, and a recently emerged 
paradigm which shall be referred to as post-neoliberalism (e.g., Burchardt 
2006; Haggard and Kaufman 2008; Kirby 2009; Riesco and Draibe 2007; 
Sheahan 2002; Silva 2007). Both the ISI and the post-neoliberal paradigms are 
characterized by a logic influenced by Keynesian ideas that is friendly to state 
intervention, while neoliberalism pushes for the expansion of the market.53 My 
 
52  According to Fred Block (2008, 4), already Marx argued that “classes are able to exert 
greater influence when they claim to be fighting for interests that are universal rather 
than just for their own particular interests.” 
53  In this sense, the long-term evolution of development paradigms in Latin America re-
minds of Karl Polanyi’s ([1944] 2001) argument of the double-movement, that is that 
phases of expanding the market provoke a counter-movement that eventually leads to a 
phase of renewed regulation and restriction of the market. 
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central argument is that the logics of ISI and post-neoliberalism provide much 
more room for actors that favor egalitarian social policies to frame their de-
mands as beneficial, and therefore desirable, for the society as a whole. In con-
trast, neoliberalism as a market-driven ideology is based on a logic that is 
highly averse to such a framing. Therefore, the discursive power resources of 
actors pushing for an extension of social policy for low-income groups are sig-
nificantly greater in a context where ISI or post-neoliberalism is the prevalent 
development paradigm than in a context of neoliberal prevalence. In the fol-
lowing, this argument will be put on a solid basis by showing how the different 
logics of the three development paradigms provided or restricted opportunities 
to frame the extension of social protection for low-income earners in a positive 
manner. As it is not the aim of this text to undertake an extensive discussion of 
all the aspects of these paradigms, I will concentrate mainly on those major 
logics of them that have important implications for the perceived viability and 
desirability of social protection for low-income earners.54 
All three development paradigms have in common that they prioritize eco-
nomic growth as the central means for social progress (Bruton 1998, 904; Peck 
and Tickell 2002, 394; Sikkink 1991, 40).55 In this logic, social policy is not 
only judged for whether it improves general welfare or not, but also for whether 
it hampers or promotes economic growth. This can be understood as one of the 
reasons why ministries of economy tend to have significantly more influence 
on issues that formally fall into the areas of responsibility of the ministries of 
labor or social security than the other way round (see e.g., Alonso 1997). 
While all three paradigms prioritize economic growth, they differ strongly 
regarding what kind of social policies are perceived to foster or hamper eco-
nomic growth. There are three issues with particularly strong implications for 
the perception of what kind of social policy is viable and desirable in the three 
paradigms: their perspectives on redistribution, on the size and role of the state 
in the economy, and the conceptualization of the relationship between the na-
tional and international economy. 
Let me begin with the first issue: the perspectives of the three development 
paradigms on redistribution. The development of the ISI paradigm during the 
mid-20th century was influenced by several aspects of Keynesian thinking 
(Burchardt 2006, 34; Filgueira and Filgueira 2002, 134). Among these aspects 
was the importance attributed to domestic demand, and hence the view that 
redistributive policies are compatible with, or even foster, economic growth 
(Riesco and Draibe 2007, 47). Particularly national-populist versions of the ISI 
paradigm emphasized the idea that redistributive measures stimulate the ex-
 
54  The parts of the following discussion that focus on the neoliberal paradigm build largely 
on my previous work (Bossert 2011). 
55  Some scholars have recently argued that the new post-neoliberal paradigm is associated 
with a slightly higher valuation of social progress independent of growth (Grugel and 
Riggirozzi 2012, 15). 
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pansion of domestic industries by raising demand for locally produced con-
sumer goods (Sikkink 1991, 34). Later versions of the ISI paradigm, often re-
ferred to as developmentalism, had a stronger pro-business orientation and put 
less emphasis on the positive role of redistribution (Lewis 1993, 191–194; Sik-
kink 1991, 35, 40). All in all, the ISI paradigm provided a lens through which 
the redistributive effects that would come along with an extension of social 
protections for low-income earners appeared to have rather positive effects for 
both the affected groups and the wider society. 
In this regard, the contrast with the neoliberal paradigm could not be more 
pronounced. For several reasons, neoliberalism renders “issues of redistribu-
tion and social investment as antagonistic to the overriding objectives of eco-
nomic development” (Peck and Tickell 2002, 394). The neoliberal paradigm 
contains the idea that income inequalities provide incentives for economic ac-
tivity and increase savings and investments. Through this lens, the redistribu-
tive effects associated with an expansion of social protection for low-income 
groups tend to hamper economic growth, which is argued to have negative ef-
fects for the society as a whole. 
The perspective of the recently emerged post-neoliberal paradigm on re-
distribution is significantly more benevolent. It largely coincides with the ISI 
paradigm in that redistributive measures foster domestic demand and thereby 
contribute to economic growth. Intellectuals who promote the post-neoliberal 
paradigm have furthermore emphasized the benefits of redistributive social 
policies, particularly those in favor of the lowest income groups, in terms of 
their positive effects on human capital formation (Barrientos and Hulme 2008, 
16; Riesco and Draibe 2007). 
The second important issue on which the three development paradigms 
differ radically relates to the size of the state and its role in the economy. The 
ISI paradigm, both in its national-populist and its developmentalist version, 
rejects the idea of efficient free markets (Bruton 1998, 905–907). Economic 
development is assumed to require a strong state that protects, promotes, and, 
if necessary, even constructs industries—a state that develops the needed in-
frastructure and manages supply and demand through fiscal and monetary pol-
icy (Silva 2007, 67). This benign view of the state offers a favorable framework 
for the idea of a broad, centralized, state-led social security system (Belmartino 
2005d, 103–105; Lewis 1993, 188–191; Sikkink 1991, 3–4). 
In sharp contrast, the neoliberal paradigm aims “to minimize the state and 
return power to the private market” (Hackworth and Moriah 2006, 525). This 
view of the state is related to the “pervasive naturalization of market logics” in 
the neoliberal paradigm and the conviction that the market is the fairest and 
most efficient mechanism to allocate resources (Peck and Tickell 2002, 394). 
Therefore, it promotes the reduction and privatization of social protections 
(Burchardt 2006, 194; Riesco and Draibe 2007, 51), and constitutes a very 
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unfavorable ideational context for the expansion of social protection for low-
income groups. 
In contrast to the market optimism of the neoliberal paradigm, the post-
neoliberal paradigm promotes a significantly larger and more active role to the 
state (Grugel and Riggirozzi 2012, 11). However, compared to the ISI para-
digm, the post-neoliberal perspective on the role and size of the state in the 
economy is more cautious, putting more emphasis on regulation than on public 
industry-building. Furthermore, the post-neoliberal paradigm favors fiscal dis-
cipline and comparatively cautious monetary policies (Grugel and Riggirozzi 
2012, 4). But in contrast to neoliberalism, the new paradigm emphasizes the 
expansion of state revenue rather than austerity as the right means to achieve 
fiscal equilibrium. In the face of the sharp increase of primary product prices 
on the world market during the 2000s, this increase in revenue builds heavily 
on the taxation, and in some cases the nationalization, of primary goods exports 
(Burchardt 2016, 60–69, Grugel and Riggirozzi 2012, 8–9; Matthes 2012, 20–
27). In this sense, the emerging paradigm partially resembles the national-pop-
ulist version of the ISI paradigm in which revenues from primary goods pro-
duction were often captured by the state, in one way or another, and used to 
stimulate domestic demand through social expenditure and infrastructural pro-
grams (e.g., O’Donnel 1977, 533–546; Rofman and Romero 1997, 165–166). 
All in all, the benign perspective on state intervention in the post-neoliberal 
paradigm provides opportunities for a positive framing of social protection 
measures for low-income earners. 
A third pivotal difference among the three paradigms is the way they con-
ceptualize the relationship between global and local economy and the conse-
quences that this conceptualization has for the perception of what kind of social 
policy is viable and desirable. The ISI paradigm was shaped by the idea that 
the “division of labor between the rich countries and the poor ones seemed to 
doom the latter to permanent poverty” (Bruton 1998, 905). In order to change 
this situation, it contained the view that peripheral countries needed to trans-
form their productive structure by expanding their industrial sectors. In turn, 
this structural transformation was perceived to be only possible through a par-
tial dissociation from the world market by protecting national industries from 
imports and by managing capital flows (Bruton 1998, 905; Silva 2007, 67). In 
Latin America, the paradigm was domestic market oriented, and hence the 
competitiveness of national industries on international markets constituted an 
issue of secondary importance, if any importance at all (Sikkink 1991, 3–4). 
All in all, the conceptualization of the relationship between the global and the 
national economy in the ISI paradigm provided local governments with a rel-
atively free hand to design social policy. 
The neoliberal view of this relationship differs radically. According to it, 
development is only possible by attaining competitiveness on the global mar-
ket. Seen through this lens, countries are compelled to compete with each other 
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to become the most attractive business location (Brand 2005, 9). Progressive 
taxation and redistributive welfare states are perceived to constitute a disad-
vantage in this competition as they are assumed to deter both investors and 
highly skilled employees. Moreover, the neoliberal paradigm suggests that 
welfare states should be cautious not to create upward pressures on wage levels 
through extensive job and income protections, as these “artificially high” wage 
levels are supposed to render the local economy less competitive, particularly 
in tradeable goods sectors. In sum, the neoliberal paradigm promotes the view 
that redistributive welfare states are reducing competitiveness and therefore it 
provides little space to frame the expansion of social protections for low-in-
come groups in positive terms. 
The emerging post-neoliberal paradigm is much less optimistic about free 
trade. Several post-neoliberal governments have reintroduced or reinforced 
tariffs, trade barriers, and capital flow regulations. At the same time, the new 
paradigm is more attentive to trade balances and the primary goods producing 
sectors than the ISI paradigm. While seldom pursuing open political alliances 
with primary product producers, Latin American governments of the left have 
enabled these sectors to considerably expand the volume of production (Brand 
2016, 21–27; Matthes 2012, 62–73). Regarding social policy, the post-neolib-
eral paradigm emphasizes its potentially positive effects on competitiveness, 
for example through facilitating education and diminishing social conflict, and 
therefore constitutes a benign ideational framework for the expansion of social 
protections for low-income earners. 
All in all, both the ISI paradigm and the post-neoliberal paradigm provide 
much more favorable ideational contexts to mobilize mass support for an ex-
pansion of social protections for low-income earners than the neoliberal para-
digm. Hence, they provide significantly more discursive power resources to 
actors that favor such policies.56 
The Interdependence of Power Resources 
The distinction of these four types of power resources as separate categories 
serves to operationalize the extended version of the power resources approach 
developed in this study. The separation into different categories shall, however, 
not obfuscate the multiple ways in which these types of power resources inter-
act with each other. 
In any concrete political struggle over social policy, different actors can 
mobilize a combination of different degrees of associational, structural, institu-
 
56  Although this is to my knowledge the first attempt to systematically integrate the role 
of development paradigms in shaping the power resources of different actors in the 
analysis of social policy in Latin America, former studies have repeatedly mentioned 
the impact of these paradigms on the distribution of power and opportunities among 
actors (e.g., Boris 2013, 148–149; Huber and Stephens 2001, 240) 
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tional, and discursive power resources. Their overall capacity to prevail in the 
policy process will finally depend on both the combined level of power re-
sources compared to that of contending actors and the capacity to mobilize 
these resources in a strategically intelligent way. For example, democracy may 
provide left parties with the opportunity to appeal to the lower popular classes 
with a progressive social policy agenda, but the prevalence of neoliberal think-
ing and a lack of party membership might make it difficult to convince signif-
icant numbers of supporters of the viability and desirability of this policy 
agenda. 
Furthermore, the different types of power resources have important feed-
back effects on each other. For example, the distribution of associational power 
resources may have medium- and long-term effects on the prevalence of dif-
ferent discursive paradigms because these associational power resources might 
be used to shape public opinion in a way favorable to the actor’s interests. 
Another example is that high unemployment and low industrialization, and 
thus low structural power resources for working-class organizations, might 
contribute to a weakening of labor’s associational power resources because the 
fear of unemployment might de-motivate attempts to organize and the disper-
sion of workers among small enterprises might make organizing strategies dif-
ficult to pursue. The list of examples could be extended much further. Yet, for 
the purpose of this analysis, it is neither possible nor necessary to discuss all 
of the multiple feedback effects among the different types of power resources. 
As these feedback effects are not at the center of this study, they will be men-
tioned in the empirical analysis where useful, but not systematically discussed. 
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3 Methodological Approach 
My methodological approach is rooted in the tradition of historical political 
analysis, a mode of analysis interested in examining causal configurations,57 
mechanisms,58 and processes59 of macro-political, social, and economic 
change (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003; Tilly 2008, 133–159). Historical 
political analyses draw great strength from their close focus on one or few 
cases over longer periods of time and their rich treatment of political processes, 
which allows the construction and testing of complex categorical variables 
(Collier and Collier [1991] 2009, 20; Rueschemeyer 2003, 305–336). By com-
bining process tracing with structured and contextualized comparisons of epi-
sodes across or within countries, the approach can provide compelling empir-
ical leverage even for theoretically complex arguments (Collier 1993; Collier 
and Collier [1991] 2009, 20; Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003; Tilly 2008, 
136–140).60 
The processes of macro-political change of interest in this analysis are 
those related to significant changes in the level of social protection for low-
income earners between 1943 and 2015 in Argentina. Specifically, I focus on 
two important areas of social protection: income transfers and health care. My 
aim is to identify medium and long-term policy patterns and to investigate the 
underlying causal configurations, mechanisms, and processes.  
For the identification of the relevant policy patterns, two broad criteria will 
be applied. The first criterion refers to whether social policy reforms extend or 
reduce the coverage of income transfers and health care provision among low-
 
57 Under causal configurations I understand the particular combinations and interactions 
of factors that correlate with the outcome under study. Based on the theoretical approach 
outlined in the last chapter, key factors are the constellation of actors and alliances en-
gaging in social politics and the level of popular class power resources. 
58  In accordance with Tilly (2008, 139) mechanisms are defined as “events that alter rela-
tions among some specified set of elements.” The attempt of actors to appeal to lower 
popular class voters, for example, is a mechanism that is assumed to have consequences 
for the process of social policy reform. 
59  In accordance with Tilly (2008, 139), processes are defined as “causal chains, se-
quences, and combinations” usually involving a variety of mechanisms. 
60 With regard to ontology and epistemology my analysis is rooted in the critical realist 
perspective. On the level of ontology critical realists assume that there exists a reality 
that is independent of our perceptions of it. On the level of epistemology, however, 
critical realists disagree with positivists as they do not believe in the ability to objec-
tively perceive or measure reality (Furlong and Marsh 2010, 184–211). On these 
grounds critical realists argue that the sophistication of the methodological approach 
and its consistency with the theoretical framework are of central importance. Yet, in 
contrast to positivist research, critical realists do not aspire to reveal the truth, but aim 
at providing as much leverage as possible to support the plausibility of the argument. 
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income earners. A significant change of coverage among low-income earners 
can result from the implementation or abolition of social programs as well as 
changes in the rules of access to existing policies. The second criterion refers 
to whether the quality of benefits that can be accessed by low-income earners 
is improved or reduced by social policy reforms.61  
Because social policy change can only partly be measured in numbers and 
because the interaction between causal factors often follows complex patterns, 
a qualitative rather than quantitative approach is appropriate. In order to be 
able to undertake an intensive dialogue between theory and evidence, I focus 
on only one case, Argentina, but trace social policy development in depth. This 
makes it possible to go beyond mere hypothesis testing and opens space for the 
discovery of novel explanations and the refining of theoretical categories (Ma-
honey and Rueschemeyer 2003, 13).  
In accordance with my theoretical framework, I have chosen a long 
timeframe for the analysis. Theoretically important factors, such as path de-
pendencies, the distribution of power resources, and the composition of gov-
erning alliances tend to change and develop consequences over the long run, 
and hence are best studied over long periods. The analysis begins with the coup 
d’état of 1943, which initiated a period of social policy expansion and marked 
the passage from a system of fragmented social policies with low coverage to 
a broader welfare state. Furthermore, this initial expansion period lay im-
portant institutional foundations that would shape the posterior dynamics of 
social politics (see e.g., Collier and Collier [1991] 2009; Haggard and Kauf-
man 2008; Isuani 2008). The end of the period of study, 2015, has been chosen 
to include the last complete cycle of social policy expansion.62 
Argentina has been chosen as a country case for four main reasons. First, 
as argued in more detail in the introduction, Argentina constitutes a paradig-
matic case regarding several puzzling theoretical questions that have to be ad-
dressed if we want to gain a better understanding of why Latin American social 
policy regimes developed in a way that excludes or disadvantages low-income 
earners. Second, Argentina experienced several periods of significant expan-
sion and retrenchment of social protection for low-income earners, so it is par-
ticularly suitable for the application of within case comparisons between dif-
ferent subperiods. These comparisons of different periods can not only shed 
 
61 In the case of income transfers a qualitative change mainly implies that the real value 
of a benefit increases or decreases. Important social policy reforms in this sense com-
prise, for example, increases or reductions of minimum pensions or of social assistance 
benefits. With regard to health care, qualitative change will be mainly assessed by eval-
uating the evolution of expenditure as a share of the GDP in relation to the covered 
population and by taking into account the analyses of health experts regarding the ef-
fects of different reforms on the quality of health care provision. 
62  The 2015 presidential elections led to the assumption of a new governing alliance with 
a considerably different social policy agenda. 
  87 
light on the patterns of policy change, but also allow us to observe how differ-
ent patterns of change correlate with different constellations of actors and so-
cio-economic, institutional, and discursive environments. Third, the intensity 
of the distributive struggle in Argentina since the mid-20th century and the 
broad range of available primary and secondary sources to reconstruct these 
struggles facilitates the undertaking of process tracing. Through this method, 
whether and in what way different underlying constellations and contextual 
factors influenced social policy reform processes can be explored, as can what 
mechanisms constituted the causal linkage between them and the resulting pol-
icy outcomes. Fourth, Argentina shares a range of structural and politico-cul-
tural characteristics with several other Latin American countries, such as the 
existence of a broad informal sector, dependency on primary good exports, the 
emergence of a populist popular class-based party and recurrent periods of au-
thoritarian governments (Burchardt 2006; Collier and Collier [1991] 2009). 
Therefore it is reasonable to assume that theoretical abstractions generated on 
the basis of the Argentine case are also meaningful for other Latin American 
countries.63 At the same time, these characteristics differentiate Argentina and 
other Latin American countries from most western countries, which makes Ar-
gentina an interesting case for theory development and specification off the 
beaten track of euro-centered welfare state research. 
Two Methodological Strategies 
I will apply two distinct methodological strategies in my analysis, each of 
which contributes in a specific way to the generation of compelling empirical 
leverage: a most-similar systems comparison between different periods of so-
cial policy development in Argentina and process tracing. 
Most-Similar Systems Comparison 
Most similar systems designs try to emulate experimental designs. Cases for 
comparison are selected based on similarity regarding as many factors of po-
tential influence as possible. Differences in the outcomes of interest can there-
fore be assumed to be related to the few differing factors of potential influence 
in the selected cases (George and Bennett 2005, 164–165). Referring to coun-
try cases, Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune (1970, 34) describe the logic of 
this approach in the following way: 
(1) The factors that are common to the countries are irrelevant in determining the 
behavior being explained since different patterns of behavior are observed among 
 
63  I agree with Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2005, 18) that regions such as Latin America 
possess “distinctive dynamics and intra-regional influences” and that therefore “delim-
iting some generalizations by regions is useful.” 
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systems sharing these factors. (2) Any set of variables that differentiates these sys-
tems in a manner corresponding to the observed differences of behavior (or any 
interaction among these differences) can be considered as explaining these patterns 
of behavior. 
In practical terms, however, similar systems designs are difficult to achieve 
when comparing country cases. Although there are countries in Latin America 
that share a range of similarities, the set of differing factors nevertheless tends 
to be sufficiently large as to make it impossible to identify those factors that 
might in fact be causing different outcomes. Uruguay and Argentina, for ex-
ample, share a range of factors that have the potential to influence social policy 
outcomes, such as social structure, cultural legacy, and economic development, 
but there remain many potentially important differences such as different party 
systems, regime types, social policy legacies, and trade union movements. The 
number of potentially causal differences is too great to permit analysts to 
clearly identify those factors that are related to different social policy out-
comes. In sum, due to the limited number of countries available for case selec-
tion, country comparisons face severe difficulties for the construction of most-
similar-systems designs (George and Bennett 2005, 164; Przeworski and 
Teune 1970, 34). 
The problem of finding sufficiently similar cases can be overcome by com-
paring different periods within one country instead of comparing different 
countries (George and Bennett 2005, 166–167). For the purpose of this study, 
Argentina provides particularly appropriate conditions for the application of 
period comparisons. There have been periods of accelerated expansion, or at 
least significant attempts to achieve such expansion, and periods of reduction 
or stagnation of social protection for low-income earners. We can observe ex-
pansive phases in the 1940s and early 1950s, in the first half of the 1970s and 
since 2002 (Lo Vuolo and Barbeito 1998a; Belmartino 2005a; 2005d; Golbert 
2004; 2008; Alonso and Di Costa 2013). The periods in between have been 
marked by either stagnation or significant backlashes (Golbert 2010; Mesa-
Lago 1989; Vargas de Flood 2006). Hence, periods of expansion and retrench-
ment of social protection for low-income earners can be distinguished suffi-
ciently clearly to permit comparisons of those periods to each other. This ena-
bles me to identify those factors of the underlying political economy that differ 
between periods of expansion and retrenchment and so might be causally re-
lated to these diverging trends in social policy. 
Process Tracing 
Comparative historical analyses have achieved growing recognition using pro-
cess tracing in addition to comparative methods (see e.g., Collier and Collier 
[1991] 2009; Haggard and Kaufman 2008; Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens, 
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and Stephens 1992). Such a twofold strategy has helped to overcome limita-
tions faced by either of the two strategies.  
Process tracing aims to provide leverage for theoretical arguments through 
the engagement “in a close processual analysis of the unfolding of events over 
time” (Collier 1993, 115). As investigators are in practice not able to observe 
processes in their entirety, process tracing rests on the observation and descrip-
tion of key events pertaining to the process of interest (Collier 2011, 823). 
These events are brought into a chronological sequence, which enables the in-
vestigator to analyze how different events and factors added up to culminate 
in the outcome of interest (Bennett 2010, 208–209).  
Through the application of process tracing, I will systematically look for 
answers to research questions64 that will enable me to assess, modify, and spec-
ify the previously elaborated theoretical categories. It also allows me to dis-
cover new elements of theoretical importance for the politics of social protec-
tion for low-income earners (Collier 2011, 823–824). Argentina is very well 
suited for the application of process tracing as there have been open struggles 
over the extension and retrenchment of social protections for low-income earn-
ers. A context related analysis of these struggles will provide insights into the 
social policy interests and strategies pursued by different actors. Furthermore, 
important long-term transformations occurred in the theoretical categories es-
tablished in the last chapter. I will therefore be able to observe the impact of 
social, institutional, and discursive change on the interests and strategies pur-
sued by these actors and their capacities to prevail in the policy process. 
Process tracing combines excellently with comparative strategies. At least 
three important limitations of the latter can be addressed through process trac-
ing. First, comparative strategies are always only approximations of the ideal 
types formulated by authors such as Mills, Przeworski and Teune. In practice, 
it is hardly possible to find two or more cases that share all but one potentially 
causal factor, as proposed by Mill’s method of difference, or two or more cases 
that differ on all but one potentially causal factor, as proposed by Mill’s method 
of agreement. Therefore, purely comparative designs must deal with what 
Przeworski and Teune (1970, 34) call overdetermination. Comparisons help to 
limit the range of factors that are plausibly related to the outcomes of interest, 
but difficulties remain for identifying which of these factors are indeed 
 
64  Which actors are initiating reform processes?  
 Why are they doing so and how far are their motivations influenced by such factors as 
vested interests created through policy legacies, the ideological and social bases of these 
actors, and regime type?  
 Which actors support such reform proposals, which actors oppose them and why are 
they doing so?  
 Which actors and alliances manage to prevail in the process?  
 Why do they prevail and what role do associational, structural, institutional and discur-
sive power resources play in these processes? 
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important and which are not. Even when comparing periods within one coun-
try, we can usually observe changes in more than one factor that could plausi-
bly be related to the policy outcome of interest (George and Bennett 2005, 
166–167). Process tracing constitutes an effective means of dealing with this 
limitation. Through the reconstruction of the political process that leads to the 
policy outcome of interest, which of these factors played an important role can 
be assessed (Bennett 2010, 208–209).  
Charles Tilly (1997, 44) points out a second limitation of purely compar-
ative strategies when he argues that Mill’s methods always remained “fatally 
vulnerable to the allegation that a hitherto-unsuspected cause was operating.” 
The tracing of political processes through the reconstruction of verifiable 
causal stories tends to reveal such unsuspected causes and is therefore well 
suited to contribute to theory building and the conceptual elaboration of new 
analytical categories (George and Bennett 2005, 215; Tilly 1997, 48). 
The third limitation of purely comparative strategies is that they provide 
little information about the interaction of different factors and the mechanisms 
through which these factors influence social policy outcomes. Process tracing 
can illuminate such mechanisms and interaction effects through the reconstruc-
tion of the sequence of events that leads to a social policy reform and the role 
of different factors that are involved in the unfolding of these events (Bennett 
2010, 208–209).  
Operationalization of Theoretical Concepts, Methodological Strategies 
and Structure of the Empirical Analysis 
The main argument outlined in the theory chapter is that an expansion of social 
protections for low-income earners is most likely when popular class forces 
have extensive power resources that enable them to push for, improve, or de-
fend such policies. The main mechanism through which popular class forces 
influence social policy is assumed to be the formation of governing alliances. 
To systematically assess this argument through the application of period 
comparison and process tracing, the empirical analysis will be structured in a 
consistent format. A separate subchapter will be dedicated to each period of 
expansion and retrenchment of social protection for low-income earners. At 
the beginning of each subchapter, the social, economic and political context of 
the period will be outlined and the distribution of power resources analyzed.65 
At the end of each subchapter, the patterns and results of social policy change 
towards low-income earners will be summarized.66 This format facilitates the 
 
65  For this purpose, see the headline The Political Arena: Social and Political Context, 
Constellation of Actors, and Distribution of Power Resources at the beginning of each 
subchapter. 
66  See the headline Political Dynamics, Patterns of Social Policy Change, and Path De-
pendency Effects at the end of each subchapter. 
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comparison of periods and the identification of correlations between the power 
resources of popular class forces and the expansion or retrenchment of social 
policies.  
For the process tracing analysis each subchapter contains at its center an 
extensive part that is dedicated to the reconstruction of the political processes 
that led to the formation of differing governing alliances and the implementa-
tion of different policy agendas. This part reveals for each period the concrete 
mechanisms that linked the distribution of power resources, the formation of 
differing alliances and the policy outcomes. At the same time, it also shows 
which strategies actors and alliances applied, which types of power resources 
they mobilized to make their interests prevail in a certain context, and how this 
influenced the outcomes in terms of social policy. 
To assess the strength of popular class forces I have defined four types of 
power resources, each of which needs to be operationalized through the selec-
tion of indicators for the empirical analysis. 
The first type has been termed associational power resources. Associa-
tional power resources stem from the construction of organizations such as 
parties, trade unions, and social movements. In the case of parties, I will take 
parliament and cabinet shares as the main indicators of their associational 
power. In the case of trade unions and social movements, I will use estimates 
of their membership as an indicator for their associational strength. 
The second type has been termed structural power resources. Structural 
power resources stem from the characteristics of the economic system and its 
current dynamic. In capitalist systems, economic elites have systemic ad-
vantages over popular class forces regarding structural power resources. Yet, 
under circumstances of tight labor markets and capital-intensive production, 
popular class actors’ structural power resources are significantly enhanced and 
the advantage of the economic elite is diminished. In order to account for such 
variance, I will use estimates of unemployment and, where available, infor-
mality as indicators for the power resources that stem from tight labor markets. 
In order to account for structural power resources stemming from capital-in-
tensive production, I will use the percentage of the workforce occupied in in-
dustries as an indicator. Low unemployment and informality and high degrees 
of industrialization are assumed to increase the structural power resources 
available to popular class actors. 
The third type has been termed institutional power resources. Here I use 
regime type classification as the main indicator. There exists an abundant lit-
erature on the classification of regimes in Latin America (see e.g., Collier and 
Levitsky 1997; Dahl 1971; Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens, and Stephens 
1992; for an overview see Lauth 2010). Most studies are inspired in one or 
another way by Robert Dahl’s (1971, 3) eight criteria for polyarchy (e.g., Hag-
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gard and Kaufman 2008; McGuire 2010).67 McGuire (2010) and Ruesche-
meyer, Huber Stephens, and Stephens (1992) combine several of these criteria 
to form three broader criteria which they use to operationalize democracy. The 
set of criteria used by Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens, and Stephens (1992),68 
slightly modified, is adequate for my analysis because it fulfills the require-
ments set by my theoretical premises and has been successfully applied to sev-
eral Latin American countries. Democracy is operationalized along the follow-
ing three criteria: first, regular, free and fair elections with universal and equal 
suffrage; second, freedoms of association and expression and existence of al-
ternative sources of information; and third, dependence of the key decision 
makers in the state apparatuses on electoral processes or responsibility to 
elected bodies.69 The first criterion is directly linked to the theoretical assump-
tion that mobilizing electoral support of low-income earners through social 
policy proposals constitutes a plausible strategy for governments to reach le-
gitimacy and for oppositional forces to broaden their political support base and 
increase their electoral chances. Where elections are not free or fair, or large 
shares of the low-income earners are excluded from suffrage, such power and 
legitimization strategies lose significantly in attractiveness to political actors. 
The second criterion is linked to the assumption that freedom of association 
and expression provides chances for low-income earners to organize, which 
constitutes a central means of building up power resources to influence state 
policy. In political regimes that ban some or all these organizations, influ-
 
67  The eight criteria established by Dahl (1971, 3) are: “1. Freedom to form and join or-
ganizations; 2. Freedom of expression; 3. Right to vote; 4. Eligibility for public office; 
5. Right of political leaders to compete for support; 6. Alternative sources of infor-
mation; 7. Free and fair elections; 8. Institutions for making government policies de-
pend on votes and other expressions of preference.” 
68  According to Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens, and Stephens (1992, 43) democracy “en-
tails, first, regular, free and fair elections of representatives with universal and equal 
suffrage, second, responsibility of the state apparatus to the elected parliament (possibly 
complemented by direct election of the head of the executive), and third, the freedoms 
of expression and association as well as the protection of individual rights against arbi-
trary state action.” 
69  This operationalization of democracy is a minimalist one, which leaves out a variety of 
issues that are dealt with in more complex conceptualizations. Notwithstanding, as re-
gime type is only one among several factors considered in this study, its operationali-
zation requires a reduction of complexity in order to focus on those elements crucial for 
the broader theoretical framework proposed in this study. Besides this, the operational-
ization is deliberately based on a formalist conceptualization of democracy which does 
not include issues such as the socio-economic requirements of real democratic partici-
pation. Despite my agreement with broader conceptualizations of democracy, the deci-
sion to adopt a formalist conceptualization has been taken consciously, because issues 
such as the impact of particular socio-economic structures on decision-making (and 
non-decision-making) processes are explicitly dealt with in separate research catego-
ries. 
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encing social policy through the construction of social movements becomes 
significantly more difficult. Finally, the third criterion is necessary to make 
sense of the first two criteria and the related theoretical assumptions. If parlia-
ments or presidents are elected but have little influence because the key deci-
sions are reserved to non-elected military officials, elections and their out-
comes lose much of their importance. I will follow the example of Haggard 
and Kaufman (2008), McGuire (2010) and Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens, 
and Stephens (1992) and define authoritarian regimes as those regimes that 
significantly violate the criteria for democracy established above. As the con-
tinuum of regimes that lie between the ideal types of democratic and authori-
tarian regimes is large, it is useful to define an intermediate category which I 
term semi-authoritarian regimes. These regimes partially comply with the 
above-mentioned criteria, such as free and fair elections, but violate other as-
pects, for example through veto-powers of military officials or the ban of major 
political forces. Each of these regime types is considered to cause a different 
distribution of institutional power resources. Democratic regimes are consid-
ered to provide high, semi-authoritarian regimes are considered to provide me-
dium, and authoritarian regimes are considered to provide low institutional 
power resources to the popular classes. 
The fourth type has been termed discursive power resources. This cate-
gory rests on the assumption that actors have better chances to prevail in the 
policy process when they are able to frame their particular goals as viable or 
even desirable for the wider society. This ability, in practice, heavily depended 
on the prevalence of different development paradigms, as these had vast influ-
ence on the public opinion, expert communities, and political circles in Latin 
America. The ISI paradigm and the post-neoliberal paradigm provided much 
more favorable conditions for framing egalitarian social policies as viable and 
desirable for the society as a whole than the neoliberal paradigm. Therefore, 
the ISI and post-neoliberal paradigms provide actors proposing such measures 
with high and the neoliberal paradigm with low discursive power resources. 
In accordance with Guillermo O’Donnell (1977, 551), a governing alliance 
is operationalized as “an alliance that imposes, through the institutional system 
of the state, policies conforming to the orientations and demands of its mem-
bers.” On this basis, the analysis of the social policy making processes in each 
subchapter will begin with the reconstruction of the negotiations, events and 
actions that resulted in the construction of the governing alliance that ruled 
during the respective period. This reconstruction will enable me to observe not 
only the composition of the alliance, but also to assess the relative weight and 
influence of different actors within it. Following this step, I will chronologi-
cally trace all major social policy reform processes during the period, examin-
ing the role of different actors and reconstructing the way in which the mobi-
lization of different power resources affected policy outcomes. 
94   
Sources of Empirical Information and Modes of Data-Collection 
For the implementation of the two methodological strategies, I draw on several 
complementary sources of empirical information and modes of data collection. 
This way I am able to obtain different perspectives on the subject and to com-
pensate for limitations of each source of information with the strengths of oth-
ers (Pickel 2009, 517–522). Due to the diverse kinds of information required 
and the long periods of time under study, this is characteristic for most histor-
ical analyses of macro-political processes (see e.g., Collier and Collier [1991] 
2009; Haggard and Kaufman 2008; Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens, and Ste-
phens 1992). 
Before I turn to the description of these sources and modes of data collec-
tion, it is useful to outline the kind of empirical information required for the 
analysis. Three main categories of necessary information can be distinguished: 
a) information on the structural, institutional and discursive contexts within 
which struggles over social protection for low-income earners took place; b) 
information on concrete processes of social policy change and the main actors 
involved in them; and c) information on the resulting social policies and their 
consequences for low-income earners. 
Secondary literature constitutes an important source for all three kinds of 
information. This is a common feature of most historical analyses of social 
policy change (see e.g., Haggard and Kaufman 2008; Huber and Stephens 
2012; McGuire 2010). Only this way is it possible to achieve adequate contex-
tual knowledge and to account for macro-political change over long periods of 
time. The information on a)70 and c)71 available in the secondary literature is 
abundant. Significantly less complete is the secondary literature on b), the po-
litical processes underlying social policy change. While some processes of re-
form are relatively well researched, there is a lack of sufficiently detailed in-
formation on others. In short, the secondary literature on the main political 
processes of social policy change is relatively abundant for the early period of 
social policy expansion between 1943 and 1955 and the retrenchment of the 
1990s. Regarding the main social policy reform processes during the remain-
ing years, primary sources of information have to be consulted more exten-
sively.72 
 
70 For comprehensive analyses of the structural, institutional and discursive transfor-
mations in Argentina since the mid-20th century see for example Adamovski 2012; 
Basualdo 2010 and 2011; James 1988; McGuire 1997; and Sikkink 1991. 
71 For comprehensive analyses of social policy development in Argentina since the mid-
20th century see for example Arza 2010; Belmartino 2005a; Golbert 2010; Feldman, 
Golbert, and Isuani 1988; and Lo Vuolo and Barbeito 1998a. 
72  As part of the generally immense academic interest in the early phase of Peronism, there 
exists considerable secondary literature on the process of social policy expansion be-
tween 1943 and 1955 (see e.g., Andrenacci, Falappa, and Lvovich 2004; Belmartino 
2005a; Berrotarán, Jáuregui, and Rougier 2004; Collier and Collier [1991] 2009; Isuani 
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Besides secondary literature, another important source of information for 
a) and c) are statistical databases. The national statistics institute INDEC, the 
SEDLAC Database (CEDLAS and World Bank 2018), CEPAL, the ILO, the 
World Bank, and the Groningen Growth and Development Centre (Timmer, 
de Vries, and de Vries 2014) provide ample statistical material regarding the 
transformations of the social and economic structures during the last 70 years 
in Argentina. Datasets of the Ministry of Economy contain disaggregated pub-
lic expenditure data that can be used for an assessment of changes in the size 
and structure of social expenditure. The social insurance institute ANSES and 
the ministries of labor, health, and social development furthermore provide 
data on social programs under their responsibility. The World Values Survey 
(Inglehart et al. 2014) provides survey data that allows us to track the rise and 
demise of neoliberalism as the dominant discursive paradigm in public opinion 
since the early 1990s.  
Where secondary information on c) is unavailable, insufficient, or not re-
liable, I additionally analyze legal texts and official documents to assess pro-
grammatic change in social policy. This has often been necessary since most 
secondary literature is focused on welfare regime development in general and 
therefore frequently lacks specific information regarding the implications of 
different reform measures for low-income earners. 
In sum, secondary sources, statistical databases, legal texts, and official 
documents provide ample information for a) and c). Information stemming 
from these sources for b) is sufficiently complete only for certain periods and 
reform processes. In order to fill this gap, I will consult different additional 
primary sources of information. One important primary source of information 
on those processes are 30 interviews with 28 experts that were conducted dur-
ing research stays in Argentina in 2013 and 2014. Expert interviews are par-
ticularly useful for the reconstruction of political processes, relatively time ef-
ficient and can be adequately focused on missing pieces of information (see 
e.g., Lauth, Pickel, and Pickel 2009, 167; Mieg and Brunner 2004, 199, 212ff). 
For my purpose, experts are those persons that due to their participation or 
other reasons possess special knowledge about the actors and actions involved 
in processes of social policy change in Argentina (see, Meuser and Nagel 2009, 
467ff; Mieg and Brunner 2004, 212). The interviewed persons are former 
 
2008; Lewis and Lloyd-Sherlock 2009; Ramacciotti 2009; Torre and Pastoriza 2002). 
The political processes of later periods of expansion of social protections during the 
1970s, the 2000s and the 2010s have been less often analyzed in the literature (see e.g., 
Arza 2012a; 2012b; Belmartino 2005a; Feldman et al. 1988; Golbert 2012). The politi-
cal processes underlying social policy retrenchment during the different authoritarian 
regimes between 1955 and 1983 and the failed attempts of social policy universalization 
during the democratic government of the 1980s have been the focus of significantly 
fewer analyses (see e.g.; Belmartino 2005a). More literature exists, in turn, on the po-
litical processes of social policy retrenchment during the 1990s (see e.g., Alonso 1998; 
2007; Lo Vuolo and Barbeito 1998a; Goldberg and Lo Vuolo 2006; Kay 2000). 
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ministers and ministerial employees, members of the parliament, political ad-
visers, trade union leaders and representatives, social movement leaders73 and 
representatives, and scientific experts. Most of these experts were selected be-
cause they have been directly involved in important reform processes since the 
1970s. Their participation occurred on different levels of these processes. 
While some experts, such as former ministers and members of parliament, pos-
sess special knowledge about the governmental and parliamentary level of the 
decision-making process, others, such as gender secretaries in trade unions or 
representatives of political parties, possess special knowledge about the inter-
nal dynamics of agenda-setting within collective actors of major importance. 
Only a small number of the interviewed experts are uniquely scientific experts 
on the subject who have no further involvement in political processes.74 In gen-
eral, the selection of experts aimed at obtaining different perspectives on the 
respective processes.75 
For each interview, a guideline was carefully prepared that took into ac-
count both the special knowledge that the respective interviewee could be ex-
pected to possess and the theoretical and empirical interest of my analysis 
(Meuser and Nagel 2009, 472f).76 Two of these interviews were completely 
transcribed and thematically analyzed. In accordance with Lauth, Pickel, and 
Pickel (2009, 177) and Meuser and Nagel (2009, 476 f), the transcription, ex-
cerption and content analyses of the other interviews was focused on themati-
cally important parts. 
In addition to expert interviews, campaign documents of collective actors 
and internal documents of the social security administrations were used to con-
firm and complement information accessed through expert interviews. Further-
more, introductory notes published with laws and decrees often contained 
 
73 Among these were leaders of feminist, indigenous, small farmers’ and unemployed 
workers’ movements.  
74  In practice, scientific social policy experts were often also participants in social policy-
making processes. Aldo Isuani and Pablo Vinocur, for example, are both academic so-
cial policy researchers, but at the same time political consultants and even occupants of 
high ranking government positions (secretaries) during the Presidency of De la Rúa. 
Only the following six interviews were specifically focused on the interviewees’ roles 
as scientific social policy experts: Guillermo Alonso (2014), Laura Golbert (2014), Ana 
Natalucci (2014), Daniel Nieto (2014), Sebastian Pereyra (2014) and Corina Rodriguez 
Enriquez (2014). However, even in these cases, all of them were in close contact with 
policy-makers, political leaders, parties and movements. Their important contribution 
therefore not only consisted in complementing the academic literature but also in 
providing numerous contacts to politicians that had been involved in crucial social pol-
icy reform processes. 
75 A detailed list of all the interviews can be found at the end of the study together with 
the literature list. 
76 Discussions with Hans-Jürgen Burchardt and colleagues from the Graduate School of 
Global Social Policies and Governance have significantly contributed to the elaboration 
of effective guidelines. 
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interesting information about what objectives the government was pursuing 
with the measures and which actors were involved in the elaboration processes. 
For more recent reform processes on which secondary information is particu-
larly scarce, I resorted to the online archives of three national newspapers (El 
Clarín, La Nación and Página 12). 
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4 The Politics of Social Protection for Low-Income 
Earners in Argentina, 1943–2015 
With the emergence and rise to power of the populist Peronist movement after 
1943, Argentina initiated the passage from a system of until then relatively 
limited social programs to a mass-based welfare state (Isuani 2008). Today the 
array of social policies in Argentina comprises everything from public educa-
tion, health care, and child allowances  through social health, pension, and un-
employment insurance  to social assistance and housing programs. However, 
the Argentine welfare state has developed in a highly fragmented way and pro-
vides significantly different levels of social protection to different segments of 
the population (Mera 2010; Belmartino 2005b; Lo Vuolo 1998a, 39; Lloyd-
Sherlock 2005; Maceira 2009). Over the last 70 years, social protections for 
low-income earners have been the subject of intense political struggles and 
different governments have pursued vastly different agendas. While during 
some periods social policy embarked on a decidedly progressive reform path, 
during others it underwent retrenchment and regressive remodeling.  
In the following, the text will reconstruct this history and analyze the struc-
tures, actors and processes that led to the significantly varying outcomes re-
garding social protections for low-income earners. After a brief part on the 
historical background before 1943, each period of either expansion, stagnation 
or retrenchment will be examined in a separate subchapter. In order to system-
atically explore the structural foundations of policy change, each of these sub-
chapters starts with an overview of the social, economic, and political context 
of the period. This provides us with an understanding of the political arena, 
that is, the constellations of actors and interests and the distribution of power 
resources. On that basis, each subchapter then traces the formation of govern-
ing alliances and the subsequent political struggles and processes of reform. 
The final part of each subchapter reviews the main patterns of social policy 
change, which facilitates the comparison with other periods. 
As the periods differ sharply in duration and the character of their reform 
processes, the chapters will also differ in their length.  
4.1 Historical Background and Social Policy before 1943 
Before 1943 public health, pensions and other income transfer policies were 
very limited. Low-income groups either lacked social protection or depended 
on the discretionary and often paternalistic support of charity organizations. 
Nevertheless, the small-scale social policy developments between the early 
  99 
19th century and 1943 are important to understanding the particular political 
dynamics of the subsequent construction of a broader welfare state. During this 
period, the emergence and increasing power resources of middle- and working-
class actors evolved into a challenge to oligarchic rule. Against this back-
ground, the latter adopted a double strategy of repression and concessions, in-
cluding charity and social insurance policies for selected groups of the society. 
Although these social policies covered a minimal share of the population, they 
contributed to the development of vested interests, which turned out to have an 
important impact on later welfare politics. 
Incipient Social Policy in the 19th Century 
The first very limited but state-sponsored social policies were implemented by 
provincial governments during the 1820s (Isuani 2008, 171). The Revolución 
de Mayo of 1810 initiated a process of independence from Spain and was fol-
lowed by a series of civil wars that caused severe social and economic diffi-
culties, impeded the consolidation of a national state for several decades and 
gave political predominance to the provincial governments. These were domi-
nated by the landed oligarchy, who controlled most of the Argentine agrarian 
economy and concentrated enormous wealth (Rapoport 2006, 31; Rock 1987, 
79–104). Against this background, provincial governments engaged in the fi-
nancing of charity societies that aimed by and large at the legitimization of 
their rule, the disciplining of the poor and the avoidance of social unrest (Isuani 
1985, 117–118; Isuani 2008, 171). The biggest of these societies was the So-
ciedad de Beneficencia, which was founded in 1823 in the Province of Buenos 
Aires. Similar associations were created in other provinces as well. Although 
these societies depended mostly on public funds, they were usually adminis-
trated independently by women of the economic and political elite (Golbert 
2008, 19). They ran hospitals, orphanages, and emergency accommodations; 
later some societies also handed out small cash benefits to persons in extreme 
poverty (Moreno 2004, 73). However, the conditions imposed on those receiv-
ing help were severe and the living conditions in these institutions were so 
adverse that their inhabitants showed a significantly elevated mortality rate (Is-
uani 2008, 171). All in all, the social protection offered to low-income groups 
by these societies was very restricted, discretionary and often tied to disciplin-
ing conditionality and moral paternalism (Passanante 1987, 30–31). 
With the consolidation of the national state towards the 1880s, public ed-
ucation was massively extended (Lo Vuolo and Barbeito 1998b, 117). One of 
the primary aims of this expansion was to foster national identity, which was 
perceived by the political elite as a necessary condition for the consolidation 
of the Argentine nation (Isuani 2008, 172). Cholera and yellow fever epidem-
ics during the 1860s and 1870s contributed to the creation of a National De-
partment of Hygiene and the extension of the network of publicly subsidized 
100   
hospitals (Golbert 2010, 54–55; Isuani 2008, 172). Nevertheless, state involve-
ment in the health care sector remained mostly limited to the prevention of 
epidemics (Isuani 2008, 172).  
Another form of social protection against health risks emerged with the 
foundation of mutual benefit societies from the mid-late 19th century on. 
Nearly all of these associations were established by immigrant workers so that 
most of them constituted at the same time collective associations based on class 
belonging or profession and on national origin (Munck 1998, 577). Among 
other things, these societies frequently fulfilled the functions of a health insur-
ance society (Golbert 2010, 57). Passanante (1987, 66–71) estimates that there 
were approximately 1,200 mutual benefit societies with over 500,000 members 
in 1914. According to Cortés, fewer than 10% of these mutual benefit societies 
belonged to trade unions around the turn of the century (cited in Lo Vuolo and 
Barbeito 1998b, 118). This situation would change radically towards the sec-
ond half of the 20th century when union-controlled health insurance funds were 
consolidated as one of the main pillars of the Argentine health care system. 
All in all, 19th-century state involvement in social policy was largely re-
stricted to those basic interventions that were perceived to be necessary to cre-
ate nationhood and to avoid fundamental threats, such as epidemics and social 
unrest.  
Structural Change, the Emergence of New Actors, and the Selective 
Implementation of Social Insurance Funds 
During the late 19th and early 20th century, Argentina experienced a period of 
accelerated economic growth and urbanization (Hänsch and Riekenberg 2008, 
60). In 1914, Buenos Aires reached a population of 1.5 million inhabitants 
(Collier and Collier [1991] 2009, 91). Other cities in the interior had also 
grown significantly, so that Argentina at that time constituted the most urban-
ized country in Latin America (Hänsch and Riekenberg 2008, 60). In combi-
nation with the consolidation of a public administration, a basic state infra-
structure and an expansion of urban industries, these developments led to the 
emergence of comparatively broad middle and working classes (Hänsch and 
Riekenberg 2008, 60). The size of the industrial labor force increased from 
approximately 120,000 workers in 1894 to nearly 400,000 in 1914 (Merkx 
1969, 91).77 Not surprisingly, these developments provided a favorable ground 
for the emergence and growing strength of the labor movement as well as mid-
dle-class demands for social and political participation (Collier and Collier 
[1991] 2009, 91–92). 
 
77  The share of the manufacturing workers of the total economically active population 
increased from 7% to 12%. 
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Although these new actors were still in the process of formation, their 
growing strength increasingly led to the perception among the conservative 
political and economic elite that repression alone would no longer be sufficient 
to confront them (Feldman, Golbert, and Isuani 1988, 28–29; Isuani 2008, 
172–173). Furthermore, experiences from Germany and other countries, where 
conservative governments used social legislation to assure the loyalty of public 
employees and to contain and divide the labor movement, were not unknown 
to Argentine elite circles (Golbert 2010; 36–38). These national and interna-
tional developments contributed to a gradual adoption of a double strategy of 
repression and social legislation towards these emerging actors (Feldman, Gol-
bert, and Isuani 1988, 28–29). 




Industry as share 
of GDP (%) 
Labor force  
in manufacturing  
industries 
Share of urban 
population (%) 
1894   – –          119,000                   37*** 
1914 -11.1 –          390,000                   53 
1919   4.8 17.9                     –                     – 
1920-1924   7.5 21.7                     –                     – 
1925-1929    4.7 24.2                     –                     – 
1930-1934 -0.3 23.7                     –                     – 
1935-1939 3.4 26.1          457,000*                     – 
1940-1944 3.5 26.3          844,000**                   62**** 
* 1935, ** 1943, *** 1895, **** 1947. Sources: Martínez (1998) for GDP growth; Rapoport (2006, 
138 and 229) for industry share of the GDP; Merkx (1969, 91) for labor force in manufacturing 
industries and Golbert (2010, 33) for share of urban population. 
As in many other countries, the first to receive public pension funds were priv-
ileged groups of public employees (Mesa-Lago 1978, 11). In 1904, coverage 
was extended to all employees of the public administration (Lo Vuolo and 
Barbeito 1998b, 116). While the loyalty of middle sectors in public employ-
ment was hence relatively early fostered through social legislation, working-
class demands were still responded to in a much more repressive way. Due to 
a variety of factors, Argentina had developed an exceptionally strong and mil-
itant labor movement since the mid-19th century (Collier and Collier [1991] 
2009, 92). Among the structural factors that facilitated this development were 
the incipient process of industrialization, a rapid progress of urbanization and 
the absence of an extensive labor reserve due to low levels of unemployment 
and a small peasantry (Collier and Collier [1991] 2009, 91–92; Lo Vuolo 
1998a, 36; O’Donnell 1977, 526–528). Furthermore, most industrial workers 
of that time were migrants  and many of them had already had experiences with 
trade unionism in their countries of origin and were familiar with anarchist and 
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socialist ideas (Collier and Collier [1991] 2009, 92). In 1901, socialists and 
anarchists formed the first trade union federation FOA (Federación Obrera Ar-
gentina). Under anarchist dominance, it soon changed its name to FORA (Fed-
eración Obrera Regional Argentina) (Golbert 2010, 39–40). Only one year 
later, in 1902, the first Argentine general strike inaugurated two decades of 
vigorous labor activism and fierce repression (Collier and Collier [1991] 2009, 
92). Ten general strikes took place during the first decade of the 20th century 
alone. As many as 220,000 workers participated in the biggest May Day 
demonstrations. Between 1907 and 1910, an impressive total of 785 strikes 
were carried out in Buenos Aires (Collier and Collier [1991] 2009, 93). The 
government often responded with repression to these protests, which, however, 
contributed to further radicalization and intensification of labor activism rather 
than to a pacification of the situation (Golbert 2010, 36).78 This increasingly 
aroused preoccupations among the oligarchic elite, who were not only con-
cerned with the magnitude and radical character of labor militancy but also 
with the fact that intensive strike activity in strategically important sectors of 
the Argentine agri-export model imposed painful economic costs on them (Is-
uani 2008, 172–173). In particular, the prolonged strike of the well-organized 
private railway workers during 1912 led to significant discomfort among the 
conservative elite (Feldman, Golbert, and Isuani 1988, 29). Although the po-
litical elite, and the oligarchy79 that dominated it, ideologically opposed redis-
tributive social policies,80 their inability to control labor militancy with repres-
sion alone led to the perception that social policies for selected and particularly 
dangerous sectors of the working class would constitute a necessary comple-
ment to repression (Golbert 2010, 36). Feldman, Golbert, and Isuani’s (1988, 
29) analysis of parliamentary debates on various initiatives for new social leg-
islation during these years clearly shows that the aim of containing and con-
trolling labor conflicts was the key motivator behind these elite initiatives. 
While several social policy initiatives failed due to intra-elite resistance, the 
railway workers strike of 1912 had been threatening enough to lead to the im-
plementation of the first pension fund for a working-class occupational group 
in Argentina in 1915 (Feldman, Golbert, and Isuani 1988, 29). In order to dis-
incentivize strike participation among railway workers, the law included an 
 
78  The repression of the May Day demonstration in 1909, for example, led to the organi-
zation of a further general strike and the assassination of the police chief of Buenos 
Aires by an anarchist (Collier and Collier [1991] 2009, 93). 
79  With the term oligarchy I refer to the relatively small and largely conservative elite of 
big landowners that dominated the Argentine agricultural, financial and commercial 
sectors until at least the early 1940s. Birle (1995, 68–79) provides a good discussion of 
the literature on the mechanisms through which the oligarchy also dominated the suc-
cessive governments during this period.  
80  For a good analysis of the anti-redistributive positions of the employer associations 
during this period see Birle (1995, 68–78). For a historical reconstruction of employer 
resistance to redistributive policies during this period see Lvovich (2005). 
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article which determined that workers fired due to strike activities would com-
pletely lose pension rights, including all contributions made until that date (Is-
uani 1985, 122).  
This pattern of a slow, gradual expansion of social insurance coverage to 
middle-class sectors and selected occupational groups of the working class 
continued until the early 1940s. In 1921 utility workers81 and in 1923 bank 
employees were provided with pension funds (Golbert 2010, 53). In 1939, mer-
chant seaman, print workers, and journalists obtained pension funds (Lewis 
and Lloyd-Sherlock 2009, 117). In sum, however, these fragmented social pol-
icies reached only small minority groups, so that by 1944 merely 7% of the 
economically active population were covered by pension insurance (Feldman, 
Golbert, and Isuani 1988, 31). A similar trend can be observed in the provision 
of public financing for mutual benefit societies, which provided health insur-
ance to their members. Only societies linked to certain groups of public em-
ployees, such as police and military officers, and well organized and strategi-
cally located working-class sectors, such as the railway workers, received con-
siderable financial support (Tobar 2001, 18).  
Figure 1: Incorporation of additional occupational groups and evolution of legal pension cover-
age, 1904–1939 
Sources: Arza (2010, 259). 
Neither the democratizing reforms of 1912 nor the rise to power of the Unión 
Cívica Radical party (UCR) between 1916 and 1930 significantly altered this 
trend. One reason why democratization did not lead to fundamentally different 
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directions in social policy is that democratization itself was part of the same 
double strategy of repression and concessions that the oligarchy employed to 
consolidate its power in the face of emerging middle- and working-class pres-
sures. In line with social insurance funds for public employees and other mid-
dle-class occupational groups, the introduction of the free, secret and universal 
male vote was part of a series of policies implemented by conservative elites 
in order to reinforce the loyalty of public employees and to win middle-class 
support as a subordinate force in the governing alliance (Rock 1975, 26–35). 
Although initially feared by parts of the oligarchy, the UCR governments fi-
nally turned out to embody precisely this alliance between a still dominant ol-
igarchy and newly incorporated middle-class sectors (Birle 1995, 76; Rock 
1975, 41).82 Democratization provided institutional power resources for the 
working class and other marginalized groups as well, but this did not lead to 
their incorporation into the governing alliance for a variety of reasons. For one 
thing, popular class forces themselves were neither strong enough nor willing83 
to lead a governmental alliance. Attempts by populist currents within the UCR 
to incorporate popular class forces into the governmental alliance, in turn, 
failed due to a mixture of different factors. First, during the late 1910s, the 
UCR government was not only confronted with labor militancy but also with 
a wave of massive and violent conservative mobilization as a reaction to the 
former (Collier and Collier [1991] 2009, 146–147). Second, predominantly an-
archist and syndicalist trade unions were largely unwilling to cooperate with 
the government (Isuani 1985, 118). Third, vast parts of the popular sector, such 
as women or recent migrants, were impeded from voting  (Isuani 1985, 117–
118). Fourth, the violent conservative mobilization, the slow-down of the in-
dustrialization process and the rise of unemployment during World War I dec-
imated the associational and structural power resources of the labor movement 
(Collier and Collier [1991] 2009, 146–147; Golbert 2010, 46, 63; Merkx 1969, 
91). And fifth, the dominance of the liberal economic paradigm provided a 
hostile discursive context for proposals of redistributive social policy. On the 
grounds of this paradigm, the elite was successful in framing redistributive 
policy as undesirable for the society as a whole, due to its supposed negative 
effects on economic growth and work ethic (Lvovich 2005, 143). 
After the UCR government intensified its attempts to reduce the influence 
of the oligarchy during the late 1920s, a right-wing military coup ended the 
democratic experience and led to a restoration of old mechanisms of oligarchic 
 
82  The unbroken influence of the oligarchy was reflected in both favorable policies and 
the presence of members of the oligarchy in pivotal positions of the UCR governments 
and party leadership (Birle 1995, 76; Hänsch and Riekenberg 2008, 61).  
83  This skepticism towards electoral politics was largely due to the predominance of anar-
chist and syndicalist currents within the labor movement (Collier and Collier [1991] 
2009, 93). 
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rule, such as electoral fraud and corruption (Birle 1995, 77–78; Collier and 
Collier [1991] 2009, 149; Riekenberg 2009, 134–135). 
Political Dynamics, Patterns of Social Policy Change, and Path 
Dependency Effects 
During the 19th century, public social policy was limited to basic interventions 
that were perceived to be necessary to avoid fundamental threats and to provide 
the basis for the formation of an Argentine national identity. Economic growth 
and urbanization contributed to the emergence of working and middle classes 
and the successful constitution of collective actors. These actors began to chal-
lenge the dominant political role of the conservative oligarchy. Concerning the 
middle classes, the oligarchic elite pursued a strategy of co-optation and grad-
ual concessions from the late 19th century on. Among these concessions was 
the extension of certain social benefits to middle-class sectors and the democ-
ratizing electoral reform of 1912. This strategy was relatively successful in 
safeguarding the oligarchy’s political dominance by incorporating middle-
class sectors into the governing alliance. In contrast, the popular classes re-
mained excluded from this alliance and repression continued to constitute the 
primary response to their demands. Popular class actors were clearly too weak 
to dispute the elite–middle class alliance’s control over the government. Dur-
ing the first half of the 20th century, The Socialist Party, and later the Confed-
eración General del Trabajo (CGT), demanded universalistic and redistributive 
social policies but were far from reaching majorities for their proposals in the 
parliament (Golbert 2010, 64; Lvovich 2005, 140–142). However, some occu-
pational groups that had attained considerable levels of associational and struc-
tural power resources, such as railway workers and merchant seamen, were 
capable of inflicting significant economic harm on the oligarchy. The fact that 
repression alone proved insufficient to contain the vigorous activism of these 
unions led the governing alliance to combine repression with fragmented and 
divisive social policy measures. These were deliberately limited to very small 
segments of the popular classes. Other segments, which lacked comparable 
structural and associational power resources, and hence most low-income earn-
ers, remained largely excluded from social protection.  
The introduction of particularistic social policies for certain occupational 
groups furthermore created vested interests that gradually began to generate 
tensions within the labor movement. Although the Argentine labor movement 
remained left-wing and continued to promote universal and egalitarian social 
policies, the defense of existing benefits also began to narrow the array of uni-
versalization strategies that would find the approval of the most powerful sec-
tors of the movement (Golbert 2010, 64; Lo Vuolo and Barbeito 1998b, 118; 
Lvovich 2005, 151) 
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4.2 Popular Class Incorporation and Social Policy 
Expansion, 1943–1955 
Between 1943 and 1955 social policy was massively expanded to cover hith-
erto excluded groups. This constituted a significant improvement of social pro-
tection for low-income earners, regarding both quality and coverage. In politi-
cal terms, this process was closely related to the construction and consolidation 
of a new, more inclusionary governing alliance that successively incorporated 
the working class and the urban and rural marginalized sectors as crucial sup-
port bases. The successful formation of this governing alliance, in turn, de-
pended on social, economic and political developments that gradually altered 
the distribution of power resources in favor of popular class actors and in-
creased their willingness to cooperate with the government.  
The Political Arena: Social and Economic Context, Constellation of 
Actors, and Distribution of Power Resources 
The eruption of the world economic crisis in 1929 severely affected Argentina 
and set in motion significant transformations of the economic, social, and po-
litical landscape. The contraction of the global demand for agricultural prod-
ucts and the parallel fall of prices resulted in a reduction of nearly 40% of the 
export value, which triggered a balance of payments  crisis, a forced reduction 
of imports and a 14% decrease of the GDP in only three years (Birle 1995, 79–
80). The social consequences were dramatic. Unemployment and poverty in-
creased steeply, particularly among rural workers and small farmers (Golbert 
2010, 63). Due to the lack of alternative employment opportunities in rural 
areas, this led to a significant intensification of the urbanization process and a 
profound deterioration of housing conditions in the urban centers (Birle 1995, 
81; Golbert 2010, 63). At the same time, import restrictions imposed after the 
crisis fueled a process of industrial growth oriented towards the production of 
goods for the national market (Rofman and Romero 1997, 163–164). The ini-
tiation of World War II further reinforced this process, as many countries ex-
porting industrial products to Argentina shifted their resources towards arms 
production (Rock 1987, 238). These developments had important effects on 
the social structure. Between 1935 and 1941, the number of workers in manu-
facturing industries increased from less than 400,000 to over 730,000 and un-
employment declined considerably (Birle 1995, 82; Murmis and Portantiero 
2004, 140). During the years of the Peronist government, these trends contin-
ued so that by 1946 the number of manufacturing workers increased to over a 
million and full employment was reached (Merkx 1969, 91; Torrado 1992, 
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175). By 1950, industrial84 employment accounted for nearly 30% of the work-
force and over 36% of the GDP (Timmer, de Vries, and de Vries 2014). These 
developments significantly increased the structural power resources of the pop-
ular classes and also provided favorable conditions for the expansion of their 
associational power resources through unionization. 
Table 2: Economic and social context, 1943–1955 
Year 
    GDP  
    growth  




as share  
of GDP (%) 






1943 0.8 – – – < 6 
1944 10.5 – – – < 6 
1945 - 3.2 19.9 – – < 6 
1946 8.9 17.6 – – < 6 
1947 11.1 13.6 – – < 6 
1948 5.5 13.1 – – < 6 
1949 -1.3 31.0 – – < 6 
1950 1.2 15.6 36.5 29.9 < 6 
1951 3.1 36.7 36.8 30.6 < 6 
1952 -6.6 38.8 35.3 30.4 < 6 
1953 5.4 4.0 32.9 28.0 < 6 
1954 4.4 3.8 34.4 30.3 < 6 
1955 4.2 12.3 35.3 31.8 < 6 
Sources: Martínez (1998) for GDP growth 1943 and 1944; Rapoport (2013) for GDP growth 
and inflation 1945–1955; Timmer, de Vries, and de Vries (2014) for industry share of the GDP 
and share of industrial employment; Torrado (1992, 175) and Belini (2014) for unemployment. 
As in other countries, the economic crisis of the early 1930s led to increasingly 
widespread doubts regarding the adequacy of the dominant liberal economic 
paradigm and the capacity of the market to solve the major economic and social 
problems of the time (Golbert 2008, 21). Nevertheless, despite the de facto 
occurring process of import substitution and the increasing discredit of the lib-
eral economic paradigm, Keynesian ideas were still largely absent from the 
debates of the 1930s in Argentina (Lvovich 2005, 143).85 Towards the late 
1930s and early 1940s, this situation began to change. The recurrent failure of 
economic policies inspired by the liberal paradigm and the rather positive 
 
84  The numbers for the industrial sector here and later in the text include manufacturing, 
construction and utilities. 
85  Rather than breaking with the liberal economic paradigm, the governments of the 1930s 
and early 1940s tried to adapt the agri-export model to the new international framework 
(Birle 1995, 82).  
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results of the first attempts of more interventionist policies contributed to the 
rapid spread of Keynesian ideas around the world (Flier 2005, 197; Sikkink 
1991, 41–42). In Latin America, Keynesian ideas merged with those of local 
economists surrounding the United Nation’s Economic Commission for Latin 
America86 to form the paradigm of Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) 
(Bethell 1996, 216; Burchardt 2006, 34). By the mid-1940s, these ideas came 
to constitute the dominant economic paradigm in Argentina. They were shared 
by a wide range of Argentinian intellectuals and economists and for “the ma-
jority of the population, some form of import-substituting industrialization, 
whether national populist or developmentalist, was the most compelling op-
tion” (quote: Sikkink 1991, 3; see also: Andrenacci, Falappa, and Lvovich 
2004: 90; James 1988, 19–20). While the most important Argentine employ-
ers’ associations continued to advocate the liberal economic paradigm, it had 
clearly lost its popular support (Birle 1995, 89–110, Sikkink 1991, 3). The 
shifting predominance from the liberal economic paradigm to the ISI paradigm 
was accompanied by related ideational developments in specific social policy 
fields. In the area of social security, the ILO became globally influential in 
promoting state-led expansions of social insurance arrangements from the 
1930s on (Flier 2005, 199–202; Gaggero and Garro 2004, 175).87 During the 
1940s, the ILO’s major concern shifted from the expansion of social insurances 
to the promotion of broader concepts of social security that would encompass 
non-salaried parts of the population (Flier 2005, 206–207). The influence of 
these concepts was additionally reinforced during the 1940s through the wide-
spread international attention to the universalistic prescriptions of the Beve-
ridge Report (Belmartino 2005d, 107). The dramatic social consequences of 
the crisis and the incapacity of the existing systems of social protection to cope 
with them contributed to the fact that these international ideas soon became 
increasingly popular in Argentina (Belmartino 2005d, 123; Flier 2005, 198). 
Taken together these changes in the ideational context shifted significant dis-
cursive power resources to actors who favored the extension of social protec-
tions. 
The transformations of the social, economic, and discursive context were 
accompanied by new developments in the realm of actors participating in so-
cial politics. The decline of foreign trade and the deterioration of the terms of 
trade reduced the economic weight of the hitherto dominant agricultural sector 
and increased the relative weight of the industrial sector (Thorp 1992, 183–
184). In 1943, the value of industrial production surpassed that of agricultural 
production for the first time (Rock 1987, 232). Within the industrial sector, the 
weight of local market-oriented small- and medium-size enterprises increased 
 
86  Elsewhere referred to with its Spanish acronym CEPAL. 
87  The foundation of the Inter-American Conference on Social Security within the ILO in 
1942 furthermore served to reinforce such ideas at the regional level (Flier 2005, 199–
202). 
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with the process of import substitution. Although these industries would have 
benefited from a more protective state, this did not translate into a repositioning 
of the main industrial employer association, the UIA. Dominated by large en-
terprises, the UIA continued to adhere to the liberal economic paradigm and 
pursued interests quite similar to those of the agricultural, commercial, and 
financial employers’ associations (Birle 1995, 85–86). An extension of social 
protections to low-income groups was rejected by employers’ organizations in 
concert with conservative politicians, arguing that this would have adverse ef-
fects on the economy and the work ethic of the beneficiaries (Golbert 2010, 
46; Lvovich 2005, 143). 
The labor movement, in contrast, reinforced its commitment to broad and 
redistributive social policies. In 1930, the socialist and the syndicalist trade 
union confederations joined forces to form the CGT, which from 1935 was 
dominated by the more moderate socialist current (Golbert 2010, 64; Murmis 
and Portantiero 2004, 141). In 1931, the CGT presented its political platform, 
the Programa Mínimo, which included explicit demands for the establishment 
of a national social insurance system that would cover unemployment, health, 
maternity, invalidity, and pension benefits (CGT 1931, reprinted in Golbert 
2010, 64). Both the CGT and the Socialist Party promoted universal social pol-
icies, which would have benefited the majority of the popular sector, unlike 
the selective concessions implemented by the exclusionary governing alliances 
before 1943. While the labor movement possessed strong associational and 
structural power resources in only a few specific branches of the economy, its 
ambition was nevertheless to represent the social policy interests of the popular 
sector as a whole (Gaggero and Garro 2004, 176; Lvovich 2005, 141–142). 
This universalistic orientation went along with determined efforts to strengthen 
trade unionism in weakly organized branches in the industrial, service, and the 
agricultural sectors (Doyon 1984, 205). Although the railway sector remained 
the best-organized sector, by the early 1940s trade unions in other sectors such 
as commerce, construction, and the textile industry were growing rapidly 
(Doyon 1984, 222). Overall trade union membership increased from about 
370,000 in 1936 to about 470,000 in 1940 and 530,000 in 1945 (Doyon 1975, 
154–160; Murmis and Portantiero 2004, 133).88 In the late 1930s and early 
1940s, tensions within the labor movement emerged between the defense of 
existing social protections for some occupational groups, the aims of newly 
organized occupational groups to attain similar protections in the short term, 
and the universalistic medium- and long-term goals of the CGT and the Social-
ist Party (Gaggero and Garro, 176; Lvovich 2005, 148). This led to the ac-
ceptance of a double strategy on the part of the CGT and the Socialist Party 
 
88  Trade union density among all wage earners was approximately 11% in 1941 and 1945 
(estimates based on Doyon 1975, 154–160). Among industrial workers trade union den-
sity was estimated between 20% and 30% in 1939 (Murmis and Portantiero 2004, 134–
135). 
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that approved the gradual extension of social protections through the creation 
of new social insurance funds for certain occupational groups in the short-term 
without renouncing the long-term goal of a universal social security system 
(Gaggero and Garro, 176; Lvovich 2005, 150). 
With the coup d’état of 1930, the military entered the political arena, in 
which it was going to constitute an important actor during the following 53 
years. Although there existed different factions within the military, its overall 
political orientation was right-wing, Catholic, nationalist and authoritarian 
(Riekenberg 2009, 133). Towards labor and its demands for redistributive pol-
icies it took a repressive stance. During the 1930s, parts of the military were 
increasingly inclined to support industrialization policies, as this was seen to 
open the way for more national sovereignty and the construction of an inde-
pendent national arms industry (Hänsch and Riekenberg 2008, 61). 
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In sum, since the early 1930s, the economic, social, and political context had 
undergone substantial transformations. The labor movement was significantly 
strengthened. Expanding union affiliation had increased its associational 
power resources. Low levels of unemployment and the ongoing process of in-
dustrialization provided it with additional structural power resources. The in-
creasing predominance of the ISI paradigm, both among experts and among 
the wider public, generated a favorable societal climate for redistributive social 
policies and increased the discursive power resources of progressive actors. 
Arguments of employers’ associations and conservative politicians about the 
disadvantageous economic effects of redistributive social policies were no 
longer credible in the eyes of the majority. Furthermore, the increasingly 
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reformist orientation of the labor movement opened new options for strategic 
alliances. By the early 1940s, these developments had created favorable con-
ditions for the formation of a new, more inclusionary governing alliance that 
would push forward the extension of social protections to hitherto excluded 
low-income sectors.  
Labor Incorporation and Social Policy Expansion under Military Rule, 
1943–1946 
The process of re-composition of the governing alliance commenced with the 
coup d’état of 1943 and the designation of Juan Domingo Perón as secretary 
of labor. From this position, Perón strategically pursued the construction of an 
alliance with sectors of the trade union movement, which later constituted the 
principal source of support that enabled Perón to win the presidential election 
in 1946.  
Several concerns motivated the right-wing military coalition that carried 
out the coup d’état on the 4th of June 1943. Among them were the rejection of 
the civilian government’s likely presidential candidate Patron Costas and wor-
ries that the ongoing electoral fraud would pave the way for political radicali-
zation and communist subversion (Collier and Collier [1991] 2009, 331; Rock 
1987, 247). 
During the first months, the military government adopted a decidedly re-
pressive stance towards labor. Shortly before, different approaches to partisan 
politics had led to a split of the CGT into a CGT-1 and a CGT-2. This division 
significantly reduced labor’s capacity to contest government repression 
(Doyon 1984, 205). The CGT-2 comprised most of the communist-led unions 
and those socialist-led unions that closely cooperated with the Socialist Party. 
It was immediately dissolved after the coup d’état and many communist union 
leaders were arrested (Del Campo 2012, 181). The CGT-1, which comprised 
most of the unions that were more independent of political parties, was allowed 
to persist but its powerful railway workers’ unions were put under control of 
military-nominated trustees (Murmis and Portantiero 2004, 150).  
Due to internal realignments, however, the military government’s repres-
sive approach to labor would soon give way to a more cooperative stance. In 
October 1943, the Grupo de Oficiales Unidos (GOU) faction became the dom-
inant force within the military government. Juan Domingo Perón, a member of 
the GOU, became secretary of labor and social security (Collier and Collier 
[1991] 2009, 331–332). Like most of the military, the GOU was authoritarian, 
nationalist, and fiercely anti-communist. Notwithstanding, in contrast to sec-
tors of the military that were more closely aligned with the traditional oligar-
chy, the GOU promoted protectionist industrialization policies that were per-
ceived to increase the economic independence of Argentina and to enable the 
strengthening of the national arms industry (Birle 1995, 91–92).  
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While the GOU held a dominant position within the military, the military 
government pursued policies congruent with the ISI paradigm, which aroused 
the resistance of the traditional employer sectors, which continued to promote 
free-market policies based on the liberal paradigm. Employer opposition meant 
that the military government lacked virtually any powerful civilian support 
base for its program (Rock 1987, 249–250). The urgent need for civilian sup-
port certainly contributed to an increased acceptance within the military of Pe-
rón’s strategy towards labor. Perón replaced the purely repressive approach 
with a mixed approach that combined repression of communists and uncoop-
erative unions with massive benefits for unions that were willing to support the 
military government and himself as secretary of labor (Collier and Collier 
[1991] 2009, 332; Torre 1989, 539).  
Perón had good reasons to reach out for labor support. First, by 1943 labor 
had achieved unprecedented power resources and the structural conditions 
were favorable for a further increase. Second, in contrast to the employers’ 
associations, the trade unions and also the unorganized working class were 
supportive of the industrialization policies based on the ISI paradigm that the 
military government was hoping to implement (Collier and Collier [1991] 
2009, 349; James 1988, 19–20). Third, Perón saw no contradiction between 
anti-communism and an alliance with the trade union movement. For him, 
strong labor unions and social policies were the most effective barrier against 
communism (Birle 1995, 104; Rock 1993, 159). Fourth, the construction of an 
alliance with organized labor constituted the basis for Perón’s personal quest 
for power and influence (Collier and Collier [1991] 2009, 335). 
Given the relative strength of the Argentine trade union movement, Perón 
had to make unprecedented material and symbolic concessions in order to se-
cure trade union and working-class support. At the same time, the successful 
construction of an alliance between Perón and a large part of the trade union 
movement also rested on the fact that by the early 1940s a significant portion 
of the latter was open to considering such an alliance. One factor contributing 
to this openness was the ideological moderation of the labor movement and the 
growing independence of many socialist-led trade unions from the Socialist 
Party during the 1930s (Murmis and Portantiero 2004, 138). A second factor 
lies in the traumatic individual and collective experiences that workers and 
their organizations had undergone during the period of the conservative regime 
between 1930 and 1943. Average real wages had stagnated between 1929 and 
1942, most strikes had been lost and the working class felt excluded from po-
litical decisions and stigmatized with low social status (James 1988, 25–30; 
Murmis and Portantiero 2004, 141–145). Against this background, the unprec-
edented material concessions and the symbolic recognition that Perón granted 
to labor fell on fertile ground. Finally, although the trade union movement had 
gained significantly in size and strength, it lacked a powerful partisan repre-
sentation. Neither the Socialist nor the Communist Party had managed to win 
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significant electoral support (Riekenberg 2009, 135). For labor, there seemed 
to be no realistic means to participate in policy making other than cooperating 
with Perón, at least in the short run. 
The first trade unions that openly declared their support for Perón were the 
railway workers’ unions, at that moment by far the biggest and most powerful 
unions (Del Campo 2012, 249–256; Doyon 1984, 222). In October 1943, Lieu-
tenant Colonel Domingo Mercante, a close ally of Perón and son of a railway 
unionist, was appointed new trustee of the railway workers’ unions. Mercante 
initiated a close cooperation with the displaced former union leaders and in 
September 1944 returned union control to them (Del Campo 2012, 254; Mur-
mis and Portantiero 2004, 150). Simultaneously, important social policy con-
cessions were granted. Among the concessions were enormous subsidies to the 
mutual benefit society of the railway workers. These were used for the con-
struction of polyclinics, hospitals, pharmacies and service centers. To lastingly 
improve the finances of the trade union-controlled mutual benefit society, an 
obligatory contribution from all workers in the sector and regular public sub-
sidies were introduced (Del Campo 2012, 201–202). These measures were re-
ceived with gratitude by the railway unions. On the 26th of April 1944, railway 
union leaders published an open letter in which they enumerated the multiple 
benefits that the secretary of labor had implemented in favor of the railway 
workers and declared their loyalty to him (Del Campo 2012, 252–253).  
Soon after, Perón praised the railway workers’ decision to support the mil-
itary government in a way that can be understood as an appeal to the other 
unions to adhere as well:  
The railway workers will always have the glory of having been the first who un-
derstood us and supported us. When the history will judge this new era of Argen-
tine social policy, when many will have to be ashamed of having obstructed the 
course of our great social achievements, the railway union may waive its crest 
clean and proud because it was the precursor of the triumph of our righteousness 
over demagoguery, sectarianism, and abstentionism. (Perón quoted in Del Campo 
2012, 253–254, author’s translation) 
The third largest Argentine trade union, the shop workers’ union, initially took 
a critical stance towards the military government. But after the Labor Depart-
ment had implemented the pension fund for shop workers for which the trade 
union had intensively campaigned since 1940, this union as well declared its 
support for Perón and its general secretary, Ángel Borlenghi, grew to be one 
of Perón’s closest allies (Del Campo 2012, 276–277; Lvovich 2005, 150). Over 
the period 1944 to 1945, the number of trade unions supporting the military 
government, and in particular Perón, increased rapidly and finally comprised 
the vast majority of all trade unions (Murmis and Portantiero 2004, 153). The 
CGT and other labor organizations even organized massive demonstrations in 
favor of Perón, the military government, and its social and labor policies (Col-
lier and Collier [1991] 2009, 339). Unprecedented material benefits such as 
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favorable social and labor policies and support in collective bargaining were 
decisive in the decision of many of these unions to support Perón (Collier and 
Collier [1991] 2009, 337–338; Del Campo 2012, 256–266). In addition to im-
portant material benefits, Perón understood the importance of symbolic ges-
tures such as the recognition of labor as a respected political actor and its es-
sential contribution to the country’s wealth and culture (James 1988, 7–40). 
While cooperative trade unions could expect massive concessions, oppo-
sitional trade unions had to expect fierce repression. The communist-led con-
struction workers union, which in 1941 was the second biggest Argentine trade 
union, rapidly disintegrated after about 1,200 of its leaders and activists were 
arrested and 130 of its local offices closed. Other influential communist-led 
trade unions in the steel and meatpacking sector met similar fates. At the same 
time, Perón supported parallel unions that had often been created beforehand 
by socialists (Del Campo 2012, 266–273). The capacity of the state to control 
trade unions was increased even more in 1945 with the issue of Decree-Law 
23.852,89 which provided the Labor Department with the capacity to decide 
which unions would be officially recognized and hence enabled to undertake 
collective bargaining. In many cases, union members themselves deserted the 
organizations that did not shift to support the government in exchange for the 
enormous benefits that this implied (Collier and Collier [1991] 2009, 339). 
In terms of social policy, the process of construction of a new governing 
alliance between 1943 and 1945 led to an important expansion of coverage. As 
it had before 1943, the extension of social rights was largely dependent on the 
distribution of power resources within the popular sector. The powerful rail-
way unions were among the first to receive social policy benefits in the form 
of favorable regulations and important subsidies that helped to further develop 
and institutionalize the trade unions’ social health insurance. However, the dy-
namic of social policy expansion after 1943 significantly differed from the 
gradual expansion prior to that time. Perón was not only interested in control-
ling and de-radicalizing the trade union movement, but also in gaining its sup-
port. This meant that the social policy agenda of the secretary of labor soon 
reached out for the support of workers and trade unions in other branches. In 
pursuit of this aim, a variety of measures were implemented that expanded so-
cial protections to hitherto excluded groups, many of which constituted sectors 
with relatively low-income. With the implementation of the pension fund for 
the commercial sector and the incorporation of new groups of workers into pre-
existing funds, pension coverage increased steeply from less than 500,000 af-
filiated workers in 1943 to more than 1,200,000 in 1945 (Gaggero and Garro 
2004, 181). In October 1943, the National Division of Public Health and Social 
Assistance was created in order to increase the state’s role in the still largely 
private health care sector (Andrenacci, Falappa, and Lvovich 2004, 103–104). 
 
89  More detail on all cited laws and decrees can be found in the Laws and Decrees section 
after the literature list. 
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One year later, the National Social Security Institute was founded to advance 
a program of centralization and universalization of social protections inspired 
by the Beveridge Report (Golbert 2010, 83). Furthermore, several new regula-
tions restricted rents for housing, implemented accident insurance, reinforced 
workplace regulations, introduced paid vacations and holidays, provided sev-
erance pay and restricted dismissal, created labor courts and an annual thir-
teenth month’s wage (Collier and Collier [1991] 2009, 337–338; Golbert 2010, 
80–81; Torre and Pastoriza 2002, 280–282) 
The process of social policy expansion was, however, not devoid of con-
tradictions. On the one hand, newly created institutions such as the National 
Social Security Institute promoted the centralization and universalization of 
social protections in line with ideas that were popular among international ex-
perts at that time. Perón, on the other hand, de facto initiated a fragmented 
expansion of social protections by providing specific occupational groups with 
pension funds or by supporting selected trade unions by extending their health 
insurance funds (Andrenacci, Falappa, and Lvovich 2004, 100–101; Belmar-
tino 2005a, 109–129). 
Democratization, Low-Income Earner Incorporation, and Social Policy 
Expansion, 1946–1955 
While the military government, and in particular Perón as its secretary of labor, 
enjoyed widespread support from the union movement and the working class, 
the employer associations increasingly criticized the government for its social 
and labor policies (Birle 1995, 94). In June 1945, a broad coalition of employ-
ers’ associations sent a memorandum to the President and published a mani-
festo in which they fiercely opposed the program of the secretary of labor. In 
the following days, large segments of the middle classes, nearly all political 
parties, most of the media, the US ambassador and important parts of the judi-
ciary and the military voiced support for the manifesto (Del Campo 2012, 239–
248).  
Perón rejected the criticism outright, and responded with a radicalization 
of his discourse, speaking of the “dictatorship of capital” and the intentions of 
the “eternal economic oligarchy” to “violently shout down the claims of the 
humble”90 (quoted in Del Campo 2012, 283–284). The shop workers’ union 
quickly declared its willingness to defend the social policies of the secretary of 
labor and called upon the other unions to organize a joint demonstration. The 
vast majority of the trade unions joined the effort and on the 12th of July 
300,000 workers gathered on the streets (Del Campo 2012, 288; Murmis and 
Portantiero 2004, 151–152). From now on, Perón repeatedly emphasized that 
the working class had to defend the social achievements of the Department of 
 
90  Translated by the author. 
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Labor and that with their support many more social improvements were going 
to be implemented (Del Campo 2012, 305–306). 
In response the opposition intensified their own agitation. During the 
months of August and September, several massive demonstrations were under-
taken by oppositional parties, trade unions, students’ and employers’ associa-
tions, some of which were met with brutal repression (Del Campo 2012, 295–
308). In the face of the escalation of the conflict, an oppositional military sector 
finally achieved the ouster and arrest of Perón in October 1945 (Torre 1989, 
545). Most of the organized labor movement and the working class perceived 
Perón’s removal from office as an attack on the social policies implemented 
under his influence, and hence, as an assault on their interests (Murmis and 
Portantiero 2004, 162). On the 17th of October, a massive demonstration of 
workers filled the Plaza de Mayo in front of the Casa Rosada, the government’s 
headquarters. Impressed by the capacity of mobilization and internally divided 
over the question of Perón, the military government finally decided to release 
him and to announce elections for the following year (Collier and Collier 
[1991] 2009, 339–340).  
The presidential and legislative elections held on the 24th of February 1946 
were a contest between two broad, ideologically heterogeneous, multi-class 
alliances. Both contained progressive and conservative elements, yet to differ-
ent degrees. The Democratic Union was supported by the socialist and com-
munist parties, but the overwhelming majority of Democratic Union voters 
were mobilized by conservative forces such as the UCR,91 the PDP, and the 
employers’ associations. The Peronist alliance was supported by the Catholic 
church, the military, a splinter group of the UCR,92 the conservative Partido 
Independiente and the progressive Partido Laborista. The Partido Laborista, 
which had been created by prominent trade union leaders shortly after the an-
nouncement of elections, was by far the party with the biggest capacity for 
electoral mobilization (Birle 1995, 95–96; Collier and Collier [1991] 2009, 
345). 
Thanks to the massive electoral support of the working class and the lower 
popular classes, the Peronist alliance won the presidential elections and broad 
majorities in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate (Collier and Collier 
[1991] 2009, 340; Del Campo 2012, 346–348; Levitsky 2003, 27). While Pe-
rón had been able to establish a high level of control over the labor movement 
during his time as secretary of labor, the developments since mid-1945 had 
also impressively shown how much he depended on labor’s powerful support. 
Perón himself was in many aspects right-wing and authoritarian, but the incor-
poration of the labor movement and the assumption of influential positions in 
the government and the parliament by long-standing labor leaders implied the 
 
91  The UCR cannot be classified as a typical conservative party, but in 1946 it was led by 
its conservative wing, to which the presidential candidate José Tamborini belonged. 
92  The UCR Renewal Board. 
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strengthening of progressive elements within the governing alliance. Most of 
the Partido Laborista leaders had socialist and anarcho-syndicalist back-
grounds, and the party’s rank and file was influenced by the membership of 
defecting socialists, communists, Trotskyists and progressive UCR members 
(Del Campo 2012, 330–332; Murmis and Portantiero 2004, 160). These ideo-
logical influences found their expression in the progressive character of the 
Partido Laborista’s declaration of principles and its electoral platform for 1946 
(Partido Laborista 1945, 1946). In these documents, the Partido Laborista ex-
plicitly rejected racism and other forms of discrimination and inequality and 
demanded an extension of political rights to women. Furthermore, it demanded 
far-ranging redistributive measures, including the extension of the social secu-
rity system to all Argentine residents. As concrete steps in this direction, the 
electoral program explicitly called for the introduction of pension funds for 
industrial, rural and domestic service workers and the extension of public 
health care provision. Interestingly, the platform extended far beyond repre-
senting the social policy interests of the organized working class to include 
those of still unorganized and marginalized groups. This corresponded to both 
the importance that its left-leaning leaders attributed to solidarity and egalitar-
ianism and their political aim to construct the broadest possible electoral alli-
ance in favor of distributive policies, comprising “workers, employees, peas-
ants, artists, and intellectuals as well as small merchants, manufacturers and 
agricultural producers”93 (Partido Laborista 1945). The vital contribution of 
the Partido Laborista to the electoral victory and Perón’s dependence on the 
support of the popular classes contributed to the fact that during the following 
years most of the proposed measures would be implemented. 
The electoral success was moreover facilitated by the circumstance that 
the overwhelming majority of the Argentinians at that time were influenced by 
the ISI paradigm (James 1988, 19–20; Sikkink 1991, 3). This provided the Pe-
ronist alliance with additional discursive power resources, in the sense that the 
promise of economic growth with and through redistribution was credible in 
the eyes of the majority, while the anti-redistributive arguments of the employ-
ers’ associations adhering to the Democratic Union had lost much of their per-
suasiveness (James 1988, 19–20). Redistribution was widely perceived as con-
tributing to economic growth and social development (Sikkink 1991, 31).  
Another decisive factor for understanding the following extension of so-
cial protections to hitherto unprotected low-income groups is that the return to 
democracy not only increased the overall power resources of the popular clas-
ses but also altered the distribution of power resources within and among these 
classes. Between 1943 and 1945, Perón had bid mainly for the support of or-
ganized labor, knowing that their real and potential associational and structural 
power resources could constitute a crucial pillar of support. Yet, with the 
 
93 Author’s translation. 
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developments of 1945 and the return to democracy, Perón felt an urgent need 
to broaden his support base. Initially, Perón’s objective was to construct a co-
alition that would comprise both labor and capital. However, the principal em-
ployers’ associations took a clearly oppositional stance.94 Under these circum-
stances, Perón opted for reinforcing as much as possible his support base 
among the popular classes. While associational power resources were mainly 
concentrated on certain segments of the working class, the right to vote pro-
vided institutional power resources to other segments of the popular classes, 
including unorganized and economically marginalized urban and rural sectors. 
In a similar vein as the Partido Laborista, Perón reacted to the new distribution 
of power resources and the existing alliances with the conception of a broad 
popular class-based coalition that was going to require further social policy 
concessions to both the working class and the marginalized urban and rural 
populations in order to be consolidated. 
Hence, from 1945 on, the governing alliance experienced another broad-
ening through the incorporation of economically marginalized groups, such as 
rural workers and internal migrants. In part due to this process, the participa-
tion of people of indigenous and mixed descent was considerably higher in the 
Peronist alliance than in the opposition (Camarero 2004, 33; Itzigsohn and 
Vom Hau 2006, 204–205). Anti-Peronist discourses therefore often took ad-
vantage of the racism inherent to widespread conceptions of the Argentine na-
tion as “white and European” and othered the Peronists as “los negros” and 
“los cabecitas negras” (Itzigsohn and Vom Hau 2006, 204–205).95 Through the 
introduction of female suffrage in 1947 and the formation of the Women’s Pe-
ronist Party  in 1949, the alliance furthermore strengthened its appeal to women 
(Barry 2008; Fisher 2000, 323–324; Guy 2009, 153–157). The following elec-
tions showed how successful the incorporation of these groups was. The share 
of Peronist votes was significantly higher among women than among men, and 
among economically marginalized rural and urban sectors than among the es-
tablished working class (Barry 2011, 25; Levitsky 2003, 41). While neither of 
these newly incorporated groups achieved political influence comparable to 
that of the organized labor movement, their incorporation would nevertheless 
be reflected in social policies that aimed at reinforcing their support. As Lewis 
(1993, 189) rightly formulated it, social policy “served as the cement of the 
Peronista, Populist alliance.” 
 
94  In 1952, Perón established a pro-Peronist employer association called Confederación 
General Económica (CGE) which represented mostly small- and medium-sized indus-
trial companies of the interior of the country that produced for the local market (O’Don-
nell 1988, 34–35). Even this pro-Peronist association was more distanced from the gov-
ernment than the trade union movement. While it supported the government’s interven-
tionist economic policies, it criticized what it saw as the excessive costs of the social 
policies (Birle 1995, 107–108). 
95  Literally meaning “blacks” and “black heads.” 
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Table 4: Composition of the new governing alliance, 1946* 
 
Support expanding 
social protections for 
low-income earners 




social protections for 
low-income earners 
Actors · Majority of trade  
unions (CGT) 
· Partido Laborista** 




· Catholic Church*** 
· Parts of the military 
· Minority faction of 
national market  
oriented small and 




· Lower popular    
classes 
· Working class 
· Lower middle class-
es in small towns 






Type of  
alliance Inclusionary-redistributive 
Strength of  
the alliance Strong and united 
* Although the composition of the alliance underwent changes and gradually weakened be-
tween 1946 and 1955, the inclusionary-redistributive character persisted over the period.  
** Later these parties merged to form the Peronist Party. *** Later left the alliance and joined 
the opposition. 
Perón’s agenda was inclusionary, in the sense that it promoted the political and 
social incorporation of long-excluded social groups. However, it was also pro-
foundly authoritarian, in the sense that it aimed at achieving nearly complete 
control over the supporting forces and increasingly repressed the opposition. 
As will be seen, the way social policies were institutionalized reflected this 
dual strategy of mobilization and control (Andrenacci, Falappa, and Lvovich 
2004; Belmartino 2005a, 109–129). 
In terms of social policy expansion, Perón continued to deliver quickly 
after the elections. The often immediate character of Perón’s responses to so-
cial demands significantly contributed to his popularity among the popular 
classes as it provided credibility to one of his frequently repeated slogans: “Do-
ing is better than talking, implementing is better than promising” (Del Campo 
2012, 200). In May 1946, the Decree-Law 13.937 created the pension fund for 
industrial workers and hence implemented one of the measures the Partido La-
borista had proposed in order to universalize pension insurance coverage. This 
measure, together with the incorporation of several occupational groups into 
other existing pension funds, gave another decisive push to the extension of 
pension coverage to hitherto excluded groups. The number of covered workers 
increased from 1,200,000 in 1945 to 2,250,000 in 1946, which represented ap-
proximately 45% of the workforce (Gaggero and Garro 2004, 180–181; Gol-
bert 2010, 84).  
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Only nine days after the creation of the pension fund for industrial work-
ers, Perón ordered the dissolution of the relatively autonomous parties in his 
coalition and created a single party that he planned to keep kainly under his 
own control. Partido Laborista leaders that openly opposed this order were 
harshly repressed, some even subjected to violent assaults and imprisonment 
(Del Campo 2012, 350–357). In a similar way, Perón continued to increase his 
control over the trade unions. Through the provision of benefits for cooperative 
unions and the application of repression to oppositional unions, Perón was able 
to achieve far-ranging authority over nearly all trade unions by the early 1950s 
(Collier and Collier [1991] 2009, 341; Mainwaring and Seibert 1982, 515; 
McGuire 1997, 56–59; Torre 1989, 547). At the same time, the government 
actively supported the organizing efforts of the unions. In combination with a 
favorable social and economic context,96 this allowed for an unprecedented 
expansion of union density from approximately 18% in 1946 to 43% in 1954 
(Doyon 1975, 154–160).97 
Table 5: Evolution of trade union membership during the first Peronist government, 1946–1955 
Sector 1946 1948 1950 1954 
Agriculture – – 17,500 53,250 
Mining 14,400 19,500 24,500 48,750 
Food industry 167,650 337,142 444,781 377,800 
Textile industry 60,650 100,899 107,500 121,000 
Tailoring 36,425 54,633 68,750 58,000 
Woodworking industry 21,855 39,045 40,000 23,000 
Paper and press 19,577 46,854 52,000 42,500 
Chemicals industry 5,000 – 20,000 31,000 
Rubber industry 7,500 7,809 17,500 17,000 
Leather industry 7,285 15,618 20,000 23,500 
Construction 26,215 54,663 122,000 155,250 
Metal industry 21,855 108,326 112,500 118,000 
Electricity 15,000 15,618 35,000 33,000 
Transport 178,109 306,977 311,623 411,531 
Communications 22,570 39,045 32,500 37,500 
Commerce and banking 89,066 132,735 189,500 195,500 
Personal services 63,100 112,945 206,500 211,500 
 
96  Full employment, the rapid expansion of the industrial sector and the dominance of the 
ISI paradigm provided an extraordinarily favorable context for efforts to increase trade 
union affiliation. 
97  In absolute numbers this represented an increase from 880,000 union members in 1946 
to 2,260,000 union members in 1954 (Doyon 1975, 154–160). 
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Sector 1946 1948 1950 1954 
Public service sector 80,135 145,471 163,500 407,750 
Overall union members 877,333 1,532,925 1,992,404 2,256,580 
Union density 18% 31% – 43% 
Sources: Doyon (1975, 154–160). 
The fact that Perón had gained extensive control over union leaders did not 
stop their rank and file members from demanding further benefits (Mainwaring 
and Seibert 1982, 519). Given that the popular classes increasingly constituted 
his only solid base of support, Perón had good reasons to frequently attend to 
their social demands with new reform measures (Torre 1989, 548; Mainwaring 
and Seibert 1982, 518). Indeed, due to a variety of factors, including the intro-
duction of female suffrage, the takeover of hitherto Catholic social assistance 
by the Fundación Eva Perón (FEP) and the increasingly quasi-religious traits 
of the Peronist leader cult, the government was gradually losing the support of 
the Catholic Church (McGuire 1997, 73–74; Rock 1993, 176–177). The in-
creasing tensions with the church also contributed to the growing opposition 
of military leaders, who rejected Perón’s redistributive agenda as well as his 
alliance with the trade union movement. These tensions further increased when 
the economic crisis that began in 1949 led to limitations on the acquisition of 
new military equipment (Rock 1993, 154–182). Moreover, his attempts to con-
struct a support base among employers were hardly successful. Despite the 
foundation of a government-friendly umbrella organization, the Confederación 
General Económica (CGE), the vast majority of employers stuck to a liberal 
economic world view and remained in political opposition to the government 
(Collier and Collier [1991] 2009, 347-349; Mainwaring and Seibert 1982, 
518). In the area of pension policies, the government’s dependence on popular 
class support contributed decisively to an ongoing expansion of coverage. Dur-
ing the early 1950s, the CGT reinforced its demand for incorporation of rural 
workers into the pension system, to which the government responded with the 
creation of the rural workers’ pension fund in 1954 (Gaggero and Garro 2004, 
183; Law 14.399). That same year, Law 14.397 created obligatory pension 
coverage for self-employed workers and employers. The following year, a 
member of the parliament representing the Women’s Peronist Party, Delia De-
gliuomi de Parodi, successfully passed a bill that aimed at providing work reg-
ulations and pension access to domestic workers (Tizziani 2013). The coup 
d’etat of 1955 impeded the implementation of the law, but soon after Decree 
326/56 implemented a similar although less generous proposal. By 1956, the 
pension system had been extended to the whole economically active popula-
tion (Golbert 2010, 84).  
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Figure 2: Incorporation of additional occupational groups and evolution of legal pension cover-
age, 1943–1955 
Sources: Feldman et al. (1988, 30) and Arza (2010, 259). 
This did not mean that in practice the whole economically active population 
was contributing to one of the pension funds. From early on, the CGT criticized 
the evasion of pension contributions by many employers (Gaggero and Garro 
2004, 182). In 1950, the existing pension funds received correct contributions 
for 86% of the theoretically covered workers. In 1955, this number decreased 
to only 50%, which was mainly due to the fact that affiliation with the newly 
created pension funds was still low (Arza 2010, 260; Gaggero and Garro 2004, 
180). Nevertheless, the expansion of pension coverage during the Peronist gov-
ernment was massive. By 1955 nearly 2,500,000 Argentinians were effectively 
contributing to the pension system, at least six times as many as in 1944 (Gag-
gero and Garro 2004, 180; Feldman, Golbert, and Isuani 1988, 30). In contrast 
to the slow extension of pension coverage before 1943, the expansion affected 
not only relatively small and well-organized occupational groups but benefited 
many low-income earners in initially weakly organized sectors. What further-
more reinforced the redistributive character of this expansion was the permis-
sive access criteria and the progressive benefit calculation formulas. In 1954, 
Law 14.370 determined that only five years of contributions were necessary to 
achieve pension rights. Under these circumstances, even workers who had 
been excluded from formal work during most of their lives could relatively 
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Figure 3: Pension replacement rates introduced in 1954 
Sources: Law 14.370. 
The same law created uniform, progressively scaled replacement rates for all 
public pension funds. This meant that low-income earners could get up to 
100% wage replacement. For higher incomes, the rate gradually decreased to 
reach only 15% for every peso earned above a certain threshold (Law 14.370).  
The Peronist government also expanded the provision of health care to the 
popular classes. In May 1946, the Public Health Department was created (Gol-
bert 2010, 87). Inspired by the international discourses on public health of the 
time, the department elaborated a universal program of public health care ex-
pansion which was also anchored in the first five-year plan of the government 
(Belmartino 2005d, 127–128; Golbert 2010, 88). The program was mainly 
aimed at guaranteeing free access to health care to an estimated 65% of the 
population, those who could not afford medical attention (Andrenacci, 
Falappa, and Lvovich 2004, 105). The ambitious project contemplated an in-
crease of the number of hospital beds from 60,000 to over 140,000, of the num-
ber of nurses from 8,000 to 46,000, a geographically more equitable distribu-
tion of physicians, and the construction of 800 health care centers distributed 
all over the whole country (Andrenacci, Falappa, and Lvovich 2004, 105–106; 
Ross 1993, 120). However, right from the beginning, the implementation of 
this program met with considerable difficulties.  
One of the main difficulties was the existence of contradicting political 
strategies for health care expansion within the Peronist alliance. In contradic-
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institutionalized the first trade union-controlled health insurance fund for rail-
way workers in 1944. This contributed decisively to the fact that the powerful 
railway workers’ unions were the first to openly declare their loyalty to Perón 
(Del Campo 2012, 201–202). As this strategy proved effective in mobilizing 
trade union support, the government continued with this strategy after 1946. 
Until 1950, similar health insurance funds were established for workers of the 
glass industry, bank and insurance employees and the employees of the Con-
gress and of the Ministry of War (Belmartino 2005a, 115–116; Danani 2005, 
170). Nevertheless, the relative importance of these health insurance funds 
should not be overstated. In contrast to the pension insurance funds, coverage 
remained relatively low and the expansion of the universal public health care 
system was clearly receiving far more resources during the first Peronist gov-
ernment (Andrenacci, Falappa, and Lvovich 2004, 105–106; Danani 2005, 
130).  
Compared to the establishment of a limited number of trade union-con-
trolled health insurance funds, the expansion of the public health system was 
capable of mobilizing broader popular class support. Both the organized work-
ing class and the electorally important but largely unorganized rural and urban 
low-income sectors benefited from this expansion. Notwithstanding, conflict-
ing interests within the Peronist alliance posed difficulties for the implementa-
tion of a unified public system. The first problem regarded the financing of the 
public health system. The Public Health Department originally aspired to re-
ceive a proportion of the funds of the National Social Security Institute. The 
institute, however, was de facto undermined by Perón’s strategic decision to 
expand the pension system by introducing additional pension funds rather than 
establishing a centralized system (Golbert 2010, 83). This meant that the Pub-
lic Health Department lacked its own resources. Instead, it had to rely on the 
provincial governments and other ministries for the expansion of public health 
care facilities, which decisively contributed to the institutional fragmentation 
of the sector (Andrenacci, Falappa, and Lvovich 2004, 100–106). This frag-
mentation was further exacerbated when Perón supported a more politicized 
expansion of public health care through the FEP, which constituted one of the 
mechanisms through which the Peronist alliance mobilized the political sup-
port of economically marginalized sectors (Belmartino 2005a, 116–117; 
Stawski 2004, 222). This fragmentation and the unwillingness of physicians to 
work in marginalized rural areas contributed to the persistence of important 
degrees of inefficiency and inequality in the public health system (Ross 1993, 
118–122). In sum, however, the public health care system was massively ex-
panded and the access of low-income earners significantly improved. Between 
1946 and 1953 the number of hospital beds increased from 60,000 to 130,000 
and the number of nurses from 8,000 to 18,000 (Andrenacci, Falappa, and Lvo-
vich 2004, 105; Ross 1993, 119–120). The Public Health Department, which 
was upgraded to a ministry in 1949, increased its overall number of employees 
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from 7,000 in 1946 to 35,000 in 1955 (Katz and Muñoz 1988, 104). Several 
successful campaigns against infectious diseases were undertaken in rural ar-
eas and 200 health centers built in small communities (McGuire 2010, 131). 
This contributed to a significant improvement in health indicators. Infant mor-
tality fell from 80 per thousand in 1943 to 60 in 1954 and life expectancy in-
creased from 62 years in 1947 to 67 in 1953 (Escudero 1981, 562; Torre and 
Pastoriza 2002, 293). 
The incorporation of marginalized rural and urban sectors into the associ-
ational and electoral support base of the Peronist alliance was also reinforced 
by an expansion of social assistance policies (Golbert 2008, 27–28). In 1946, 
the government took control of the semi-private charity societies that had car-
ried out most of the publicly financed social assistance until that moment. Dur-
ing the following two years, most of the assets and activities of these charity 
societies were integrated into the Public Health Department, the National De-
partment of Social Assistance and the FEP, whereby the latter clearly became 
the most important institution (Andrenacci, Falappa, and Lvovich 2004, 107; 
Golbert 2008, 27–28). Besides the aforementioned role in the provision of 
health care, the FEP distributed cash benefits, scholarships, and goods to poor 
households. Moreover, it provided an extensive infrastructure for social assis-
tance including emergency accommodations, retirement homes, social housing  
projects, holiday camps and supply stores with subsidized prices (Andrenacci, 
Falappa, and Lvovich 2004, 109; Golbert 2010, 95–96). In general, the activi-
ties of the FEP aimed at both mitigating poverty and generating support among 
the marginalized sectors of society. Frequently these activities included clien-
telistic practices and were accompanied by intensive pro-Peronist publicity 
(Andrenacci, Falappa, and Lvovich 2004, 108–109; Stawski 2004, 222). It 
proved useful to the Peronist government to channel the majority of the funds 
to the FEP instead of state agencies, because the former largely escaped par-
liamentary control due to its formally private status as a foundation; this facil-
itated the use of the funds for shoring up political support. In order to assure 
the political impact of the FEP’s actions, only committed Peronists were hired 
as staff (Stawski 2004, 210–214). The mechanisms through which the founda-
tion mobilized popular class support are well exemplified by the distribution 
of non-contributory pensions to needy elderly persons. Applications for these 
pensions had to be made to the FEP, where the politically committed staff had 
large discretion in deciding whose applications to accept, providing ample op-
portunities for clientelistic practices (Stawski 2004, 200). Once the first thou-
sand beneficiaries had been selected, a glamorous public event was organized 
at the Teatro Colón in which Eva Perón personally handed out the benefits 
(Gaggero and Garro 2004, 187). Although the non-contributory pension 
scheme was restricted to only certain geographical areas and remained quite 
limited, in sum the resources channeled to social assistance policies through 
126   
the FEP were considerable. In 1951, the FEP constituted nearly 7%98 of the 
total public expenditure (Belmartino 2005a, 116–117). Due to the fact that the 
FEP was financed to a large degree by obligatory wage deductions paid by 
formal workers and semi-voluntary donations by the trade unions, the founda-
tion constituted also a significant mechanism of income redistribution from the 
established working class to the economically marginalized segments of the 
popular classes (Torre and Pastoriza 2002, 295).  
Political Dynamics, Patterns of Social Policy Change, and Path 
Dependency Effects 
From the mid-1930s on, the Argentine labor movement saw its power re-
sources significantly enhanced. Expanding union affiliation increased its asso-
ciational power resources. At the same time, the process of industrialization 
and declining levels of unemployment provided it with additional structural 
power resources. Furthermore, the increasing dominance of the ISI paradigm 
in public opinion provided the labor movement with ample discursive power 
resources that enabled it to frame its demands for redistribution as viable and 
desirable for the society as a whole. Against this background, a re-composition 
of political alliances was initiated with the coup d’état in 1943, which eventu-
ally gave way to the emergence and consolidation of a new, more inclusive 
governing alliance. As secretary of labor of the military government, Perón 
originally pursued the construction of a broad multi-class alliance including 
both capital and labor. Considering the relative strength of the labor movement, 
its incorporation required significant symbolic and material concessions, 
among which the expansion of social policy played a prominent role. While 
big parts of the labor movement proved to be cooperative, the employer asso-
ciations refused the government’s social and economic policies and so did the 
currents of the military elite that adhered to a rather liberal economic paradigm. 
By 1945, pressures from employers and the political opposition had increased 
in such a way that Perón was removed from office and arrested. However, due 
to massive strikes and demonstrations in favor of Perón, the military govern-
ment decided to release him and to announce free elections for 1946. Quickly 
the majority of trade union movement joined forces to establish the Partido 
Laborista, which would constitute the backbone of Perón’s electoral success in 
the upcoming elections. The return to democracy furthermore brought about a 
reshuffling of power resources, which would be reflected in another broaden-
ing of the governing alliance and an extension of social policy benefits to eco-
nomically marginalized urban and rural sectors. These largely unorganized 
sectors possessed few associational and structural power resources, but the 
 
98  This equaled approximately 1% of the GDP (author’s calculations based on data from 
Belmartino 2005a, 116–117, and Martínez 1998, 17). 
  127 
return to democracy provided them with the right to vote, and hence with a 
crucial institutional power resource. Moreover, the predominance of the ISI 
paradigm in public opinion made it easier to frame redistributive policies in 
favor of the marginalized sectors as being beneficial to society as a whole. 
Under these circumstances, the Partido Laborista decided to adopt a program 
of social policy universalization that reflected its ambitions of creating a broad, 
popular class-based electoral alliance ranging from the marginalized rural and 
urban sectors through the organized working class to segments of the middle 
classes. The adoption of an egalitarian social policy program was moreover 
facilitated by the left ideological positions of most of its leaders. 
Once in power, Perón delivered quickly and extended social protections 
for both the organized labor movement and the largely unorganized marginal-
ized urban and rural sectors. The gradual loss of support from the church and 
the military further exacerbated Perón’s political dependence on popular class 
support, which in turn contributed to the continuity of the process of social 
policy expansion until 1955. 
By 1956, all occupational groups were covered by the pension system and 
the criteria for access and the calculation of benefits were highly progressive, 
clearly favoring low-income earners. Even though the generalization of a con-
tribution-based social insurance system faced in practice difficulties in incor-
porating informal workers as contributors, the permissive access criteria which 
required only five years of contributions de facto meant that the vast majority 
of informal workers were going to be able to receive pension benefits at retire-
ment age. Access to health care was extended through the creation of a free 
and universal public health system, the strengthening of trade union-controlled 
health insurances and the expansion of a network of hospitals controlled by the 
FEP. The latter also significantly expanded the coverage of social assistance 
policies, including the distribution of basic supplies, cash benefits and social 
housing. Although certain privileges for powerful occupational groups were 
preserved in the pension and health care systems, most resources were concen-
trated on the expansion of coverage to hitherto excluded groups. All in all, 
social protection for low-income earners was massively expanded between 
1943 and 1955.  
In many senses, this period also shaped the foundations on which later 
social politics would take place. Important path dependency effects emanated 
from the particular social policy legacy left by this period. The fragmented 
expansion of the pension system and the institutionalization of some trade un-
ion-controlled social health insurances created significant vested interests in 
the preservation of particular privileges. At the same time, the politicized and 
hardly institutionalized character of social assistance made it easy for subse-
quent governing alliances to dismantle these structures. Further crucial path 
dependency effects resulted from Perón’s authoritarian restructuring of the la-
bor movement. On the one hand, the Peronist government fostered trade union 
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organization and therefore contributed to the achievement of unprecedented 
levels of associational power resources and considerable degrees of unioniza-
tion also in small companies and among low-income earners. 
On the other hand, Perón established nearly complete control over the 
movement. This process led to the marginalization of left currents in the move-
ment, generated a significant autonomy of the leaders from the rank and file, 
and instituted a far-reaching dependence on the state. Taken together, these 
factors contributed to the development of a broader but less progressive and 
less democratic trade union movement in Argentina. For a majority of the un-
ion leaders, the defense and extension of particularistic benefits would come 
to constitute a crucial axis of involvement in social politics. 
Table 6: Change in social protection for low-income earners, 1943–1955 
Pension policies + Massive expansion of coverage to hitherto excluded groups 
+ Introduction of uniform and permissive access criteria, that  
de facto allowed most low-income earners and even informal  
workers to receive benefits 
+ Introduction of progressive replacement rates that strongly  
favored low-income earners 
- Proliferation of a fragmented system with privileges for certain 
occupational groups 
Health care policies + Creation and expansion of a free, universal and public health 
care system 
+/- Simultaneous creation of a limited number of social health  




+ Massive expansion of social assistance expenditure to  
approximately 7% of public expenditure and 1% of the GDP 
+ Proliferation of social housing, rural health and assistance  
pension programs 
- Clientelism and discretionality instead of rights-based access 
Family allowance 
policies 
+/- No major change 
Overall evolution of social protection 
for low-income earners Strong expansion 
On the other hand, Perón established nearly complete control over the move-
ment. This process led to the marginalization of left currents in the movement, 
generated a significant autonomy of the leaders from the rank and file, and 
instituted a far-reaching dependence on the state. Taken together, these factors 
contributed to the development of a broader but less progressive and less dem-
ocratic trade union movement in Argentina. For a majority of the union leaders, 
the defense and extension of particularistic benefits would come to constitute 
a crucial axis of involvement in social politics. 
  129 
4.3 Military Intervention, Exclusionary Governing 
Alliances, and Regressive Social Policy Reform,  
1955–1973 
The 1955 military coup led to an abrupt expulsion of the popular classes from 
the governing alliance. During the following 18 years, recurrent military inter-
ventions, the proscription of Peronism and a reduction of the power resources 
of progressive popular class actors effectively blocked the formation and rise 
to power of inclusionary alliances. Under these circumstances, overall social 
policy change was clearly regressive. As during the decades preceding 1943, 
improvements in social protection were mainly conceived as concessions to 
those parts of the popular classes that had significant structural and associa-
tional power resources at their disposal. In contrast to the pre-1943 period, the 
union movement had become significantly broader and stronger, so that social 
policy concessions between 1955 and 1973 were more generous and reached 
significantly more people. Low-income sectors, however, lacked associational 
and structural power resources and were largely deprived of their electoral 
power resources in the face of authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes. 
Against this background, most low-income sectors experienced a significant 
restriction of their access to social protection. 
The Political Arena: Social and Economic Context, Constellation of 
Actors, and Distribution of Power Resources 
An economically benign international context, the continuity of the process of 
industrialization and a massive expansion of public employment quickly cre-
ated conditions of full employment during the first years of the Peronist gov-
erning alliance (Birle 1995, 102; McGuire 1997, 58; Torrado 1992, 175). Even 
when Argentina slid into economic crises during 1949 and 1952, employment 
levels remained largely stable (Andrenacci, Falappa, and Lvovich 2004, 93–
94; Torrado 1992, 175). This situation would change with the coup d’état of 
1955. The implementation of structural adjustment programs and the economic 
crises of 1959 and 1962–63 triggered a rise of open unemployment to nearly 
9% in 1963, which was followed by a gradual decline to around 5% during the 
late 1960s (McGuire 1997, 95; Torrado 1992, 176). However, by and large, the 
ISI model remained intact. Industrial production as a share of GDP rose from 
35% in 1955 to 41% in 1973 and industrial employment moderately increased 
from 32% to 33% of the labor force. At the same time, the declining importance 
of the agricultural sector continued, so that between 1955 and 1972 its share of 
GDP fell from 13% to 9% and its share of the labor force from 26% to 17% 
(Timmer, de Vries, and de Vries 2014). Under these circumstances, the struc-
tural power resources of the labor movement remained relatively high, 
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although the rise in unemployment implied a moderate decline compared to 
the previous period. 

















1955 4.2  12.3 35 32 – 
1956 2.8  13.4 35 32 – 
1957 5.1 27.7 35 34 – 
1958 6.1 22.5 36 35 – 
1959 -6.4 113.7 33 33 – 
1960 7.8 27.3 34 35 – 
1961 7.1 13.5 35 35 – 
1962 -1.6 28.1 33 33 – 
1963 -2.4 24.0 33 31 8.8 
1964 10.3 22.2 35 32 6.9 
1965 9.1 28.6 36 33 5.3 
1966 0.6 31.9 36 32 5.5 
1967 2.6 29.2 36 32 6.4 
1968 4.4 16.2 37 32 4.9 
1969 8.5 7.6 39 33 4.3 
1970 6.4 13.6 40 33 4.9 
1971 4.8 34.7 40 33 6.0 
1972 3.1 58.5 41 33 6.6 
1973 6.1 60.3 41 33 5.8 
Sources: Rapoport (2013) for GDP growth and inflation; Timmer, de Vries, and de Vries (2014) 
for industriy share of GDP and share of industrial employment; Torrado (1992, 175) for unem-
ployment. 
The establishment of authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes deprived the 
popular classes of their electoral power resources for advancing redistributive 
policies. Already Perón had begun to undermine democracy through a variety 
of measures such as repression against non-Peronist politicians, constraints on 
opposition parties’ access to the media and the partisan manipulation of district 
boundaries (Collier and Collier [1991] 2009, 342–343; McGuire 1997, 69; 
Rock 1987, 305). Nevertheless, the ways in which Perón gradually undermined 
democracy did not curb the necessity of the Peronist alliance to appeal to the 
popular classes, as they constituted the main electoral support base and source 
of legitimation. Growing opposition within the army and the church even 
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exacerbated the dependence of the governing alliance on the popular class vote 
(Birle 1995, 98; Collier and Collier [1991] 2009, 334–342). Under these cir-
cumstances, the electoral process continued to provide the popular classes with 
power resources that could be mobilized through and for the expansion of so-
cial protections. The 1955 coup finally eliminated this mechanism. From 1955 
to 1958 and from 1966 to 1973 Argentina was governed by authoritarian mili-
tary governments. Between 1958 and 1966 several elections were held, but the 
electoral force that captured the vast majority of the popular class support, Pe-
ronism, was banned. The military furthermore vetoed any attempt of these ci-
vilian governments to adopt a pro-Peronist or redistributive agenda (Collier 
and Collier [1991] 2009, 486–488; Golbert 2008, 43; McGuire 1997, 82). By 
this means, the mobilization of the popular classes’ electoral power resources 
through and for redistributive policies was largely blocked between 1955 and 
1973. This proved particularly disadvantageous for most of the low-income 
sectors, as these sectors lacked structural and associational power resources 
(Golbert 2010, 100). 
Import Substitution Industrialization remained the dominant economic 
paradigm during the period (Sikkink 1991, 3). This provided progressive actors 
with discursive power resources, which enabled them to frame their demands 
for redistribution as desirable for the society as a whole and supportive of the 
overriding goal of industrial development. Yet, in the absence of free elections, 
one of the most important mechanisms for transmitting discursive power re-
sources into policy change was blocked; namely the formation of electorally 
successful redistributive alliances.  
In terms of associational power resources, the trade union movement had 
grown massively during the previous period. Although the more repressive 
stance of the post-1955 governments showed some effects, the organizational 
strength of the trade union movement remained on a high level compared to 
other Latin American countries. Between 1954 and 1964 union density de-
clined moderately from an estimated 43% to an estimated 36% (Doyon 1975, 
154–160; Torre 1973, 909).99 The structural, associational and discursive 
power resources of the trade union movement enabled it to exercise significant 
pressure on both the employers and the government (Golbert 2010, 100). How-
ever, the distribution of associational power resources was highly unequal 
among different segments of the popular classes. While approximately 80% of 
all workers in the energy sector and 66% of transport and communication 
workers were organized in 1964, this was the case for only 5% of the rural 
workers (Torre 1973, 909). In general, the economically marginalized sectors 
of the popular classes tended to possess low associational power resources. 
The solidarity of better organized sectors could have partially remedied such 
 
99  There are differing estimates of union density for both years, however all authors agree 
that there was a moderate decline (see e.g., Doyon 1975, 154–160; Lamadrid and Orsatti 
1991, 153–156; Marshall and Perelman 2004, 36; Torre 1973, 909). 
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associational weakness, yet for reasons described above the emphasis of trade 
union participation in social politics was increasingly on the defense and im-
provement of existing social rights and less so on the extension of social pro-
tections to still insufficiently protected groups. 
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The employer associations continued to oppose redistributive social policies 
and the permanent threat of military intervention deterred most of the civilian 
parties from an open pursuit of redistributive agendas (Birle 1995, 110–135; 
Collier and Collier [1991] 2009, 496–497; Sikkink 1991, 8–9). 
In sum, the context between 1955 and 1973 was unfavorable for the emer-
gence of powerful alliances in favor of an expansion of social protections for 
low-income earners. Only during the last years of the period did left-leaning 
forces gain strength within and without the Peronist movement and the trade 
unions (Collier and Collier [1991] 2009, 496; McGuire 1997, 150).  
The Expulsion of the Popular Classes from the Governing Alliance  
and the Regressive Turn in Social Policy Reform, 1955–1958 
By 1954 the Peronist alliance showed clear signs of erosion. The introduction 
of female suffrage, the takeover of Catholic charity functions by the FEP and 
a reported affair of Perón with a fourteen-year-old girl led the church to assume 
an oppositional role (McGuire 1997, 73). The increasingly authoritarian char-
acter of the government further intensified the antagonism of the opposition 
political parties (Birle 1995, 98). In the military the oppositional faction be-
came increasingly dominant due to a variety of concerns with Perón’s redis-
tributive social and labor policies and his relationship to Eva Perón (Collier 
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and Collier [1991] 2009, 334). By the mid-1950s the popular classes were the 
only strong support base of the Peronist alliance (Mainwaring and Seibert 
1982, 518).  
Against this background, the military coup of 1955 was welcomed by a 
coalition that included ample parts of the middle classes, the church, and nearly 
all employer associations and opposition parties (Birle 1995, 111; Cavarozzi 
2006, 16). Consequently, the re-composition of the governing alliance follow-
ing the coup saw the expulsion of the popular classes and the inclusion of a 
variety of forces that opposed redistributive social policies; most importantly 
the employer associations, conservative politicians and right-wing military 
sectors that adhered to a liberal economic world view (Birle 1995, 112–113; 
Cavarozzi 2006, 16–17). Nevertheless, conscious of the significant power re-
sources of the largely Peronist labor movement, the military government under 
General Eduardo Lonardi took a reconciliatory stance during the first two 
months of its rule, and so most of the labor and social policies that benefited 
the organized working class were preserved (Collier and Collier [1991] 2009, 
484; McGuire 1997, 81–82). At the same time, it was only a few days before 
the military government dissolved the FEP, which had been in charge of most 
of the social assistance policies that benefited mainly unorganized, economi-
cally marginalized sectors (Golbert 2008, 29–39). This pattern of regressive 
social policy reform would predominate politics over the following 18 years. 
Table 9: Composition of the new governing alliance, 1956* 
 
Support expanding 
social protections for 
low-income earners 
Neither actively  
support expansion  
nor retrenchment 
Support retrenching 
social protections for 
low-income earners 
Actors · Parts of the Socialist 
and Communist  
Parties 
· Sections of the  
Catholic Church 
· Minority faction of the 
military 
· Parts of the UCR 
Party 
· Employers’  
associations 
· Majority faction of the 
military 
Electoral 







Strength of  
the alliance Relatively strong but internally divided 
* Although the composition of the alliance underwent several changes between 1955 and 1973, 
the exclusionary-regressive character persisted. ** Between 1958 and 1966 the regime type 
was semi-authoritarian. The electoral stronghold of the UCR governments during these years 
consisted of the middle classes. 
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As the majority faction of the military and the economic elite favored harsher 
repression of the Peronist movement, Lonardi was replaced by General Pedro 
Aramburu only two months after the coup (Collier and Collier [1991] 2009, 
484–485). Aramburu outlawed the Peronist Party, took over the CGT and re-
moved and persecuted thousands of Peronist trade union leaders and activists 
(McGuire 1997, 81–82). The labor movement met these repressions with in-
creasing resistance, which culminated in three years of massive strikes, factory 
occupations, sabotage, and even bombings (Collier and Collier [1991] 2009, 
485). Under these circumstances, the Aramburu government adopted a double 
strategy towards the labor movement that combined repression with social and 
labor policy concessions for selected groups (Collier and Collier [1991] 2009, 
485; Golbert 2010, 99–100). The most important social policy concession was 
the institutionalization of employer-financed family allowance funds for work-
ers in the industrial and commercial sectors. By 1954, most trade unions had 
already achieved the establishment of modest family allowances through col-
lective agreements (Gaggero and Garro 2004, 187). Nevertheless, in the 1956 
collective bargaining round, the commercial sector workers’ union achieved a 
more generous arrangement that foresaw the legal implementation of a family 
allowances fund that would be financed through a 4% payroll tax paid by the 
employers (Falappa 2014, 201–202). In the following year, Decree-Law 7913 
implemented this fund with explicit reference to the 1956 collective agreement. 
In order to reduce the complexity of the wage negotiations in the industrial 
sector in a context of intense social conflict, Decree-Law 7914 established a 
similar fund for industrial workers, making reference to the explicit support of 
the UIA for the measure. Although the institutionalization of family allowance 
funds had progressive redistributive effects among formal workers of the in-
dustrial and commercial sector, low-income earners in other sectors were not 
affected. 
Overall social policy change during the military government was highly 
detrimental to most low-income earners. Not only was social assistance dras-
tically reduced; the universal public health sector also suffered from retrench-
ment. In order to reduce the fiscal deficit, the government transferred the re-
sponsibility for hospitals to the provinces without transferring adequate re-
sources (Belmartino 2005a, 129–132). This initiated a long-term trend of de-
terioration of public health services. One indicator of the rapid decline during 
the military dictatorship was that between 1954 and 1958 the number of hos-
pital beds was reduced by 13,000 (Katz and Muñoz 1988, 106).  
Civilian Governments and Military Veto, 1958–1966 
Aramburu’s attempt to destroy the Peronist movement triggered massive con-
flicts and yielded little success. The unbroken appeal of Peronism to the pop-
ular classes was not only reflected in the inability to “de-Peronise” the trade 
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unions but also in the fact that during the 1957 elections for a constituent as-
sembly nearly one quarter of the voters cast blank ballots in support of the 
banned Peronist Party (Collier and Collier [1991] 2009, 737; Golbert 2008, 
30–31). Against this background of limited political success and the erosion of 
the military government’s political support base, general elections were sched-
uled for February 1958 (Rock 1987, 337). Nevertheless, due to the proscription 
of the Peronist Party, the force that attracted the vast majority of the popular 
class vote remained excluded from political competition until 1973 (McGuire 
1997, 82).  
In 1957, the UCR split into two because of internal differences regarding 
the strategy towards the Peronist movement and its policy legacy. The Unión 
Cívica Radical Intransigente (UCRI), which was led by Arturo Frondizi, 
wanted to preserve the inherited social and labor policies. The Unión Cívica 
Radical del Pueblo (UCRP), which was led by Ricardo Balbín, explicitly sup-
ported the military government’s attempts to repeal many of these policies and 
to “de-Peronise” the society (McGuire 1997, 85). While the UCRP received 
support from the military government, the UCRI negotiated a deal with the 
exiled Perón who agreed to recommend that his followers vote for Frondizi in 
exchange for policy measures in favor of the labor movement and an eventual 
suspension of the ban against the Peronist Party. With the support of most Pe-
ronist votes, Frondizi triumphed with a landslide electoral victory, winning 
also nearly all provincial governments and a majority in the legislature  (Collier 
and Collier [1991] 2009, 489–490; Golbert 2010, 100–101). 
During the first three months of its administration, the Frondizi govern-
ment maintained a good relationship with the Peronist movement. It decreed 
wage increases, allowed several Peronist politicians and union leaders to return 
to politics and restored the main provisions of the Law of Professional Asso-
ciations that Perón had instituted in 1944 (McGuire 1997, 86). A second im-
portant concession was Law 14.499,100 which introduced an inflation-based 
pension indexation mechanism. In the face of high inflation rates, this was per-
ceived as an important improvement by the trade union movement. Because 
the popular classes were excluded from the governing alliance, there was noth-
ing that would have guaranteed regular and adequate adjustment by means of 
presidential decrees. However, the indexation mechanism came also at a cost. 
Law 14.499 introduced slightly lower replacement rates and, more im-
portantly, established that a part of the surplus of the pension system would be 
 
100 Most of the literature analyzing Law 14.499 emphasizes the relatively high replacement 
rate of 82% that was established by it (Feldman, Golbert, and Isuani 1988, 45; Golbert 
2010, 103; Isuani 2008, 175). However, the replacement rate of 82% only affected the 
lowest income bracket defined in the law. The preceding Law 14.370 from 1954 had 
actually fixed a replacement rate of 100% for the lowest income bracket. The main 
innovation of Law 14.499 was therefore not the replacement rate but the automatic in-
dexation mechanism that it implemented. 
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transferred to the government for the purpose of public investments. This trans-
fer of funds in conjunction with easy access criteria, high levels of evasion and 
high replacement rates accelerated the maturation of the pension system so that 
by the early 1960s the first pension funds began to accumulate deficits (Arza 
2010, 263).101 In political terms, Law 14.499 fulfilled mainly three functions 
for the government. First, it contributed to avoiding conflicts with the powerful 
trade union movement. Second, it enabled the government to achieve control 
over significant financial resources. And third, the law responded to the con-
stitutional amendment of 1957. Although the constituent assembly of that year 
had the main function of legitimizing the replacement of the Peronist constitu-
tion with the constitution of 1853, a minority faction of the assembly with good 
relations to the labor movement had managed to incorporate the article 14 bis, 
which established among others the right to adequate pension indexation (“ju-
bilaciones y pensiones móviles”).  
While these policies were well received by the labor movement, they 
caused significant discontent within the military and fears of a renewed coup 
d’état arose within the government (Cavarozzi 2006, 173). When soon after 
the threat of military intervention was reinforced by the threat of an approach-
ing foreign-exchange crisis, Frondizi radically changed the agenda and 
adopted austerity measures including privatizations and a devaluation of the 
currency. The consequences for the popular classes were severe: economic re-
cession, high rates of inflation and a significant reduction of real wages 
(McGuire 1997, 86; Rock 1987, 338–339). Austerity policies also included re-
trenchment in the public health care and social assistance sectors (Golbert 
2008, 32; Katz and Muñoz 1988, 108; McGuire 2010, 132). Some provinces 
even initiated experiments with the introduction of market mechanisms and 
fees for treatment in the formerly free and universal public health care system 
(Belmartino 2005a, 132–134). While this deterioration of the public health sys-
tem reduced the access to and quality of health care for low-income earners, 
better-earning workers increasingly affiliated with private and trade union-
controlled health insurances, which decisively contributed to rising inequali-
ties in health care coverage (Danani 2005, 181–182). 
The austerity program was supported by the main employer associations, 
but the Peronist labor movement fiercely opposed it and responded with strikes 
and factory occupations (Birle 1995, 116–117). These protests, in turn, were 
violently repressed by the military and finally ended the alliance between Fron-
dizi’s government and the Peronist labor movement (Collier and Collier [1991] 
2009, 491; Golbert 2010, 102–103). At the same time, the military significantly 
intensified its political interference and virtually eliminated any space for pur-
suing pro-Peronist or redistributive policies (Birle 1995, 116; Golbert 2010, 
103; Rock 1987, 340). When in the 1962 elections neo-Peronist parties won a 
 
101  In 1963 the first fund ran into financial crisis and stopped payments to approximately 
200,000 pensioners for several months (Danani 2005, 155). 
  137 
combined national vote of 32% and won in most provinces, the military finally 
undertook another coup d’état and annulled the electoral results (Birle 1995, 
117; Collier and Collier [1991] 2009, 728). Frondizi was replaced by José Ma-
ría Guido, the president of the Senate, who governed for 18 months in tight 
collaboration with the military and whose cabinet was composed of conserva-
tives, employers and big landowners (Birle 1995, 121; McGuire 1997, 92).102 
In 1963 new elections were held, but this time both the neo-Peronist can-
didate Vicente Solano Lima and Arturo Frondizi were excluded from the com-
petition. In this context, Arturo Illia, the candidate of the UCRP, assumed the 
presidency with only 25% of the vote (Rock 1987, 344). Compared to his pre-
decessors, Illia pursued more interventionist economic policies that provided 
the ground for real wage increases and rising consumption (Birle 1995, 123). 
Yet, considering his weak electoral and legislative support, his margins of ac-
tion were even tighter than those of Frondizi. The threat of military interven-
tion largely obstructed the possibility of mobilizing low-income earner support 
with redistributive or pro-Peronist policies. Furthermore, both the Peronist la-
bor movement and the employer associations actively opposed the government 
(Golbert 2010, 108; Rock 1987, 345–346).  
Few progressive social policy innovations could be expected in this situa-
tion. The most significant reform was an increase in the value and the coverage 
of the family allowances. In 1964, these were extended to dock workers, a tiny 
but structurally powerful occupational group (Falappa 2014, 205). Further-
more, covered workers were entitled to receive allowances for their husbands 
and wives as well as for their children in secondary school (Golbert 2010, 110). 
The value of the allowance was fixed at 10% of the minimum wage (Falappa 
2014, 213). In the area of public health care and social assistance, the govern-
ment made some experiments with community-based approaches and opened 
approximately 250 maternal and infant health care centers (Golbert 2010, 108–
116; McGuire 2010, 133). Nonetheless, the resources that the national govern-
ment devoted to social assistance programs were extremely low and never sur-
passed 0.2% of the GDP (Golbert 2008, 33).103 
In sum, the social policies of the UCR governments between 1958 and 
1966 provided some improvements for formal workers, yet informal employ-
ment increased104 and social protections for low-income earners and informal 
workers were cut significantly.  
 
102  The short period of the Guido government was furthermore shaped by a profound eco-
nomic crisis (Rock 1987, 342–343).  
103  Considering that during the early 1950s the FEP alone disposed of over approximately 
1% of the GDP, these numbers indicate a significant reduction of social assistance. 
104  Between 1955 and 1960 informality increased significantly in several sectors. Among 
workers of the commercial sector it increased from 26% to 40% and among industrial 
workers from 29% to 50%. Even the already high levels of informality among self-
employed workers increased from 85% to 95% (Arza 2010, 260). 
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Military Rule and the Consolidation of Exclusionary Social Insurances 
at the Expense of Universality and Redistribution, 1966–1973 
The major employer associations took an increasingly hostile stance towards 
the Illia government because they felt that its rather interventionist economic 
policy was not adequately considering business interests and that its approach 
to labor protests was too permissive. This hostility became so intense by 1966 
that the major employer associations actively campaigned for a military coup 
(Birle 1995, 124–125). A steep fall of economic growth from double-digit rates 
to virtual stagnation additionally complicated the situation. In response to these 
employer pressures and a looming economic crisis, the Illia government im-
plemented austerity measures. Yet, the labor movement responded with such 
a massive a wave of strikes that the government eventually abandoned the 
wage freeze, which constituted one of the main components of the adjustment 
program (Rock 1987, 346). Against this background, General Onganía, who 
had been promoting pro-coup sentiments within the military since April 1965, 
took over the government by means of a coup d’état on the 28th of June 1966 
(McGuire 1997, 145; Rock 1987, 346). 
Initially, the coup was welcomed by a wide array of actors, including a 
majority of the more conservative union leaders, the major employer associa-
tions, and most opposition parties (Birle 1995, 126; Golbert 2010, 116; 
McGuire 1997, 145–150). In political terms, the Onganía government quickly 
advanced its authoritarian agenda. The parliament and all political parties were 
dissolved, judges of the supreme court were removed, and the universities were 
put under military surveillance Employers were furthermore granted important 
influence on public policy (Birle 1995, 127–129). In economic terms, the 
Onganía government implemented an austerity program that combined a cur-
rency devaluation with a wage freeze, price controls and increased export taxes 
for agricultural products. Not surprisingly, the relations between the govern-
ment and the majorX employer associations were good, although the most 
powerful agricultural employers’ association, the Sociedad Rural Argentina 
(SRA), criticized the government for allegedly promoting industry more vig-
orously than agricultural production (Birle 1995, 128–129). However, despite 
the initial support of the coup by many trade union leaders, they remained ex-
cluded from the governing alliance and the above-mentioned measures led to 
a decline of real wages, particularly for white collar workers (Birle 1995, 130; 
O’Donnell 1988, 265–268). Therefore, soon after the coup, the CGT launched 
a series of protests against declining wages and public sector worker layoffs. 
In February 1967, the trade unions attempted to extend their protests with a 
wave of strikes and factory occupations, yet the military government success-
fully repressed the strikes and withdrew the official recognition of several im-
portant unions (Golbert 2010, 116–117). 
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Until 1969, the government was highly successful in the pursuit of its 
agenda. The economy grew at high rates, inflation declined, the balance of 
payments improved, and investment increased. The dissolution of the political 
parties had effectively paralyzed most of their activities and the repressions 
against the trade union movement had led to a complete failure of the CGT’s 
strike wave in 1967 (Cavarozzi 2006, 39). In this context of apparently stable 
political domination, the exclusionary governing alliance initiated a far-rang-
ing and profoundly regressive reform of the pension system. 
In August 1967, shortly after the successful suppression of the trade union 
movement’s wave of strikes, Law 17.385 increased pension contribution re-
quirements from 5 to 10 years. Decree 4576/67 simultaneously adjusted the 
rules for the calculation of the replacement rate, slightly reducing their pro-
gressive character. One and a half years later, the Laws 18.037 and 18.038 
established that the 10-year contribution requirement would rise by one each 
year up to a maximum of 30 years. These increases in the contribution require-
ments severely restricted the pension access of many low-income earners as 
their unstable employment histories and precarious employment relations ob-
structed the accumulation of a high number of years of contributions. By this 
means, the above-mentioned high levels of informality in certain sectors in-
creasingly translated into exclusion from access to pensions. The Laws 18.037 
and 18.038 furthermore introduced new replacement rates that implied a sig-
nificant redistribution of pension resources in favor of high-income earners by 
abolishing the progressive scaling of benefits. While the Law 14.499 of 1958 
had established replacement rates that ranged from 82% for the lowest income 
bracket to 10% for the highest, the Laws 18.037 and 18.038 established a uni-
form 70% replacement rate. Workers who had contributed more than 30 years 
could receive one additional percentage point for each additional year of con-
tribution and reach a maximum replacement rate of 82%. In practice, this 
meant that while before 1968 low-income earners received significantly higher 
replacement rates, after 1968 higher income groups tended to receive higher 
replacement rates because they were on average more likely to have accumu-
lated over 30 years of contribution. Camila Arza (2010, 265–266) estimated 
that the new pension calculation formula was one of the main reasons behind 
the drastic rise of inequality within the group of pensioners from a Gini-coef-
ficient of 0.29 in 1970 to 0.39 in 1980.  
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Figure 4: Increasingly less progressive replacement rates in 1954, 1958, 1967 and 1968 
 * For the 1968 replacement rate 30 years of contribution are assumed. Sources: Law 14.370 
for 1954, Law 14.499 for 1958, Decree 4576/67 for 1967 and Laws 18.037 and 18.038 for 1968. 
Besides these highly regressive alterations of the access criteria and benefit 
calculation formula, the 1968 reform laws also introduced profound changes 
in the organizational structure of the pension system. The thirteen existing pen-
sion funds were replaced by only three funds, one for public sector workers, 
one for private sector workers, and one for self-employed workers (Golbert 
2010, 117). Law 18.037 introduced uniform contribution rates and retirement 
ages for salaried workers and Law 18.038 did so for self-employed workers. 
At the same time, the government preserved pension privileges for the military 
and security forces (Lo Vuolo and Barbeito 1998b, 125). Although these cen-
tralizing measures reduced administrative costs and enabled the compensation 
of deficits of some pension funds with the surpluses of others, the financial 
stabilization of the pension system did not last for long and by 1971 the system 
had again a negative financial balance (Arza 2010, 267). The reform further-
more eliminated the participation of trade unions in the administration of the 
funds (Arza 2010, 265–266; Isuani 2008, 176). This was criticized by the trade 
union movement, however, against the background of the failed strike effort 
of 1967, it did not initiate broader protest activities against the reform law 
(Danani 2005, 155–156). 
In this context of apparent political strength, the military government also 
initiated regressive reforms in the health care sector that proved to be favorable 
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measures was the signing of an international agreement that tied Argentina to 
the international network of patents and improved the business opportunities 
of multinational drug companies in the country (Escudero 1981, 563). At the 
same time, the government began to analyze the fragmented health insurance 
sector and implemented further retrenchment and decentralization in the uni-
versalistic public health care system (Bermann and Escudero 1978, 533; 
Danani 2005, 152; Katz and Muñoz 1988, 108). The first proposal for a reform 
of the health insurance sector was elaborated by the Public Health Department. 
The main goal of the proposal was to reduce the inefficiency of the fragmented 
and weakly regulated sector and to separate the health insurances from union 
control (Belmartino 2005a, 165–166). This project, however, faced opposition 
from two sides. For the trade unions, the control over important parts of the 
social health insurance sector provided significant financial resources and an 
important tool for the recruitment of members (Danani 2005, 164). The most 
important confederation of physicians, the COMRA, furthermore rejected the 
idea that the state would regulate the business relations between professionals 
and health insurers. Therefore, both COMRA and the CGT opposed the pro-
posal of the Public Health Department (Belmartino 2005a, 170–171). 
While the pension reform process did not involve concessions to the trade 
union movement, the health insurance reform would follow a different path in 
the face of the initiation of a new wave of trade union and left-wing militancy. 
During his government, Perón had marginalized the left within the trade union 
movement. Yet, shortly after the coup of 1955, he started to support the left 
wing of the unions from exile in order to build a loyal counterweight to the 
more conservative but also more autonomous trade union sector led by Au-
gusto Vandor (Collier and Collier [1991] 2009, 494–495; James 1976, 273–
275; McGuire 1997, 87–92).105 In the context of a worldwide strengthening of 
the radical left, an ongoing deterioration of real wages and the support of Pe-
rón, the combative left-wing currents were able to gain increasing strength 
within the union movement during the late 1960s (Collier and Collier [1991] 
2009, 496; Falappa 2014, 210). In March 1968, a left-leaning trade union sec-
tor finally won the leadership elections of the CGT, which led to a split of the 
trade union movement into a left-leaning and combative CGT de los Argenti-
nos106 and a more conservative CGT Azopardo, which was more inclined to 
negotiate with the military government (James 1976, 275; McGuire 1997, 
 
105  Ideologically Perón stood much closer to the conservative trade union faction, so that 
his support for the left was of a strategic nature (Collier and Collier [1991] 2009, 494–
495; McGuire 1997, 88). 
106  Reflecting its left-leaning ideological position, the program of the CGT de los Argenti-
nos emphasized the necessity of universal access to health care, education, and housing. 
Furthermore, the program expressed solidarity with the inhabitants of the Villas de 
Emergencia, the poor neighborhoods that had emerged in many cities (CGT de los Ar-
gentinos [1968] 2006). 
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156). Although the CGT de los Argentinos faced severe repression by the gov-
ernment and started to disintegrate by 1969, this could not stop the initiation 
of a new wave of left-leaning labor and student protests from mid-1968 on 
(Falappa 2014, 210; Godio 2000, 1035–1040; McGuire 1997, 156). In Decem-
ber 1968, the military government decreed a wage increase far below inflation. 
In order to partially compensate for the deterioration of wages, Law 18.017 
enacted simultaneously a substantial rise of family allowances for formal in-
dustrial, commercial and dock workers.107 The same law also introduced an 
additional increase for families with three or more children, which was justi-
fied on the grounds of nationalist ideas that this would increase “the number 
of births in order to enrich the human potential of the country” (Law 18.017). 
In May 1969, the protests nevertheless began to run out of the government’s 
control. Three students were shot by policemen in Rosario and Corrientes 
(McGuire 1997, 157). On the 29th of May, students and auto workers joined 
forces in a demonstration in Córdoba in opposition to policies that promoted 
price hikes and declining wages. The next day, this protest was joined by thou-
sands of further citizens that occupied most of Córdoba’s downtown and de-
fended it for 48 hours against the police, using barricades, rocks, and Molotov 
cocktails. When the army finally repressed the protest, fourteen protesters had 
been killed and the perception of stable governmental control shattered 
(McGuire 1997, 157; Rock 1987, 348–349). In the aftermath, violent forms of 
political protest and guerrilla activity grew markedly (O’Donnell 1988, 176–
177). 
The Córdoba riots and the unprecedented radicalization of student and la-
bor protests posed a real challenge to the military government and the business 
community. By 1969, unemployment had decreased to 4.3%, its lowest point 
in many years, so that striking workers were not easily replaced. In the auto-
mobile sector, strikes imposed extraordinarily high costs on manufacturers due 
to the relatively high capital intensity of the sector (O’Donnell 1988, 179; Tor-
rado 1992, 176). In short, the increasing radicalization of protests and the as-
sociational strengthening of the left coincided with the possession of signifi-
cant structural power resources by participating labor sectors. Against this 
background, a wave of capital flight began and currency reserves declined rap-
idly, threatening the advent of a new balance of payments crisis (Birle 1995, 
131).  
These developments caused a division within the military regarding the 
kind of response that was perceived to be adequate (O’Donnell 1988, 172–
173). While some sectors wanted determined repression, others preferred to 
make concessions. The latter faction would eventually prevail (Rock 1987, 
349). On this basis, social policy reform took a different path, yet not neces-
 
107  The rise of family allowances soon created financial imbalances, so that in October 
1970 the contribution rate for employers was elevated to 12%. In 1972, the value of the 
allowances for disabled children was furthermore doubled (Falappa 2014, 213–214). 
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sarily one that was more favorable for low-income earners. The minister of 
social welfare was replaced by Carlos Consigli, who distanced himself from 
the initial health reform proposal of the Public Health Department and em-
braced an alternative proposal of the Community Assistance and Development 
Department. The latter was led by intimates of the president himself and sug-
gested a health insurance reform that would be devised in cooperation with 
collaborative trade union leaders (Belmartino 2005a, 166–167; O’Donnell 
1988, 73). Only a few weeks after the Córdoba riots, the government imple-
mented concessions that extended the coverage of social health insurance 
funds of a few selected trade unions, by then commonly referred to as Obras 
Sociales (Danani 2005, 185).108 These concessions were well received, partic-
ularly by the most conservative trade union leaders. In contrast to the left-lean-
ing CGT de los Argentinos, which emphasized the need for universal access to 
health care in its program, the collaborationist unions concentrated on particu-
laristic demands, among which the strengthening of the trade union-controlled 
Obras Sociales occupied a high priority (CGT de los Argentinos [1968] 2006; 
Godio 2000, 1051). In November 1969, the military government eventually 
announced that it was studying a law for introducing obligatory social health 
insurance coverage for all wage workers financed by employer and worker 
contributions but managed largely by the trade unions. While this announce-
ment was heavily criticized by all employer associations, it coincided with a 
marked improvement of the government’s relations with the more conservative 
union leaders. In December 1969, the government met with a group of 25 pow-
erful conservative union leaders in order to discuss the reunification of the 
CGT under conservative leadership. A short time later, Law 18.610 put the 
obligatory health insurance affiliation into effect, which additionally increased 
the readiness of the group of 25 union leaders to cooperate (O’Donnell 1988, 
181–182). In May 1971, Law 19.032 complemented these reforms with the 
implementation of a separate social health insurance fund for pensioners. 
Social health insurance reform, in several ways, played an important role 
in stabilizing the political situation after the 1969 riots. First, it constituted a 
significant concession to the labor movement as a whole, which was thought 
to reduce the militancy of the more combative wing and to increase the readi-
ness to cooperate of the more conservative wing. At the same time, the 
strengthening of the union-controlled Obras Sociales also increased the power 
of the union bureaucracy over the affiliates, which proved beneficial in a situ-
ation in which conservative union leaders were looking for ways to moderate 
or even suppress the radicalization that was taking place among some of their 
bases (Danani 2005, 195). And finally, the Law 18.610 also involved the 
 
108  Besides social health insurance, the Obras Sociales also provided affordable holiday 
packages and other benefits to their members. Nevertheless, social health insurance 
clearly is the most important component of their services. Therefore, the terms social 
health insurances and Obras Sociales will be used interchangeably in this study. 
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creation of the National Institute of Obras Sociales (Instituto Nacional de 
Obras Sociales / INOS), which was officially responsible for overseeing the 
system of Obra Sociales and for mitigating financial inequalities by redistrib-
uting a certain share of the revenue between the different Obras Sociales. How-
ever, there were no clear rules for resource transfers, so that in practice, the 
distribution of funds ended up being a political mechanism through which the 
government could exercise a certain level of control over trade union leaders 
(Mera 2010, 105; Interview Neri 2014a).  
Law 18.610 mandated a certain transfer of resources from employers to 
formal workers, yet its overall effects were far from being progressive. First 
and foremost, it led to the consolidation of a highly fragmented, inefficient and 
inegalitarian system in detriment of the universal health care system (Belmar-
tino 2005a, 155–175; Interview Neri 2014a). Before the reform, the universal 
and free public health care system provided coverage for most of the popula-
tion on a relatively egalitarian basis. In 1967, only about 15%109 of the popu-
lation were covered by Obras Sociales. In contrast, by 1971, 66%110 of the 
population was covered by Obras Sociales and the public health care system 
was gradually downgraded to a safety net of last resort that lacked adequate 
infrastructure, technology, and financing (Katz and Muñoz 1988, 107; Inter-
view Neri 2014a). While private physicians and health care companies bene-
fited from the contracts they were able to sign with the strengthened Obras 
Sociales, the access to health care of low-income earners de facto deteriorated 
with the decline of the public health care system (Belmartino 2005a, 170; 
Lloyd-Sherlock 2005, 1895; Interview Neri 2014a). Furthermore, access to 
health care varied significantly between different occupational groups and their 
respective Obras Sociales, so that also among those affiliated with the system 
of social health insurance, considerable inequalities existed (Belmartino 
2005a, 177–183). 
The regressive nature of health care reform under the military government 
was also reflected in the poor evolution of health indicators. According to Ber-
mann and Escudero (1978, 533), infant mortality increased by a stunning 19% 
between 1966 and 1970. Although the rise was exceptionally strong under the 
military dictatorship, the decline of the public health sector contributed to weak 
health indicators over the whole period between 1955 and 1973. While infant 
mortality had declined by 29% between 1943 and 1954, it increased by 4% 
between 1954 and 1971 (Escudero 1981, 562; McGuire 2010, 133; Torre and 
Pastoriza 2002, 293). Life expectancy rose by 8% between 1947 and 1953 but 
had decreased by 2% by 1970, despite important technological advances and 
economic growth (INDEC 2015; Torre and Pastoriza 2002, 293). 
 
109 Author’s calculation on the basis of Danani (2005, 193) and CEPAL (2017b). 
110 Same as preceding footnote. 
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Political Dynamics, Patterns of Social Policy Change, and Path 
Dependency Effects 
The coup d’état against the Peronist government in 1955 marked the rise to 
power of new, more exclusionary governing alliances that heavily depended 
on the support of anti-redistributive forces such as the majority faction of the 
military, the major employer associations and centrist and conservative politi-
cal forces. During the following years, repression, economic adjustment and 
authoritarianism weakened the overall power resources of the popular classes 
so that the possibilities for the formation and rise to power of an inclusionary 
alliance were severely limited. However, the loss of power resources was un-
equally distributed among different segments of the popular classes. The fact 
that military interferences and the proscription of the Peronist Party largely 
blocked possibilities to mobilize electoral and discursive power resources for 
redistributive policies meant that economically marginalized and weakly orga-
nized segments of the popular classes were excluded from social politics. In 
contrast, the labor movement preserved levels of associational and structural 
power resources that enabled it to cause significant political and economic in-
stability, so that the governments repeatedly perceived the need to make social 
policy concessions. These policies, however, only benefited formal workers or 
even only certain groups of formal workers. The majority of low-income earn-
ers, in contrast, faced a profound deterioration of their access to social protec-
tions due to the regressive reform of the pension system and the retrenchment 
of the universal public health system and social assistance policies. 
Table 10: Change in social protection for low-income earners, 1955–1973 
Pension policies - Introduction of restrictive access criteria that de facto excluded most 
low-income earners and informal workers from benefits 
- Elimination of the highly progressive replacement rates and  
introduction of a regressive benefit calculation formula 
+ Introduction of an automatic indexation mechanism 
Health care  
policies 
- Retrenchment of the universalistic and free public health care sector 
- Generalization of an inegalitarian, exclusionary and fragmented  





- Dissolution of the Eva Perón Foundation  and massive  
retrenchment of social assistance expenditure 
Family allowance 
policies 
+ Implementation and gradual strengthening of employer funded  
family allowance funds for formal industrial, commercial and dock 
workers 
Overall evolution of social protection 
for low-income earners Strong retrenchment 
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Social policy reform between 1955 and 1973 also created important path de-
pendency effects that would go on to influence later political dynamics of so-
cial policy reform. The centralization of the pension system resulted in the 
elimination of most pension funds for particular occupational groups and with 
them the influence of trade unions in their administration. Therefore, the re-
forms significantly reduced the interest of the trade unions in defending the 
status quo. This, in turn, would facilitate later attempts to reform pensions. In 
the case of health insurance, the path dependency effects left by the reform, on 
the contrary, strongly increased the interests of the trade union movement in 
the preservation of the status quo. The 1970 reform gave trade union leaders 
control over significantly expanded Obras Sociales, which provided them with 
important financial resources and constituted effective tools for controlling and 
expanding their rank and file members. The consolidation and expansion of 
the system of Obras Sociales would go on to provide a strong motivation for 
trade unions to resist both progressive and regressive efforts to reform health 
care in the following decades. 
4.4 Social Policy Expansion and Political Conflict during 
the Second Peronism, 1973–1976 
The discredit of the military government, the rise of left-wing youth move-
ments and combative trade unions, the return to democracy and the lifting of 
the ban on Peronism in 1973 provided favorable conditions for a realignment 
of political forces and the formation of a more inclusionary governing alliance 
that comprised the Peronist Party, organized labor, unorganized low-income 
sectors, left-leaning youth organizations and the CGE. Quickly this new alli-
ance developed an ambitious agenda for progressive social policy reform. Due 
to severe conflicts within the Peronist movement, economic difficulties, and 
the growing influence of right-wing Peronists, important parts of this agenda 
were never implemented. Nevertheless, during the three years of democracy 
between 1973 and 1976, the public health system was financially strengthened, 
social assistance policies expanded, and access to pensions strongly facilitated. 
In sum, social protection for low-income earners was significantly expanded. 
The Political Arena: Social and Economic Context, Constellation of 
Actors, and Distribution of Power Resources 
The Peronist alliance assumed government in an extraordinarily benign eco-
nomic context. Economic growth during the preceding years had reduced un-
employment to moderate levels between 5% and 6% (Torrado 1992, 176). 
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Furthermore, a world commodity boom boosted export earnings by approxi-
mately 65% and led to a swift expansion of foreign currency reserves (Rock 
1987, 361). Coupled with policies that promoted the expansion of the local 
market, this unexpected increase in export value initially fostered rapid eco-
nomic growth. Although the export boom ended by early 1974 and economic 
difficulties returned (Birle 1995, 137), unemployment continued to fall, reach-
ing a long-time low of under 4% in 1975 (Torrado 1992, 176). At the end of 
the Peronist government, in 1976, the industrial sector employed 32% of the 
workforce and produced 40% of the GDP (Timmer, de Vries, and de Vries 
2014). Taken together, the process of industrialization, the related increase in 
capital intensity, and the virtual elimination of unemployment provided the 
popular classes with considerable structural power resources. 





















1973 6.1 60.3 41 33 5.8 – 
1974 5.3 24.2 41 33 4.2 17.6 
1975 -0.9 182.8 40 31 3.7 18.0 
1976 -0.7 444.1 40 32 4.8 18.1 
Sources: Rapoport (2013) for GDP growth and inflation; Timmer, de Vries, and de Vries (2014) 
for industry share of GDP and share of industrial employment; Torrado (1992, 175) for unem-
ployment in 1973; INDEC (2003) for unemployment 1974–1976; Beccaria and Groisman (2009, 
110) and Jiménez (2013, 59) for informality. 
In addition to these structural power resources, the recovery of democracy and 
the lifting of the ban on Peronism returned electoral power resources to the 
popular classes. This increased particularly the political importance of rural 
and urban low-income sectors that mostly lacked structural and associational 
power resources but constituted a crucial electoral support pillar of the Peronist 
movement (Levitsky 2003, 41).  
At the same time, the national and international discursive context was 
extraordinarily favorable for projects of welfare state expansion. Across Eu-
rope, and indeed many countries around the globe, Keynesian thinking reached 
its heyday during the 1960s and 1970s and the growth of welfare states accel-
erated considerably (Hay and Wincott 2012, 22–23). These processes were in 
turn reinforced by regional and international organizations that recommended 
the extension of social policies. In this vein, the summit of the ministers of 
public health of the Americas in 1972, and a few years later the Alma-Ata 
conference of the WHO, recommended the extension of public primary health 
care in order to improve the access of the poorest to the health system (Es-
cudero 1981, 559–560; Interview Neri 2014a; Tittor 2012, 116–117). The ILO 
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and the Inter-American Conference on Social Security continued to promote 
the strengthening and extension of social security arrangements through nu-
merous policy papers, conferences and international conventions (Deacon 
1997, 74; Falappa 2014, 219). On the national level, this global trend found its 
counterpart in a broad public approval of state intervention on social and eco-
nomic issues that extended throughout most of the political spectrum, includ-
ing the two major political parties PJ111 and UCR (Belmartino and Bloch 1994, 
251). Progressive political forces and popular class organizations that were in-
terested in an extension of social protections for low-income earners thus en-
joyed significant discursive power resources. 
The evolution of important social policy actors since the late 1960s, and 
the distribution of associational power resources among them, was also favor-
able to a renewed attempt to achieve social policy expansion for low-income 
earners. Orchestrated by a global wave of left-wing protest and thought, and 
catalyzed by the 1969 riots against the conservative Onganía dictatorship, the 
political left emerged as an increasingly important actor in the Argentine po-
litical arena (Collier and Collier [1991] 2009, 496; McGuire 1997, 151). Trade 
union density started to recover towards the early 1970s and reached an esti-
mated 43% in 1974 (Lamadrid and Orsatti 1991, 150–156). Although some 
independent Marxist organizations  gained considerable strength in Córdoba, 
Tucumán, and other cities of the interior, in large part the rise of the left took 
place within the Peronist movement and to a certain extent also within the Rad-
ical Party and the established trade union movement. Within the Peronist trade 
union movement, the rise of the left was supported by Perón himself as a stra-
tegic move to counter the increasing autonomy of the more conservative trade 
union leaders (Collier and Collier [1991] 2009, 494–495; James 1976, 273–
275; McGuire 1997, 87–92). In 1968, the left-leaning faction of the trade union 
movement founded the CGT de los Argentinos, which adopted a progressive 
program that explicitly emphasized the necessity of universal access to health 
care, education, and housing (CGT de los Argentinos [1968] 2006; Godio 
2000, 1051). However, the left remained a minority faction within the trade 
union movement and during the early 1970s the CGT reunified under rather 
conservative leadership (Rock 1987, 357). More lasting was the growth and 
radicalization of the left-leaning youth sector of the Peronist movement that 
had been taking place since the late 1960s. In 1972, the various left-leaning 
Peronist youth organizations united and formed the Peronist Youth, which de-
veloped an impressive associational strength and capacity for mass mobiliza-
tion. The Peronist Youth became one of the main organizational pillars of Pe-
ronism alongside the trade union movement and was incorporated into its na-
tional decision-making bodies and attained considerable political influence 
(Godio 2000, 1069; James 1976, 282–284). The Peronist left was furthermore 
 
111  In 1971, Law 19.102 prohibited party names containing references to particular political 
leaders, so that the Partido Peronista changed its name to Partido Justicialista (PJ).  
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successful in organizing residents of poor neighborhoods and in 1973 the slum 
dwellers’ movement Movimiento Villero Peronista (MVP) was founded (Zic-
cardi 1984, 148, 159–160). Within a short time, the MVP became able to mo-
bilize thousands of low-income earners and sustained base-level structures in 
450 slums throughout the country (Gillespie [1983] 1998). Left-leaning think 
tanks such as the Technological Council of the National Peronist Movement 
elaborated extensive economic and social policy proposals of clearly redistrib-
utive and universal character (Rougier and Fiszbein 2006, 53; CTMNP 1973a; 
1973b; 1973c). At the same time, less radical center-left forces gained strength 
within the UCR Party. In 1968, center-left student activists founded the Junta 
Coordinadora Nacional and in 1972 Raúl Alfonsín founded the social demo-
cratic Movimiento de Renovación y Cambio. Although Balbín’s conservative 
faction maintained its majority, the center-left had gained significant weight 
within the UCR by the early 1970s (McGuire 1997, 162–163). As was the case 
with the Peronist left, the center-left of the UCR supported redistributive social 
policy (Belmartino and Bloch 1994, 223; Interview Neri 2014a).  
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Progressive currents had also considerably gained in strength at the base-level 
of the Catholic Church since the early 1960s and intensified their cooperation 
with other progressive and lower popular class organizations (Ghio 2007). 
Simultaneously, the weakening of the traditionally liberal employer associa-
tions and the growth of the more interventionist CGE beginning in the late 
1960s weakened the capacity and willingness of employer associations to 
openly oppose redistributive policy proposals (Birle 1995, 134–135). 
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Summing up, by the early 1970s, the social, economic, and political con-
text had become considerably more favorable to the renewed formation of an 
inclusionary governing alliance and the pursuit of redistributive social policy 
reforms. 
Social Policy Expansion during the Rise and Fall of the Short Peronist 
Government 
The Córdoba riots of 1969 marked the beginning of the end of the military 
government as it initiated a massive increase in protest and guerilla activity, 
contributed to capital flight and the return of economic problems and divided 
the military about the question of how to respond to these challenges. When 
General Aramburu was killed by a guerilla group in May 1970, opposition 
within the military grew and President Onganía was replaced by General Lev-
ingston (Rock 1987, 351–356). Levingston implemented a more intervention-
ist economic policy but was unable to control the growing inflation and dis-
content among employers increased (Birle 1995, 131–132). In early 1971 a 
second episode of riots took place in Córdoba, which led to the replacement of 
Levingston by General Lanusse. Lanusse promised elections and the restora-
tion of civilian rule but tried to convince the major political parties to agree to 
the formation of a national coalition that would nominate him as its presidential 
candidate (Rock 1987, 356–358). In order to foster popular support, his gov-
ernment implemented several concessions such as the creation of a public fund 
for the construction of housing in 1972. The fund was financed by 2.5% em-
ployer contributions and aimed at improving workers’ access to credits without 
however reaching the lowest income groups (Golbert 2010, 120). The for-
mation of a national coalition nevertheless failed. Instead, the major parties 
joined forces and formed an alliance called Hora del Pueblo to oppose the dic-
tatorship (Godio 2000, 1068). 
As social protests and guerilla activity continued with intensity, the mili-
tary government finally gave in and decided to schedule presidential elections 
for the 11th of March 1973. Perón himself was not permitted to run, but in an 
attempt to counter the radicalization of his followers, the proscription of the PJ 
was lifted (Adamovsky 2012, 298–299). In view of the presidential elections, 
the Peronist movement formed a broad electoral alliance (FREJULI112) that 
besides the PJ included minor parties from both the conservative and socialist 
spectrum, the left-leaning Peronist Youth, the CGT, the CGE and left-leaning 
slum dwellers’ organizations (Godio 2000, 1068–1069; Ziccardy 1984, 148). 
Although the alliance was heterogeneous, its electoral core constituency was 
clearly to be found among the popular classes. The selection of candidates and 
the organization of the campaign was accompanied with euphoria by the 
 
112 Frente Justicialista de Liberación. 
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Peronist left. Finally, Héctor Cámpora, who was seen with sympathy by the 
Peronist Youth but with reservations by the CGT, was chosen as the presiden-
tial candidate. Several sympathizers of the Peronist left—but no union lead-
ers—were nominated for Argentina’s 23 governorships. Due to the official 
recognition of the Peronist Youth as one of the main pillars of the Peronist 
Movement, it was now also receiving a considerable proportion of the candi-
dacies for the parliament (James 1988, 242). Angered by these decisions, most 
union leaders virtually pulled out of the electoral campaign, so that it was the 
Peronist Youth that set the tone of the campaign and organized most of the 
electoral mobilization (James 1976, 282; McGuire 1997, 161).  
Table 13: Composition of the new governing alliance, March 1973* 
 
Support expanding 
social protections for 
low-income earners 




social protections for 
low-income earners 
Actors · Peronist Youth 
· Left wing of the PJ 
· Minority of trade  
unions 
· Slum dwellers’  
movement 
· Progressive think 
tanks 
· Centrist wing of the 
PJ (trade union  
dominated) 
· Majority of trade  
unions** 
· Minority faction of 
national market  
oriented small and 
medium size  
industrialists 
· Right wing of the PJ 
Electoral 
strongholds 
· Lower popular  
classes 
· Working class 









Strength of  
the alliance Strong but internally divided 
* Due to intensive internal conflicts, the composition of the alliance and the dominance of dif-
ferent sectors within it varied between 1973 and 1976. The general character remained never-
theless inclusionary-redistributive. ** The majority of the trade union movement opposed uni-
versalistic health care reform, but supported the the extension of pension coverage to low-
income earners. 
The landslide victory of the FREJULI in the March 1973 elections indicated 
the massive mobilization capacities that the Peronist Youth, and more gener-
ally the Peronist left, had developed during the preceding years (Godio 2000, 
1069; James 1988, 242). The Peronist left had become de facto one of the main 
support pillars of the Cámpora government and achieved significant personal 
presence in various state apparatuses, providing several ministers, governors, 
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parliamentarians, and technical staff (Adamovsky 2012, 300; Belmartino and 
Bloch 1982, 10; Godio 2000, 1070). In combination with the traditional de-
pendence of the Peronist alliance on the electoral support of the urban and rural 
low-income groups, the increased influence of the left contributed to the de-
velopment of an ambitious and decidedly progressive agenda of social policy 
reform. 
In the area of health care, the newly elected government of Héctor 
Cámpora proposed the most far-reaching and progressive transformation yet 
by creating a single universal national health system that would provide equal 
access and treatment to all residents of the country. The demand for a universal 
and egalitarian health care system was shared by a heterogeneous spectrum of 
center-left and left political forces, and proposals for reform in this direction 
had been made by progressive forces within both major political parties, the PJ 
and the UCR (Belmartino and Bloch 1994, 223; Golbert 2008, 41; Interview 
Neri 2014a). The rapid growth of the left within the Peronist movement and its 
decisive role in Cámpora’s campaign and government also enhanced its possi-
bilities to influence the electoral platform and the government’s policy agenda. 
Cámpora included the proposal of a national health system in his electoral plat-
form and inaugural speech (Belmartino and Bloch 1994, 238; Cámpora 1973, 
35).113 Once he had assumed the presidency, Domingo Liotta, subsecretary of 
health, was put in charge of elaborating a concrete reform project. For this 
purpose, a commission of mostly progressive health care experts with different 
party affiliations was formed and started to design a clearly redistributive re-
form proposal that foresaw a reassignment of existing resources in favor of 
low-income earners and an additional expansion of overall public health care 
spending (Interview Neri 2014a). Initially, Perón, who still lived in exile, also 
approved the reform project (Belmartino 2010, 119–120).  
However, resistance to the project was soon mounted from different sec-
tors. The pharmaceutical industry did not like the idea that the new system 
would create a monopoly of demand, most associations of health care profes-
sionals preferred a largely private system, and the companies running health 
care facilities feared losing all their business opportunities (Belmartino and 
Bloch 1982, 11; Interview Neri 2014a). Most important, however, was the re-
sistance stemming from trade union leaders who opposed the integration of the 
 
113 The social policy demands of the Peronist left were expressed through the think tank 
Technological Council of the National Peronist Movement, which elaborated policy 
programs for various fields of social and economic policy (Belmartino and Bloch 1982, 
10; CTMNP 1973a; 1973b; 1973c). In the area of health care, the Technological Coun-
cil recommended the introduction of a “Single National Health System that includes all 
the human, material and financial resources of the sector” and provides “free and equal 
access” (CTMNP 1973b, 14, author’s translation). As a clear sign of the think tank’s 
influence, Cámpora literally copied a part of the text of its policy paper into his inaugu-
ral speech to the parliament (Belmartino and Bloch 1994, 238; Cámpora 1973a, 62). 
  153 
trade union-controlled health insurance funds into the new system (Belmartino 
and Bloch 1994, 238; Interview Neri 2014a). None of these actors opted for a 
strategy of open confrontation. The private health care industry and the medi-
cal associations intensified their lobbying activities. But according to Aldo 
Neri, one of the commission’s leading health experts, they had only limited 
influence on the final project (Interview Neri 2014a). Much more effective in 
influencing the final law were the trade union leaders. These formed an alliance 
with the minister of social welfare, López Rega, who, as a leader of the Peronist 
right, had little sympathy for the progressive health reform project. López 
Rega, demanded modifications of the reform project from the subsecretary of 
health, Domingo Liotta, who offered little resistance in the face of the rapidly 
changing power relations within the governing alliance to the detriment of the 
left wing and in favor of the trade union movement (Belmartino 2010, 121; 
Interview Neri 2014a). 
At the moment the ambitious reform project was announced, the Peronist 
left had attained unprecedented influence within the governing alliance and 
could count on the sympathy of the president, Héctor Cámpora (Adamovsky 
2012, 300; Belmartino and Bloch 1982, 10; Godio 2000, 1070). This situation, 
however, quickly changed. On the 20th of June Perón finally returned from 
exile and thousands of his followers waited nearby the Ezeiza airport to greet 
him. What was supposed to become a big welcome event ended in what was 
called the massacre of Ezeiza when a group of right-wing Peronists opened fire 
on columns of left-wing Peronists (Rock 1987, 360). Perón decided to side 
with the right wing of the movement and started to attack the Peronist left as 
infiltrators. In the following month, after repeated press reports of Perón’s dis-
satisfaction with Cámpora for being too closely related to the Peronist left, the 
latter was replaced by Lastiri, son-in-law of López Rega. Lastiri replaced sev-
eral ministers and high-ranking officials that were associated with the Peronist 
left and scheduled new elections for the 23rd of September 1973. This time it 
was not the Peronist Youth but the CGT who played the leading role in the 
electoral campaign. In August, Perón further tightened his relations with the 
union leaders and confirmed a series of changes in the party hierarchy that 
vastly strengthened the right wing. In the September elections, Perón won with 
over 60% of the votes (Cavarozzi 2006, 188–189; James 1976, 286–288). Only 
a few days later, the assassination of the CGT leader Rucci by a leftist guerrilla 
group marked a further escalation of political tensions and contributed to in-
creasing marginalization of the movement’s left wing (Godio 2000, 1075).  
In this context, the initially ambitious reform project was increasingly wa-
tered down. Already in August a version of the project was presented that ex-
empted the health insurance funds of the trade unions and the provincial public 
health systems from obligatory integration into the new system and increased 
the number of union representatives in its administrative body. When the pro-
ject finally passed the parliament in December 1973, little was left of the origi-
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nally universalist and egalitarian spirit. In the end, only four provinces volun-
tarily joined the program (Belmartino and Bloch 1994, 244–247).  
Nevertheless, between 1973 and 1975 the new governing alliance in-
creased public health expenditure from 1.4% to 1.7% of the GDP and several 
provinces initiated primary health programs that improved access to health 
care among urban and rural low-income groups (Escudero 1981, 564; Vargas 
de Flood 2006, 188). At the same time, the governing alliance also continued 
to strengthen the health insurance system by increasing contribution rates from 
2% to 4.5% for employers and from 1.7% to 2.7% for workers (Lo Vuolo and 
Barbeito 1998a, 337). Coverage was furthermore extended to recipients of 
non-contributory pensions (Feldman, Golbert, and Isuani 1988, 54). In sum, 
although the fragmentation and the inequalities of the Argentine health system 
persisted, both low-income sectors and organized labor benefited from health 
care expansion, reflecting in this sense the composition of the governing alli-
ance’s popular support base. After 15 years of stagnation, child mortality de-
clined massively from 61.2 to 43.2 per 1000 between 1970 and 1975 (McGuire 
2010, 311).  
Income transfers were also significantly expanded during the short Peron-
ist government. The electoral platform of the Peronist alliance appealed to the 
popular classes with the promise of a progressive extension of income trans-
fers, explicitly announcing its intentions to augment the value of the minimum 
pension, reduce informality through tougher controls and reintroduce a pro-
gressive scale for pension replacement-rates (Cámpora 1973, 32–34). These 
and other proposals were then incorporated into a social compact which was 
signed by the government, the CGT and the CGE during early June 1973 in 
order to generate a consensus for the economic and social policy agenda of the 
government.114 Among other things, the social compact115 promised to “elimi-
nate social marginalization through effective public policies in the areas of 
housing, education, health and social assistance,” to eliminate unemployment, 
to increase low pensions and to increase the income of low-income earners and 
families with many children (El Día, June 9, 1973). The progressive character 
 
114  One of the most important components of the social compact was to freeze both wages 
and prices in order to reduce inflation (Rougier and Fiszbein 2006, 60–65). According 
to Oraldo Britos (Interview 2014), an important trade unionist and Peronist Senator at 
that moment, the CGE was skeptical because of the costs that the expansion of social 
policies would mean for the employers, but nevertheless agreed to the package as a 
whole. 
115  The social policy measures proposed by the social compact were later specified in the 
Social Security Program which was signed by the government, the CGT and the CGE 
in late November 1973 (Decree 466/73). This program also foresaw the implementation 
of an unemployment benefit, which was, however, never implemented. According to 
Oraldo Britos (Interview 2014), the trade unions did not insist on its implementation, 
given the low levels of unemployment and the many other pressing problems at that 
time. 
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of the social policy guidelines established in the social compact should be un-
derstood in the wider context. The prevalence of the ISI paradigm as the dom-
inant perspective through which to analyze the economy made it possible to 
frame redistributive social policy as both benefiting the poorest and the econ-
omy as a whole. In the text of the compact it was explicitly argued that income 
redistribution and social housing projects would foster economic growth 
through increasing demand (El Día, June 9, 1973). In addition, minister of 
economy José Gelbard,116 who had much influence on the elaboration of the 
compact, was well aware of the heterogeneous support bases of the governing 
alliance, and hence the necessity to incorporate significant concessions to the 
Peronist left and the rural and urban low-income groups (Godio 2000, 1071–
1072; Rougier and Fiszbein 2006, 72; Seoane 2003, chap. 7).  
In October 1973, Law 20.541 established a 23% to 28% increase for all 
pension benefits below 1000 pesos. This initiated a series of policies that led 
to a 43%117 increase in the real value of the minimum pension during the short 
Peronist government. As higher pensions increased much less, pensioners with 
lower income were the principal beneficiaries of the reshuffling of resources. 
At the same time, the social compact initiated measures that involved the trade 
unions in the control of employer contributions in order to reduce informality 
(Falappa 2014, 218–219). By means of a sectoral agreement that stipulated the 
automatic deduction of social security contributions at the moment of sale of 
agricultural products, these efforts were particularly successful in extending 
pension coverage to approximately 600,000 rural workers (Feldman, Golbert 
and Isuani 1988, 53–54). Because the agricultural workers’ union was going 
to play an important role in the registration of workers, the measure also helped 
to strengthen union organization in the agricultural sector (Interview Britos 
2014). In April 1975, Decree 796/75 established an increase in workers’ pen-
sion contributions to 11%. In October 1975, a moment at which the CGT dom-
inated the government, Law 21.118 implemented more generous rules for pen-
sion calculation and virtually abolished contribution requirements, which enor-
mously facilitated informal workers’ and low-income earners’ access to pen-
sion benefits (Feldman, Golbert, and Isuani 1988, 54–55; Rougier and Fiszbein 
2006, 100–106). Taken together, pension reform during the short Peronist gov-
ernment was favorable for low-income earners as it extended coverage and led 
to a more egalitarian distribution of resources among pensioners. In contrast to 
the reform path in the health care system, trade union leaders had no compa-
 
116  José Gelbard was formerly head of the CGE and maintained close relations with the 
Communist Party (Brennan and Rougier 2009, 177; Seoane 2003). The latter might 
have contributed to the fact that the social policy guidelines included in the compact 
tended to favor the lowest income groups. 
117  Based on the comparison of the real value of the minimum pension in January 1973 and 
January 1976 (Feldman, Golbert, and Isuani 1988, 119). 
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rable interests in defending the status quo and actively participated in progres-
sive reform in favor of low-income earners.  
The policies expanding family and social assistance also benefited low-
income earners. In 1973, family allowances were increased by 40% and in 
1974, following recommendations of the ILO, they were extended to pension-
ers and pregnant women (Interview Britos 2014; Falappa 2014, 218). Expendi-
ture for social assistance programs increased from 1% of GDP in 1973 to 1.3% 
in 1975 and expenditure for social housing increased from 0.4% to 0.9% (Var-
gas de Flood 2006, 188). In the case of social housing, however, the benefits 
for low-income earners were very limited. During the initial phase of the Pe-
ronist government, progressive housing construction projects had been devel-
oped. However, with the marginalization of the Peronist left after the resigna-
tion of President Cámpora, the right-wing minister of social welfare channeled 
most of the resources towards better-situated beneficiaries (Ziccardi 1984, 
151–156, 169). 
Political Dynamics, Patterns of Social Policy Change, and Path 
Dependency Effects 
The economic and political context during the early 1970s was favorable for a 
renewed attempt to extend social protections for low-income earners. Eco-
nomic growth, industrial development, and low unemployment increased the 
structural power resources of the popular classes. At the same time, these struc-
tural developments and the global wave of left-wing protests contributed to the 
recovery of the trade union movement and a marked growth of the left’s asso-
ciational power resources. The return to democracy and the lifting of the ban 
on Peronism furthermore provided electoral power resources to the popular 
classes and increased the political weight of low-income groups that had only 
weak structural and associational power resources. At the same time, the con-
tinued predominance of the ISI paradigm provided ample discursive power re-
sources to progressive actors to frame their demands for redistribution as via-
ble and desirable for the society as a whole. Against this background, an inclu-
sive electoral alliance was formed and won the elections on the 11th of March 
1973. During the electoral campaign, the alliance mobilized popular class sup-
port through the promise of redistributive social policy. Once in government 
and with the left occupying important political positions, the alliance elabo-
rated a highly progressive and ambitious social policy agenda. 
However, the ambitious agenda was only partially implemented. Soon af-
ter the 1973 elections, political tensions within the governing alliance came to 
the forefront. Perón decided to side with the trade unions and the right wing of 
the movement and the left was increasingly marginalized. In this context, the 
trade union leaders, who had strong interests in maintaining control over their 
health insurance funds, could successfully stop the implementation of a univer-
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sal public health system reform. Yet, in other social policy areas, the trade un-
ions supported progressive reform. All in all, social policy change during the 
three years of democratic government was highly favorable for low-income 
earners. Spending on public health care and social assistance was significantly 
increased and the coverage of family allowances and pensions extended among 
low-income groups. Furthermore, the minimum pensions were significantly 
increased so that the distribution of resources among pensioners became in-
creasingly egalitarian. 
Table 14: Change in social protection for low-income earners, 1973–1976 
Pension policies + Universalization of access by means of eliminating contribution  
requirements 
+ Massive increase of the minimum pension benefit 
+ Formalization of approximately 600,000 agricultural workers 
Health care  
policies 
+ Strenghtening of both the universal public health sector and the  
social health insurances 





+ Strong increase of social assistance and housing expenditure  
Family allowance 
policies 
+ Extension of coverage to pensioners and pregnant women 
+ Real value increase of the benefits 
Overall evolution of social protection 
for low-income earners Strong expansion 
4.5 The Retrenchment of Social Policy under a Neoliberal 
Dictatorship, 1976–1983 
By 1976, internal conflicts had significantly weakened the governing alliance. 
Furthermore, economic recession, high inflation and an increasing escalation 
of politically motivated violence aroused widespread public discontent. 
Against this background, the military staged a coup d’état in March 1976 and 
formed a reactionary governing alliance that excluded the popular classes. The 
labor movement and the organizations of the political left were fiercely re-
pressed. In contrast, the big, anti-interventionist employer associations were 
incorporated into the core of the governing alliance and members of them as-
sumed crucial positions in ministries and other state apparatuses. On this basis, 
the military government implemented a series of profoundly regressive social 
policy reforms that significantly reduced social protections for low-income 
earners. 
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The Political Arena: Social and Economic Context, Constellation  
of Actors, and Distribution of Power Resources 
Steeply rising oil prices, import restrictions implemented by the European 
Community, and a further escalation of political tensions after the death of Pe-
rón on the 1st of July 1974 initiated a deterioration of the economic situation 
(Birle 1995, 137; Godio 2000, 1094). By 1976 Argentina had an enormous 
trade deficit, inflation reached over 440% and the economy shrank by 0.7% 
(Rapoport 2013, Table 5; Rock 1987, 363–364). During the following years, 
the military government attempted to control inflation by implementing a rad-
ically neoliberal economic program. Within a very short time, export and im-
port taxes were reduced or eliminated, cross border financial transactions were 
liberalized and the domestic financial market was deregulated. At the same 
time, collective wage bargaining was suppressed, which led to an average real 
wage reduction of over 30% in 1976 alone (Beccaria, Groisman, and Maurizio 
2009, 13–14). While these measures failed to bring inflation under control, 
they led to a profound financial crisis during the early 1980s and set into mo-
tion a process of industrial decline due to the fall of national consumption and 
the influx of cheaper imported products (Damill and Frenkel 2006, 110; Rock 
1987, 369). Industry’s share of the GDP fell from 40% in 1975 to 37% in 1983 
and its share of the overall employment decreased from 31% to 27% (Timmer, 
de Vries, and de Vries 2014). In the strongholds of Argentine unionism, in 
industrial companies with more than 1000 workers, the reduction of employ-
ment reached nearly 50% (Abal Medina 2012, 113). These processes also cor-
related with a gradual deterioration of the labor market. The latter was not re-
flected in a massive increase in open unemployment. Instead, as Torrado 
(1992, 175–178) and Marshall (1988, 12–13) argue, it found its expression in 
a shrinking of the economically active population, which constituted a form of 
hidden unemployment. In sum, the processes of de-industrialization and labor 
market deterioration induced a gradual decline of the popular classes’ struc-
tural power resources. The imposition of military rule  furthermore deprived 
the popular classes of electoral power resources. 
Although the ISI paradigm remained influential in Argentine public opin-
ion, the economic difficulties of the mid-1970s and the failure of the social 
compact to resolve them began to nurture doubts about its adequacy. At the 
same time, signs of discursive change appeared on the international level, such 
as the election of radically neoliberal governments in Great Britain and the US. 
Furthermore, the massive increase of Argentina’s foreign debt  from less than 
10 billion US Dollars in 1976 to over 45 billion in 1983 contributed to a relative 
increase in the influence of neoliberal-oriented international organizations, 
such as the World Bank and the IMF, compared to that of the WHO and the 
ILO, which continued to promote social policy expansion (Deacon 1997; Var-
gas de Flood 2006, 147). 
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as share  
of GDP (%) 











1976 -0.7 444.1 40 32 4.8 18.1 
1977 6.0 176.0 41 32 3.3 15.3 
1978 -3.9 175.5 40 32 3.3 16.5 
1979 6.8 159.5 40 31 2.5 –     
1980 0.7 100.8 39 33 2.6 18.5 
1981 -6.2 164.7 37 31 4.8 –     
1982 -5.2 343.3 36 27 5.3 20.0 
1983 3.1 433.7 37 27 4.7 –     
Sources: Rapoport (2013) for GDP growth and inflation; Timmer, de Vries, and de Vries (2014) 
for industry share of GDP and share of industrial employment; INDEC (2003) for unemployment 
and Jiménez (2013, 59) for informality. 
The constellation of social policy actors and the distribution of associational 
power resources between them also evolved in a way that proved to be unfa-
vorable for progressive forces. After the replacement of president Héctor 
Cámpora, left-wing leaders were quickly removed from influential positions 
within the governing alliance and the trade unions (James 1976, 286–288; 
1988, 243–244). Simultaneously, the activity of right-wing paramilitary forces 
massively increased with the support of the Peronist right, parts of the military 
and the police (Rock 1987, 355; Cavarozzi 2006, 49–55). It is estimated that 
by 1975 the right-wing paramilitary organization Argentine Anti-Communist 
Alliance, commonly referred to as Triple-A, killed around 50 left-wing activ-
ists and intellectuals per week and thereby contributed to a rapid decline of 
leftist movements, such as the Peronist youth, the slum dwellers’ movement 
MVP, progressive base-level structures of the Catholic church and independent 
Marxist groups  (Esquivel 2000, 19–24; Rock 1987, 360–363; Ziccardi 1984, 
168). While the Peronist left had constituted an influential component of the 
governing alliance during 1973, by mid-1975 it had been marginalized and its 
organizations decimated (Cavarozzi 2006, 53). After the military coup in 1976, 
the persecution and killing of tens of thousands of activists and supposed sym-
pathizers finally led to the complete disintegration of many organizations of 
the left. The center-left current within the UCR party led by Raúl Alfonsín was 
one of the few progressive forces that were able to grow and extend its influ-
ence (McGuire 1997, 162–163).  
Although the trade union movement suffered from fierce repression as 
well, union density decreased only moderately from an estimated 43% in 1974 
to 41% in 1982–1983 (Lamadrid and Orsatti 1991, 156). Nevertheless, many 
of the base-level associations of the unions were crushed, so that despite the 
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relative stability of union density its activist structures were significantly 
weakened (Rock 1987, 376). 
Realignments among the employer associations were also detrimental to 
the prospects of social policy expansion. While the more interventionist CGE 
suffered from numerous defections during the mid-1970s and was outlawed in 
1977, the neoliberal-dominated employer associations absorbed many of these 
defectors and closed ranks by forming the multi-sector employers’ assembly 
APEGE in August 1975 (Birle 1995, 141, 163; Rougier and Fiszbein 2006, 
94–108). The economic transformations that were initiated by the military 
junta’s neoliberal policies further consolidated this development by economi-
cally weakening those parts of the industrial sector that were more inclined to 
support, or at least tolerate, state interventionist policies (Birle 1995, 176). 
In sum, from the mid-1970s on, the social, economic, and political context 
turned increasingly unfavorable for the extension of social protections for low-
income earners. 
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Exclusionary Military Rule and Regressive Social Policy Reform 
The promising context under which the Peronist alliance had assumed govern-
ment in 1973 soon evaporated. Right from the beginning, the alliance was 
plagued by enormous internal tensions between the left-leaning Peronist youth, 
the centrist trade union sector and the right wing of the PJ. Perón was able to 
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contain some of these tensions, yet when he died in July 1974 the willingness 
to cooperate of the different organizations within the alliance virtually disap-
peared and gave way to a violent escalation of conflicts. Several of the organ-
izations that had constituted important components of the alliance in 1973, 
such as the left-leaning youth organizations and the CGE, were significantly 
weakened (Rapaport 2006, 547–551; Cavarozzi 2006, 53–55). The trade union 
movement retained high levels of affiliation, but politically it was paralyzed 
after it had failed to halt the deepening of the political and economic crises 
during the second half of 1975 when the movement enjoyed unprecedented 
control over the government. By 1976, the governing alliance had practically 
fallen apart and the country was plagued by an economic recession, sky-rock-
eting inflation and a massive lockout organized by a majority of the employer 
associations that had joined forces and formed the APEGE (Birle 1995, 142; 
Rapoport 2013, Table 5; Rock 1987, 360–366; Rougier and Fiszbein 2006, 94–
108).  
Against this background, the military seized power in March 1976. The 
coup d’état led to the complete expulsion of the popular classes from the gov-
erning alliance (Belmartino and Bloch 1982, 12). Instead, the neoliberal-ori-
ented employer associations came to constitute the core of the new alliance 
(Birle 1995, 175). José Alfredo Martínez de Hoz, who belonged to a traditional 
family of big landowners and was president of the Argentinean Employers’ 
Council, became the minister of economy during the first five years of the dic-
tatorship. Members of other employers’ associations were put in charge of cen-
tral positions in several ministries and the central bank. In particular, the 
ADEBA, the association of the biggest Argentine banks, was able to exercise 
significant influence on the government (Birle 1995, 169–174). 
Due to the nearly total collapse of Peronism, the paralysis of the trade un-
ion movement and the pulverization of the left, the military junta  possessed 
ample freedom of maneuver and encountered only weak resistance (Birle 1995, 
147; Rock 1987, 367). Against this background, the junta adopted a program 
of radical neoliberal reform, which reflected the dominance of neoliberal think-
ing within the military elite and most of the employers’ associations (Belmar-
tino 2010, 125; Birle 1995, 169–174). Taxes on foreign trade were reduced or 
eliminated, cross border financial transactions were facilitated and the regula-
tions on the domestic financial market were significantly loosened (Beccaria, 
Groisman, and Maurizio 2009, 13–14). Progressive direct taxes were increas-
ingly replaced by regressive indirect taxes (Marshall 1988, 143–144). At the 
same time, wages and payroll taxes were cut massively; free collective bar-
gaining and the right to strike were eliminated. The CGT was outlawed and 
trade union activity was fiercely repressed. Political opponents, especially 
those that were assumed to be left-wing, were persecuted and approximately 
30,000 were murdered (Godio 2000, 1103). Labor laws were reformed in a 
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way that increased the discretionary power of employers and reduced the costs 
of dismissals. 
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As a result of these policies, the wage share of the GDP dropped from 44% in 
1975 to only 31% by 1977, which constituted its lowest level since 1935 (Cor-
tés and Marshall 1993, 402; Golbert 2010, 129; Lindenboim, Graña, and Ken-
nedy 2005, 35; Rock 1987, 367–370). Income inequality, measured with the 
Gini-coefficient, increased steeply from 0.35 in 1975 to 0.43 in 1983 (Gaspa-
rini and Cruces 2010, 5). While these developments constituted a massive loss 
of welfare and freedom for the popular classes, the biggest employers’ associ-
ations, except the CGE, were highly pleased by the junta’s policies (Birle 1995, 
164). 
In the area of social policy the junta’s agenda also reflected the interests 
of the anti-redistributive forces that dominated the governing alliance. Rather 
than compensating for the dramatic social consequences of its economic and 
labor policies, social policy reform produced an additional deepening of in-
come inequalities (Marshall 1988, 11, 139). The retrenchment of social pro-
tections under the junta was detrimental for the popular classes as a whole, yet 
it was most profound for low-income earners, which reflected the unequal dis-
tribution of power resources among different segments of the popular classes. 
While the abolition of democracy eliminated the electoral power resources of 
the popular classes as a whole, the union movement preserved considerable 
associational power resources. Their internal left being marginalized, the un-
ions focused largely on the defense of the social rights of the formal working 
class. This provided the junta with incentives to offer concessions to this seg-
ment of the popular classes in order to contain strike activity or facilitate col-
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laboration with some of the most reactionary union leaders. Most low-income 
earners lacked access to the formal labor market and were not represented by 
the union movement, and as a result of this lack of associational power re-
sources, the military government  was able to more quickly dismantle social 
policies that benefited low-income earners than those which benefited the for-
mal working class. 
In the area of health care policies, the junta immediately implemented a 
radical retrenchment of the universal public health sector. Within only two 
years, spending as a percentage of GDP was cut by half, falling from 1.7% in 
1975 to only 0.9% in 1977 (Vargas de Flood 2006, 188). One of the mecha-
nisms used to consolidate this spending cut was to transfer public health care 
responsibilities to the provincial level without an equivalent transfer of re-
sources. At the same time, a rapidly growing part of the resources that re-
mained in the public health system was used for military hospitals that were 
not open to the general public (Marshall 1988, 88). The effects of these policies 
were dramatic. Entire hospitals were closed and the access of the popular clas-
ses to health care as well as the quality of attention was significantly reduced 
(Lo Vuolo and Barbeito 1998b, 126; Marshall 1988, 60–68). In late 1978 the 
junta passed Law 21.902, which completely derogated the national health sys-
tem law that had been introduced by the Peronist alliance. In 1981, a new mi-
gration law limited the access of migrants to the public health system and 
obliged health care professionals to report undocumented immigrants to the 
authorities (Novick 2008, 140).118 Low-income earners were disproportionally 
affected by all these restrictions and retrenchment policies because most of 
them lacked health insurance coverage, and hence depended vitally on the free 
and universal public health system. Due to the deteriorating labor market, the 
share of the population that had no health insurance coverage increased during 
the years of the dictatorship, so that increasingly fewer resources had to pro-
vide health care for ever more people. Formal workers in occupational groups 
with comparatively low incomes also suffered from these spending cuts, as the 
health insurance of these groups tended to provide poor services so that their 
members were often treated in public hospitals (Marshall 1988, 129–130). The 
only exception to this general trend of retrenchment in public health provision 
was that the military government during the first two years continued the ex-
pansion of rural health programs that aimed at providing basic and cost-effec-
tive access to primary health care. Between 1976 and 1977 the number of per-
sons attended by such programs increased from approximately 500,000 to 
1,400,000 and remained on that level during the following years (McGuire 
2010, 137–138; Belmartino and Bloch 1984, 269). This expansion, however, 
went along with the elimination of beneficiaries’ participation in the organiza-
tion of these programs and the persecution and expulsion of many progressive 
 
118  This reinforced the exclusionary-regressive character of the governments’ health poli-
cies as a significant share of low-income earners were migrants. 
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local political activists and organizations that had been involved during the 
preceding years (Bertolotto, Fuks, and Rovere 2012, 363). Despite the limited 
resources devoted to these programs, their continuity nevertheless contributed 
significantly to a further decline in infant mortality, reaching 33.2 per 1,000 in 
1980 (McGuire 2010, 311). 
In the area of social health insurance, the junta pursued two principal aims. 
The first was to eliminate union control over health insurance funds as part of 
a wider strategy of weakening the labor movement. The second was to promote 
further privatization of the system. In line with the junta’s neoliberal approach 
and the interests of its social support bases, these reforms deepened the regres-
sive nature of the system at the same time that they generated new investment 
and profit opportunities for the financial sector. In contrast to the drastic spend-
ing cuts in the egalitarian public health sector, spending on the in-egalitarian 
health insurance system was markedly increased from 1.3% of GDP in 1976 
to 2% in 1983 (Vargas de Flood 2006, 188). According to Gerardo Munck 
(1998, 236–237), the junta used the spending increase to show that social 
health insurance worked better under military control than under control of the 
trade unions, which were accused of being corrupt and inefficient. In Decem-
ber 1976 the junta passed the first resolution that aimed at a restriction of the 
trade unions’ influence on the use of health insurance resources (Belmartino 
2010, 125), and soon after the junta’s minister of economy, Martínez de Hoz, 
announced his plans to combine the elimination of union control with the pri-
vatization of the system. For both components of the proposal he received ex-
plicit support from all of the big employer associations (Belmartino 2005a, 
174–175; Belmartino 2010, 126–132). In November 1979, the military gov-
ernment passed the Law 22.105 which ordered the dissolution of the CGT and 
simultaneously prohibited trade unions from administering health insurance 
funds. In August 1980, Law 22.269 established that the administration of 
health insurances would be taken over by an administrative body whose staff 
would ultimately be designated by the government’s health insurance institute 
(INOS). At the same time, this law allowed beneficiaries to switch to private 
health insurance, which benefited the best-earning affiliates at the expense of 
the low- and middle-income beneficiaries (Belmartino and Bloch 1982, 13; 
Marshall 1988, 133–134). However, in a context of resurging trade union pro-
test and the initiation of a profound economic crisis during the early 1980s, the 
law was never regulated by decree and went largely unimplemented (Interview 
Neri 2014b). 
Although the major employer associations maintained generally good re-
lations with the military junta, the junta’s failure to stabilize the economy and 
the negative effects of some of its measures for the industrial and agricultural 
sectors gradually led to the emergence of tensions within the governing alli-
ance (Birle 1995, 153–172). At the same time, external pressures on the junta 
increased. While the trade union movement had been paralyzed during the first 
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two years of the dictatorship, a general strike in April 1979 signaled its come-
back as a powerful actor in Argentine politics. Among the demands of the 
strike were the “normalization” of the trade unions and health insurance funds 
that had been put under control of state-nominated trustees. In 1980 several 
important unions reconstituted the CGT despite legal prohibition and in June 
1981 another general strike took place (Godio 2000, 1117–1122). Against this 
background, the military government decided to refrain from implementing the 
privatization of social health insurance funds and made them part of their carrot 
and stick tactics towards the labor movement. Hence, instead of generally de-
priving trade unions of their control over social insurance funds, as foreseen 
by Law 22.269, the junta negotiated participation in the administration of each 
fund with individual union leaders, which served as an effective tool to divide 
the union movement and to provide cooperative union leaders with benefits.119 
All in all, the dictatorship cut down the universalistic public health system, 
which resulted in a drastic deterioration of health care for most low-income 
earners. Due to the authoritarian character of the regime and the violent dis-
mantlement of most left-wing political organizations, the lowest income sec-
tors lacked power resources to resist these policies. In contrast, the trade union 
movement was able to mobilize significant associational and structural power 
resources in a moment in which economic problems were already arousing 
tensions within the governing alliance. This led the junta to make considerable 
concessions in the area of social health insurances, which however only cov-
ered the shrinking formal working class. 
The junta’s pension policies were also profoundly regressive. The drastic 
fall of real wages during 1976 caused a parallel reduction in the real value of 
the average pension by nearly 50% that year. During the following years, the 
value of the average pension recovered slightly, but in 1983 it was still 26% 
lower than in 1975 (MTEyFR 2001). In addition to an overall decrease of the 
pension value, the military government induced a redistribution of resources 
among pensioners that benefited higher-income pensioners to the detriment of 
low-income pensioners. In March 1976, shortly before the military coup was 
carried out, the value of the minimum pension constituted approximately 82% 
of the average pension, which indicated a highly egalitarian distribution of re-
sources among pensioners. By August 1979, the value of the minimum pension 
had fallen to only 35% of the average pension (Feldman, Golbert, and Isuani 
1988, 119–120). Furthermore, the government implemented stricter access cri-
teria. In June 1976, the junta repealed Law 21.118, which had virtually abol-
ished contribution requirements eight months before (Law 21.327). In Novem-
ber that year, the government finally raised contribution requirements to 15 
years (Law 21.451). These measures excluded many low-income earners from 
access to pensions, as most of these worked in informal jobs and were therefore 
 
119  According to Aldo Neri (Interview 2014b), most health insurances were de facto under 
control of trade unionists when he took over as the minister of health in 1983. 
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unable to accumulate sufficient years of contribution. In October 1980, Law 
22.293 completely abolished employer contributions to the pension system and 
social housing fund (FONAVI), which meant an overall reduction of employer 
contributions by a stunning 20 percentage points and a lasting destabilization 
of the system’s financial balance. In order to mitigate the negative financial 
effects, regressive value-added taxes were increased (Lo Vuolo and Barbeito 
1998b, 137). This significantly shifted the financing burden from capital to the 
popular classes and was heavily criticized by trade unions (Arza 2010, 268–
169; Feldman, Golbert, and Isuani 1988, 58; Marshall 1988, 13). When the 
country entered into economic crisis in 1981–82, the government felt forced to 
cut pensions again. However, as was the case with health care reform, the junta 
was now more inclined to make concessions to the popular classes in the con-
text of growing internal tensions and a revival of trade union protest. In con-
trast to the drastic pension cuts of 1976, the government decided to maintain 
at least the real value of the minimum pension, so that by 1983 the distribution 
of resources among pensioners had become again more egalitarian (Cárcamo 
Manna 1998, 15; MTEyFR 2001).  
As the financial deficit of the pension system ran out of control, the gov-
ernment began to transfer resources from the family allowance funds, which, 
in turn, resulted in a reduction of family allowance expenditure from 1.5% of 
GDP in 1975 to 0.5% in 1983 and a corresponding fall of the real value of this 
benefit (Falappa 2014, 222–223; Marshall 1988, 118; Vargas de Flood 2006, 
188). In a similar vein, the military government radically cut down social as-
sistance expenditure from 1.3% of GDP in 1975 to 0.4% in 1983 (Vargas de 
Flood 2006, 188). In the area of social housing, spending cuts were combined 
with the application of regressive access rules that de facto excluded most low-
income earners. At the same time, the junta carried out violent evictions of 
unregistered settlements, which taken together with the aforementioned poli-
cies led to a massive deterioration of the housing situation of low-income earn-
ers (Belmartino 2005e, 251). 
Political Dynamics, Patterns of Social Policy Change, and Path 
Dependency Effects 
The military formed an exclusionary governing alliance that heavily relied on 
the support of neoliberal-oriented employer associations and conservative 
parts of the middle and upper classes. Immediately it started to implement a 
radical neoliberal reform program that involved a far-ranging restructuring of 
the system of social policies in favor of capital and high-income earners and to 
the detriment of the popular classes. 
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Figure 5: Evolution of income inequality measured with the Gini-coefficient, 1976–1983 
Sources: Fishlow et al. (1993, 3) for 1976–1979 and Gasparini and Cruces (2010, 5) for 1980–
1983. 
Initially the junta faced hardly any resistance, as the collapse of the Peronist 
alliance in conflict had either decimated and dispersed the associational power 
resources of popular class forces, as happened with the organizations of the 
Peronist left, or politically paralyzed them, as was the case with the trade union 
movement and the PJ party. At the same time, the establishment of an author-
itarian regime deprived the popular classes of electoral power resources, so 
that the junta’s lack of support among the sizeable but weakly organized lower 
popular classes appeared to be of little threat. Therefore, the dictatorship was 
able to advance quickly with its agenda during its first years. However, from 
1979 on the trade union movement gradually recovered the capacity to act and 
began to mobilize their associational, structural, and discursive power re-
sources to confront measures of the government and to extract concessions. 
The lowest income sectors of the popular classes, however, lacked comparable 
power resources. The destruction of the organizations of slum dwellers and of 
the political left and their deprivation of electoral power resources resulted in 
an extreme marginalization in the political arena. This unequal distribution of 
power resources within the popular classes was also reflected in the way social 
policies were cut. In combination with growing tensions within the governing 
alliance and a deterioration of the economic context towards the early 1980s, 
trade union protests led the government to make concessions and to refrain 
from the original plan of complete separation of the social health insurance 
funds from union control. Expenditure on social health insurance was also in-
creased, in contrast to the original plan of strengthening the private health in-
surance sector. However, in those social policy areas that provided most of the 
social protection for the lowest income sectors, retrenchment was far-reaching. 
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family allowances were massively reduced. The regressive reform of the pen-
sion system also disproportionally affected low-income earners. 
The political, economic, and social transformations initiated by the mili-
tary government left a complicated legacy, which would go on to shape the 
dynamics of later struggles over social policy in important ways. On the polit-
ical level, the persecution and assassination of thousands of progressive polit-
ical activists lastingly weakened the Argentine left as a political actor. The only 
exception to this development was the increasing strength of the center-left 
wing of the UCR party. The financial strengthening of the social health insur-
ances and the weakening of the public health system increased the interests of 
the trade unions in preserving this fragmented and in-egalitarian system. On 
the economic and social level, the junta’s neoliberal adjustment policies initi-
ated a profound transformation, which had an important impact on later social 
politics. The passage from a process of industrialization to one of de-industri-
alization and financialization induced a long-term deterioration of the struc-
tural power resources of the labor movement and provided a severe challenge 
to its associational power resources, as trade unions were well organized in the 
declining industrial sector. 
Table 18: Change in social protection for low-income earners, 1976–1983 
Pension policies - Introduction of stricter access criteria that excluded many  
low-income earners and informal workers from pension benefits 
- General reduction of benefits 
- Complete elimination of employer contributions 
Health care  
policies 
- Radical retrenchment of the universal public health sector and shift 
of resources to the inegalitarian health insurance system 
- Introduction of a restrictive migratory law, that severely limited  
migrants’ access to the public health system 




- Radical retrenchment of social assistance expenditure by over two 
thirds 
- Complete elimination of employer contributions to the social housing 
fund and significant retrenchment of housing expenditure 
Family allowance 
policies 
- Reduction of family allowance expenditure by two thirds 
Overall evolution of social protection 
for low-income earners Strong retrenchment 
Moreover, with the demise of local market oriented industrial companies, the 
more interventionist employer association CGE lost importance. This contrib-
uted to the overcoming of the ideological division among employers’ associa-
tions in favor of a neoliberal consensus. Finally, the exponential increase of 
public and private foreign debts would constitute a heavy burden during the 
  169 
following decades and provide neoliberal IFIs with significant political influ-
ence.120 
4.6 Return to Democracy, Stagflation, and the Failed 
Attempt of Inclusionary Social Policy, 1983–1989 
After having caused a severe economic crisis and provoked a war over the 
Falkland Islands that ended in a clear-cut defeat, resistance to the military gov-
ernment grew stronger during the early 1980s. Finally, democratic rule was re-
established in late 1983. The return to democracy, a temporary comeback of 
the ISI paradigm and the recovery of trade unions and political parties created 
once again a chance for the formation of a more inclusionary governing alli-
ance. Under the leadership of its center-left faction, the UCR won the elections, 
making significant inroads into the traditionally Peronist popular class elec-
torate and proposing a progressive social policy agenda that contemplated a 
significant expansion of social protections for low-income earners. However, 
in the face of economic crisis and the fierce opposition of most corporate or-
ganizations, the alliance largely failed to implement progressive social policy 
change. 
The Political Arena: Social and Economic Context, Constellation of 
Actors, and Distribution of Power Resources 
The democratically elected government of Raúl Alfonsín inherited a heavy 
burden of social and economic problems from the military dictatorship. During 
the crisis of 1981 and 1982, the GDP had fallen by over 11% and by 1983 
inflation reached over 400% (Rapoport 2013, Table 5). Foreign debt amounted 
to over 45 billion dollars and foreign debt services swallowed 50% of Argen-
tina’s export earnings (Rock 1987, 391; Vargas de Flood 2006, 147). After 
1983, continued capital flight, deteriorating world market prices for grains and 
high interest rates further exacerbated these problems (Basualdo 2011, 58–60; 
McGuire 1997, 185). Although the Alfonsín government was unable to last-
ingly reverse the tendency of economic and social deterioration during the 
1980s, its heterodox economic and social policies were able to stabilize the 
situation during its first years in office. Through a package of economic poli-
cies referred to as Plan Austral, inflation was reduced to 82% in 1986 and eco-
nomic growth temporarily returned (Rapoport 2013, Table 5). However, from 
that year on a renewed deterioration of the terms of trade and a bad harvest 
 
120  An analysis of the social, economic and political legacy of the military government can 
be found in Basualdo (2011, 41–58). 
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exacerbated the difficulties of servicing foreign debt and put enormous pres-
sure on the central bank’s foreign currency reserves (Birle 1995, 239). In 
March 1988, the government was finally forced to cease interest payments to 
commercial banks. By February 1989, foreign currency reserves ran out and 
the country entered into a deep hyperinflation crisis (McGuire 1997, 215).  





















1983 3.1 433 37 27 4.7 –     
1984 2.2 688 36 29 4.6 –     
1985 -4.6 385 35 28 6.1 19.5 
1986 5.8 81 37 28 5.6 23.0 
1987 1.8 174 37 28 5.9 24.5 
1988 -3.0 387 36 27 6.3 27.0 
1989 -4.4 3079 35 26 7.6 29.0 
Sources: Rapoport (2013) for GDP growth and inflation; Timmer, de Vries, and de Vries (2014) 
for industry share of the GDP and share of industrial employment; INDEC (2003) for unemploy-
ment and Jiménez (2013, 59) for informality. 
Despite these adverse economic developments, the heterodox policies of the 
Alfonsín government contributed to a relative stability of the country’s indus-
trial base. Between 1983 and 1989, industry’s share of GDP remained rela-
tively stable between 35% and 37% and its share of the employed population 
oscillated modestly between 26% and 29% (Timmer, de Vries, and de Vries 
2014). At the same time, the labor market underwent profound changes. There 
was a marked increase in women’s labor market participation. While women’s 
share of the economically active population had increased by a mere seven 
percentage points between 1947 and 1980, during the 1980s alone, it increased 
by another seven percentage points.121 Unemployment increased from 5.5% in 
May 1983 to 8.1% in May 1989 (INDEC 2003). Informality among salaried 
workers rose from less than 20% in 1985 to 29% in 1989 (Jiménez 2013, 59). 
According to McGuire (1997, 185), this expansion of unemployment and in-
formality after 1976 generated for the first time an extensive reserve army of 
labor that caused a moderate but steady erosion of the popular classes’ struc-
tural power resources. 
On the institutional level, the re-establishment of democracy returned elec-
toral power resources to the popular classes, which strengthened these classes 
 
121 Author’s calculations based on Torrado (1992, 92) and CEPAL (2017b). 
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as a whole and increased the political weight of the lowest income sectors 
within them.  
On the discursive level, the gross economic failure of the military’s ne-
oliberal economic policies and the massive human rights violations that were 
associated with their implementation led to a profound discrediting of the ne-
oliberal paradigm in the eyes of the mass public and a revival of the popularity 
of Keynesian ideas and the ISI-paradigm (Munck 1987, 109; Portantiero 1994, 
303; Svampa 2005, 25). This provided progressive political forces with discur-
sive power resources to justify the expansion of social protections for low-
income earners as fostering overall economic growth and being desirable for 
the society as a whole. The change in the public mood facilitated the construc-
tion of electoral and associational alliances between the lower popular classes 
and other sectors of the society in order to press for progressive social policy 
change. The neoliberal paradigm only started to become more popular again 
during the late 1980s, when the economic situation deteriorated and a growing 
share of the public perceived the ISI-paradigm to be unable to provide adequate 
solutions. 
These broader economic, social and political developments also influ-
enced the evolution of the main actors involved in social politics. The return 
of democracy and the lifting of repression favored a process of associational 
recuperation of popular class actors, in particular of the trade unions and polit-
ical parties (Palomino 2005, 391). The PJ was stunningly efficient in re-build-
ing its base-level organizations. Base units of the party virtually mushroomed 
up everywhere and within a very short time, the PJ had signed up approxi-
mately three million members (Levitsky 2003, 49). However, the PJ party of 
1983 was very different from the one that had existed ten years earlier. The 
persecution and killing of thousands of activists and supposed sympathizers 
had drastically decimated the Peronist left (Cavarozzi 2006, 53). In 1983 the 
PJ party was dominated by centrist union leaders, which were much less en-
thusiastic about defending the interests of the lowest income sectors (Goldin 
1997, 123–130; Palomino 2005, 390). Things were different in the UCR Party, 
where the social democratic wing was able to extend its influence. After the 
death of the conservative party leader Ricardo Balbín in 1981, a member of the 
social democratic faction, Raúl Alfonsín, won the internal elections and be-
came president of the UCR. Under center-left leadership, the UCR developed 
concepts for universalizing social protections, in particular in the health care 
sector, and actively reached out to the traditionally PJ-dominated working-
class and poor neighborhoods in order to mobilize electoral support (Belmar-
tino 2010, 138; McGuire 1997, 162–191; Interview Neri 2014a).  
The associational strength of the trade union movement had been surpris-
ingly resilient during the years of the military dictatorship. The return to 
democracy and constitutional rights, as well as the extensive strike activity 
during the 1980s, enabled the trade unions to increase union density from an 
172   
estimated 41% in 1982–1983 to approximately 44% in 1989 (Lamadrid and 
Orsatti 1991, 156). However, under conservative leadership, trade union in-
volvement in social politics was ambivalent regarding the interests of low-in-
come earners. In the health care sector, interests of the union leaders in pre-
serving control over health insurance funds led to union opposition against uni-
versalizing reforms, while in other social policy areas the unions were more 
supportive of progressive change.  
Right-wing paramilitary and military repression had also decimated a wide 
array of other progressive social movements such as movements of residents 
of poor neighborhoods and feminist organizations (Fisher 2000, 324; Ziccardi 
1984, 171). With the return to democracy, social movements of these types 
began to gradually re-emerge. The majority of them favored universalizing so-
cial policy reforms, as the existing fragmented system tended to disadvantage 
or even exclude most residents of poor neighborhoods as well as most women. 
Yet, the political influence of these movements remained very limited (Fisher 
2000, 324; Merklen 2005, 51–59). 
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Among the employer organizations, the 1980s brought a consolidation of the 
neoliberal consensus and a general rejection of redistributive social policies. 
Although the more interventionist employer association CGE was re-founded 
in 1984, it did not recover the influence that it had had during the preceding 
decades (Birle 1995, 225; 1996, 207–209). Moreover, employer-financed ne-
oliberal think tanks, such as the Fundación Mediterránea, the Fundación de 
Investigaciones Económicas Latinoamericanas (FIEL), and the Centro de 
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Estudios Macroeconomicos de Argentina (CEMA), became increasingly influ-
ential through lobbying and a strong presence in the media (Basualdo 2011, 
56). 
All in all, during the 1980s, the context was ambivalent for the extension 
of social protections for low-income earners. While such proposals of social 
policy extension seemed to be electorally viable, economic restrictions were 
tight and the particular constellation of interests and the distribution of power 
resources provided difficult conditions for the construction of a governing al-
liance that could sustain a progressive reform process. 
The Formation of a Weak Center-Left Governing Alliance and its 
Limited Success in Expanding Social Protections for Low-Income 
Earners 
By the early 1980s, pressure on the military government increased from vari-
ous sides. The labor movement, which had been largely paralyzed during the 
first years of the dictatorship, gradually regained a capacity to take action and 
staged successful general strikes in April 1979 and June 1981 (Godio 2000, 
1117–1122). The protests of human rights groups also grew in strength and 
visibility, particularly the ones of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo , who de-
manded justice for all those who were killed or kidnapped by the dictatorship 
(McGuire 1997, 175; Rock 1987, 384–385). At the same time, the gross failure 
of the junta’s economic policy and the advent of crisis led to the emergence of 
tensions within the governing alliance. From 1979 on, internal criticisms were 
voiced by the industrial and agrarian employers’ associations, which were dis-
contented with the government’s exchange rate policies that led to a massive 
overvaluation of the currency. With the deepening of the economic crisis in 
1981 these internal tensions grew in intensity and even the financial sector as-
sociations, which were among the closest supporters of the regime, started to 
express discontent with the government for not being radical enough in imple-
menting neoliberal policies (Birle 1995, 153–175).  
Under pressure from within and without the governing alliance, General 
Videla was replaced by General Viola as the head of the government in March 
1981. However, Viola was also unable to stabilize the economy and to control 
popular protests. In December 1981, he was replaced by the nationalist hard-
liner General Galtieri (Rock 1987, 374–375). While popular resistance contin-
ued to grow and a massive general strike paralyzed large parts of the country 
in March 1982, the Junta decided to invade the British-controlled Falkland Is-
lands. In the short run, this strengthened nationalist sentiments among the mass 
public and helped to recover popular support for the military. However, as the 
war resulted in a stunning defeat after only 72 days, popular protests and ten-
sions within the governing alliance re-emerged with even higher intensity than 
before. Against this background, General Galtieri was replaced by General 
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Bignone, who finally scheduled elections for October 1983 (Birle 1995, 147–
148; Rock 1987, 375–385).  
With the elections nearing, the major parties were stunningly quick in re-
building their base level organizations and reaching out for popular class sup-
port. Within a short period, the PJ had affiliated approximately three million 
members and the UCR came close to 1.5 million (Levitsky 2003, 49). Despite 
the significantly broader membership of the PJ, Raúl Alfonsín of the UCR was 
able to mobilize broad-based support and won the presidential elections with 
52% to 40% of the vote (McGuire 1997, 183). The UCR’s victory was possible 
for several reasons. First, among the major candidates, Alfonsín had been the 
most vehement opponent of the military junta, while some of the conservative 
trade union leaders that dominated the PJ at that time were accused of collab-
oration with the regime. Alfonsín was hence perceived as the most credible 
candidate to restore and consolidate democracy and the rule of law. After seven 
years of violent dictatorship, this reputation gained him massive popular sup-
port (Birle 1995, 191; Portantiero 1994, 295–298). Second, the center-left cur-
rents122 of the UCR that supported Alfonsín had successfully constructed base-
level structures that were able and willing to reach out to working-class and 
poor neighborhoods that were traditionally dominated by the PJ. In contrast to 
the 1973 elections, in 1983 it was the UCR rather than the PJ that received 
impetus from left youth organizations. This provided Alfonsín’s campaign 
with a mobilizational dimension that proved to be highly effective (McGuire 
1997, 191). Third, in conjunction with the base-level activities of the party’s 
youth in poor and working-class neighborhoods, the social-democratic plat-
form of Alfonsín was able to generate hopes for real material improvements 
for lower income sectors, particularly in regard to social policy. In a context of 
a renewed popularity of Keynesian ideas and the ISI Paradigm, progressive 
social and economic policies were furthermore widely perceived as being ben-
eficial for the society as a whole, by promoting economic recovery through 
revitalizing local demand. The combination of these factors made it possible 
for Alfonsín to construct a broad electoral support base, which involved a ma-
jority of middle-class voters, who traditionally supported the UCR, and a sig-
nificant share of the poor and working-class voters, who had traditionally con-




122  Alfonsín received his main intra-party support from three center-left organizations 
within the UCR: the Movimiento de Renovación y Cambio, of which Alfonsín was one 
of the founders in 1972, and the youth and student organizations Junta Coordinadora 
Nacional and Franja Morada. 
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Table 21: Composition of the new governing alliance, 1983* 
 
Support expanding 
social protections for 
low-income earners 
Neither actively  
support expansion  
nor retrenchment 
Support retrenching 
social protections for 
low-income earners 
Actors · Center-left wing of 
the UCR (Junta Co-
ordinadora Nacional, 
Movimiento de Reno-
vación y Cambio) 
· Franja Morada (stu-
dent organization) 
· Centrist wing of the 
UCR 
· Emerging neoliberal 




· Segments of the 
lower popular class-
es 
· Segments of the 
working class 








Strength of  
the alliance Weak but united 
* In the face of failed attempts to stabilize the economy and to form a strong progressive gov-
erning alliance, towards the second half of the presidency the influence of neoliberal sectors 
within the UCR grew. ** The alliance is classified as trundcated in the sense that it attempted 
to incorporate the popular classes, however failed to achieve the adherence of major parts of 
the trade union movement. Its electoral support among the popular classes also remained lim-
ited. 
The newly elected government pursued with much vigor an ambitious reform 
agenda that comprised economic and labor market policies inspired by 
Keynesian ideas, a democratization of the trade union movement, a restriction 
of the autonomy of the military, the legal prosecution of human rights viola-
tions that occurred during the dictatorship and an expansion of social protec-
tions for low-income earners by means of expanding social assistance policies 
and universalizing the health care system (Birle 1995, 198; Golbert 2010, 132–
136; McGuire 1997, 183–186; Portantiero 1994, 302). However, it soon turned 
out that the margins of maneuver of the government were much smaller than it 
had expected. An important limitation resulted from the complicated fiscal, 
economic and social legacy left by the dictatorship. Neither did the return to 
Keynesian policies result in the expected recovery of the economy nor did the 
IFIs make any significant concessions to the Argentine government (Birle 
1995, 228–229). Even more important were the limitations resulting from the 
political weakness of the governing alliance. Although the UCR was able to 
repeat its electoral success in the 1985 legislative elections, it never reached a 
majority in the Senate and the 1987 elections even resulted in a loss of its 
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majority in the Chamber of Deputies. In contrast to its initially broad electoral 
support, it failed right from the beginning to incorporate any significant sup-
port from corporate organizations. 
Immediately after taking office, the government attempted to widen the 
UCR’s influence within the trade union leadership by democratizing union 
elections and by strengthening the representation of minorities. However, in-
stead of generating trade union support, the measure led the mostly Peronist 
trade union leaders to overcome their divisions and to form a united front 
against the government (Golbert 2010, 133; McGuire 1997, 183–193; 
Portantiero 1994, 302). Due to the opposition of the senators of the PJ and two 
minor parties, the corresponding bill failed to pass the Senate, in which the 
UCR held no majority on its own (Interview Britos 2014). Hence, from the 
beginning, relations between the trade union movement and the government 
were characterized by conflict and in only five years the CGT organized 13 
nationwide general strikes (Palomino 2005, 390). At the same time, the gov-
ernment attempted to establish a supportive relationship with the industrial em-
ployers’ association UIA, which however rejected the government’s heterodox 
economic policy and took an oppositional stance, as did the other the employ-
ers’ associations (Birle 1995, 210). To make things even more complicated for 
the government, the CGT and several employers’ associations repeatedly 
formed alliances and jointly opposed the government’s policies (Palomino 
2005, 390; Portantiero 1994, 300–301).  
This opposition of both employer and working-class organizations put se-
vere limits on the government’s capacity to implement its social policy agenda. 
The centerpiece of this agenda was a universalizing health care reform that 
aimed at creating a national health insurance that would equally cover all in-
habitants of the country, independent of whether they were able to contribute 
or not (Golbert 2010, 135). The most emphatic promoter of this reform was 
Aldo Neri, who, as one of the country’s leading experts in public health, had 
already played a crucial role in the elaboration of the universalizing health re-
form proposal of the last Peronist government. Neri belonged to the center-left 
wing of the UCR Party and had been in close contact with Alfonsín since the 
early 1970s. As was the case with the PJ, also within the UCR the more con-
servative sectors viewed egalitarian health care reform with skepticism while 
the party’s left supported it. The rise of the center-left faction of the party under 
the leadership of Alfonsín therefore created the party internal support base for 
the elaboration of an egalitarian health care agenda (Interviews Isuani 2014a; 
Neri 2014a; 2014b). During the electoral campaign, health care universaliza-
tion was discussed as part of a wider package of social democratic reforms that 
increased the UCR’s electoral appeal to the lower income sectors (Belmartino 
2010, 138). Once the UCR was in government, Neri was put in charge of the 
Ministry of Health and immediately began to work out concrete drafts for 
health care reform. By and large, these drafts were inspired by the same 
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universalistic aims as the national health system proposal of 1973 (Interview 
Neri 2014b). Initially, the government planned to advance quickly on this is-
sue. However, against the background of the failure of the trade union reform 
bill to pass the Senate, the government decided to refrain from sending the 
health reform bill to the parliament in early 1984 in order to avoid a second 
failure and a further escalation of the confrontation with the trade union lead-
ers, who had a strong interest in defending the existing health insurance system 
(Belmartino and Bloch 1994, 324). The first detailed reform proposal for a 
national health insurance system was finally presented to the public in Novem-
ber 1984. The core of the proposal was the creation of a unified health insur-
ance system with universal coverage and equal quality of treatment for all res-
idents of the country. The coverage of the lowest income groups, among them 
many informal and unemployed workers and their dependents who were not 
able to pay contributions, was going to be financed by government contribu-
tions to the insurance. The proposal foresaw the incorporation of the already 
existing social health insurance funds into the national insurance system as 
mere financing bodies. The influence of the trade union leaders on these fi-
nancing bodies was furthermore going to be drastically reduced, as their ad-
ministration would be carried out by a body elected by the beneficiaries 
(Belmartino 2010, 139; Interview Neri 2014b). At the same time, the 3% work-
ers’ contributions were going to be abolished and employer contributions 
raised from 4.5% to 7.5% (Golbert 2010, 135).  
As Neri had actively participated in the process of failed health care reform 
during the 1970s, he was well aware of the capacities and willingness of the 
trade union leaders to block any kind of reform that would restrict their control 
over the health insurance funds. Against the background of the ample electoral 
victory and significant inroads into the traditionally Peronist working-class 
electorate, Neri’s proposal aimed at driving a wedge between the rank and file 
of the unions and their predominantly Peronist leaders. By means of the elim-
ination of workers’ contributions and the introduction of democratic elections 
of the insurances’ administrators, the proposal provided important material and 
political benefits for the affiliated workers while at the same time restricting 
the influence of the union leadership. In practice, however, the proposal rein-
forced the aggressively oppositional stance of the trade union leaders, who 
proved capable of mobilizing their rank and file to participate in a series of 
general strikes against the government’s policies (Interview Neri 2014b).123 
Furthermore, the increase of employers’ contributions and the expansion of the 
role of the state in the proposed national health insurance aroused the clear 
opposition of the employer associations, both within and without the health 
sector (Alonso 2000, 78; Belmartino and Bloch 1994, 346–348). Supported by 
 
123  The first general strike took place in September 1984. The second took place in May 
1985 and 11 more followed until the end of Alfonsín’s presidency in 1989 (Cavarozzi 
2006, 196–202). 
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the World Bank, the IMF and the IADB these associations actively promoted 
privatization and decentralization of the health sector (Belmartino 2005c, 294, 
308; Tittor 2012, 182). The majority of the associations of health care profes-
sionals also rejected the reform proposal for potentially reducing their entre-
preneurial independence (Interview Neri 2014b). To make things even more 
complicated, delegates of the CGT and the main employer associations held 
several meetings during the second half of 1984 in order to join forces against 
the government. In late January 1985, they finally agreed on a joint manifesto 
of twenty demands that involved the consolidation of the existing, fragmented 
social insurance system and the complete restoration of trade union control 
over it. In exchange for support on this issue, the trade union leaders even 
agreed to a variety of demands of the employer associations that were detri-
mental to the working class, such as wage restraints and privatizations (Birle 
1995, 232–233; Godio 2000, 1163–1164). 
Despite the hostility of the corporate organizations, the popularity and the 
margins of action of the government increased during the second half of 1985 
due to the initial success of its heterodox economic policy program Plan Aus-
tral in reducing inflation (Birle 1995, 234–236). In this context of apparent 
strength and in the hope of gaining a majority in the Senate in the approaching 
legislative elections, the government decided to send the health reform bill to 
the Congress in September 1985 (Belmartino 2010, 140). However, despite a 
favorable electoral result in the November 1985 elections, the governing alli-
ance failed to win a majority in the Senate. This meant that there was a risk for 
the government that the health reform bill would not pass the Senate. Against 
this background, Alfonsín decided to withdraw the bill and to support the more 
hesitant faction of his government, represented by the Ministry of Labor and 
the Social Security Department, which favored a negotiated reform instead of 
risking an unfavorable decision in the parliament. In April 1986, Neri, who 
represented a more confrontational approach and was not willing to accept a 
dilution of the contents of the project, finally resigned as minister of health 
(Interview Neri 2014b). As the general economic situation began to deteriorate 
again during 1986 and the threat of a military coup re-emerged in an acute 
manner,124 the government finally decided to provide some of the more coop-
erative trade union leaders with decisive influence on the elaboration of labor 
and health care legislation in order to lower the tensions with the labor move-
ment. In late March 1987, Alfonsín appointed Carlos Alderete, leader of the 
light and power workers’ union, as minister of labor. On the 6th of May finally, 
an agreement regarding health care reform was signed, which was heavily in-
fluenced by the involved union leaders (Belmartino and Bloch 1994, 351; 
Belmartino 2010, 142). As a result of this process, the two health reform laws 
that passed the Congress in late 1988, Law 23.660 and Law 23.661, by and 
 
124  During Easter 1987, the government was even confronted with an open rebellion of 
parts of the military. 
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large consolidated the existing system of fragmented social health insurances 
under trade union control. In order to address the financial problems of the 
health insurance funds, employer and worker contribution rates to the pension-
ers’ health insurance were increased by 2 percentage points in June 1988 and 
employer contribution rates to workers’ health insurance were raised by 1.5 
percentage points in early February 1989 (Lo Vuolo and Barbeito 1998a, 338). 
Law 23.661 mandated the extension of health insurance coverage to hitherto 
excluded sectors under egalitarian premises. The concrete mechanisms and 
modalities of incorporation were left to be established by decree, however, in 
the face of the following period of hyperinflation and the assumption of the 
neoliberal government of Carlos Ménem, these decrees were never promul-
gated and so Law 23.661 did not result in any relevant change regarding low-
income earners’ access to health care (Interview Neri 2014b).  
In sum, due to tight economic restrictions and fierce trade union and em-
ployer opposition, the government was neither able to shift resources from the 
inegalitarian health insurance system to the public health sector nor to assign 
major additional fiscal resources to the latter. Public health sector expenditure 
increased from 1% to 1.3% of the GDP between 1983 and 1989 (DAGPyPS 
2011). However, at the same time, the reduction of health insurance coverage 
in the face of growing informality in the labor market meant that a growing 
share of the population was dependent on the public health sector.125 Against 
this background, health indicators improved only moderately between 1983 
and 1989, with child mortality falling from 30 to 25 per 1,000 live births and 
life expectancy increasing by less than one and a half years (World Bank 2018). 
In the area of pension policies, the agenda of the Alfonsín government was 
far less ambitious and heavily shaped by the financial crisis of the system. 
Nevertheless, regarding coverage and the distribution of the available re-
sources, it was progressive and therefore fit well with the center-left character 
of the governing alliance and its attempt to consolidate a support base among 
low-income earners.  
When the government assumed office, the pension system was in a disas-
trous financial situation. Furthermore, from 1982 on, the military government 
had started to deviate from the legal indexation mechanism and raised pension 
benefits at a slower pace than inflation, which led to a rapid decline of the real 
value of pensions. The first response of the new government to these problems 
was to gradually reintroduce employer contributions from 1984 on (Lo Vuolo 
and Barbeito 1998a, 338). Nevertheless, due to the general economic crisis, 
growing informality and unemployment and the effects of the long-term pro-
cess of population aging, this measure was far from sufficient to solve the fi-
nancial problems of the system. In this context, the government continued the 
practice of deviating from the legally defined pension adjustment criteria so 
 
125  Informality among salaried workers rose from less than 17% in 1980 to nearly 30% in 
1988 (Beccaria and Groisman 2009b, 110; CEDLAS and World Bank 2018). 
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that by 1988 the real value of the average pension had fallen by approximately 
36% compared to 1980 (Arza 2006, 88; Madrid 2003, 103). This caused a flood 
of legal demands by pensioners against the state. In 1986, the government de-
creed a situation of pension emergency, suspended all legal processes and de 
facto introduced a new benefit calculation formula that consisted of a minimum 
pension plus a reduced replacement rate. In contrast to the replacement rates 
that had been introduced by the military government of Onganía, the new 
mechanism provided higher replacement rates for low-income earners and 
therefore contained a progressive element (Arza 2006, 88). At the same time, 
the government took measures to keep the access of low-income earners to 
pension benefits relatively open, despite a rapidly deteriorating labor market. 
Reiterated moratoriums preserved the eligibility for benefits of retiring work-
ers who had achieved pension age but lacked sufficient years of contribution 
due to unemployment or informality (Lo Vuolo and Barbeito 1998b, 162–163). 
Furthermore, Law 23.226 from 1985 guaranteed a right to a widow pension 
also to unmarried life partners while the number of non-contributory pensions, 
which mainly benefited low-income households, was increased from 30,400 in 
1981 to 137,500 in 1989 (Marshall 1988, 119; Bertranou and Grushka 2002, 
41). According to Rubén Lo Vuolo and Alberto Barbeito (1998b, 161), these 
measures contributed to a situation in which nearly all elderly persons who had 
been economically active got access to pensions during the 1980s. Despite the 
overall progressive character of the government’s pension policies, they con-
tributed little to consolidating a political support base among low-income earn-
ers. In the context of a flood of legal claims, the declaration of pension emer-
gency and the decline of the average pension, a perception of government fail-
ure in this area prevailed throughout the society. 
Another social policy that aimed at the alleviation of poverty and the 
strengthening of lower-class support was the Plan Alimentario Nacional 
(PAN), which the government implemented in 1984 (Garay 2010, 45). The 
program was massive in scale and consisted of the regular provision of food 
boxes to up to 1.4 million poor households (Lo Vuolo and Barbeito 1998b, 
180). Overall spending for social assistance increased from 0.4% of GDP in 
1983 to nearly 0.9% in 1989 (DAGPyPS 2011). In 1985, the government fur-
thermore introduced an unemployment allowance , which covered hitherto for-
mal workers. The benefit was paid from the family allowance funds and con-
sisted of 70% of the minimum wage plus family allowance benefits for a period 
of up to four months. The average number of beneficiaries ranged from 56,795 
in 1985 to 153,059 in 1989, which represented 9% and 17% of the unemployed 
(Chebez and Salvia 2001, 6). In sum, these policies constituted a moderate im-
provement of low-income earners’ social protection against unemployment 
and poverty and contributed to the government’s success in competing for the 
traditionally Peronist popular class electorate in the 1985 legislative elections. 
However, this support eroded soon after. The increasingly rapid deterioration 
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of the economic situation during the following years meant that living condi-
tions for low-income earners were nevertheless deteriorating. Furthermore, the 
provincial and municipal governments, a majority of which belonged to the 
oppositional PJ, used their control over the distribution of food boxes associ-
ated with the PAN to apply clientelistic practices, which both limited the gov-
ernment’s ability to use the policy to consolidate lower-class support and led 
to a wave of criticism in the media that damaged its approval among the middle 
classes (Garay 2010, 45–46). 
Political Dynamics, Patterns of Social Policy Change, and Path 
Dependency Effects 
The conditions for the formation of an inclusive governing alliance and an ex-
pansion of social protections for low-income earners were ambivalent during 
the 1980s. On the one hand, the popular classes regained electoral power re-
sources with the return to democracy. Once military repression was lifted, po-
litical parties, trade unions, and social movements were quick in reconstructing 
their associational power resources. The temporary discrediting of neoliberal-
ism and a resurgence of Keynesian thinking widened the discursive power re-
sources of progressive social forces that aimed at the extension of redistribu-
tive measures. Under these conditions, the center-left candidate of the UCR 
Party, Raúl Alfonsín, was able to win the 1983 presidential elections based on 
a progressive political platform. On the other hand, the dictatorship left a dis-
astrous economic heritage, which consisted of not only a heavy fiscal burden 
but a significant deterioration of the country’s industrial base and labor market 
as well, which significantly weakened the structural power resources of the 
labor movement. Furthermore, the killing of thousands of leftist activists had 
moved both the PJ party and the union movement to more conservative posi-
tions. 
Under these circumstances, the government had difficulties in constructing 
a sufficiently strong inclusionary alliance that would have been able to sustain 
its ambitious social and economic policy agenda. While it was able to mobilize 
broad electoral support, the corporate organizations of both the working class 
and capital, as well as the oppositional PJ party, successfully used their power 
resources to block health care reform, the centerpiece of the government’s pro-
gressive social policy agenda. The fierce resistance of trade union leaders to 
progressive health care reform had, however, less to do with a general rejection 
of redistributive social policies than with the fact that this reform would have 
significantly limited their control over the health insurance funds. Therefore, 
the Alfonsín government did not face similar resistance in other areas of social 
policy, where it was able to pursue a moderately progressive line. In the face 
of a deep financial crisis of the pension system and a rapid expansion of infor-
mality, the government implemented measures that successfully maintained 
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relatively broad access to pension benefits also among low-income earners. 
Furthermore, it changed the mechanism of benefit calculation in a way that 
favored low-income groups. The government also introduced a massive social 
assistance program and an allowance for unemployed workers. Family allow-
ance and social housing spending were maintained roughly at the levels inher-
ited from the military government (DAGPyPS 2011). However, due to the pro-
found deterioration of the labor market and the economy in general, these 
measures were not enough to halt the steady increase of inequality.  
Figure 6: Evolution of income inequality measured with the Gini-coefficient, 1983–1989 
Sources: Gasparini and Cruces (2010, 5). 
The 1980s once more evidenced the powerful path dependency that character-
izes the Argentine health insurance system and which makes reform a politi-
cally difficult task. At the same time, the profound crisis of the pension system 
and the de facto application of mechanisms for benefit calculation that differed 
considerably from the legally established rules seemingly eroded path depend-
ency in the pension system. In the face of a breakdown of the system, far-
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Table 22: Change in social protection for low-income earners, 1983–1989 
Pension policies + Temporarily restricted measures to increase pension  
coverage, that benefited low-income earners and informal 
workers 
+ De facto introduction of a progressive replacement rate 
that favored low-income earners 
+ Reintroduction of employer contributions 
- Overall strong decline of the real value of pension  
benefits 
Health care policies +/- Failed attempt of universalization. Preservation of the  
status quo 
Social assistance and un-
employment protection 
+ Strong increase of social assistance expenditure and  
introduction of a massive social assistance program 
+ Introduction of an unemployment allowance 
+ Increasing number of non-contributory pensions 
Family allowance policies +/- No major changes 
Overall evolution of social protection for 
low-income earners Moderate expansion 
4.7 Neoliberalism and Regressive Social Policy Reform, 
1989–2001 
The multiple crises of the 1980s not only ended in a clear-cut electoral defeat 
of the UCR in the 1989 presidential elections but also resulted in an alteration 
of the distribution of power resources to the detriment of the popular classes 
and progressive political actors. On this basis, the victorious candidate of the 
PJ Party, Carlos Menem, was able to form a solid cross-class governing alli-
ance, in which neoliberal actors including members of the conservative eco-
nomic elite, the big employer associations, and the IFIs obtained a high level 
of influence. In contrast, popular class actors such as the trade union movement 
and more progressive parts of the PJ Party were incorporated in a subordinated 
manner and politically marginalized. The new government pursued a genu-
inely neoliberal policy approach that included the pursuit of a highly regressive 
agenda of social policy reforms. These reforms significantly eroded social pro-
tections for low-income earners.  
The Political Arena: Social and Economic Context, Constellation of 
Actors, and Distribution of Power Resources 
The government of Carlos Menem assumed power in a situation of profound 
economic crisis. In 1989 the Argentine GDP fell by 4.4%, and inflation 
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skyrocketed to over 3000% with the consequence of a sudden and massive 
impoverishment of large parts of the population (Rapoport 2013, Table 5; Birle 
1995, 277). The government confronted these economic problems with a ne-
oliberal agenda of privatizations, fiscal austerity, labor market deregulation, 
and the removal of trade and financial market regulations. However, only after 
the national currency was pegged to the US dollar in a fixed exchange rate in 
April 1991 was inflation brought under control and economic growth returned 
(Lo Vuolo 1998b, 189–190; Rapoport 2013, Table 5).  



















1989 -4.4 3079.5 35 26 7.6 29.0 
1990 -1.8 2314.0 33 26 7.5 27.0 
1991 10.6 84.0 34 25 6.5 32.5 
1992 9.6 17.5 35 25 7.0 31.2 
1993 5.7 7.4 35 23 9.6 31.9 
1994 5.8 3.9 35 22 11.4 29.1 
1995 -2.8 1.6 33 22 17.5 33.1 
1996 5.5 0.1 34 22 17.2 35.1 
1997 8.1 0.3 34 22 14.9 36.2 
1998 3.9 0.7 34 21 12.9 37.9 
1999 -3.4 -1.1 33 20 14.2 38.3 
2000 -0.8 -0.9 32 19 15.1 38.5 
2001 -4.4 -1.1 30 19 17.4 38.7 
Sources: Rapoport (2013) for GDP growth and inflation; Timmer, de Vries, and de Vries (2014) 
for industry share of GDP and share of industrial employment; INDEC Database for unemploy-
ment; Jiménez (2013, 59) for informality 1989–1990; and CEDLAS and World Bank (2018) for 
informality 1991–2001. 
Nevertheless, in the medium and long run, these policies had severe negative 
effects. The pegging of the peso to the US dollar on a one-to-one basis led to a 
strong overvaluation of the local currency, which diminished the competitive-
ness of national manufacturing industries. In order to compensate for this, com-
panies tried to reduce wages and imported machinery to replace labor. The 
high value of the peso furthermore favored the importation of consumer goods 
and hence contributed to a negative foreign trade balance and a high depend-
ence on foreign capital inflows. In the face of a largely deregulated financial 
market, Argentina’s economy became extremely vulnerable to the volatility of 
international capital flows. In this context, the Mexican Tequila Crisis of the 
mid-1990s had profound and direct consequences for the Argentine economy, 
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which experienced a nearly 3% decline of GDP and an increase of the unem-
ployment rate to over 18% (INDEC 2003; Rapoport 2013, Table 5). Although 
financial support from the IMF helped to temporarily stabilize the economy 
again, the next downturn came in 1998. By 2001, the Argentinian crisis had 
finally become so severe that the one-to-one exchange rate was no longer sus-
tainable (Beccaria, Groisman and Maurizio 2009; Damill and Frenkel 2006). 
The neoliberal reform agenda also had profound transformative effects on 
the structure of the economy and the labor market. Trade liberalization and an 
overvalued currency triggered a process of de-industrialization. Industry’s 
share of GDP decreased from 35% in 1989 to 30% in 2001 and the share of 
industrial employment fell from 26% to 19% (Timmer, de Vries, and de Vries 
2014). These developments went along with an increase of the unemployment 
rate from 7.6% in 1989 to 17.4% in 2001 (INDEC 2003). Informality among 
salaried workers increased from 29.0% in 1989 to 38.7% in 2001 (Jiménez 
2013, 59; CEDLAS and World Bank 2018). These trends towards de-industri-
alization and labor market deterioration led to an erosion of labor’s structural 
power resources, while at the same time the economic model’s high depend-
ency on capital inflows and foreign currency credits significantly increased the 
structural power resources of big capital and the IFIs. 
Despite these adverse long-term effects, the initial success of these policies 
in getting inflation under control and stabilizing the economy in conjunction 
with the promotion of neoliberal thought by a variety of employer-financed 
think tanks, the IFIs, and a global shift to neoliberalism contributed to a broad-
based agreement with neoliberal beliefs during the early 1990s.126 At the same 
time, the hyperinflation crisis of the late 1980s led to an increasingly wide-
spread perception that the ISI-Paradigm and its interventionist policies had 
failed and were no longer adequate to resolve the economic challenges of the 
time (Basualdo 2001, 51; Goldin 1997, 124; Svampa 2005, 31, 112–115). Data 
from the World Values Survey shows that in 1991 a stunning 65% of the re-
spondents agreed that larger income inequality was needed in order to provide 
incentives, while only 21% stated that incomes should be made more equal.127 
Also an ample majority agreed that private ownership of business should be 
 
126  With the global rise of neoliberalism, the World Bank and the Inter-American Devel-
opment Bank (IADB) increasingly replaced the less neoliberal ILO as key agents of 
external pension policy advice in Latin America (Kay 2000, 7). 
127  The question of the World Values Survey was: “Now I’d like you to tell me your views 
on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree 
completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the 
statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose 
any number in between. Sentences: Incomes should be made more equal vs We need 
larger income differences as incentives.” For the calculation of the numbers, the an-
swers 5 and 6 have been considered to be expressions of neutrality, while the answers 
1–4 and 7–10 have been considered as inclination to one of the sentences (Bossert 
2011). 
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increased to the detriment of state ownership and that individual responsibility 
should be increased to the detriment of public welfare provision (Inglehart et 
al. 2014: World Values Survey Wave 2). This pervasive dominance of neolib-
eral beliefs in the broader Argentine public weakened the discursive power 
resources of the popular classes and provided the political right with the ability 
to mobilize broad-based public support for regressive social policy reform, 
which was widely perceived as necessary and ultimately beneficiary for the 
society as a whole and even for the poorest sectors of it. Only when the dra-
matic social consequences of neoliberalism became increasingly visible and 
progressive forces managed to reorganize and to effectively articulate their 
criticism of the economic model did this predominance of neoliberal thinking 
began to erode again (Inglehart et al. 2014: World Values Survey Waves 3 and 
4). 
The prolonged crisis of the 1980s and the profound social, economic and 
political changes of the 1990s also coincided with important transformations 
of the main collective actors in Argentine welfare politics. During the late 
1980s and early 1990s all major parties adopted neoliberal programs. Against 
the background of the failure of the heterodox economic policy package de-
nominated Plan Austral, the UCR adopted an increasingly orthodox approach 
from 1987 on (Basualdo 2011, 69). In the internal elections of 1988, the con-
servative wing of the UCR won and Eduardo Angeloz, who proposed a con-
sistently neoliberal electoral platform, became the presidential candidate (Birle 
1995, 369). At the same time, the genuinely neoliberal party UCeDé, which 
had close ties to members of the Argentine economic elite, grew to become the 
third strongest party with nearly 10% of the vote in the 1989 elections (Birle 
1995, 276; Cavarozzi 2006, 201).  
After winning the 1989 presidential elections, Carlos Menem and his allies 
also transformed the PJ from a state interventionist party, whose policies 
largely constituted a populist version of the ISI-Paradigm, to a neoliberal party 
that pursued deregulation and free-market policies. Not surprisingly, this dra-
matic change of policy aroused resistance from more progressive parts and the 
trade union wing of the party. However, Menem and the neoliberal faction of 
the party were quite effective in co-opting and disciplining those leaders within 
the party and the CGT who were willing to cooperate and in dividing and mar-
ginalizing those who were not (Levitsky 2003, 144–185). Within five years, 
the share of trade union deputies in the PJ bloc in the Chamber of Deputies 
declined from 20% to less than 5% and the share of unionists in the executive 
board of the party decreased from 25% to only 12.5% (Levitsky 2003, 134–
135). Several circumstances contributed to the fact that Menem and his allies 
could shift the party to a completely different political orientation without de-
stroying it. First of all, his success in stabilizing the economy and getting in-
flation under control provided the PJ with considerable electoral success dur-
ing the first half of the 1990s. Second, the PJ had always been ideologically 
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heterogeneous and the party’s program had frequently been adapted to a chang-
ing environment or new internal relations of power (Levitsky 2003, 27). Third, 
the weakness of formal decision-making structures and party bureaucracy fa-
vored in practice a concentration of power in the hands of public office holders 
and particularly the President. Fourth, mechanisms that were established dur-
ing the first Peronist government, such as the necessity of official recognition 
of unions and the repartition of funds among trade union-controlled health in-
surance funds, served effectively to co-opt and discipline most trade union 
leaders.128 Fifth, the loss of support from more progressive Peronists was com-
pensated for by absorbing voters and activists from the neoliberal UCeDé, as 
well as some of the rather conservative voters of the UCR (Birle 1995, 286). 
And finally, the PJ was able to use its dense network of local units to establish 
a patronage-based relationship with the lower popular classes that heavily re-
lied on the repartition of state resources, such as public jobs and social assis-
tance benefits (Levitsky 2003, 123–124). This way, the PJ was relatively suc-
cessful in mobilizing a large portion of low-income earner votes, despite the 
government’s pursuit of an agenda that was highly detrimental to this social 
stratum. 
The neoliberal turn of the UCR and the PJ, however, paved the way for the 
emergence of a new center-left party. In 1993 eight deputies of the Peronist 
left, who opposed Menem’s neoliberal course, decided to leave the PJ and form 
a new party called Frente Grande. One year later the Frente Grande joined 
forces with PAIS, another party that had split off from the PJ, and several 
smaller center-left and left groups to form the FREPASO. The new center-left 
party was highly successful in absorbing the more progressive parts of the mid-
dle-class electorate and making some inroads into the working-class and lower 
popular class electorate. In the 1995 presidential election the party had devel-
oped such that it won the second biggest share of votes (Cavarozzi 2006, 165). 
With the neoliberal turn, employer associations became increasingly in-
fluential actors in social politics. Their influence was strengthened not only by 
the employer associations’ increased structural and discursive power re-
sources, but an increase in their associational power resources due to the over-
coming of internal divisions and the development and strengthening of a vari-
ety of influential think tanks. (Basualdo 2011, 56; Svampa 2005, 112–115).129 
 
128  In Argentina, trade unions are not legally entitled to conduct many of their essential 
functions, such as collective wage bargaining, without the official recognition of the 
Ministry of Labor. Neither can they maintain a social health insurance without recog-
nition (Goldin 1997, 139). 
129  Three very influential employer-financed think tanks were the Mediterranean Founda-
tion (Fundación Mediterránea), the Center for Macroeconomic Studies (Centro de Es-
tudios Macroeconomicos) and the Foundation for Latin American Economic Research 
(Fundación de Investigaciones Económicas Latinoamericanas). Two of the ministers of 
economy came from the first two think tanks. The last developed an extensive and much 
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For the trade union movement, the 1990s were going to constitute a diffi-
cult decade. De-industrialization and the rise of unemployment and informality 
not only reduced the structural power resources of labor but also affected its 
associational power resources. Employment declined drastically in some of the 
best-organized sectors of the economy and hence led to an erosion of many 
unions’ membership and activist structures. The metal workers’ union UOM 
was particularly hard hit. For decades it had constituted the strongest union in 
Argentina, reaching a peak membership of over 500,000 in the 1970s. By 2001, 
the membership had fallen to only 70,000 (Abal Medina 2012, 120). At the 
same time, however, sectors such as food processing, private oil, and road 
haulage prospered during the 1990s and the respective unions did so too 
(Etchemendy and Collier 2007, 366–367). In total, Adriana Marshall estimates 
that union density shrank moderately and accounted for an estimated 40% of 
wage earners in 2001 (Marshall 2005, 25). As important as the decline of mem-
bership was the fact that, in the face of high unemployment, informality and 
the deregulation of the labor market, the fear of job loss had strong disciplining 
effects on workers, which decimated the activist structures of many unions and 
undermined their capacity to mobilize for collective action (Abal Medina 2012, 
113–114; Wyczykier and Barattin 2012, 59).  
The neoliberal turn of the PJ and the social and economic transformation 
of the Argentine society during the 1990s triggered important processes of po-
litical change and realignment within the labor movement. The majority of the 
unions in the CGT decided to cooperate with the neoliberal government and to 
try to retain members through an extension of their services and engagement 
in business activities instead of a focus on collective action (Alonso 2007, 166–
167).130 The social policy demands of the CGT were mainly oriented towards 
preserving the existing system of social protections, and in particular in de-
fending the union-controlled social health insurance funds. The extension of 
social protections to low-income earners as well as informal or unemployed 
workers was hardly on the agenda of the CGT. Nevertheless, an internal dis-
pute over a canceled general strike in December 1993 led to the formation of 
a more combative faction within the CGT called Movimiento de los Trabaja-
dores Argentinos (MTA), which was led by the increasingly powerful transport 
workers’ unions. Although the MTA was not particularly concerned with the 
 
cited proposal for social security reform that largely coincided with the agenda pursued 
by the government (Basualdo 2011, 56; CEA-FIEL 1995; Svampa 2005, 112–115) 
130  Most of the Argentinian unions had already developed a broad range of services since 
the first Peronist government, which among others often included health insurance, hos-
pitals, hotels, sport facilities, libraries, pharmacies, and so on (Abal Medina 2012, 110). 
During the 1990s some unions took advantage of the privatization of state enterprises 
and the pension system and extended their activities to the realm of business by offering 
pension funds and credit cards or buying shares of privatized companies (McGuire 
1997, 237; Murrillo 1997, 433). 
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extension of the system of social protections to low-income earners, it actively 
opposed the neoliberal government and cooperated frequently with more pro-
gressive political forces and unemployed workers’ organizations (Interview 
Ardura 2014; McGuire 1997, 232–233). 
A more radical approach to oppose neoliberalism was pursued by a hand-
ful of white-collar workers’ unions, including the state workers’ union (ATE) 
and the teachers’ union confederation (CTERA), which left the CGT in 1992 
and formed an independent confederation called Argentine Workers Congress 
(CTA) (Interview Fuentes 2014; Levitsky 2003, 137). The political approach 
of the CTA was quite different from that of the CGT. Not only did the CTA 
oppose the government in a combative manner, it also organized more demo-
cratically and allowed direct affiliation, so that informal and unemployed 
workers were able to join. In contrast to the CGT, the CTA actively demanded 
the universalization of social policies, which implied their extension to low-
income groups (Interview Fuentes 2014; Interview Larisgoitia 2014). On the 
level of party politics, many of the CTA leaders were involved in the founda-
tion of the center-left Frente Grande, which later became part of FREPASO 
(Interview Fuentes 2014). The fact that the ATE and the CTERA, the largest 
member unions of the CTA, did not directly control their own health insurances 
and hence possessed greater independence from the state and weaker interest 
in the maintenance of the status quo than other unions, contributed to the 
CTA’s combative nature and progressive orientation (Larisgoitia 2014). Under 
the motto “The neighborhood is the new factory” the CTA actively reached out 
to incorporate and support unemployed workers’ organizations, peasants’ 
movements, indigenous communities, migrants’ organizations, poor neighbor-
hoods and tenants’ associations (Adamovsky 2012, 419; Caggiano 2011, 4–9). 
Furthermore, women’s collectives and gender departments were formed within 
the CTA to fight gender inequalities (Interview Díaz 2014; Interview Ocar and 
Martínez 2014). Once part of the CTA, these organizations were able to par-
ticipate in the confederation’s decision-making structures and to influence its 
political agenda (Interview Larisgoitia 2014). By this means the CTA devel-
oped a strong commitment to broad-based redistributive social policies which 
explicitly included the extension of social protections to low-income earners. 
While the CGT membership gradually decreased during the 1990s, the new 
strategies allowed the CTA to grow throughout the decade and to reach a mem-
bership of nearly 1.5 million during the early 2000s (Interview Fuentes 2014; 
Interview Lozano 2014). 
Furthermore, from the mid-1990s on, several new and increasingly pow-
erful lower popular class movements emerged. Not surprisingly, one of the 
decisive impulses came from the CTA. In 1996, the confederation began to 
organize national unemployed workers’ congresses and intensified its cooper-
ation with neighborhood associations and cooperatives in poor areas. This con-
tributed to the foundation of the Federación de Tierra y Vivienda (FTV) in 
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1998, which soon after became the largest unemployed and informal workers’ 
movement in Argentina (Adamovsky 2012, 419; Svampa and Pereyra 2003, 
40–46).131 In the northern province of Jujuy a second important unemployed 
workers’ movement emerged within the CTA, the Tupac Amaru (Tavano 
2015, 231–232). Another impulse came from the small Maoist Partido Revo-
lucionario Comunista (PCR). In 1994, in the midst of strike activities of mu-
nicipal workers in the province of Jujuy, the PCR founded the Corriente 
Clasista y Combativa (CCC) as a network for combative unionists. In the fol-
lowing years, the CCC decided to broaden its scope of organization and devel-
oped branches for unemployed and retired workers as well as for indigenous 
movements (Natalucci 2010, 104–105; Interview Peñailillo 2014; Svampa and 
Pereyra 2003, 22). After its foundation in 1998, the unemployed workers 
branch rapidly developed into the by far biggest and most important branch of 
the CCC (Interview Ardura 2014). The significant success of these organiza-
tions in organizing unemployed and informal workers and in developing effec-
tive forms of collective action was also based on the enormous frustration and 
anger among large parts of the lower popular classes in the face of a dramatic 
deterioration of their social and economic situation. Beginning in 1996, Argen-
tina experienced a series of spontaneous riots. What sometimes started as pro-
tests against the destruction of formal jobs quickly converted into week-long 
self-organized roadblocks in which marginalized sectors of the population not 
only participated but increasingly played a crucial role. The government re-
acted to these riots by conceding social assistance measures as a means of pac-
ifying the situation (Adamovsky 2012, 422; Svampa and Pereyra 2003, 101–
149). These experiences became an important impetus and inspiration for the 
efforts of the FTV and the CCC. Both organizations took up the method of 
roadblocks and the CCC even adapted its decision-making structure to resem-
ble the assembly-based approach that emerged during the above-mentioned 
protests (Interview Ardura 2014; Interview D’Elía 2014). In addition to the 
FTV and CCC, a large range of smaller movements emerged either as inde-
pendent organizations or with the support of leftist parties, left-wing Peronist 
groups, or progressive sections of the church (Adamovsky 2012, 425–426; 
Golbert 2004, 18). By the early 2000s, the FTV had grown to approximately 
90,000 and the CCC to over 70,000 members (Interview Ardura 2014; Inter-
view D’Elía 2014). The overall membership of all unemployed workers’ or-
ganizations was estimated at 300,000 at that time, which meant that the lower 
popular classes had for the first time achieved considerable associational 
 
131  Most movements such as the FTV and the CCC organize a variety of different groups 
belonging to the lower popular classes, such as peasants, cooperative workers, informal 
workers, neighborhood activists, indigenous activists, and so on. Unemployed workers 
and their demands, however, came to constitute their biggest mass base during the late 
1990s. In the following I will therefore refer to these movements as unemployed work-
ers’ movements. 
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power resources (Alcañiz and Scheier 2007, 160). The majority of the base-
level activists were women, and a high percentage had a migratory background 
(Adamovsky 2012, 428). 
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At the same time that women played an important role in the emergence and 
growth of unemployed workers’ movements, the women’s movement gradu-
ally became broader. A majority of activists belonged to the popular classes 
and had links to progressive political organizations, such as the CTA, the un-
employed workers’ movements, left parties, and student organizations. From 
1986 on, the Encuentro Nacional de Mujeres was established as a yearly gath-
ering point for the women’s movement. While in 1986 approximately 600 ac-
tivists participated, the number rose to over 12,000 by 2001 (Adamovsky 2012, 
431–432). Furthermore, from 1991 on a new law prescribed a minimum of 
30% female candidates for general election party lists, which contributed to a 
significant increase of the women’s movement’s political influence (Cavarozzi 
2006, 203). Although collective actions focused most often on gendered vio-
lence and the right to abortion, the large majority of the movement was also in 
favor of better social protection for low-income earners, as such policies were 
considered to contribute to a diminution of both gender and class inequalities 
(Interview Díaz 2014; Interview Ocar and Martínez 2014; Interview Rodriguez 
Enriquez 2014). 
All in all, the 1990s can be described as a decade of profound social, eco-
nomic, and political transformation. The early years of the decade were char-
acterized by a distribution of power resources that was highly detrimental to 
progressive political forces and the popular classes. Neoliberalism had risen to 
be the dominant worldview not only within the employer sector but also within 
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public opinion and the leadership of the two big parties, which were dominated 
by their respective right wings. Furthermore, the structural and associational 
power resources of the popular classes were weakened by the profound eco-
nomic crisis. The lack of electoral alternatives and the effective patronage-
based local structures of the PJ in poor neighborhoods additionally limited the 
degree to which the popular classes were able to use their electoral power re-
sources in favor of social policy change during most of the 1990s. Only to-
wards the end of the 1990s, after years of social deterioration and a painstaking 
process of realignments of left and popular class organizations, did resistance 
begin to strengthen, new movements emerge, and neoliberal thinking lose its 
dominant position. 
The Formation of a Neoliberal Cross-Class Governing Alliance  
and the Initiation of Regressive Social Policy Reform, 1989–1995 
The second half of the 1980s was characterized by a deepening of economic 
problems and social conflict and the erosion of the support basis of the gov-
erning alliance. In 1986 alone, the government was confronted with four gen-
eral strikes (Cavarozzi 2006, 199). In 1987, three more followed and the mid-
term parliamentary elections led to the government’s loss of its majority in the 
Chambers od Deputies (Cavarozzi 2006, 199–200; Portantiero 1994, 306–
307). The trials against human rights violators of the dictatorship furthermore 
aroused three armed rebellions in 1987 and 1988, which added another dimen-
sion to an atmosphere already characterized by conflict (McGuire 1997, 186). 
In the economic realm, the inability of the heterodox Plan Austral to enduringly 
stabilize the economic situation led to a gradual shift within the governing al-
liance towards more neoliberal oriented policies and an increase of the influ-
ence of neoliberal technocrats and the center-right wing of the UCR (Birle 
1995, 226). Initially, the neoliberal turn of the government mobilized some 
active support from the biggest employer associations. This support, however, 
began to erode as it soon became evident that the political circumstances and 
resistance within the party would impede the consequent application of a pro-
found neoliberal reform program (Birle 1995, 247–249). By 1988, the eco-
nomic situation had deteriorated to such an extent that the government had to 
declare its temporary inability to service foreign debts. The worst drought in 
120 years contributed to a further escalation of the economic crisis and initiated 
a period of hyperinflation in 1989, which ended in a massive impoverishment 
of a significant proportion of the population and incidents of looting in several 
cities (Basualdo 2011, 61; Birle 1995, 262–263). 
Not surprisingly, economic policy was the central issue of the 1989 presi-
dential elections. Eduardo Angeloz of the UCR and Álvaro Alsogaray of the 
UCeDé built their electoral campaigns around genuinely neoliberal reform pro-
grams. Menem of the PJ based his campaign on a more eclectic platform, 
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promising on the one hand massive wage hikes while on the other hand an-
nouncing privatizations and spending cuts. The elections resulted in a clear-cut 
victory for Menem. In the face of a dramatic deepening of the social and eco-
nomic crisis, President Alfonsín decided to hand over power to Menem on the 
8th of July 1989, five months before the transfer of office was scheduled (Birle 
1995, 276–77; Lupu 2014, 578; Madrid 2003, 106). 
Once president, Menem shifted immediately to a genuinely neoliberal 
agenda, which consisted of the privatization of public enterprises, the removal 
of trade and financial market regulations, fiscal austerity, the deregulation of 
the labor market and the convertibility  of the Argentinian peso with the dollar 
on a one to one basis (Lo Vuolo 1998b, 189–190). While this appeared like a 
sudden turn to some Peronist activists, others had seen it coming due to the 
alliances Menem had forged to win the primary elections (Interview Trotta 
2014, Interview Vinocur 2014). In fact, Menem’s bid for becoming the PJ 
Party’s presidential candidate was primarily supported and financed by the Un-
ion Roundtable Menem for President (URMP), which united right-wing Pe-
ronist union leaders, many of whom had collaborated with the military dicta-
torship and shared the neoliberal analysis of the Argentinian economic situa-
tion. In contrast, his rival Antonio Cafiero was supported mainly by the Group 
of 25, which united union leaders who were mostly inclined to the left of the 
political spectrum (Godio 2000, 1180–1187; McGuire 1997, 204–213). Once 
Menem had won the internal election and become the presidential candidate of 
the PJ, the URMP members Jorge Triaca, leader of the plastic workers’ union, 
and Armando Cavalieri, leader of the retail clerks’ union, used their connec-
tions to the business community and Argentine high society to raise significant 
campaign funds from business magnates like Carlos Bulgheroni and Amalia 
Lacroze de Fortabat (McGuire 1997, 214). According to Godio (2000, 1184), 
Menem also had direct consultations from a range of big companies such as 
Bunge y Born, R. Handley, and Citibank during his campaign.  
Immediately after he won the 1989 presidential elections, Menem had a 
series of meetings on economic policy with top managers of the biggest cor-
porations and representatives of all the important employer associations. All 
the big employer associations thereafter declared their support for Menem’s 
neoliberal policy program. The CEA, a circle of many of the most powerful 
members of the Argentine economic elite which had actively cooperated with 
the last military government, reappeared and financed a series of newspaper 
ads that promoted the government’s economic platform (Birle 1995, 336–337). 
As minister of economy, Menem appointed a former manager of the Bunge y 
Born corporation, who according to the conservative union leader Luis Bar-
rionuevo (quoted in Basualdo 2001, 58), had donated 700,000 US dollars to 
Menem’s electoral campaign. Although the minister of economy was changed 
several times during the first years of the government, there was continuity in 
that all the ministers of economy were representatives or close allies of the 
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neoliberal oriented economic elite and that the ministry obtained a de facto 
dominant role in the decision-making process within the cabinet (Basualdo 
2011; Lloyd-Sherlock 2006, 358; Madrid 2003, 108). In a very short time, the 
new governing alliance had deliberately incorporated the big corporations, em-
ployer associations, the IFIs, and the US government into the core of its base 
of support and conceded to these actors strong political influence (Birle 1995, 
279; Lupu 2014, 579). Menem also established a parliamentary alliance with 
the neoliberal UCeDé Party, which had won nearly 10% of the votes and 15 
seats in the Chamber of Deputies in the 1989 parliamentary elections. The 
party’s leader, Álvaro Alsogaray, was appointed presidential consultant (Birle 
1995, 276–286). As Menem veered to the right also on moral issues, such as 
abortion, he was also able to establish benign relations to the Catholic church 
(Blofield 2006, 122). 
In turn, the popular classes were incorporated in a subordinated manner 
with little influence on the agenda and limited power to block policies that 
were detrimental to their interests. Compared to Alfonsín, Meném had the ad-
vantage that most trade unions were willing to cooperate and refrained from 
confronting the government with strike activity due to their historical linkages 
to the Peronist movement. Furthermore, Menem was skillful in employing di-
vide and rule and carrot and stick tactics to co-opt more cooperative union 
leaders and to marginalize those who decided to resist. Menem’s main allies in 
disciplining the union movement were several right-wing union leaders that 
had already participated in the URMP and were now assigned to positions that 
gave them ample leverage to punish or reward other union leaders. Jorge Triaca 
of the plastic workers’ union became minister of labor and Luis Barrionuevo 
of the hotel and restaurant workers’ union was put in charge of ANSSAL,132 
an entity with ample leeway for redistributing resources between union-con-
trolled social health insurances. The exemplary case of the metal workers’ un-
ion shows quite clearly how these entities were used to co-opt union leaders 
and how effective they were in doing so. Originally, the long-standing leader 
of the metal workers’ union, Lorenzo Miguel, was one of the union leaders that 
in October 1989 had founded the CGT-Azopardo, which united those unions 
of the CGT that disagreed with Menem’s neoliberal agenda. However, when 
the CGT-Azopardo was about to declare a general strike in March 1990, Mi-
guel suddenly opposed the initiative after the Ministry of Labor had assigned 
his trade union the representation of the workers of two car parts factories ra-
ther than giving it to the auto workers’ union. A few months later, he even 
withdrew completely from the CGT-Azopardo after the ANSSAL had agreed 
to absorb 25 million US dollars of debt of the metal workers’ union’s health 
insurance. Another example is that in December 1991 several trade union rep-
resentatives in the chamber of deputies approved the labor market deregulation 
 
132 The Administración Nacional de Seguro de la Salud (ANSSAL) replaced the INOS du-
ring the late 1980s.  
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law in exchange for the assumption of debts accumulated by the trade unions’ 
social health insurance funds (Etchemendy and Palermo 1998, 567; Goldin 
1997, 116–127; McGuire 1997, 220–229). By the end of 1991, the oppositional 
CGT-Azopardo had lost most of its supporting unions and hence the CGT was 
de facto reunited (Godio 2000, 1196). Combined with a deep-rooted tradition 
of trade union support for Peronist governments, an overall weakening of the 
unions’ power resources, and the fact that many of the more rightist union 
leaders were quite sympathetic to the neoliberal worldview by the early 1990s, 
the above-described co-optation tactics were highly effective. Most of the un-
ions finally aligned with the government and limited themselves to minor acts 
of resistance in the framework of an overall cooperative relation with the gov-
ernment. At the same time, Menem and his allies used their influence to dra-
matically reduce the overall number of union representatives within the party 
and the Chamber of Deputies (Levitsky 2003, 134–135).  
In a similar vein, progressive party internal forces were quickly marginal-
ized and by 1993 the mandate of the eight most resistant deputies had run out 
(Birle 1995, 284). Although these deputies then founded a center-left party 
called Frente Grande, they possessed little power in the parliament until the 
1995 elections. Taken together, these developments meant that even the lim-
ited capacity of representatives of the unions or the more progressive wing of 
the PJ to block neoliberal economic and social policy reform initiatives in the 
Congress was gradually vanishing during the first years of the 1990s. 
The political success in quieting resistance from within the popular class-
based Peronist movement was furthermore facilitated by the fact that the intro-
duction of a fixed exchange rate with the US dollar led to a short-term recu-
peration of real wages. According to Beccaria, Groisman, and Maurizio (2009, 
28), real wages increased by nearly 28% between 1989 and 1993. Although 
they were still 13% lower than in 1987, the partial recuperation represented a 
significant improvement in the economic situation of the popular classes com-
pared to the period of hyperinflation. In combination with the increasing dom-
inance of neoliberal thinking in the public discourse, this context contributed 
to the widespread perception that neoliberal policies were the only possible 
response to the economic and social challenges of the time. 
Another factor that facilitated the high velocity with which the Menem 
government implemented the neoliberal turn was the increasing concentration 
of power in the hands of very few high-ranking officeholders, especially the 
president, both within the PJ party and in the wider institutional setup. Within 
the PJ, Levitsky (2003, 123–124) observes a consolidation of machine politics 
during the 1990s, “which may be defined as an informal pattern of political 
organization in which state resources, particularly government jobs, are the 
primary currency of political exchange between higher- and lower-level party 
actors. (…) Due to their access to state resources, public office holders enjoyed 
a great advantage in the patronage game.” Hence, very much as ANSSAL 
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served the Menem government to discipline and co-opt union leaders by 
providing or denying financial support to their social health insurance funds, a 
variety of further state resources, such as financial and technical support for 
local social assistance, infrastructure, or housing programs, served to effec-
tively bring governors, mayors, party leaders and activists in line. And as gov-
ernors play a decisive role in composing the lists of candidates for the parlia-
mentary elections, these mechanisms also provided the president with strong 
leverage vis-a-vis the deputies and senators of the party. Some of these mech-
anisms even worked to enforce cooperation of office holders that belonged to 
other parties. The opportunities to use patronage further increased by means of 
several reforms enacted during the 1990s that augmented the financial depend-
ence of provinces and municipalities on the central government. In 2000, prov-
inces and municipalities accounted for 47% of the public expenditure, but only 
for 20% of public revenue (Cetrángolo and Gatto 2002, 6).  
Looking at the formal institutional setup, Menem additionally imple-
mented measures that strengthened the power of the president vis-a-vis the par-
liament. When Menem and Alfonsín agreed that Menem would assume the 
presidency five months early, they also agreed that the UCR would vote in 
favor of government bills until the newly elected deputies took office in five 
months. Thus, during the first months, Menem had an extraordinarily broad 
parliamentary majority, which he used to pass the state reform law and the 
economic emergency law (Birle 1995, 284). These two laws provided Menem 
with the ability to privatize state enterprises  and to implement economic poli-
cies by decree without requiring the approval of the parliament (Cavarozzi 
2006, 113). Furthermore, Menem increased the supreme court from five to nine 
members, filled the new seats with political allies, and thereby eliminated this 
actor as a veto player. This cleared the way for Menem to legislate with so-
called emergency decrees, which were often of questionable constitutionality. 
With the 1994 constitutional reform, the relatively broad use of emergency 
decrees was finally legalized (Lo Vuolo 1998b, 210–211).133 
All in all, and in contrast to Alfonsín a few years earlier, Menem was able 
to form a relatively broad and solid cross-class governing alliance, in which 
neoliberal and conservative actors and the economic elite clearly dominated 
the agenda-setting process. Within the popular classes, new progressive actors 
were emerging, such as the CTA, MTA, and FREPASO, but until the mid-
1990s these had little ability to block government policies. On this basis, the 
government was able to initiate a profound neoliberal restructuring of the Ar-
gentine state and economy. 
  
 
133  Between 1989 and 1999 Menem issued 545 emergency decrees (Ferreira Rubio and 
Goretti quoted in La Nación, April 13, 2008). 
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Table: 25: Composition of the new governing alliance, 1991* 
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* With the electoral victory of the UCR-FREPASO alliance in the 1999 elections the composition 
of the governing alliance changed significantly. However, the new alliance also had a regressive 
character. ** Over the years, the majority of more progressive forces left the governing alliance 
and joined the opposition.   
Regarding social policy, pension privatization clearly constituted the first pri-
ority of the government. Not only was the system stricken by a profound fi-
nancial crisis—it was also an area of key importance for a variety of actors 
within the governing alliance, especially banks and insurance companies, who 
were expecting enormous business opportunities (Interview Alonso 2014). 
One of the first measures of the government was to deal with the enormous 
debts that the system had accumulated with its beneficiaries by de facto devi-
ating from the legally established replacement rate. By decree it was estab-
lished that all debts of the pension system until March 1991 would be automat-
ically converted into public bonds with a duration of ten years (Lo Vuolo 
1998b, 217–218). The return to legally established replacement rates in com-
bination with the freezing of the minimum pension at the relatively low value 
of 150 pesos led to an increasing differentiation of pension benefits, and hence 
to an increasingly unequal distribution of resources among pensioners to the 
detriment of the lower-income sectors. While in 1989 the minimum pension 
represented 86% of the value of the average pension, in 1995 it represented 
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50% and in 2001 only 42%. This increasing inequality was caused by both a 
recovery of pension benefits above the minimum and by a decline of the real 
value of the minimum pension due to the lack of any adjustment criteria. Be-
tween 1989 and 1995, the real value of the minimum pension fell by over 
21%.134 At the same time, the government took measures to ameliorate the fi-
nancial crisis of the system. In 1991, decree 2016/91 raised the contribution 
requirement from 15 to 20 years, which led to the exclusion of important parts 
of the popular classes from access to pensions, who due to a variety of reasons 
such as unemployment, informality, migration or child and elderly care were 
not able to accumulate sufficient years of contribution. In the same year, the 
government decided to cut the funding of the national housing fund (FONAVI) 
and instead direct the 5 percentage points employer contributions to the pen-
sion system (Lo Vuolo and Barbeito 1998a, 338). In consequence, expenditure 
on housing policies as a share of the GDP declined by nearly 40% between 
1990 and 1995, despite the fact that about one third of Argentina’s households 
were suffering from housing deficits (Belmartino 2005e, 252; DAGPSyPS 
2011). 
Traditionally, Argentine governments have appointed lawyers of the Min-
istry of Labor to head the Social Security Department that is in charge of the 
pension system. But in 1991, the neoliberal economist Walter Schulthess, a 
person who had the confidence of the minister of economy, was assigned to 
this office (Lo Vuolo 1998b, 215). Immediately, the Social Security Depart-
ment began to work on proposals for the privatization of the pension system. 
In 1992, the government finally sent a bill to the Congress, which foresaw the 
replacement of the public pension system with that of a predominantly private 
system, the increase of the contribution requirements from 20 to 30 years, and 
an increase of the retirement age by five years. The bill was supported by the 
major employer associations, especially by those of the financial sector, yet 
was opposed by most of the trade unions and all oppositional parties. The CTA 
and a variety of pensioners’ associations organized weekly protests in front of 
the Congress building. Due to the fact that in 1992 15% of the PJ bloc in the 
Chamber of Deputies were still representatives of trade unions, the bill could 
not win a majority (Alonso 1998, 601–613; MTEySS 2003, 16). 
Potential investors declared that privatization via emergency decree would 
not give them sufficient confidence in the political sustainability of the reform. 
Hence, Menem was forced to negotiate with the CGT and the trade union lead-
ers in the PJ bloc (Alonso 1998, 595–604). Initially, the CGT totally rejected 
privatization. But over the course of negotiations, the government made vari-
ous concessions that led the CGT and most member unions to finally accept a 
 
134  All numbers have been calculated by the author on the basis of the following sources: 
MTEyFRH (2001) for the average pension benefit in 1989; Cárcamo Manna (1998, 15) 
for the minimum pension benefit in 1989; MTEySS (2010) for the average and mini-
mum pension benefits in 1995 and in 2001; and INDEC (2008) for inflation adjustment. 
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modified reform proposal. The most important concession was that workers 
would be able to choose between a private capitalization scheme and a re-
formed public pay-as-you-go scheme. Both schemes contained a public com-
ponent called Universal Basic Benefit.135 Over the course of the negotiations, 
the trade unions won the concession that the value of this component be raised 
from 20 to 27.5% of the Argentinean average wage, which was particularly 
beneficial to lower income pensioners. Furthermore, the income-related com-
ponent of the public scheme was strengthened and the establishment of a pen-
sion fund in the hands of a public bank, the Banco Nación, was supposed to 
create a safe option within the capitalization scheme. Finally, as many unions 
were expanding their business activities during the 1990s, the right to establish 
their own pension funds was seen with sympathy by a range of more conserva-
tive union leaders. Eventually, the modified reform bill passed Congress in 
October 1993 (Alonso 1998; Kay 2000, 12; Lo Vuolo 1998b, 222).  
Although the trade unions were able to negotiate some important conces-
sions, these hardly ameliorated the regressive character of the reform and the 
dramatic exclusionary effects it had on low-income earners. In theory, workers 
were able to choose between a public and a private scheme. However, those 
who did not actively choose within a certain period were automatically trans-
ferred to the private scheme, which led in practice to the transfer of most con-
tributors (Arza 2009, 9). Furthermore, the reform meant that the legally-de-
fined 70%–82% replacement rate of the public system was abolished in favor 
of new, more differentiated and generally much lower replacement rates (Kay 
2000; Lo Vuolo 1998b). The most regressive component of the reform was the 
rise of the eligibility criteria first to 20 and then to 30 years of contributions, 
which de facto led to the exclusion of the vast majority of low-income earners 
from pension benefits. In combination with a dramatic deterioration of the la-
bor market, this led to a decline of pension coverage among the lowest income 
quintile of persons in retirement age from 73% to 50% between 1991 and 2001 
(Rofman and Oliveri 2011, 50). The decline in coverage, in turn, contributed 
to a growing need of elderly persons too seek employment, which further 
added to the already high unemployment rates of the 1990s (Alós et al. 2008, 
34). In addition to these problematic social effects, the privatization of the sys-
tem constituted an enormous financial burden for the state, because any con-
tributor who switched to the private system was in consequence providing 
nothing towards the financing of the current obligations of the public system 
(Rofman 2006, 94; Kay 2000, 7). This already challenging fiscal deficit of the 
system was further exacerbated by agreements between the national govern-
ment and provinces about a differentiated reduction of the employer contribu-
tions (Lo Vuolo 1998b, 221). According to the Ministry of Labor, these added 
 
135  Despite its name, the benefit was by no means universal considering that 30 years of 
contributions would be required to access it. Indeed, due to the tough access criteria, 
most low-income earners had hardly any chance to receive it upon retirement age. 
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up to an average national reduction of employer contributions of slightly over 
one third in 1996 (La Nación, November 6, 1996).  
Health care reform was the second big area of neoliberal social policy re-
form for the government. Already during the 1980s, many of the actors that 
constituted the core of Menem’s governing alliance, such as the major em-
ployer associations, the World Bank and the neoliberal UCeDé Party, pro-
moted privatization and decentralization in the health sector. Although the spe-
cific interests and regulatory demands of different employer sectors varied, 
they agreed on the direction of change towards more market, more private busi-
ness opportunities, and less influence from the trade unions (Alonso 2007, 
171–173; Belmartino 2005a, 189; 2005c, 294). 
In the public health sector, which provided health care coverage for most 
low-income earners, the government pursued three main aims: decentraliza-
tion, cost-containment, and the introduction of market mechanisms. In July 
1992, Decree 1269 transferred public hospitals from national to provincial re-
sponsibility without an adequate transfer of fiscal resources. As a result, the 
public health sector not only faced fiscal challenges as a whole, but regional 
inequalities were also further exacerbated to the detriment of poorer provinces, 
both of which caused a deterioration of health coverage for low-income groups 
(Cetrángolo and Gatto 2002, 18–19; Lo Vuolo 1998b, 231). In 1993, with the 
technical and financial support of the World Bank, the government furthermore 
increased the autonomy of hospital managers and tried to introduce competi-
tion and market mechanisms in the sector (Lloyd-Sherlock 2005, 1898). 
The main reform project of the government, however, was to introduce 
market mechanisms in the social insurance sector and to open it to private in-
surers, which was repeatedly demanded by different employer associations 
during the early 1990s. In April 1991, the first convention of 
CONFECLISA,136 the main employers’ association of the private health sector, 
demanded better market access for private health insurers. In August of the 
same year, the employer-financed think tank FIEL presented an extensive re-
form proposal for the health sector that contained the complete opening of the 
social health insurance market to private competition.137 The trade unions, not 
surprisingly, clearly repudiated these demands (Alonso 1996, 753–756). 
The Menem government, as it did on most issues, decided to pursue the 
main demands of the employers’ associations. In November 1991, Alberto José 
Mazza, at this time president of the employers’ association of private health 
insurers, was appointed secretary of health and later ascended to minister of 
health (Alonso 2007, 171–173). Soon after, in January 1992, the government 
sent a bill to the Congress that proposed the gradual deregulation of the social 
health insurance sector with the final aim of full competition between trade 
 
136  Confederación Argentina de Clínicas, Sanatorios y Hospitales Privados. 
137  The presentation took place on a convention held under the auspices of the employers’ 
association of Argentine private banks ADEBA. 
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union-controlled and private health insurance funds. Like the pension reform 
bill, the health insurance reform bill had been elaborated under the leadership 
of the Ministry of Economy (Alonso 1996, 757–758). 
The proposal aroused heavy protest from trade unions, not only because 
they completely rejected its contents, but also because they had not been con-
sulted in any way in its development. In this way, the bill contributed deci-
sively to the reunification of the CGT in March 1992. In the face of this, the 
government decided to pull back and temporarily freeze the reform project, 
also because it did not want to endanger the even more important project of 
pension reform by over-stretching the union leaders’ willingness to cooperate 
(Alonso 1996, 757–759; Lloyd-Sherlock 2005, 1896). In January 1993, the 
government finally announced that it was planning to reform the social health 
insurance sector by decree, however, making a significant concession to the 
trade unions by limiting the introduction of competition to the universe of so-
cial health insurance funds and excluding private insurers from access to the 
market. Although the majority of trade union leaders also rejected this pro-
posal, in contrast to the bill of 1992 it created divisions within the CGT. Some 
of the more conservative union leaders indeed perceived the proposal as an 
opportunity to strengthen their own health insurance funds by attracting affili-
ates of other funds. Against this background, the government decided to issue 
the decree swiftly and to establish a short period during which the details were 
supposed to be negotiated with the trade unions. However, it soon turned out, 
that the implementation required the collaboration of the trade unions not only 
for political but also for technical reasons, given that the trade unions were 
administering most of social health insurance system. In practice, this led to 
the implementation of the decree being put on hold (Alonso 1996, 760–762). 
Another aim of the government in social health insurance reform was to 
reduce costs for employers. Therefore, once the pension reform law had suc-
cessfully passed Congress with the support of most trade union deputies, the 
government announced a reduction of employer contributions to the social 
health insurances in December 1993. As the trade unions saw their funds in 
danger, the CGT immediately scheduled a general strike. The action was called 
off as soon as the government showed a disposition to negotiate and tax au-
thorities announced that they might undertake an investigation of the unions’ 
finances and the personal possessions of a range of trade union leaders, how-
ever. Within the CGT this decision was controversial, and finally led to the 
foundation of the more combative internal faction MTA (McGuire 1997, 232–
233). All in all, due to the unified resistance of the trade union movement and 
the fact that the government used the threat of health insurance reform to obtain 
concessions on other issues, health care reform advanced at a very slow pace 
during Menem’s first government compared to other areas, such as labor mar-
ket and pension reform.  
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Spending on family allowances as a share of GDP slightly recovered com-
pared to the years of hyperinflation, but it remained at a generally low level 
during the 1990s (DAGPyPS 2011). The main change during Menem’s first 
term was of an administrative nature and consisted of the merging of the hith-
erto three existing family allowance funds (Lo Vuolo 1998b, 234). 
In 1990, the Menem government eliminated the unemployment allowance, 
which had been established under Alfonsín in 1985. In 1991, it was replaced 
with the creation of the so-called National Employment Fund. The fund was 
financed by 1.5% employer contributions, which had hitherto been used to fi-
nance the family allowance system. The central component of the fund was the 
introduction of an unemployment insurance with considerably stricter eligibil-
ity criteria than the former unemployment allowance. In combination with the 
deterioration of the labor market, this led to a dramatic decline in coverage. 
While the earlier unemployment allowance covered 17% of the unemployed in 
1989, the coverage of the new unemployment insurance fell to only 6% in 
1995. Supported by a 350 million US dollar credit from the IADB, the fund 
also financed a variety of short-lived and focalized temporary employment and 
qualification programs (Chebez and Salvia 2001, 6; Lo Vuolo 1998b, 206, 
240–241). However, even taken together, in 1995 the unemployment insurance 
and the temporary work programs only covered less than 8.4% of the unem-
ployed.138 
In general, contrary to the official discourse and despite the massive rise 
of unemployment and poverty, the first government of Menem only increased 
expenditure on focalized programs by a meager 0.1% of the GDP (DAGPyPS 
2011). Initially, Menem even suspended most of the programs of the prior ad-
ministration, including the PAN, which distributed up to 1.4 million food 
boxes to poor households (Garay 2010, 46–47; Lo Vuolo 1998a, 67). Only in 
the Province of Buenos Aires, whose governor was the Peronist Duhalde, was 
a food distribution program called Plan Vida implemented which reached up 
to 400,000 households. Instead, the government established resource transfers 
in order to support provincial governments’ maintenance of soup kitchens and 
other assistance measures,139 introduced a new social assistance pension for 
mothers of seven or more children and significantly increased the overall num-
ber of non-contributory pensions from 136,000 in 1989 to 291,000 in 1995 
(Bertranou and Grushka 2002, 41; Golbert 2010, 61).140 Additionally, a variety 
 
138  Author’s calculations based on Golbert (2004, 22) for the number of workfare pro-
grams, Velásquez Pinto (2005, 51) for the number of beneficiaries of the unemployment 
insurance and DGEyFPE (2003) for the total number of unemployed persons. 
139  These transfers were established through the Communitarian Social Policy Program 
(POSOCO). 
140  The strongest rise can be observed for those types of non-contributory pensions that 
have no clear eligibility criteria and therefore serve well for clientelistic purposes (Ber-
tranou and Grushka 2002, 41). 
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of over 60 mostly small and short-lived social assistance policies were intro-
duced, which, despite the financial and technical support of several IFIs, re-
ceived very little resources (Lo Vuolo 1998b, 238). For Menem and his closest 
allies within the governing alliance these fragmented and discretionary social 
assistance programs nevertheless fulfilled an important role in maintaining the 
lower popular classes as one of the subordinate bases of support of the alliance. 
Many of these policies served to consolidate and expand the PJ’s clientelistic141 
base-level networks, which were very effective in mobilizing the lower popu-
lar class vote and controlling resistance (Garay 2010, 48; Levitsky 2003). An 
unemployed organizations’ leader described the role of these networks and the 
distribution of social assistance like this: 
The Peronists are always present on the territory, with their local brokers, the social 
plans. They have thermometers and they control the thing … In poor neighbor-
hoods here, you can find 6 or 7 [PJ] basic units and there is no single radical 
comite142. [other parties] don’t have thermometers … The Peronists pick up the 
phone and say: ‘there’s trouble here, things are getting nasty’… and intervene. 
(quoted in Garay 2010, 48) 
All in all, the first government of Carlos Menem initiated a far-ranging reform 
process with a profoundly negative impact on the social protection for low-
income earners. Its centerpiece was the privatization of the pension system in 
a way that de facto excluded most of the low-income earners from pension 
coverage and led to an increasingly unequal distribution of income within the 
population of pensioners. These regressive policies thereby reinforced the neg-
ative social consequences of the neoliberal restructuring of the economy and 
the labor market. 
The Deepening of Regressive Social Policy Reform in the Context  
of Growing Resistance, 1995–1999 
Over the course of his first term as president, Menem was able to consolidate 
his governing alliance and even to increase the dominance of neoliberal actors 
within it. During the 1991 and 1993 legislative elections, the government was 
not only able to get rid of dissidents within the PJ bloc, but also to increase its 
number of seats in the Congress. Furthermore, in 1993, the government 
reached an agreement with the UCR party about a constitutional reform, which, 
among other things, allowed Menem to run for a second term in 1995 (Cava-
rozzi 2006, 204). Menem focused his electoral campaign on his successes in 
recovering economic growth and reducing inflation, which earned him a land-
slide victory with nearly 50% of the votes (Birle 1995, 279; Lupu 2014, 581). 
 
141  Political clientelism in this context is conceptualised as “a relationship based on politi-
cal subordination in exchange for material rewards” (Fox 1994, 153). 
142  Radical comité refers to the base level units of the UCR party. 
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While the neoliberal agenda of the government had caused the defection of 
many progressive middle- and popular-class voters, it had won the votes of 
conservative upper- and middle-class voters, which implied the virtually com-
plete absorption of the UCeDé’s electoral base (De Riz 1996, 136). The 
FREPASO, the new center-left party, was able to fill the vacuum on the left of 
the political spectrum and emerged as the second strongest party, reaching 
nearly 30% of the votes in the presidential and over 20% in the legislative 
elections. The UCR was relegated to third place (Cavarozzi 2006, 206).  
Hence, the 1995 elections expressed both ongoing broad public support 
for the governing alliance and growing disillusionment and opposition in the 
face of a dramatic rise in unemployment, informality, and poverty. Data from 
the World Values Survey clearly shows that, although still in the majority, the 
approval of key neoliberal arguments had significantly declined by the mid-
1990s (Inglehart et al. 2014: World Values Survey Wave 3). The strong results 
of FREPASO as well as the emergence and strengthening of the combative 
union factions CTA and MTA furthermore evidenced that progressive actors 
were successfully reorganizing. 
The mid-1990s were generally characterized by growing polarization, 
which found its expression in an increasing intensity of protest and social con-
flict. The protest movement reached a first peak in 1994 when a broad alliance 
initiated by the CTA organized the Federal March to protest the government’s 
neoliberal policy. On the 6th of June, the march culminated with a massive 
demonstration in front of the presidential palace. In 1996 and 1997, protest 
reached another peak with the first joint national general strike of all trade un-
ion confederations, a massive “cacerolazo”143 in the capital and the eruption of 
week-long rebellions and roadblocks in several cities of the interior (Adamov-
sky 2012, 419–422; Godio 2000, 1210–1211; Svampa and Pereyra 2003, 101–
149). A short time later, the first national unemployed workers’ movements 
emerged (Svampa and Pereyra 2003, 53–70). 
While the growing protest movements held the government’s neoliberal 
policies responsible for the dramatic deterioration of the social situation, 
Menem blamed undocumented immigrants, non-wage labor costs, and labor 
market regulations  for the rise of unemployment. In other words, the govern-
ment argued that the solution was not to be found in an abandonment but in a 
deepening of the neoliberal reform path. This approach received the decided 
support of the employer associations and the IFIs (McGuire 1997, 222–223). 
Shortly after the 1995 elections, the intersectoral employers’ association CEA 
and the neoliberal think tank FIEL published an extensive study, in which they 
proposed a wide-ranging neoliberal reform of the entire system of social pro-
tection. The proposed measures included free competition in the health insur-
ance sector, further privatization and less redistribution in the pension system 
 
143  Cacerolazo refers to a form of protest, in which the participants gather on the street and 
beat cooking pots. 
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and the introduction of work requirements for social assistance benefits (CEA-
FIEL 1995). Simultaneously, the IADB supported the government with a 450 
million US dollar Sector Program in Support of Fiscal Adjustment and Social 
Reform which explicitly aimed at smoothing the political process by providing 
resources and consulting for overcoming resistance (Tittor 2012, 184). 
The first social policy initiative during Menem’s second term was to un-
dertake a renewed attempt at health insurance reform. Under the leadership of 
the Ministry of Economy, the government and the World Bank developed a 
new reform proposal for the complete opening of the health insurance market. 
A few months later, the government agreed with the IMF that private insurers 
would become able to enter the market. In the face of a skyrocketing of unem-
ployment to over 18%, the government furthermore took up a recommendation 
of the industrial employers’ association UIA and reiterated its proposal to re-
duce employer contributions to the social health insurances. Both measures 
were, once more, repudiated by the trade unions and contributed to the decision 
of the CGT to announce a general strike for the 6th of September 1995. How-
ever, two weeks before the strike, the leaders of the CGT and the government 
reached an agreement and the strike was called off. The CGT finally accepted 
the introduction of competition and a reduction of employer contributions by 
one percentage point. In return, Menem promised that private insurers would 
remain excluded and agreed to the creation of a commission with the partici-
pation of the CGT that would elaborate a Programa Médico Obligatorio 
(PMO), which defined a catalog of treatments that any social health insurance 
would have to cover. Furthermore, the government conceded to the conversion 
of several social health insurance funds with tripartite administration into 
purely trade union-controlled social health insurance funds.144 Finally, after 
nearly four years of back-and-forth negotiations, Decree 1141 broke up the 
monopoly that the different health insurance funds had in their respective oc-
cupational groups and established that from January 1997 workers would be 
able to choose their social health insurance providers (Alonso 1997, 169-173; 
Lloyd-Sherlock 2006, 358; Lo Vuolo 1998b, 232). One year later, these rules 
were complemented by Decree 504/98, which allowed social health insurance 
funds to decline applicants and to offer differential coverage to new affiliates 
based on the amount of their contributions (Lloyd-Sherlock 2005, 1900).  
In practice, the reform had highly regressive effects and deteriorated the 
quality of coverage for low-income affiliates. High-income affiliates, however, 
benefited from the new rules, as they massively undermined the existing mech-
anisms of redistribution within occupational groups. Not surprisingly, the 
newspaper El Clarín (April 24, 2003) concluded that most workers who 
switched social health insurance between 1998 and 2003 were disproportion-
ally young and high earning. In order to compete for these affluent affiliates 
 
144  This applied for example to the social health insurance of banking, glass and railway 
workers. 
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with differentiated insurance packages, many health insurances started to con-
tract out to private insurers, which led to a gradual process of privatization 
(Lloyd-Sherlock 2006, 359). The regressive effects of the reform were addi-
tionally intensified by the fact that the increase in unemployment and infor-
mality led to a reduction of coverage from over 63% of the population in 1991 
to under 45% in 2004.145 
In the area of pension reform, the government focused on cost contain-
ment. In 1995 and 1997, Law 24.463 and Emergency Decree 833/97 first re-
stricted and then eliminated the indexation of public pensions, which led to a 
steady decline of their values (Kay 2000, 12–13; Lo Vuolo 1998b, 222).  
In 1996, a reform of the family allowance system introduced three differ-
ent benefit levels that were inversely related to the income of the recipient (Lo 
Vuolo 1998b, 234). Although the new benefit formula slightly increased redis-
tribution within the group of formal wage earners, the core problem of the sys-
tem persisted. It continued to exclude the rising number of informal and unem-
ployed workers, and therefore most poor households. According to a survey 
from 2001 only 31.2% of all minor Argentinians were covered by the system 
and only 4.7% of those living in extreme poverty (Salvador 2007, 24). 
With the rise of unemployment, poverty, and social conflict from the mid-
1990s on, social assistance policies became increasingly important for both the 
exercise of political control through the government and the development of 
associational power resources through unemployed workers’ movements. 
While during Menem’s first term, the number of non-contributory pensions 
was significantly increased, during his second term workfare programs became 
the centerpiece of social assistance policy (Bertranou and Grushka 2002, 41; 
Svampa and Pereyra 2003, 87–88). As recommended by the CEA and FIEL 
(1995), and in contrast to the non-contributory pensions, these programs con-
sisted of hiring unemployed workers for temporary jobs that were considered 
of public interest. In exchange, the beneficiaries received a small monthly non-
wage payment of typically no more than 200 pesos.146 The biggest programs 
of this type were the national Work Program (Plan Trabajar) and the provincial 
Buenos Aires Neighbourhoods Program (Plan Barrios Bonaerenses) (Lo Vuolo 
1998b, 241; Svampa and Pereyra 2003, 88–89). The extension of these pro-
grams was closely related to the massive eruption of lower popular class pro-
tests and roadblocks that became viral after the 1996 and 1997 rebellions 
against the privatization of the state oil company in the provinces of Neuquén 
 
145 Calculations of the author based on the following sources: INDEC (2010) national cen-
sus data for 1991 overall health insurance coverage, MSN (2010) for 2004 social health 
insurance coverage and Lloyd-Sherlock (2006, 358) for an estimate of persons covered 
by private health insurance. 
146  Due to the convertibility regime, 200 pesos equaled 200 US dollars at that time. Hence, 
these non-wage payments were far below both the wage for regular employment and 
the poverty line for an average household. 
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and Salta. By that time, the breadth and the militancy of the protests had 
reached such a level that the national and regional governments decided to 
complement repression with the repartition of workfare benefits to the protes-
tors (Adamowsky 2012, 423). In order to intervene as quickly as possible, the 
Ministry of Labor even created two additional small workfare programs which 
had highly flexible rules and therefore served perfectly for negotiations with 
protestors (Garay 2010, 60). The Buenos Aires Neighborhoods Program was 
implemented in July 1997 as a direct reaction to the spreading of roadblocks 
(Svampa and Pereyra 2003, 90). Nationwide, the average number of workfare 
beneficiaries increased from 63,000 in 1995 to 130,000 in 1997 (Golbert 2004, 
22). 
In addition to the pacifying function, the distribution of workfare benefits 
also served the government to maintain their ties to the lower popular classes, 
which suffered severely from the neoliberal transformation. Most benefits 
were still not handed out to protestors but distributed through the dense clien-
telistic networks of the PJ in poor neighborhoods (Svampa and Pereyra 2003, 
87). In an analysis of over one thousand municipalities in the years 1998 and 
1999, Marcelo Nazareno, Stokes, and Brusco (2006, 78–80) found that the 
quantity of locally distributed workfare benefits had, in fact, a significant in-
fluence on the electoral results.  
Through the emergence of unemployed workers’ organizations and their 
growing associational power resources after 1998, however, lower popular 
class actors were increasingly able to challenge these clientelistic structures 
and to enforce the receipt of workfare benefits despite their opposition to the 
government (Garay 2010, 48). In turn, the administration of workfare benefits 
and related projects, such as soup kitchens or small manufactures, provided the 
organizations with key resources with which to consolidate their membership 
and attract new affiliates (Golbert 2004, 21–22; Natalucci 2010, 96).  
Against this background, expenditure for social assistance and unemploy-
ment protection increased from 0.97% of GDP in 1995 to 1.44% in 1999 
(DAGPyPS 2011). Although this constituted an important increase, unemploy-
ment insurance and workfare programs together still covered only about 9.6% 
of the unemployed in 1999.147 Therefore, it hardly compensated for the dra-
matic rise in unemployment and poverty. Furthermore, the regressive reform 
of the much more resource-intensive health insurance sector meant that overall 
social policy reform during Menem’s second term continued to deteriorate so-
cial protections for low-income earners and shifted resources increasingly to 
the better off. 
 
147  Author’s calculations based on DGEyFPE (2003), MTEySS (2010) and Golbert (2004, 
22). 
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The Formation of a Weak Neoliberal Governing Alliance and the 
Vanishing Viability of Regressive Social Policy Reform, 1999–2001 
The perpetuation of high unemployment and poverty rates and the increasing 
intensity of social conflict during the second half of the 1990s led to a gradual 
erosion of the government’s public support. In order to take advantage of this 
situation, the main opposition parties, the FREPASO and the UCR, decided to 
form an electoral alliance in August 1997 called Alliance for Work, Justice and 
Education. In public statements, the alliance committed to a vaguely defined 
center-left electoral platform, criticized corruption and the social consequences 
of Menem’s neoliberal policies and promised the improvement of infrastruc-
ture, working conditions, and education. On that basis, the Alliance was able 
to wrench a share of the popular class vote from the PJ and to win the 1997 
legislative elections (Cavarozzi 2006, 121, 208–210; Godio 2000, 1149–1151; 
Salvia 2015, 112).  
Within the alliance, however, existed enormous contradictions. The cen-
ter-left profile was supported only by a part of the coalition, namely the 
FREPASO and the social democratic wing of the UCR. In fact, since the crisis-
ridden presidency of Alfonsín, the UCR had been largely dominated by its 
conservative-neoliberal wing. This led to the joint 1998 primary elections be-
ing contested between the center-left FREPASO candidate Graciela Fernández 
Meijide and the conservative-neoliberal UCR candidate Fernando De la Rúa. 
Mainly due to the disproportionally stronger base-level structures and party 
membership of the UCR, De la Rúa won the primaries by a wide margin. As a 
result, the neoliberal wing of the UCR took the lead of the alliance (Cavarozzi 
2006, 128; Godio 2000, 1149–1151). 
After arduous internal disputes, the governing PJ Party named Eduardo 
Duhalde its presidential candidate. However, when economic crises erupted in 
Southeast Asia, Russia, and Brazil, economic growth collapsed and so did the 
main source of legitimacy of the government. Against this background, the 
October 1999 general elections ended in a sweeping victory for the opposition 
UCR-FREPASO alliance. Once in office, De la Rúa swiftly abandoned the 
party’s original center-left electoral platform and shifted towards a radically 
neoliberal agenda, which immediately aroused heavy criticism from 
FREPASO deputies and cabinet members but was welcomed by IFIs and em-
ployer associations. As Menem had done ten years before, De la Rúa took ad-
vantage of the high concentration of power in the office of the president pro-
vided by a range of formal and informal institutional practices to marginalize 
internal critics and to circumvent parliamentary resistance through the issuance 
of emergency decrees. In practice, the agenda-setting of the new government 
was dominated by a small group of technocrats and neoliberal politicians sur-
rounding the president and the minister of economy. Although FREPASO and 
social democratic UCR politicians were assigned to lead the Ministry of Social 
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Development and the Ministry of Labor, these were provided with hardly any 
freedom of action in a framework of fiscal adjustment. The marginalization of 
the left wing within the alliance went so far that, soon after becoming president, 
De la Rúa even ceased to consult with the FREPASO on many important pol-
icies (Interview Isuani 2014b; Lupu 2014, 577–583; Interview Vinocur 2014). 
Despite certain similarities to the neoliberal turn of President Menem ten 
years before, De la Rúa was unable to form any comparably strong governing 
alliance in support of his agenda. In consequence, a large part of the govern-
ment’s social policy initiatives failed to overcome internal and external re-
sistance. This situation can be credited to various factors. First, Menem under-
took the neoliberal turn in a historical situation in which neoliberal thinking 
dominated public opinion. This provided him with ample discursive power re-
sources to successfully frame his agenda in a way that it appeared both neces-
sary and desirable for most of the population. By 1999 this had radically 
changed, as data of the World Values Survey shows (Inglehart et al. 2014: 
World Values Survey Wave 4). In complete contrast to the 1991 survey, a large 
majority rejected privatizations and rising income inequality and preferred 
more public welfare provision over individual responsibility. Second, due to 
the close link between the majority of the trade unions and the PJ, Menem had 
an enormous advantage in taming trade union resistance, while De la Rúa’s 
government faced three general strikes only in its first year (Cavarozzi 2006, 
211–213). Third, with the emergence of unemployed workers’ movements, the 
lower popular classes had developed their own associational power resources 
that De la Rúa completely underestimated (Interview Berra 2003). Fourth, 
while Menem’s employer support was reinforced by a strong unity among dif-
ferent employer sectors, over the years tensions had arisen as some sectors 
benefited more than others from the neoliberal transformation. Furthermore, 
by the early 2000s employer associations were increasingly divided regarding 
the question of whether to continue with the convertibility regime, dollarize 
the economy, or float the peso, so that De la Rúa’s base of support among 
employers was much more complex and less reliable. Fifth, both the viability 
of the convertibility regime and the support of certain employer sectors de-
pended on the ongoing privatization of state enterprises, but by 1999 most of 
them had already been sold (Basualdo 2001, 85–101). Sixth, disciplining dep-
uties and cabinet members and creating a public image of unity turned out to 
be much more difficult for De la Rúa because the majority of his internal critics 
belonged to the FREPASO, and hence he lacked intra-party disciplining mech-
anisms. 
Against this background, the president started his term faced by the rising 
of unprecedented levels of social and political conflict. Only one month after 
assuming office, in January 2000, the government sent a labor market reform 
bill to the Congress, which, if passed, would enact even more flexible work 
contracts and a significant weakening of the trade unions by decentralizing 
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collective bargaining and limiting the validity of collective agreements. Two 
weeks later, the IMF linked an urgently needed credit of 7.4 billion US dollars 
to the condition that the labor market reform bill and further measures pass the 
parliament. However, the labor reform was repudiated by a majority in the par-
liament, including many deputies of the governing alliance. The trade union 
confederations, in turn, joined forces and called for a national general strike 
for late February. After several negotiations with more conservative union 
leaders and a range of deputies from both the coalition and the opposition, the 
bill surprisingly passed parliament in April 2000. At the same time, the oppo-
sition on the streets grew continuously and at the end of May the government 
was confronted with a massive demonstration against its neoliberal agenda, 
supported by a broad alliance of the MTA, the CTA, unemployed workers’ 
movements, a part of the FREPASO, left parties, students’ associations, human 
rights organizations and sectors of the Catholic church. Finally, it turned out 
that the bill’s approval had been reached through systematic bribery. This 
caused a massive public scandal and the resignation in protest of the vice pres-
ident and several other more progressive cabinet members. It also accelerated 
the withdrawal of FREPASO deputies from the governing alliance, which 
meant a further disintegration of its already weak support base (Cavarozzi 
2006, 211–213; Interview Isuani 2014b; Salvia 2015, 120).  
In the middle of this tumultuous period, the government decreed that the 
social health insurance market would be opened to competition from private 
insurers from January 2001 on. Furthermore, the decree abolished the right of 
insurance funds to reject applications of new affiliates and changed the formula 
for the guaranteed minimum revenue from 40 pesos per affiliate to 20 pesos 
per covered person, including family members. This renewed attempt to de-
regulate the health insurance system was again strongly rejected by the trade 
unions. Several union-controlled social health insurers took legal action 
against the decree and it was temporarily stopped in the courts. The decree 
received also very hesitant support from private health insurers, as most of 
these had already established profitable contracts with trade union-controlled 
social health insurers. In March 2001, the government finally gave in and sus-
pended the decree (Alonso 2007, 161–162). 
In the area of pension policies, the government’s agenda mainly consisted 
of trying to comply with demands of the IFIs and the employer associations to 
reduce both the fiscal deficits of the system and employer contributions. En-
couraged by the IMF, the government reduced public pensions and federal 
public sector salaries by 13% in July 2001, which aroused massive strikes and 
demonstrations by the trade unions. Due to agreements with the opposition PJ 
Party, the measure nevertheless passed the parliament (La Nación, July 31, 
2001; Salvia 2015, 125). At the same time, Decree 814/01 and Law 25.453 
replaced the fragmented arrangements for the reduction of employer contribu-
tions made during Menem’s government with two uniform nationwide contri-
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bution rates. For the vast majority of companies, overall social security contri-
butions were fixed at 21%, which meant that within ten years employer contri-
butions had been reduced by an impressive 12 percentage points (Lo Vuolo 
and Barbeito 1998a, 337).148 In an increasingly desperate social and economic 
situation, the government finally also reduced worker contributions to the pri-
vate pension scheme from 11% to 5%, arguing that this would contribute to 
stimulating much-needed consumption (Arza 2009, 8). 
When De la Rúa had assumed the presidency, unemployment had already 
stood at nearly 14% and approximately 25% of the population had lived under 
the poverty line. By late 2001, these numbers had increased to over 18% and 
40% respectively (Cavarozzi 2006, 214; Gasparini and Cruces 2010, 5; INDEC 
2003). Despite the dramatic impoverishment of major parts of society, De la 
Rúa initially assigned relatively low importance to social assistance and unem-
ployment protection programs. As did the Menem administration in 1989, his 
government even systematically cut the social assistance programs of its pre-
decessor, assuming that these benefited the clientelistic networks of the oppo-
sitional PJ party (Garay 2010, 63). Although the government simultaneously 
implemented similar new programs, such as the Employment Emergency Pro-
gram, the total amount of workfare benefits declined significantly (Golbert 
2004, 22).149 Not surprisingly, this led to a massive increase and radicalization 
of protests and roadblocks undertaken by unemployed workers’ organizations. 
The government’s response was harsh repression, which rather than quieting 
the protests fueled cooperation between these movements. In October 2000, 
FTV and CCC undertook a joint roadblock of the important highway National 
Route 3 in the Matanza district near the city of Buenos Aires. The massive 
participation of over 3,000 activists for six days finally forced the government 
to give in and to negotiate with the leaders of these two unemployed workers’ 
organizations the provision of 9,500 workfare benefits (Salvia 2015, 117–
118).150 The successful protest and the control over a significant number of 
workfare benefits not only strengthened the FTV and the CCC, it also inspired 
other unemployed workers’ organizations throughout Argentina to reinforce 
their activities. Without any clearly recognizable strategy, during the following 
year the government’s responses to these protests oscillated between repres-
sion and concessions, while unemployed workers’ organizations grew rapidly 
(Interview Berra 2014; Svampa and Pereyra 2003, 71–72). In the context of 
 
148  Only for big service sector companies was a higher contribution rate of 25% established. 
The numbers also include social health insurance contributions. 
149  The average number of persons covered by workfare benefits declined from 106,000 in 
1999 to 86,000 in 2000 (Golbert 2004, 22). 
150  A certain share of the negotiated benefits was directly managed by the unemployed 
workers’ movements, which enrolled unemployed activists and created small coopera-
tives aimed at covering diverse needs of the local community (Adamovsky 2012, 424). 
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this dynamic, the number of workfare benefits and social assistance expendi-
ture slightly recovered during 2001 (DAGPyPS 2011; Golbert 2004, 22).  
Two national assemblies of nearly all unemployed workers’ organizations 
in July and September 2001 additionally strengthened their capacity for mobi-
lization and coordinated action. Among other demands, the assemblies insisted 
that workfare programs must be universalized to cover all unemployed workers 
over the age of 16. They also agreed on a common protest plan based on the 
nationwide intensification of roadblocks and the initiation of an open-ended 
protest action towards the end of the year (Golbert 2004, 20; Svampa and 
Pereyra 2003, 209–210). Parallelly, in July 2001, the CTA founded the 
FRENAPO (Frente Nacional contra la Pobreza), a national alliance of progres-
sive forces that committed to the eradication of poverty in Argentina through 
the universalization of social policies. Within a short period, a broad range of 
political and social leaders and organizations joined the alliance.151 Concretely, 
FRENAPO demanded the implementation of a non-contributory unemploy-
ment allowance of 380 pesos for all unemployed heads of household, the uni-
versal coverage of child allowances of 60 pesos per month and a universal 
minimum pension of 150 pesos per month for the elderly (Interview Lozano 
2014). Faced with these demands for universal social protections, the govern-
ment elaborated—without consulting trade unions, the FRENAPO or unem-
ployed workers’ movements—an emergency decree that replaced the existing 
family allowance system and workfare programs with a system of family al-
lowances of 30 pesos per month for all children under the age of 14 and a 
universal minimum pension for persons over 75 without income (Decree 
1382/2001). Although this decree would have significantly expanded family 
allowance coverage towards low-income earners, it was heavily repudiated by 
all popular class actors, including the FRENAPO. Unemployed workers’ or-
ganizations, such as the CCC, also participated in protests against the decree. 
This broad-based rejection had much to do with the fact that the decree did not 
deviate from the general logic of permanent fiscal adjustment that character-
ized the government of De la Rúa. Indeed, by implementing the decree, the 
government estimated it could reduce spending in 2002 by approximately 500 
million pesos. In practice, the decree meant that most formal workers would 
see their family allowances either significantly reduced or even completely 
eliminated.152 For unemployed workers and their organizations it was unac-
ceptable to implement the reform on costs of formal labor as well as to lose the 
 
151  Members of the alliance included among others unemployed workers’ organizations, 
such as the FTV, human rights organizations, progressive sectors of the church and a 
variety of politicians from the FREPASO, ARI and the PJ. One of them was the Peronist 
governor of the Province of Santa Cruz and future president Néstor Kirchner.  
152  The decree abolished all family allowances for all children at the age of 14 or older and 
generally restricted the receipt of the benefit to households with incomes below 1,000 
pesos. 
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workfare benefits many of them had struggled for in exchange for a small ben-
efit of 30 pesos per month (Interview Ardura 2014; Interview Lozano 2014; El 
Clarín, November 2, 2001).153 Finally, the decree was successfully opposed in 
the courts by the CGT and never implemented (Garay 2010, 65). 
All in all, the government of De la Rua attempted to deepen the regressive 
restructuring of social policies that had been successfully pushed forward dur-
ing the preceding governments. However, due to the growth of protest against 
these measures and the weakness of De la Rúa’s governing alliance, a major 
part of its agenda could not be implemented.  
Political Dynamics, Patterns of Social Policy Change, and Path 
Dependency Effects 
The rise of neoliberalism was rooted in the failure of heterodox policies to sta-
bilize the economy during the 1980s. The virtually permanent economic and 
political crisis of the so-called lost decade had led to a shift in the distribution 
of power resources that was increasingly detrimental for the implementation 
of progressive social policy. Rising unemployment and informality reduced 
the structural power resources of the popular classes, while a high dependence 
on foreign debt increased the influence of IFIs. The increasing dominance of 
conservative and neoliberal currents within the main parties, the PJ and the 
UCR, dramatically reduced the associational power resources of the political 
left. A neoliberal shift in public opinion furthermore provided ample discursive 
power resources for neoliberal actors to frame regressive social policy reform 
in such a way that it appeared both necessary and desirable for the majority of 
the society and hence facilitated the electoral viability of a neoliberal alliance. 
Based on these shifts in the distribution of power resources, Menem was able 
to form a strong, regressive governing alliance in which neoliberal technocrats 
and representatives of the economic elite dominated agenda-setting. This, in 
turn, initiated a decade of regressive social and economic policy reform and 
rapidly rising income inequalities. 
  
 
153  Indeed, the two biggest unemployed workers’ movements, the FTV and the CCC, have 
very close links to the trade union movement, so that it was quite common that these 
organizations supported demands of the trade union movement even when these de-
mands affected only formal workers. 
214   
Figure 7: Evolution of income inequality measured with the Gini-coefficient, 1989–2001 
Sources: Gasparini and Cruces (2010, 5). 
In contrast to the exclusionary governing alliance of the military junta between 
1976 and 1983, Menem’s governing alliance incorporated popular class actors, 
though in a strongly subordinated way. This subordinated incorporation meant 
that reform was undertaken gradually and went along with nearly permanent 
internal discussions and concessions. Due to the historically strong interests of 
the trade union movement in the preservation of the system of social health 
insurances, the main concession to organized labor consisted of refraining from 
the complete deregulation of this sector. With the growth of lower popular 
class protests and the emergence of unemployed workers’ movements since 
the mid-1990s, these sectors were also able to extract concessions, mainly in 
the form of the expansion of social assistance policies. Throughout the decade, 
resistance to neoliberalism grew and the distribution of power resources turned 
gradually more favorable to progressive actors. Nevertheless, popular strug-
gles were defensive during the whole period and regressive social policy re-
form continuously outweighed concessions. Social protections for the vast ma-
jority of the popular classes deteriorated significantly and low-income earners 
were particularly hard hit. Through privatization, the introduction of market 
mechanisms, increasingly regressive benefit calculation formulas and exclu-
sionary eligibility criteria, the health and pension systems were restructured in 
favor of high-income earners. Low-income earners either completely lost ac-
cess or saw their benefits dramatically reduced. Simultaneously, employers 
benefited from massive reductions in social insurance contributions. The grad-
ual increase in social assistance expenditure neither compensated for these 
massive disadvantages nor did the increase adequately reflect the dramatic rise 
in poverty and unemployment. Hence, despite the neoliberal rhetoric about the 












  215 
reform during the 1990s took away resources from the poorest sectors and con-
centrated them increasingly on the better off. 
Table 26: Change in social protection for low-income earners, 1989–2001 
Pension policies - Introduction of severely stricter access criteria, which de facto led to 
the exclusion of most low-income earners and informal workers from 
access to pension benefits and a strong decline in coverage 
- Partial privatization of the system 
- Introduction of more regressive replacement rates in the public  
component of the pension system 
- Declining real value of the minimum pension benefit 
- Elmination of the indexation mechanism 
- Massive reduction of employer contributions 
Health care poli-
cies 
- Regressive restructuring of the social health insurance system in 
detriment of formal low-income workers 
- Decentralization of the public health system increased regional  
disparities to the detriment of poorer provinces and municipalities 




- Reduction of expenditure on social housing 
- Replacement of the unemployment allowance with an  
unemployment insurance with stricter eligibility criteria 
+ Introduction of workfare programs with limited coverage 
+ Increasing number of non-contributory pensions 
Family allowance 
policies 
+ Progressive scaling of family allowances in accordance with the  
income of the beneficiary 
Overall evolution of social protection 
for low-income earners Moderate retrenchment 
Due to the truncated nature of social health insurance reform, the strong inter-
ests of the trade unions in the system were not significantly altered and there-
fore the main mechanism of path dependency remained intact. In fact, the con-
version of social health insurances with mixed administration into purely trade 
union-controlled entities provided trade unions with additional interests in 
maintaining the status quo. The increasingly high importance of workfare ben-
efits for the functioning of unemployed workers’ movements and the inability 
of De la Rúa’s government to cut them on a massive scale indicate furthermore 
that this time path dependency effects also emerged in the system of social 
assistance policies. 
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4.8 Crisis, Paradigm Change, and the Expansion of Social 
Protections for Low-Income Earners, 2002–2015 
The inability of De la Rúa’s government to create a stable base of support, to 
overcome the economic crisis, and to contain the ever-growing protest move-
ments finally ended in a dramatic breakdown of the neoliberal governing alli-
ance. The emergence and growing strength of new progressive actors and the 
discredit of the neoliberal model furthermore led to a significant shift in the 
distribution of power resources. Against this background, the center-left elec-
toral alliance of Néstor Kirchner won the 2003 presidential elections and initi-
ated a period of social policy expansion, which strongly extended and im-
proved social protections for low-income earners. 
The Political Arena: Social and Economic Context, Constellation of 
Actors, and Distribution of Power Resources 
When president De la Rúa resigned in late 2001 in the midst of massive pro-
tests, the Argentine economy was stuck in a profound crisis, foreign debt had 
become a massive burden and the one-to-one exchange rate regime between 
the peso and the US dollar had become unsustainable. His successors, the in-
terim presidents Adolfo Rodríguez Saá and Eduardo Duhalde, first announced 
debt default in late 2001 and eventually, in early 2002, abolished the converti-
bility regime and devalued the peso (Golbert 2004, 13). Four years of crisis 
finally culminated in 2002 with an accumulated reduction of 20% in GDP, 21% 
unemployment and over 50% of the population living under the absolute pov-
erty line (Beccaria, Groisman, and Maurizio 2009, 21; Vargas de Flood 2006, 
201).  
However, from mid-2002 on, the Argentine economy began a rapid pro-
cess of recovery. The devaluation of the currency had altered the structure of 
relative prices in favor of domestically produced goods and services, which 
constituted an important comparative advantage for the crisis-ridden local in-
dustries and facilitated the expansion of production and employment. Further-
more, a strong increase in commodity prices led to an expansion of the primary 
sector, especially soybean production, which contributed to the generation of 
fiscal revenues and trade surpluses (Burchardt 2016, 60–69). The government 
reinforced these benign economic trends with a low-interest-rate policy and a 
range of measures that fostered a steady growth of domestic demand (Etche-
mendy and Collier 2007, 390). In effect, between 2003 and 2015 the Argentine 
economy expanded at an average yearly rate of nearly 4.8% (INDEC 2016, 7; 
Trujillo 2017, 9–16). Industry’s share of GDP recovered slightly from 29% to 
33% between 2002 and 2011 and industrial employment rose from 17% to 21% 
of overall employment (Timmer, de Vries, and de Vries 2014). Between 2002 
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and 2007 alone, the absolute number of industrial workers grew by an esti-
mated 36% (Wyczykier and Barattin 2012, 68). Unemployment fell from 20% 
in late 2002 to 10% by the end of 2005 and 6.6% in mid-2015 (INDEC 2003; 
MPyT 2019). Informality among wage earners decreased from over 48% in 
2004 to under 33% in 2015 (CEDLAS and World Bank 2018).  




















2002 -10.9 25.9 29 17 19.7 44.1 
2003 8.8 13.4 32 19 17.3 47.1 
2004 9.0 4.4 33 20 13.6 48.0 
2005 9.2 9.8 33 20 11.6 46.3 
2006 8.5 10.9 34 20 10.2 43.3 
2007 8.2 25.7 34 21 8.5 40.2 
2008 4.4 23.0 33 21 7.9 37.0 
2009 -3.4 14.8 33 20 8.7 35.9 
2010 9.3 25.7 33 20 7.7 34.9 
2011 6.5 22.5 33 21 7.3 34.2 
2012 -0.5 25.2 –     –     7.2 34.3 
2013 2.3 27.9 –     –     7.0 33.5 
2014 -2.6 38.5 –     –     7.3 33.2 
2015 2.1 27.8 –     –     6.8 32.6 
Sources: Rapoport (2013) for GDP growth and inflation 2002–2006; Trujillo (2017, 9–16) for 
GDP growth 2007–2014; INDEC Database for GDP growth 2015; IPC del Congreso (2018) for 
inflation 2007–2015; Timmer, de Vries, and de Vries (2014) for industry share of GDP and share 
of industrial employment; INDEC Database for unemployment; and CEDLAS and World Bank 
(2018) for informality. 
These developments meant that the disciplining effects of unemployment and 
informality weakened, that workers became more difficult to replace and that 
employment in capital intensive sectors grew. Taken together, this led to a sig-
nificant recovery of the structural power resources of the popular classes. 
At the same time, the break with the convertibility exchange regime, the 
default on foreign debts and the return of fiscal and trade balance surpluses 
drastically reduced Argentina’s dependence on capital inflows, and hence, re-
duced the structural power resources of the IFIs and foreign investors. 
Moreover, growing resistance to the neoliberal model and its failure to 
comply with its promises of progress, stability, and wealth for all led to a wide-
spread discrediting of neoliberalism and the return of a more state-interven-
tionist consensus in public opinion. The rapid initiation of economic and social 
218   
recovery with the implementation of policies inspired by and justified with the 
logic of the Keynesian and ISI paradigms further contributed to the consolida-
tion of this consensus. In contrast to data from 1991 and 1995, World Values 
Survey data from 1999, 2006 and 2013 show stable majorities in support of an 
active role for the state in reducing income inequalities, increasing public wel-
fare provision, and expanding national ownership of companies (see Figures 
8–10; Inglehart et al. 2014: World Values Survey Waves 2–6). As part of this 
general discursive shift in favor of state intervention and redistributive policies, 
proposals for universal social policies that would extend coverage to low-in-
come earners became increasingly popular in both academic and political cir-
cles (Danani and Beccaria 2011; Hintze and Costa 2011, 164). On the interna-
tional level, universal and redistributive social policies were promoted by the 
ILO through the Social Protection Floor program. These developments pro-
vided progressive actors with much more favorable conditions in which to 
frame their demands in a positive manner and to mobilize mass support, and 
hence, significantly increased their discursive power resources.154 
The profound social, economic, and political crisis of the late 1990s and 
early 2000s also significantly affected the constellation of actors participating 
in Argentine social politics. A range of corruption scandals and the incapacity 
of governments of different colors to reverse the process of economic and so-
cial deterioration led to a widespread and profound loss of confidence in the 
Argentine political elite (Adamovsky 2012, 436). Not surprisingly, the govern-
ing parties were particularly hard hit. The center-left FREPASO, whose par-
ticipation in the neoliberal government was widely perceived as a complete 
betrayal of its own program, completely disintegrated.155 The UCR became a 
shadow of its former self, winning only 2% in the 2003 presidential elections 
and 14% in the same year’s legislative elections. Instead, former UCR politi-
cians left the party to form the neoliberal Recrear party and the center-left ARI 
party. The PJ party did not suffer from similar splits. However, internal differ-
ences led to the decision that three Peronist candidates were allowed to com-
pete separately in the 2003 presidential elections. 
 
154  Figures 8, 9 and 10 show changes in the Argentine public opinion that reflect the shift 
from neoliberal predominance during the early 1990s to the prevalence of a more inter-
ventionist post-neoliberal paradigm during the 2000s. In four waves of the World Val-
ues Survey respondents were asked to position themselves on a scale from 1 to 10 in 
order to express their inclination to either of two given options. For the elaborations of 
the figures the positions 1–4 have been summarized and represent those who prefer the 
first option. The positions 7–10 have been summarized and represent those who prefer 
the second option. The middle-positions 5 and 6 are considered expressions of neutral-
ity. 
155  One of the two founding parties of the FREPASO, the Frente Grande, continues to exist 
but plays only a minor political role compared to the 1990s. 
  219 
Figure 8: Public opinion with regard to government and individual responsibility in welfare pro-
vision, 1991–2013  
Sources: World Values Surveys (1991, 1995, 2006, 2013). 
Figure 9: Public opinion with regard to income inequalities, 1991–2013  
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Figure 10: Public opinion with regard to public and private ownership of business companies, 
1991–2013 
Sources: World Values Surveys (1991, 1995, 2006, 2013). 
Carlos Menem was the candidate uniting most of the right and neoliberal fac-
tions of the party. Adolfo Rodríguez Saá was the candidate of the center. Nés-
tor Kirchner adopted a center-left profile and united support from both the cen-
ter and the left wing of the PJ. To sustain his campaign, he formed the center-
left electoral alliance Frente para la Victoria (FpV), which additionally incor-
porated several smaller center-left and left political parties and social move-
ments. Kirchner finally won the 2003 presidential elections (Zelaznik 2011, 
96–99). The swift economic recovery and a range of redistributive policies 
soon contributed to a strong rise of Kirchner’s popularity. By the mid-2000s, 
the FpV became the dominant electoral force in Argentina (Cavarozzi 2006, 
143). Although it received considerable middle-class support, its electoral 
stronghold was composed of the popular classes and its support was strongest 
among those groups with low incomes and low levels of formal education 
(Moncagatta and Safranoff 2013, 32–43). Overall, these developments in the 
Argentine party system were highly favorable for an extension of social pro-
tections low-income earners.  
While during the 1990s employers’ associations, employer-financed think 
tanks and IFIs were united by a strong neoliberal consensus, during the 2000s 
these actors suffered from fragmentation. In the context of profound economic 
crises, tensions between different sectoral interests regarding the exchange re-
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service sector associations and enterprises that had accumulated foreign debt 
favored the replacement of the peso with the US dollar as official currency. 
This way they hoped to avoid a fall of the dollar value of their investments in 
Argentina and a respective relative increase of the value of their foreign debts. 
On the other hand, the agricultural sector and export-oriented industries, as 
well as companies that had invested larger amounts outside Argentina, sup-
ported a currency devaluation, because this would increase their international 
competitiveness and the local value of their foreign investments (Basualdo 
2001, 58–101). The Kirchnerist governments furthermore used state interven-
tionist policies, such as import regulations and subsidies, to selectively favor 
certain sectors and companies and thereby to additionally divide the capital 
side (Bonvecchi 2011, 143–146). The involvement of employer-financed think 
tanks, employer associations and the IFIs in the agenda-setting of the 1990s 
furthermore led to the strong discrediting of these actors in the opinion of the 
public. Taken together, these developments implied a significantly weakened 
influence of these actors. While during the 1990s they had a decisive influence 
on the agenda-setting of social policy reform, during the 2000s their struggles 
were rather defensive and consisted of criticizing and resisting the govern-
ment’s agenda. 
The profound economic and social crisis also affected the trade union 
movement. Although union density fell only slightly to an estimated 40%, the 
absolute number of affiliates declined significantly due to the rise of unem-
ployment (Marshall 2005, 25). The threat of unemployment and the defensive 
strategy towards neoliberal policies pursued by the majority faction of the un-
ion movement led to a significant weakening of most unions’ activist structures 
and mobilization capacities (Etchemendy and Collier 2007, 369–370). Further-
more, after the MTA left the CGT due to a dispute over labor market reform 
in 2000, the labor movement was politically divided into three confederations 
(Campione and Rajland 2006, 317–318). Hence, the associational power re-
sources of the trade union movement were significantly weakened by the early 
2000s. However, with the economic recovery and a range of government 
measures that strengthened collective bargaining and employment growth, a 
process of union revitalization began after 2003 (Weinmann, Bossert and 
Hecker 2016, 195–189). Between 2003 and 2005 the number of strike actions 
and signed collective agreements tripled (Etchemendy and Collier 2007, 369–
370; Etchemendy 2011, 59–60). According to Carlos Gdansky, secretary gen-
eral of the metal workers’ union in the La Matanza district, his union grew 
from 70,000 members in 2001 to 300,000 in 2011 while union specialist Héctor 
Palomino estimated a 24% growth of overall union membership between 2003 
and 2009 (Abal Medina 2012, 120). Besides this important growth, the capac-
ity to influence policy was strengthened by the reunification of the CGT in 
2004. Hugo Moyano, the former leader of the combative MTA, became its 
president and later also assumed the vice-presidency of the PJ party (Campione 
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and Rajland 2006, 317–318; Svampa 2008a, 88). Although both the CGT and 
the CTA split again into various factions after 2008, all in all, an important 
recovery of associational power resources of the Argentine union movement 
can be observed (Weinmann, Bossert, and Hecker 2016). 
In contrast to the union movement, unemployed workers’ organizations 
were able to massively increase their associational power resources already 
during the years of the crisis. According to the national coordinator of the CCC, 
the organization grew from approximately 12,000 members in late 2001, to 
50,000 in early 2002 and 70,000 in 2003 (quoted in Golbert 2004, 21). The 
FTV and other organizations also grew strongly during this period so that the 
overall membership of unemployed workers’ movements reached approxi-
mately 300,000 at that time (Interview D’Elía 2014; Alcañiz and Scheier 2007, 
160). Due to various factors, the general growth of their associational power 
resources during the crisis was succeeded by a period of more ambivalent de-
velopments after 2003. One reason was that the number of unemployed work-
ers and the public acceptance of roadblocks declined with the recovery of the 
economy. Another reason was that the unity among unemployed workers’ 
movements during 2001 did not last for long and differences regarding politi-
cal orientation and strategy came increasingly to the forefront (Natalucci 2010, 
109–110). During the Kirchnerist governments, the movements furthermore 
split into two factions that either supported or opposed the government. The 
alliance with the government enabled the FTV to maintain a membership of 
roughly 90,000 during the following years (Interview D’Elía 2014). Other al-
lied social movements, such as the Tupac Amaru, the Movimiento Evita, or the 
Frente Transversal were even able to grow significantly and to convert into 
mass movements (Natalucci 2012a; 2012b). Government support and privi-
leged access to subsidies and social assistance programs made an important 
contribution to this growth. At the same time, opposing unemployed workers’ 
movements, which received fewer subsidies and faced frequent judicial perse-
cution for their protest actions and roadblocks, mostly suffered from declining 
membership (Svampa 2008b, 9–13). Nevertheless, many of these movements 
also retained significant associational power resources. The CCC, for example, 
was able to maintain a membership of approximately 35,000 and a high level 
of protest activity (Interview Ardura 2014). Summing up, despite a certain de-
cline in public visibility compared to the crisis period, the unemployed work-
ers’ movements were able to consolidate their role as important actors in the 
national political arena after 2003. 
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At the same time, the women’s movement became a real popular mass move-
ment (Di Marco 2010, 203). By the mid-2010s it proved capable of mobilizing 
several hundred thousand demonstrators throughout the country against gen-
dered violence and for legal, safe, and free abortion. Participation in the 
Encuentro Nacional de Mujeres, the most important annual gathering of the 
Argentine women’s movement, rose from around 12,000 in 2001 to over 
60,000 in 2015 (Tarducci 2005, 397; Página 12, October 11, 2015). The mas-
sive growth of the women’s movement was to an important part related to the 
growing participation of women from progressive parties, trade unions, and 
unemployed workers organizations. The annual national gatherings served as 
an opportunity to participate in issue workshops and build networks, which in 
turn constituted an important support for strengthening the influence of women 
in their respective organizations. By 2002 the CTA and several unemployed 
workers’ movements had incorporated the demand for legal abortion into their 
programs (Daich and Tarducci 2012, 7; Sutton and Borland 2013, 213). For 
the vast majority of activists, women’s interests also included broader redis-
tributive and universalizing social policy reform, because such policies were 
considered to contribute to a diminution of both gender and class inequalities 
(Interview Díaz 2014; Interview Ocar and Martínez 2014). 
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In summary, the distribution of power resources and the constellation of 
actors that emerged out of the multiple economic, social and political crises of 
the 1990s and early 2000s provided a favorable context for the formation and 
consolidation of an inclusionary-progressive governing alliance. The re-emer-
gence of Keynesian, demand-oriented thinking in public opinion led to a re-
newed strengthening of the discursive power resources of popular class actors. 
Progressive forces, such as the CTA, unemployed workers’ and women’s 
movements, and the center-left FpV electoral alliance, had emerged and grown 
in strength. This meant an important increase of the associational power re-
sources of the popular classes. The economic boom after 2002 and a slight 
trend towards re-industrialization furthermore contributed to a recovery of la-
bor’s structural power resources. In contrast, key drivers of the regressive so-
cial policy agenda of the 1990s, such as employer-financed think tanks, the 
IFIs and employer associations, suffered from discrediting before the public 
and increasing internal fragmentation. 
Struggles over Social Policy in a Period of Profound Economic,  
Social and Political Crisis, 2002–2003 
By late 2001, poverty had risen to unprecedented levels and affected approxi-
mately 40% of the population (Cavarozzi 2006, 214). This not only fostered 
organized protests by unemployed workers’ movements but also led to the pro-
liferation of somewhat loosely organized lootings. In the face of an accelera-
tion of capital flight, the government announced on the 1st of December a re-
striction on the withdrawal of money from bank accounts, which led to a wave 
of middle-class protests as well as a joint general strike of the CTA and the 
CGT on the 13th of December. In response to the proliferation of lootings and 
the increasing intensity of protests, President de la Rúa declared a state of 
emergency on the 19th of December and ordered the repression of protests, 
which resulted in severe street battles and numerous deaths. Instead of calming 
the situation, however, the measure led to a further growth and radicalization 
of the protests. On the 20th of December, De la Rúa saw no other choice than 
to resign (Adamovsky 2012, 436–440; Cavarozzi 2006, 213–214). 
On the 22nd of December, the parliament elected the Peronist governor 
Rodríguez Sáa as his successor (Cavarozzi 2006, 215). The new president was 
immediately confronted with social demands. During the preceding days, the 
FRENAPO had mobilized over 1.7 million supporters in an informal referen-
dum in favor of its demand for universal social protection. On the day of 
Rodríguez Sáa’s election, the FRENAPO furthermore announced that it was 
going to present a bill with its demands in the parliament. Simultaneously, sev-
eral social movements met in the city of Rosario and demanded an immediate 
halt of foreign debt payments (La Nación, December 22, 2001). In response to 
the growing strength of these demands and in consideration of the delicate 
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political context, Rodríguez Sáa announced in his inaugural speech a default 
on foreign debt and the creation of one million state-sponsored jobs. He imme-
diately invited representatives of unemployed workers’ movements to discuss 
the creation and distribution of these jobs (Interview Ardura 2014; Interview 
Berra 2014). While these measures were well received by most of the social 
movements, Rodriguez Sáa lacked support from his own party, which led him 
to resign on the 30th of December (Cavarozzi 2006, 215–216).  
On the 2nd of January 2002, the Peronist senator Eduardo Duhalde took 
office as his successor (Cavarozzi 2006, 216). One of his first announcements 
was to end the fixed one-to-one exchange rate between the US dollar and the 
Argentine peso. This caused a sharp devaluation of the local currency and 
thereby a further loss of income for most Argentinians (Golbert 2010, 147). 
The unemployed workers’ movements immediately returned to the streets to 
demand that Duhalde keep his predecessor’s promise to create one million jobs 
and FRENAPO leaders reiterated their demand for a universal unemployment 
allowance (La Nación, January 14, 2002; La Nación, January 15, 2002). Aware 
of the vulnerability of his government and the power resources of the social 
movements and the FRENAPO, Duhalde met with social movement leaders 
and shortly thereafter announced the implementation of a non-contributory 
workfare program called Programa de Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desocupados 
(PJJHD), which would provide a monthly allowance of 150 pesos in exchange 
for participation in communal work (Interview Ardura 2014, Interview D’Elía 
2014). In order to calm down political conflicts, he also invited these move-
ments as well as the trade union centrals, various employers’ associations, and 
representatives of the Catholic church and other religions to participate in a 
multisectoral roundtable to agree on policies to confront the crisis (Interview 
López 2014). One of the policies discussed in this context was the PJJHD. The 
government’s original proposal limited the number of beneficiaries to 500,000 
and the duration of the benefit to only three months (Golbert 2004, 27; Decree 
165/2002). These restrictions were rejected by the CTA, the CCC and the FTV, 
which demanded broader social policies that would cover all those in need and 
have stronger redistributive impact (Interview Ardura 2014; Interview D’Elía 
2014; Interview Lozano 2014). Finally, the multisectoral roundtable agreed to 
significantly extend the program. The introductory paragraph of the Decree 
565/2002 that introduced the PJJHD stated that the multisectoral roundtable 
agreed on an “urgent necessity to universalize the Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar 
in order to secure a minimum monthly income to all Argentine families” and 
that “it is important to promote a redistribution of resources from those with 
high incomes towards the social sectors with low income.”156 This allowed an 
unprecedented expansion of coverage and within a few months the PJJHD 
 
156  Author’s translation. 
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reached nearly two million households (Golbert 2004, 23–27).157 Furthermore, 
the universalistic discourse and the proposition of rights to “social inclusion” 
found in the text of the Decree 565/2002 distinguished the PJJHD strongly 
from preceding social assistance programs. Parallel to the PJJHD, the govern-
ment introduced the Plan Nacional de Seguridad Alimentaria (PNSA), which 
consisted mainly in the provision of food to low-income households, and the 
program Ingreso para el Desarrollo Humano (IDH), which was similar to the 
PJJHD but did not require participation in communal work and reached about 
200,000 households (Cruces, Epele, and Guardia 2008, 22; Vargas de Flood 
2006, 167–168).  
All in all, social assistance and workfare policies that benefited the lowest 
income sectors were massively expanded during the interim presidency of Ed-
uardo Duhalde. Between 2001 and 2003 the overall expenditure on social as-
sistance and unemployment protection increased from 1.5% to 2.5% of GDP 
(DAGPyPS 2011). The political process behind this expansion reflects the shift 
in the distribution of power resources in favor of progressive popular class 
forces, such as the unemployed workers’ movements and the FRENAPO, and 
the subsequent redefinition of the relationship between the national govern-
ment and these forces. While the government of President De la Rúa was re-
luctant to receive these actors as negotiation partners, responded to their pro-
tests with repression and finally fell over a wave of protest and social conflict, 
Duhalde acknowledged the need to receive these actors and to negotiate the 
terms of social policy with them. This disposition was related less to any gen-
uinely progressive political orientation of his government than to the fact that 
social conflict, roadblocks, and mass protests had reached such an intensity 
that they were perceived to be a real threat to the ability to govern. Most em-
ployers’ associations also perceived this situation as being highly explosive, 
considering that it included an increasing number of factory occupations, and 
so refrained from more vehement resistance to the expansion of social assis-




157  This meant that coverage was approximately 15 times higher than that of the biggest 
preceding workfare program, the Plan Trabajar (Golbert 2004, 23–27). 
158 Between 2002 and 2003 approximately 160 factories were occupied and resumed pro-
duction under worker control (Adamovsky 2012, 421–422). 
159  Stronger objections came only from the associations of the big agricultural producers 
SRA and CRA, which protested the implementation of export taxes on agricultural 
products and processed foods to finance social assistance measures (La Nación, March 
5, 2002). However, despite their public refusal, no major protests were organized. 
Roughly two thirds of the PJJHD was financed through export taxes (Golbert 2004, 30). 
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Figure 11: Roadblocks and social assistance, 1997–2005 
Sources: Massetti (2006, 30) for the number of roadblocks; DAGPyPS (2011) for social assis-
tance and unemployment protection expenditure. 
Although policy change was most profound in the area of social assistance and 
unemployment protection, the new distribution of power resources also influ-
enced social policy making in other areas. In early 2002 health workers, asso-
ciations of patients with chronic conditions, and unemployed workers’ move-
ments organized several protests to demand free access to medical care includ-
ing pharmaceuticals.160 Hospital workers furthermore staged several strikes for 
improvements in supply of pharmaceuticals and working conditions (Garay 
2010, 68). In response to these protests and the severe crisis of the health sys-
tem the government decreed a “sanitary emergency” in early April 2002 and 
announced a range of measures to ensure the financial viability of the system, 
to increase the redistribution of resources among health insurance funds and to 
“universalize free access to pharmaceuticals” for low-income earners (Decree 
486/2002). Soon after, in June 2002, the government finally announced the 
implementation of the Plan Remediar, which gradually extended the free pro-
vision of basic pharmaceuticals nationwide to over 6500 primary health care 
 
160  The unemployed workers’ movements alone organized over 30 roadblocks and other 
















1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Number of roadblocks (left)
Social assistance and unemployment protection as % of GDP (right)
228   
centers and approximately 15 million Argentinians living in low-income 
households (La Nación, June 19, 2002; Garay 2010, 81–83; Tobar 2004). In 
order to address the financial deficit of the health system, employer contribu-
tions to the health insurance system were raised from 5% to 6% and to the 
pensioners’ health insurance from 1.5% to 2% (La Nación, November 17, 
2002). Furthermore, the Obligatory Medical Plan, which detailed the treat-
ments all health insurance funds had to cover, was replaced by the Emergency 
Obligatory Medical Plan, which contained a revised and reduced catalog of 
treatments and pharmaceuticals. Among other things, it was mandated that 
physicians had to prescribe generic drugs wherever possible (La Nación, Feb-
ruary 15, 2002). 
In July 2002, the government decided to raise the minimum pension from 
150 to 200 pesos (La Nación, July 17, 2002). Compared with the inflation rate 
of slightly over 25% in 2002, this meant that the pensioners with the lowest 
incomes experienced a significant increase in the real value of their benefit 
(MTEySS 2017, 37; Rapoport 2013, Table 5). This measure, however, did not 
alter the problem that, due to the high contribution requirements instituted in 
the early 1990s, most low-income earners completely lacked access to any kind 
of pension benefit. Against this background, the biggest unemployed workers’ 
movements started to organize protest activities in late 2002 to demand the 
expansion of pension coverage to low-income groups without access. Duhalde 
received the leaders of these movements again and finally promised the crea-
tion of one million additional pension benefits. However, as no concrete 
measures followed, the unemployed workers’ movements together with allied 
trade unions staged massive protests for an expansion of pension coverage in 
January and February 2003. In response to these, the government finally im-
plemented the Plan Mayores in March 2003, which provided a monthly benefit 
of 150 pesos to persons over 70 who live in the poor provinces in the north of 
Argentina and have no other source of income. Yet, due to the restrictive access 
criteria, the program had only a very minor impact (Garay 2010, 70–84; Pau-
tassi, Rossi, and Campos 2004, 11).  
All in all, the ability of Duhalde’s government to restore a certain level of 
social peace and governability was very much related to his recognition of the 
strength and mobilization capacity of a range of progressive popular class ac-
tors that had emerged and grown during the 1990s, such as the unemployed 
workers’ movements and combative union confederations. He acknowledged 
them as legitimate political actors, initiated a dialogue with them, and re-
sponded to several of their demands. This led to a significant extension of so-
cial protections for low-income earners. Notwithstanding these concessions, 
the redefinition of the relationship between the government and these progres-
sive social forces was more a result of perceived political necessity than a gen-
uinely pursued aim of President Duhalde. As soon as the political situation 
appeared to be stabilizing, the government returned to a more conservative 
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stance. Shortly after implementing the supposedly universal PJJHD program, 
an internal resolution of the Ministry of Labor decided that no new enrollments 
to the program would be permitted after the 17th of May 2002. This contributed 
to the fact that merely 62% of the households that met the eligibility criteria 
ended up receiving benefits from the program (Neffa 2008 et al., 102ff).  
In general, social policy responses to unemployed worker and trade union 
protests became much more limited from mid-2002 on and the government 
returned increasingly to a more repressive stance. Repression finally culmi-
nated with two young protestors being killed by the police in a roadblock on 
the 26th of June 2002 (Pereyra, Pérez, and Schuster 2008, 20). This escalation 
of violence, in turn, severely damaged the image of the government, led to a 
further growth of protests, and aroused the opposition of significant parts of 
the lower and middle classes and the media. Eventually, this contributed to 
Duhalde’s decision to schedule elections for early 2003 and to refrain from 
running for president (Svampa 2008b, 11; Norden 2011, 102). 
The Formation of a Strong Inclusionary Governing Alliance and the 
Initiation of Progressive Social Policy Expansion, 2003–2007 
A more solid transformation of the relationship between the government and 
the new popular class actors took place under the following presidency of Nés-
tor Kirchner, who deliberately pursued their integration into his governing al-
liance. As governor of Santa Cruz, Kirchner had initially supported the gov-
ernment of Carlos Menem; from the mid-1990s, however he had become a 
fierce critic of Menem and the neoliberal model (Galasso 2016, 28–35). During 
the crisis he supported the FRENAPO and its demand for universal social pro-
tection (Interview Fuentes 2014). And when he ran for president as one of the 
three Peronist candidates in the 2003 elections, he based his campaign on a 
center-left and strongly anti-neoliberal rhetoric, promising the implementation 
of a more state interventionist economic model focused on social inclusion, 
redistribution, and national sovereignty as well as a strengthening of the public 
health and pension systems (La Nación, April 26, 2003; Zelaznik 2011, 96). 
This platform was well received by many of the unemployed workers’ move-
ments, the more combative factions of the union movement, many human 
rights organizations, the more progressive sections of the PJ party, and several 
smaller center-left and left parties. During the campaign, Kirchner was able to 
forge an alliance with the biggest unemployed workers’ movement, the FTV, 
the center-left party Frente Grande and some leaders of the CTA (Interview 
D’Elía 2014; La Nación, February 19, 2003). Because Kirchner was relatively 
unknown to the public compared to most of the other candidates, forging po-
litical alliances within the powerful PJ party apparatus was also crucial for the 
success of his candidacy. While most of the influential Peronist politicians sup-
ported one of the other two Peronist candidates, Meném or Rodríguez Sáa, 
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Kirchner eventually won the backing of interim President Eduardo Duhalde, 
which added the support of significant base-level party structures to his cam-
paign, especially in the populous province of Buenos Aires.161 Furthermore, 
Duhalde was able to gather the support of 71 mostly smaller CGT unions for 
Kirchner (La Nación, February 21, 2003). With this support, Kirchner finally 
obtained 22% of the votes in the first round of the presidential elections, which 
enabled him to enter the final ballot against Ménem, who had reached 24% of 
the votes. In the face of unfavorable public opinion polls Ménem finally with-
drew his candidacy and Kirchner became president (Cavarozzi 2006, 136–
138). 
Once in office, Kirchner actively pursued the consolidation and expansion 
of his progressive governing alliance. In order to incorporate a broader range 
of progressive and popular class-based organizations, the government imple-
mented a range of both symbolic and material measures (Etchemendy and 
Garay 2011, 284; Zelaznik 2011, 97). Kirchnerism shifted economic policy 
from neoliberalism to Keynesian state interventionism, started to renationalize 
formerly privatized companies, expanded social expenditure, established price 
and trade controls, and promoted collective bargaining and wage hikes as a 
way to foster local demand as a driver of the economy (Bonvecchi 2011). In 
public speeches the government frequently emphasized that its redistributive 
policies were not only improving the living conditions of the beneficiaries, but 
that they were also crucially contributing to the growth of the economy and the 
progress of the society as a whole, thereby effectively taking advantage of the 
post-neoliberal development paradigm that dominated public opinion (Díaz 
Rosaenz 2017, 101–106). In addition to these broad-based policies in favor of 
both formal and informal labor, the government used the distribution of selec-
tive benefits, such as political posts and resources of social assistance and in-
frastructure programs, to favor loyal supporters and to negotiate political sup-
port on different levels of the political arena. On the one hand, basic units of 
the PJ party in poor neighborhoods continued to function as clientelistic net-
works using social programs to establish direct linkages to low-income earn-
ers. On the other hand, on a more aggregate level, the selective distribution of 
resources through political posts, social assistance, and infrastructure programs 
served as leverage in negotiations with social movements and lower rank lead-
ers of political parties (Etchemendy and Garay 2011, 283–285; Mauro and 
Rossi 2011, 17). Given that in Argentina provinces and municipalities are 
highly dependent on fiscal transfers from the national government, this helped 
 
161  Duhalde’s support of Kirchner was of a strategic nature rather than based on genuine 
political proximity. Indeed, Duhalde first tried to convince two political allies, the gov-
ernors of Santa Fé and Córdoba, to run for the presidency, but failed in both cases. As 
he nevertheless wanted to avoid a victory of his long-term rival Carlos Ménem, he fi-
nally forged an agreement with Néstor Kirchner in early 2003 (Cavarozzi 2006, 136–
138).  
  231 
Kirchner to rapidly build a network of supporters from both major parties, the 
PJ and the UCR (Cavarozzi 2006, 142). 
With the aim of extending his alliance with the unemployed workers’ 
movements, Kirchner received leaders of the FTV and the CCC immediately 
after assuming office. A short time later he also invited leaders of smaller so-
cial movements and established a fluid channel of communication through the 
General Secretariat of the Presidency. Kirchner himself participated several 
times in meetings, emphasizing that he was willing to defend lower popular 
class interests, but that in order to do so the social movements would have to 
support the governing alliance (Boyanowski Bazán 2010, 114–116; Galasso 
2016, 62–63). Besides this general promise to defend low-income earners’ in-
terests, the government conceded participation in housing construction pro-
grams and other public works to several organizations. This strategy turned out 
to be relatively successful, so that soon many of the unemployed workers’ or-
ganizations either joined the alliance or at least loosely cooperated with it (In-
terview Ardura 2014; Mauro and Rossi 2011, 169; Tavano 2015, 232). In the 
following years, new Kirchnerist social movements such as the Movimiento 
Evita and the Frente Transversal were founded and grew rapidly. The collabo-
ration with the government was advantageous for these movements, and in 
particular for their leaders. The distribution of the resources of social assistance 
and housing programs was strongly biased in favor of loyal organizations, 
which ultimately increased the capacity of these groups to attract new mem-
bers. Furthermore, the receipt of state resources strengthened the control of the 
leaders over the rank and file, because the leaders were able to grant more 
benefits to particularly committed and loyal members (Interview Falcón 2014; 
Golbert 2004, 21–22; Massetti 2009, 60–88). In return, these organizations fre-
quently mobilized their members in support of the government both electorally 
and on the streets (Etchemendy and Garay 2011, 284). 
At the same time, Kirchner actively sought the incorporation of the trade 
union movement into his government. While the center-left orientation of his 
government was in many ways closer to that of the progressive CTA, Kirchner 
believed that a broad-based inclusionary governing alliance required also the 
support of the two CGTs, which still represented the majority of the union 
movement (Etchemendy and Collier 2007, 390). To achieve this support, 
Kirchner established a close alliance with the more combative unions that were 
organized in the CGT Disidente162 and also invited the more moderate sector 
(La Nación, December 4, 2003). In parallel, the government began to imple-
ment decidedly pro-union policies that helped unions to revitalize collective 
bargaining, reinstituted tripartite concertation, reinforced workers’ rights, and 
fostered employment creation (Weinmann, Bossert, Hecker 185–189). These 
measures provided the ground for significant wage increases and were well 
 
162 After the MTA had left the CGT due to political differences, the member unions of the 
MTA founded the CGT Disidente. 
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received by the union movement and the majority of the workers.163 In 2004, 
the two CGTs finally reunited and in 2005 Hugo Moyano, leader of the com-
bative teamsters’ union and close ally of the government, ascended to become 
its sole secretary general (La Nación, July 7, 2005). In 2006, the CTA elected 
as secretary general a supporter of the government, Hugo Yasky of the teach-
ers’ union confederation (El Clárin, November 11, 2006). Hence, by the mid-
2000s, the trade union movement had become a solid pillar of support of the 
governing alliance (Wyczykier and Barattin 2012, 55). 
A majority of the human rights organizations also joined the governing 
alliance, which reopened trials against human rights violators of the last mili-
tary dictatorship and provided several of these organizations with funding to 
carry out education and social assistance projects (Mauro and Rossi 2011, 171; 
Zelaznik 2011, 97). All in all, within two years a strong progressive governing 
alliance with broad-based popular class support had emerged which was both 
willing and able to implement a redistributive social policy agenda. 
The most profound reform process was undertaken in the pension system, 
which had constituted an important focus of unemployed workers’ movement 
protests during early 2003. To countervail the inegalitarian distribution of re-
sources within the system, the government implemented a combination of gen-
eral benefit increases and disproportionally higher minimum pension in-
creases. Between 2003 and 2004 the real value of the minimum pension was 
raised by a stunning 32% while the average pension benefit grew by 13%.164 
Until the end of Kirchner’s presidency in 2007, the relative value of the mini-
mum pension increased from 50% to 80% of the average pension, so that the 
distribution of resources within the group of pensioners had become highly 
egalitarian (MTEySSS 2017, 37).  
Ten months before the 2005 mid-term elections, the government then ad-
dressed one of the main demands of the unemployed workers’ movements and 
the CTA by implementing the Pension Inclusion Program, which resulted in a 
massive expansion of pension coverage among the elderly and thereby strongly 
benefited unemployed and informal workers.165 The program introduced the 
possibility of early retirement for unemployed workers at the age of 60 or later, 
as well as providing access to pension benefits to persons at retirement age 
who did not meet the requirement of 30 years of contribution. (Law 25.994). 
In order to account for the missing years of contribution, the benefit was then 
 
163  During Néstor Kirchner’s presidency both the minimum wage and the wages accorded 
in the main collective agreements nearly doubled in real terms (Etchemendy 2011, 57, 
76). 
164  Estimates of the INDEC Database have been used for inflation adjustment.  
165  Although the CGT did not explicitly demand such measures, as part of the inclusionary 
governing alliance the CGT clearly supported the extension of pension coverage beyond 
the margins of formal labor (Puricelli 2019, 118–133).  
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reduced by a certain proportion during the first five years; afterward it con-
verted into a full regular pension benefit (Law 25.994; Decree 1.454/05).166 
Table 29: Composition of the new governing alliance, 2005* 
 
Support expanding 
social protections for 
low-income earners 
Neither actively  
support expansion  
nor retrenchment 
Support retrenching 
social protections for 
low-income earners 
Actors · Center-left wing of 
the PJ 
· Partido de la Victoria 
· Frente Grande party 
· Unemployed work-
ers’ movements 
· Progressive minority 
faction of the union 
movement 
· Human rights  
organizations 
· Centrist wing of the 
PJ 
· Majority faction of the 
union movment 




· Lower popular  
classes 
· Working class 
· Segments of the  









Strength of  
the alliance Strong with internal tensions 
* The composition of the alliance experienced minor changes over the years, however, both its 
composition and its inclusionary-progressive orientation remained largely stable between 2003 
and 2015. 
This resulted in an enormous increase of pension coverage among the lower 
popular classes. Pension coverage among elderly persons living in households 
of the lowest income quintile increased from 42% in 2004 to 85% in 2010, and 
for the second lowest income quintile the respective increase was from 66% to 
95% (Rofman and Olivieri 2011, 49). Furthermore, the program had a pro-
foundly egalitarian impact regarding gender and migratory background, be-
cause both women and migrants were much more often unable to reach 30 
years of contribution and were thus disproportionally beneficiaries of the pro-
gram (Rofman and Olivieri 2011, 45; Sala 2014, 9). The major limitation of 
the program consisted of the fact that it was designed as a temporary measure 
and not as permanent change of the eligibility criteria. Nevertheless, it resulted 
in an enormous improvement of social protection for low-income earners. In 
 
166  The discounted amount depended on the number of missing years of contribution and 
averaged approximately 40% (Arza 2009, 12). 
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political terms, the measure contributed significantly to the consolidation of 
majoritarian support from the lower popular classes, the unemployed workers’ 
movements, and the CTA (Interview D’Elía 2014; Interview Fuentes 2014; 
Interview Larisgoitia 2014). 
By 2007, the pension inclusion program made up about 30% of the total 
pension expenditure (Arza 2009, 12). To finance these costs and to strengthen 
the public pension system, the government undertook further highly popular 
measures, which received explicit support from most trade unions and political 
parties (Arza 2012a, 49; Garay 2010, 84). Law 26.222 allowed affiliates of the 
private pension system to switch to the public system, established the rule that 
new contributors would be automatically affiliated with the public instead of 
the private system, and significantly increased the replacement rate.167 Affili-
ates of the private system within 10 years of retirement age who had accumu-
lated only low amounts on their individual pension capitalization accounts 
were automatically transferred to the public system. Decree 313/07 further-
more increased the contribution rate for the private pension system from 5% 
to 11% and thereby eliminated an important financial incentive to opt for the 
private system. This led not only to a significant number of additional contrib-
utors in the public system but also provided access to funds that hitherto pri-
vately insured contributors had accumulated on their pension accounts. 
The massive increase in pension coverage also had positive effects regard-
ing health care coverage, as approximately two and a half million new pen-
sioners were now also covered by the pensioners’ health insurance (Arza 
2012b, 36). Furthermore, in May 2004 the government introduced the Federal 
Health Program. A central aim was to strengthen the universal public health 
sector by improving low-income earners’ access to preventive treatments. In 
order to do so the number and quality of primary health care centers and the 
distribution of free pharmaceuticals were extended (Cohen 2009, 30; Golbert 
2012, 145). Another measure in this framework was the implementation of the 
Plan Nacer, which aimed at reducing child and mother mortality by providing 
health insurance coverage to uninsured pregnant women and children up to the 
age of six in nine northern provinces (Golbert 2010, 151). By 2007, the cover-
age of Plan Nacer had reached 450,000 and child mortality had fallen by one 
quarter in the provinces where it was implemented (McGuire 2010, 125–142). 
All in all, the coverage and quality of health care for low-income earners 
improved significantly during Kirchner’s presidency. The expansion of pen-
sion coverage and formal employment led to an important increase in health 
insurance coverage, and the government also increased the resources available 
for the universal public health system (MSN 2010). In real terms, the expendi-
ture per person covered only by the public sector approximately doubled 
 
167  For an average wage earner with 30 years of contributions, who retired in 2010, Law 
26.222 meant an increase of over 10 percentage points of the replacement rate (author’s 
calculations). 
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between 2004 and 2007.168 However, in contrast to previous progressive health 
care reform efforts of the 1940s, 1970s and 1980s, the government did not at-
tempt to overcome the systemic fragmentation and inefficiency of the system, 
which continued to be divided between a universal public sector, approxi-
mately 300 social health insurance funds and a wide range of private insurers 
(Maceira 2009). This has much to do with the fact that all these previous at-
tempts to enact integral reform failed due to significant resistance. In inter-
views, health experts from within the governing alliance assured that they still 
preferred a unified public system. However, for political and strategic reasons 
they refrained from proposing integral reform in order to avoid conflicts with 
the trade union wing of the governing alliance (Interview Gago 2014; Inter-
view Trotta 2014). 
Social assistance policies continued to be crucial for mobilizing lower pop-
ular class support during Kirchner’s presidency. However, while workfare pro-
grams had been the main tool during the previous governments, Kirchner 
shifted the focus towards housing and infrastructure programs and social as-
sistance pensions.169 Although the protest wave by unemployed workers’ 
movements calmed down significantly with the assumption of the new govern-
ment, pressure from below nevertheless remained significant with over 1,200 
roadblocks in 2003 (Massetti 2006, 30). Furthermore, several unemployed 
workers’ movements made publicly clear that they would return to the streets 
if it turned out that the government would not implement policies in the interest 
of the lower popular classes (Página 12, August 3, 2003). In this context and 
with the aim of winning the unemployed workers’ movements for the govern-
ing alliance, the government introduced the program Manos a la Obra in Au-
gust 2003, which provided subsidies to worker cooperatives of municipalities 
and 17 different unemployed workers’ organizations (Natalucci 2012a, 143). 
Although not all of these organizations eventually joined the governing alli-
ance, several of them did. Those movements furthermore benefited particularly 
well from the following expansion of housing and infrastructure programs, 
which created both better living conditions and jobs for many residents of poor 
neighborhoods (Página 12, August 3, 2003; Svampa 2008c, 22–25; Interview 
D’Elía 2014). Between 2004 and 2007 expenditure as a percentage of GDP on 
housing, running water, and sewage nearly doubled from 0.77% to 1.32% 
(SPM 2016). This provided the basis for the construction of over 400,000 
 
168 Aurthor’s calculations based on DAGPyPS (2011) for expenditure data and MSN 
(2010) for the number of covered persons. 
169  In contrast to the extension of pension coverage among the elderly through the Pension 
Inclusion Program, social assistance pensions were usually provided to beneficiaries in 
working age, so that in practice their social function was to provide protection against 
risks such as unemployment, poverty and invalidity. In political terms, the distribution 
of social assistance pensions was often clientelistic and served to mobilize lower popu-
lar class support. 
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houses for low-income families and a significant extension of basic services 
and public schools in poor areas (Garay 2010, 73).  
The government also increased the number of conditional cash transfers 
without work requirements. The main measure to do so was the expansion of 
non-contributory invalidity and motherhood pensions. As a result, the overall 
number of non-contributory pensions nearly doubled from 345,000 in 2003 to 
625,000 in 2007 (MTEySS 2017, 49). Compared to other social assistance pro-
grams, these benefits were relatively high, constituting between 70% and 
100% of the minimum pension and increasing with each adjustment of the lat-
ter. In 2004, the government furthermore implemented the Program for the So-
cial Inclusion of Families,170 which was mainly thought of as a replacement for 
the PJJHD without work requirements for women with children under the age 
of 19 (Zaga Szenker 2009, 4–11). In 2007 the program reached 542,000 bene-
ficiaries.171 Along the same lines, a conditional cash transfer linked to a train-
ing program called Employment and Training Insurance was established in 
2006, which enrolled only very few beneficiaries, however (Rodríguez 
Enríquez and Reyes 2006, 28–29). In sum, expenditure as a percentage of the 
GDP on social assistance policies including housing and non-contributory pen-
sions increased between 2003 and 2007, which represented a significant im-
provement in social protection for low-income earners if we take into consid-
eration that the number of unemployed and poor persons fell by nearly one half 
during the same period (Gasparini and Cruces 2010, 5; MPyT 2019; SPM 
2016).  
The rapid expansion of social protection for low-income earners was fur-
thermore reinforced by two additional factors. First, the development of sig-
nificant associational power resources of the lower popular classes not only 
increased their capacity to influence the agenda-setting of the policy process 
but also their capacity to ensure the effective implementation of these policies. 
In many cases unemployed workers’ movements informed the residents of 
poor neighborhoods about new social programs, helped with the enrollment 
process, and provided legal assistance, thereby contributing to the fact that 
even quite complicated policies such as the Pension Inclusion Plan rapidly ex-
panded among low-income earners (Almonacid 2013, 245). And second, since 
the late 1990s, an alliance of the CTA with several migrants’ organizations and 
progressive politicians from different parties had promoted a new migratory 
law. With the support of the government, this initiative finally led to a new law 
in 2003, which explicitly stated that the government is responsible to ensure 
the same social rights to migrants as to Argentine citizens and that under no 
circumstances could health care can be denied (Caggiano 2011, 8–9; Dome-
nech 2013, 126–127; Law 25.871). The new migratory law furthermore 
 
170 Programa Familias por la Inclusión Social. 
171 http://www.desarrollosocial.gov.ar/Planes/PF/resena.asp. Accessed on November 15, 
2010. 
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permitted the legalization of many migrants’ migratory status, which facili-
tated the formalization of working relations and the enrollment in social pro-
grams. Hence, in several ways, the new legislation contributed to an important 
expansion of social protections for migrants, who were disproportionally often 
low-income earners (Bertranou 2014, 105; Sala 2014, 18).  
Social Policy Expansion, Popular Class Mobilization, and the Growing 
Intensity of Political Conflicts after the Economic Boom, 2007–2011 
After four years of massive social policy expansion, high real wage increases, 
and an average economic growth rate of nearly 9%, the governing alliance en-
joyed broad-based public approval (Levitsky and Murillo 2008, 16–19). Its ac-
tivist base among the popular classes had been successfully consolidated 
through the incorporation of the majority of the trade union movement and 
several of the strongest unemployed workers’ and human rights movements. 
In view of the 2007 presidential and legislative elections, the governing alli-
ance therefore aimed at increasing its support among the middle classes. In 
order to do so, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, the President’s wife and now 
presidential candidate, forged an alliance with several leaders of the center-left 
wing of the oppositional UCR party, which traditionally captured an important 
part of the middle class vote (Zelaznik 2011, 99). Furthermore, two small cen-
ter-left parties, Libres del Sur and the Partido Intransigente (PI), joined the 
alliance. On this basis, the governing alliance captured 45% of the votes and 
emerged as the dominant political force from the election, controlling absolute 
majorities in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate and three-quarters of 
Argentina’s 23 governorships (Levitsky and Murillo 2008, 16). Also, for the 
first time, five unemployed workers’ leaders were elected to Chamber of Dep-
uties (Mauro and Rossi 2011, 170). 
The picture soon began to change, however. A first fissure in the unity of 
the governing alliance appeared when the ex-President Néstor Kirchner re-
vealed his intention to preside over the PJ party. Several unemployed workers’ 
movements in the governing alliance had emerged during the 1990s as a left-
wing opposition to the PJ and now feared that the party would assume a dom-
inant role within the alliance. Although the two biggest unemployed workers’ 
movements, the FTV and the Movimiento Evita, finally accepted Kirchner’s 
intention to preside the PJ, another big organization, Barrios de Pie, decided to 
leave the governing alliance in 2008 (Boyanovsky Bazán 2010, 32–34; Mauro 
and Rossi 2011, 176). Tensions arose moreover in relations between the gov-
ernment and a part of the trade union movement. In July 2008, the hotel and 
restaurant workers’ union under the lead of the right-wing Peronist Luis Bar-
rionuevo and 56 smaller unions split off from the CGT to form the CGT Azul 
y Blanca, which assumed a distanced relationship with the government (El 
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Clarín, July 8, 2008).172 Two years later, after divisive internal elections, the 
CTA also split into two, the CTA de los Trabajadores (CTA-T) and the CTA 
Autónoma (CTA-A), the latter adopting a combative oppositional stance (In-
terview Fuentes 2014; Retamozo and Morris 2015, 76).173 Although the two 
majoritarian trade union confederations remained in the governing alliance, the 
emergence of two opposition confederations clearly weakened its support base 
among formal labor. 
Another challenge for the government emerged from a deterioration of the 
economic context. From 2007 on, inflation returned to values over 20% and 
became a constant source of criticism from the media and the opposition.174 
Furthermore, due to the global financial crisis, economic growth slowed down 
significantly in 2008 and Argentina entered into recession in 2009. The fiscal 
surplus gave way to a growing deficit and the government decided to address 
this situation with an increase in export taxes on soybeans and other agricul-
tural products (Bonvecchi 2011, 144–150). The measure was strongly objected 
to by the four major agricultural employers’ associations, which immediately 
formed an alliance to organize resistance. This unity put the employer sector 
in a powerful position given that, taken together, they not only united enor-
mous economic resources but also several hundred thousand members with 
high lobbying capacities and political influence in nearly all political parties 
and major media companies. On this basis, the agricultural employers’ associ-
ations developed a broad-based campaign that involved extensive presence in 
the media with the aim of winning public support, close cooperation with the 
political opposition, intensive lobbying with the aim of promoting divisions in 
the governing alliance, and massive protest actions and roadblocks aiming at 
disturbing the supply of certain types of food to the cities (Bonvecchi 2011, 
149; Mauro and Rossi 2011, 175). The government, in turn, communicated that 
the revenue from the tax increase was going to be used for the construction of 
public hospitals, housing for low-income earners, and better infrastructure in 
impoverished rural areas (Lodola 2011, 220). At the same time, it mobilized 
allied trade unions and unemployed workers’ movements to engage in mass 
 
172  During the 1990s Barrionuevo had been one of the strongest supporters of Carlos 
Menem’s neoliberal government. Besides political differences with the leadership of 
the CGT and the government, the principal motivation for the split was that Barrionuevo 
aspired becoming secretary general of the CGT yet lacked the necessary support for 
being elected (El Clarín, July 8, 2008). 
173  An important reason for this split was that a part of the CTA was strongly disappointed 
with the government’s decision to not officially recognize the CTA in order to avoid 
conflicts with the CGT (Interview Fuentes 2014). Furthermore, several of the leaders 
of the newly created CTA-A, such as Claudio Lozano and Víctor De Gennaro, were at 
the same time leaders of a minor left-wing opposition party that electorally competed 
with the governing alliance.  
174  Additionally, the government pressured the national statistics institute INDEC to lower 
the official numbers on inflation, which became another important focus of criticism. 
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protests in favor of the measure. The powerful teamsters’ union helped to en-
sure food supply to the cities. After four months of intensive conflict, the gov-
ernment finally decided to try to legitimize the resolution that raised the export 
taxes by converting it into a law bill and approving it in the parliament. The 
bill passed the Chamber of Deputies, but the fact that 19 deputies of the gov-
erning alliance voted against it, showed that the agricultural employer associ-
ations had managed to drive a dividing wedge into the alliance’s unity. One 
day before the treatment of the bill in the Senate on the 16th of July 2008, the 
agricultural employers’ associations, as well as the government, mobilized 
again several hundred thousand protestors against and for the passing of the 
bill. Finally, the vote in the Senate ended in a 36-to-36 standoff, so that Julio 
Cobos, the Vice-President of the government and president of the Senate, was 
enabled to vote. Cobos voted against the bill, which meant that it failed to pass 
the parliament. The government finally gave in and revoked the export tax in-
crease (Garay 2010, 74; Mauro and Rossi 2011, 175; Serrafero 2011, 30–32). 
This defeat significantly damaged the governing alliance’s standing in 
public opinion and led to the desertion of numerous deputies, senators, gover-
nors, and mayors. Most of these officials represented centrist and conservative 
political currents and had joined the alliance in order to improve their access 
to funds distributed by the national government and because it had appeared 
politically opportune during the years in which the government enjoyed high 
popularity. Furthermore, the fight over the export tax increase inaugurated a 
much more hostile relationship with the biggest media companies and the em-
ployers’ associations of the agricultural sector, which had initially benefited 
from Néstor Kirchner’s exchange rate policy (Varesi 2011, 44; Zelaznik 2011, 
102–103).  
The government responded to these developments with the adoption of a 
more confrontational course towards conservative political and economic sec-
tors and a reinforcement of its efforts to mobilize popular class support (Varesi 
2011, 44; Zelaznik 2011, 102–103). Pension policies played again a crucial 
role in this strategy. In late July 2008, President Cristina Kirchner officially 
announced that the government was preparing a bill to introduce an automatic 
mechanism for pension benefit indexation (La Nación, July 28, 2008). Thereby 
she took up a long-standing demand of all trade union confederations, many 
pensioners’ associations, and several opposition parties (Página 12, August 13, 
2006; Página 12, November 15, 2006; Smulovitz 2008, 297).175 By the 1st of 
October the bill had successfully passed both chambers with large majorities. 
On the 21st of October, the government sent a second bill to the Congress, 
which aimed at the complete renationalization of the pension system under fa-
vorable terms for those previously affiliated to the private system (Mesa-Lago 
 
175 In simplified terms, the new indexation mechanism was based on two main variables: 
the evolution of the system’s fiscal revenue per beneficiary and the evolution of wages 
(Arza 2009, 16–17).  
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2009, 18–19). This measure was highly welcomed by the trade union confed-
erations and unemployed workers’ movements. The major employer associa-
tions and IFIs rejected the measure but refrained from further confrontation in 
the face of approximately 90% public approval for the measure. Finally, the 
bill passed the parliament with ample support even from a wide range of op-
position deputies and senators (Arza 2012a, 49–56; Bonvecchi 2011, 150).  
The nationalization of the pension system was not only highly popular—
it also provided the government with abundant additional fiscal resources. The 
incorporation of millions of contributors helped to finance the massive expan-
sion of coverage among low-income earners and women as well as the new 
pension indexation mechanism.176 Furthermore, the nationalization of the as-
sets accumulated in the individual pension capitalization accounts valuing ap-
proximately 9% of GDP) could be used by the government to confront the 
economic crisis with countercyclical measures and further social policy expan-
sion in other areas (Arza 2009, 4; El Clarín, November 30, 2008).177 
Among those countercyclical measures was massive government invest-
ment in the universal public health sector, the construction of social housing, 
and the extension of running water and sewage in poor neighborhoods. In each 
of these areas public spending as a percentage of the GDP increased by ap-
proximately 20% between 2008 and 2009 (SPM 2016). The Plan Nacer, which 
provided basic health insurance to uninsured low-income mothers and children 
up to the age of six, was extended to all Argentine provinces and by 2010 
reached 1,500,000 beneficiaries (Golbert 2012, 146).178 The government also 
increased expenditures on social assistance policies. In May 2008, it created a 
new program called Jóvenes con Más y Mejor Trabajo which provided a 
monthly allowance to support unemployed persons between 18 and 24 who 
lacked diplomas to attend school or participate in professional training. In 
2009, the program already had over 72,000 beneficiaries and by 2011 this num-
ber had risen to approximately 150,000 (Brown 2012, 21–24). In early 2009, 
the government introduced another new social assistance program in collabo-
ration with one of the biggest unemployed workers’ movements, the Mo-
vimiento Evita. In order to create jobs and to improve public infrastructure in 
poor neighborhoods in greater Buenos Aires, the Programa de Inversión Social 
(PRIS) provided subsidies for the creation of up to 1,000 cooperatives with 
approximately 15,000 workers (Natalucci 2012, 143). Furthermore, the 
 
176  In large part due to these measures, pension expenditure skyrocketed from 5.6% to 
11.4% of GDP between 2005 and 2015. 
177  The government furthermore used the nationalized shares of companies to obtain com-
pany internal information in order to reduce tax evasion and to influence company de-
cisions. This, in turn, led to intense conflicts with several companies, including the 
country’s biggest industrial company, Techint (Bonvecchi 2011, 150). 
178  In 2007 the Plan Nacer had covered nine provinces and approximately 450,000 benefi-
ciaries (McGuire 2010: 125–142). 
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expansion of social assistance pensions was significantly accelerated. Between 
2008 and 2009 alone the number of non-contributory pensions increased from 
720,000 to over 923,000. In 2011, it reached 1,195,000 (MTEySS 2017, 49). 
Despite these efforts to mobilize popular class support, the governing alli-
ance was not able to recover sufficiently quickly from the costly dispute over 
export taxes in 2008. In the context of economic crisis and increasing criticism 
from the mainstream media, the legislative elections of June 2009 resulted in 
a clear-cut defeat and the governing alliance lost its majorities in both cham-
bers (Jones and Micozzi 2011, 59–61). Again, the response of the government 
was to increase confrontation with the opposition and to deepen the redistrib-
utive agenda. Two months after the elections, the government sent a bill to the 
Congress, which aimed at replacing the media law implemented by the last 
military dictatorship. Among others, the bill foresaw limitations regarding the 
concentration of media in the hands of a few private companies. This, not sur-
prisingly, further exacerbated the already existing conflict between the most 
powerful media companies and the government. With the support of several 
center-left and left deputies and senators, the bill successfully passed both 
chambers (Kitzberger 2011, 186–187). At the same time, the government im-
plemented a new social assistance policy called Ingreso Social con Trabajo,179 
which massively extended the creation of subsidized worker cooperatives in 
poor neighborhoods. In 2011, the program had nearly 160,000 beneficiaries 
with monthly wage subsidies of 1,200 pesos and health insurance coverage (La 
Nación, November 30, 2014). However, because most of the subsidies were 
channeled to mayors and unemployed workers’ movements within the govern-
ing alliance, the program quickly gave rise to repeated and massive waves of 
roadblocks by opposition social movements and heavy criticism from opposi-
tion parties (Guimenez and Hopp 2011, 5–6). These protests, in turn, provoked 
widespread negative media coverage for the government, which was accused 
of using the program for clientelistic purposes.180 Furthermore, the selective 
distribution of subsidies led to considerable tensions among social movements 
supporting the government. The two social movements most favored in the 
disbursement of subsidies were the Movimiento Evita, which was able to reg-
ister approximately 15,000 members in the program, and the Frente Transver-
sal, which was able to register over 5,000 members (La Nación, February 14, 
2010). The more autonomous FTV, for its part, received considerably fewer 
subsidies and therefore started to publicly threaten with roadblocks. In order 
to avoid further desertions from the governing alliance, additional subsidies 
were finally granted to cooperatives led by the FTV (Interview D’Elía 2014). 
All in all, the program had ambivalent results for the government. On the one 
 
179  Popularly known as Programa Argentina Trabaja.  
180  The conflict was virtually omnipresent in the media, the topic of hundreds of newspaper 
articles. Here only three examples shall be mentioned: La Nación, December 30, 2009; 
Página 12, November 4, 2009; and El Clarín, November 9, 2009. 
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hand, it provided significant resources that helped allies to strengthen their 
base-level networks, to create jobs, and to improve infrastructure in poor 
neighborhoods.181 On the other hand, the political conflicts associated with the 
clientelistic distribution of benefits damaged the image of the government and 
indicated that the policy was hardly able to generate broad-based electoral sup-
port. 
Once again, the government decided to address the situation by taking up 
an existing and increasingly popular social policy demand: the introduction of 
a universal child allowance (Bossert 2016, 120–121). Already during the eco-
nomic crisis in the early 2000s a wide range of progressive trade unions, social 
movements, and politicians had demanded a similar measure through the 
FRENAPO alliance. From 2008 on, the demand gained new momentum within 
both the opposition and the governing alliance (Interview Linares 2014; Inter-
view Lozano 2014). In 2008 and 2009 alone, five bills were introduced in the 
Congress that proposed an extension of the child allowance system to children 
of informal or unemployed workers. One of them was even promoted by a 
deputy of the governing alliance (Hintze and Costa 2011, 181). Against this 
background, Cristina Kirchner issued a presidential decree in October 2009 
which implemented the Asignación Universal por Hijo (AUH) and extended 
the child allowance system to approximately 3.5 million informal and unem-
ployed workers. It provided a monthly payment of 180 pesos per child on the 
condition that school-aged children attend school and comply with a plan of 
vaccinations. Although the measure replaced both the PJJHD and the Programa 
Familias por la Inclusión Social, it represented a massive improvement regard-
ing both the coverage and the value of the cash transfers for low-income house-
holds. Furthermore, in contrast to the partly clientelistic programs it replaced, 
it constituted a genuine social right (Gasparini and Cruces 2010, 15–16). In 
March 2011, only a few months before the next national elections, the govern-
ment extended the benefit to pregnant women, which increased coverage by 
approximately another 180,000 beneficiaries (Página 12, March 2, 2011). 
Resurgence and Decline of the Inclusionary Governing Alliance,  
2011–2015 
After the clear-cut defeat in the 2009 mid-term elections, the governing alli-
ance found itself in a severe crisis. Soon after, however, the alliance experi-
enced a stunning resurgence. One important factor was that the economic crisis 
was quickly overcome. Anti-cyclical policies contributed to maintaining low 
unemployment levels and to a significant increase in real wages during the 
 
181  In a qualitative study, Zaragoza (2015, 348) revealed that most of these jobs in practice 
were a precarious form of (public) employment that did not really comply with the idea 
of autonomous cooperatives. Interviews with former cooperative workers point in the 
same direction (Interview Córdoba 2014; Interview Falcón 2014). 
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short period of recession. In 2010 and 2011, fostered by demand-oriented pol-
icies on the national level and a combination of low interest rates and rising 
commodity prices on the international level, Argentina returned to extraordi-
narily high growth rates (Gerchunoff and Kacef 2016, 21; Trujillo 2017, 15).182 
Thus, in contrast to the 2009 mid-term elections, the 2011 elections took part 
in a highly favorable economic context. 
The public perception of progress was furthermore reinforced by the deep-
ening of the government’s redistributive social policy agenda. Between 2009 
and 2011 alone, the lowest income decile’s share of the national income rose 
by approximately one third (CEDLAS and World Bank 2018).183 In particular, 
the universalization of the child allowance system was extraordinarily popular 
and became a crucial component of the electoral campaign. This and other pol-
icies, such as the free public broadcasting of football, became effective sym-
bols of the government’s commitment to both economic growth and social in-
clusion (Cherny 2011, 137; Zarazaga 2015, 353–354).  
Despite the massive conflicts associated with the introduction of the coop-
erative program Ingreso Social con Trabajo, this measure also fulfilled an im-
portant function in the political resurgence. Rather than being suitable for mass 
communication, it contributed to a broadening and disciplining of the frag-
mented activist base of the governing alliance. As the distribution of subsidies 
was largely discretionary and controlled by the national government, it pro-
vided important leverage for carrot-and-stick tactics directed at mayors and 
governors. Those who decided to support the governing alliance were granted 
with numerous subsidies, nurturing thereby electorally important clientelistic 
networks in poor neighborhoods. Those mayors and governors who did not 
cooperate received very few subsidies. In their districts, the distribution of sub-
sidies and the creation of cooperatives was then often carried out by social and 
political movements of the governing alliance. This contributed decisively to 
the alignment of local politicians and to a rapid expansion of the base-level 
structures of completely loyal organizations, such as the Movimiento Evita, 
the Frente Transversal, La Cámpora, and Kolina. All of these organizations 
had been created in close cooperation with the government and Kolina was 
even led by the sister-in-law of the President (La Nación, March 10, 2013; La 
Nación, November 30, 2014; Zarazaga 2015, 347–348).  
These factors together with the fragmentation of the opposition and a wave 
of compassion and public attention aroused by the sudden death of ex-Presi-
dent Néstor Kirchner in October 2010 led to a clear-cut electoral victory for 
the governing alliance, which won the presidency with 54% of the vote and 
recovered majorities in both chambers (Cherny 2011, 137).  
 
182  In 2010 9.3% and in 2011 6.5% (Trujillo 2017, 15).  
183  Between 2009 and 2011 the Gini coefficient fell from 0.444 to 0.419 and the lowest 
income decile’s share of the national income rose from 1.5% to 2.0% (CEDLAS and 
World Bank 2018).  
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However, the resurging unity and strength of the governing alliance was 
only temporary. Since at least 2011, there had been internal discussions be-
tween Hugo Moyano, the general secretary of the CGT, and Cristina Kirchner 
about the representation of the trade union movement on electoral lists and in 
the cabinet. While Moyano considered the status quo to be insufficient, Cris-
tina Kirchner was much more inclined to provide influential positions to more 
progressive and less autonomous organizations, such as La Cámpora, than to 
the CGT. Furthermore, Moyano demanded the elimination of income taxes for 
wage earners, which the government rejected. In turn, the government sup-
ported the candidacy of Antonio Caló, leader of the metal workers’ union, for 
general secretary of the CGT. In June 2012, the dispute eventually escalated 
and Hugo Moyano publicly broke with the governing alliance, which led to a 
further split of the trade union movement. While the majority of the trade un-
ions remained in the governing alliance and formed the CGT-Oficialista under 
the lead of Antonio Caló, a minority faction under the lead of Hugo Moyano 
created the CGT-Opositora (Perfil, October 3, 2012; Schmall 2012, 93). This 
meant that by 2012 the trade union movement was divided into five confeder-
ations, of which only the two biggest adhered to the governing alliance. 
In addition to these internal disputes, the economic context deteriorated 
sharply. In 2012 the GDP fell by 0.5% and in 2013 growth remained moderate 
at 2.3% (Trujillo 2017, 15–16). Due to an increase in capital flight and the 
relative appreciation of the Argentine peso during the preceding years, the for-
eign currency reserves of the central bank were decreasing rapidly. To deal 
with this situation the government undertook several measures: tight re-
strictions on currency exchange, import restrictions on a broad range of prod-
ucts, and the nationalization of the YPF oil company with the aim of increasing 
oil production and therefore reducing dependency on energy imports (Ger-
chunoff and Kacef 2016, 21–27; Vilas 2017, 51). Restrictions on the capacity 
to buy US dollars and certain imported goods caused significant discontent 
among important sections of the middle and upper classes. In combination with 
high inflation, a growing perception of insecurity, and various allegations of 
corruption, this led to the emergence of middle- and upper-class demonstra-
tions throughout the country in 2012 and 2013 (Gómez 2014, 96–98). At the 
same time, the opposition trade union confederations organized several pro-
tests calling for the derogation of wage taxes and an increase in the minimum 
pension to 82% of the minimum wage, so that taken together the government 
was faced with a significant rise in protest activity (Trujillo 2017, 14). 
As in 2009, the government responded to the economic cool down with 
demand-oriented measures and to the political conflict with redistributive pol-
icies that aimed at reinforcing its alliance with the lower popular classes and 
loyal organizations. In June 2012, the government implemented a new housing 
program called Pro.Cre.Ar, which provided highly subsidized credits to low- 
and middle-income earners (Decree 902/2012). Subsequently, expenditure on 
  245 
housing policy increased steeply from 0.75% of GDP in 2012 to 1.19% in 
2015. Thereby, the government injected money into the economy to prevent a 
crisis in the construction sector, reinforced its alliance with the powerful con-
struction workers’ union and redistributed resources to low- and middle-in-
come families (Trujillo 2017, 15). In order to avoid negative income effects of 
the economic cool down, it furthermore extended social assistance policies for 
low-income earners of working age. In March 2013, the government imple-
mented a program called Ellas Hacen. The policy was designed in collabora-
tion with the national women’s council184 and addressed issues of gendered 
violence and economic emancipation, which the increasingly strong Argentine 
women’s movement had brought to broad public attention (Hauría and Men-
doza 2017, 4). Through the program approximately 88,000 jobs in subsidized 
cooperatives were created for women in difficult economic situations. Women 
who had experienced gendered violence were given priority (La Nación, No-
vember 30, 2014). In addition, the government increased the number of social 
assistance invalidity pensions by over 250.000 between 2011 and 2013. The 
overall number of non-contributory pensions reached 1,450,000 in 2013 and 
1,515,000 in 2015 (MTEySS 2017, 49).  
In the area of health care policies, the government continued the expansion 
of the Plan Nacer. The number of mothers and children receiving basic health 
insurance coverage through the program increased from 1.5 million in 2010 to 
4.7 million in 2012 (Página 12, March 25, 2014). In August 2012, the policy 
was renamed Programa Sumar and coverage was extended to uninsured 
women up to the age of 64 and adolescents up to the age of 19, so that by late 
2015 the number of beneficiaries rose to nearly 13 million (MSN 2016, 4; 
Página 12; August 7, 2012).  
Another measure that improved social protections for low-income earners 
was the sanctioning of the Law 26.844 in March 2013, which improved labor 
regulations for domestic workers by reducing the working day from 12 to 8 
hours, promoting the formalization of working relations, and including domes-
tic workers in the family allowance and work accident insurance systems. The 
sector remained predominantly informal, yet formality increased from 15% to 
25% within one year (Pereyra 2017, 29–32). 
These efforts to extend social protections and to mobilize popular class 
support could be considered by and large successful. Notwithstanding, the de-
sertion of an important part of the labor movement and the emergence of mas-
sive middle- and upper-class protests meant that the governing alliance faced 
a complicated environment in the 2013 mid-term elections. Contributing to the 
challenging conditions, Sergio Massa, one of the conservative Peronist politi-
cians who had left the governing alliance during the preceding years, had 
 
184  The national women’s council is a public entity in Argentina in charge of promoting 
gender equality. The council traditionally cooperates closely with organizations of the 
Argentine women’s movement. 
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successfully constructed an oppositional Peronist alliance. This alliance re-
ceived support from a part of the base-level structures of the PJ party and the 
opposition trade unions and benefitted from the discontent of important parts 
of the middle and upper classes. Against this background, the governing alli-
ance won only 34% of the votes, though it was able to retain majorities in both 
chambers (Pagni 2016, 111).  
Once the elections were over, the government decided to tackle the alarm-
ing reduction of foreign currency reserves by devaluating the Argentine peso 
and raising the interest rate. While the measure had little success in augmenting 
the reserves, it fostered inflation and threw the economy back into recession. 
In order to avoid any increase of inequality and poverty in consequence of the 
devaluation, the government immediately enacted several measures to increase 
social protection for low-income earners (Gerchunoff and Kacef 2016, 30; Vi-
las 2017, 53). In January 2014 the government announced a new social assis-
tance program called PROGRESAR, which provided an allowance of 600 pe-
sos per month to unemployed or informal workers between 18 and 24 years of 
age, who participate in a professional training program, finish their school ed-
ucation, or study at a university (Di Giovambattista, Gallo, and Panigo 2014, 
32–41). One year later, the allowance was increased to 900 pesos and by late 
2015 the program reached over 900,000 beneficiaries (Página 12, July 21, 
2017; Vilas 2017, 53). In June 2014, Cristina Kirchner furthermore announced 
a renovation of the Pension Inclusion Plan, which until 2017 allowed over 
800,000185 additional low-income earners at retirement age to receive a con-
tributory pension benefit. An important difference to the Pension Inclusion 
Plan of 2005 was that this time enrollment in the program was explicitly re-
stricted to low-income households (La Nación, June 4, 2014; La Nación, Au-
gust 14, 2014). At the same time, the government introduced tighter controls 
and higher penalties for companies evading social insurance contributions and 
increased expenditure on the universal public health system, passing from 
2.67% of GDP in 2013 to over 3% in 2015 (Law 26.940; SPM 2016). And 
finally, four months before the presidential elections of 2015, the government 
announced the extension of the automatic indexation mechanism for pensions 
to the family allowance system (Página 12, June 16, 2015). 
All in all, the expansion of social protections to low-income earners con-
tinued between 2011 and 2015, despite the economic recession, falling com-
modity prices, and increasing political conflicts. 
The End of the Inclusionary Governing Alliance 
The general elections of 2015 took place in a complicated economic context: 
declining commodity prices, rising fiscal deficit, slow economic growth, and 
 
185  Calculations of the author based on MTEySS (2017, 47). 
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high inflation (Gerchunoff and Kacef 2016, 31). Although the government’s 
demand-oriented economic and social policies were relatively effective in pro-
tecting the purchasing power of most low- and middle-income households, dis-
content over the general state of the economy was growing, especially in the 
middle and upper classes. This discontent was additionally enhanced by a 
range of allegations of corruption against high ranking government officials 
(Manzetti 2014, 185–192). Another scandal erupted when in early 2015 federal 
prosecutor Alberto Nisman was found dead in his apartment right before he 
was to speak before the Congress where he wanted to make several accusations 
against President Cristina Kirchner. Although the circumstances of his death 
remained unclear, the case evolved into an omnipresent issue in the media with 
negative impacts on the governing alliance’s electoral outlook (Murillo, Rubio, 
and Mangonnet 2016, 5).  
At the same time, the opposition converged in two main electoral alliances, 
UNA and Cambiemos, and thereby overcame the fragmentation that had deci-
sively contributed to their electoral defeat in 2011. The first was led by the 
conservative Peronist mayor Sergio Massa and the second by the neoliberal 
businessman and mayor of Buenos Aires Mauricio Macri. Due to the em-
ployer-friendly platform of Mauricio Macri’s alliance and his extensive net-
work within the economic elite, Cambiemos was able to raise approximately 
70% more campaign funds than the governing alliance (Tagina 2016, 238). 
While the opposition was increasingly united, the governing alliance engaged 
in long internal arguments over the question of who would run as its candidate 
(Pagni 2016, 110). Finally, it was decided that Daniel Scioli, governor of the 
province of Buenos Aires, would be the candidate. However, the decision re-
mained controversial and not all sectors of the alliance were willing to support 
him energetically (Grimson 2016, 18). The electoral campaign of the govern-
ing alliance hence experienced several difficulties.  
At the same time, Macri was able to reach out to new groups of voters. By 
assuring that his government would maintain the existing redistributive social 
programs, he deliberately addressed a broad group of voters who recognized 
the social progress made under the Kirchner governments but disliked their 
confrontational style (Tagina 2016, 235).186 
Against this background, the presidential elections of 2015 finally ended 
in a narrow electoral victory for Cambiemos, and Mauricio Macri became 
 
186  This promise to maintain the existing social protections for low-income earners was 
clearly a recognition of the societal distribution of power resources and the acknowl-
edgement that a confrontation with the beneficiaries of these programs and the social 
movements of the lower popular classes would result in a significant loss of votes. 
While the actual preference of Macri’s party was to cut most of the social assistance 
programs and to replace them with “incentives” for employers to create jobs (Interview 
Schmidt-Liermann 2014), the 2015 presidential campaign promised to complement one 
with another. 
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president. Right from the beginning, a range of influential employers was in-
cluded in the core of the new governing alliance. Ten businessmen became 
ministers in Macri’s cabinet, the big private media companies immediately 
changed their relationship with the government from confrontation to thinly 
concealed support and on the global level the international financial institu-
tions welcomed both his election and his political agenda (Lijalad 2016, 8; 
Pagni 2016, 113). On this basis, the new governing alliance initiated a period 
of regressive social policy reform. As a consequence, inequality, unemploy-
ment, and informal salaried employment began to rise again (CEDLAS and 
World Bank 2018). 
Political Dynamics, Patterns of Social Policy Change, and Path 
Dependency Effects 
By the early 2000s, the distribution of power resources had shifted in favor of 
the popular classes. Progressive actors had increasingly gained associational 
power resources, intensified the coordination with each other and forged alli-
ances with middle-class and small business sectors. The discrediting of neolib-
eralism and the resurging popularity of a state interventionist economic para-
digm had furthermore shifted significant discursive power resources towards 
more progressive actors. Unemployed workers’ movements and the CTA ef-
fectively mobilized these power resources for the extension of social protec-
tions for low-income earners. Against this background, the economic crisis and 
the fall of the neoliberal government of President De la Rúa in late 2001 initi-
ated a profound shift in social policy. The following interim President Eduardo 
Duhalde acknowledged the increasing power of these new actors, received 
them as legitimate negotiation partners and responded to their demands and 
protest actions with a massive expansion of social assistance policies. In 2003 
the center-left electoral alliance of Néstor Kirchner won the presidential elec-
tions and deliberately pursued the integration of the new progressive actors 
into the core of its support base. Backed by a series of redistributive labor and 
social policies, Kirchner was eventually able to form a solid and inclusionary 
governing alliance that incorporated trade unions, unemployed workers organ-
izations, the PJ party, smaller center-left parties and even some business actors. 
Labor and the lower popular classes soon became the electoral backbone of the 
alliance. 
On this basis, the new government massively expanded public expenditure 
from 29% of GDP in 2003 to 47% in 2015, pursued demand-oriented economic 
policies, reintroduced labor market and trade regulations and renationalized 
several privatized companies (DAGPyPS 2011; SPM 2016). This general in-
tensification of state intervention involved at its core a massive expansion and 
reform of social policies, which strongly improved social protections for low-
income earners regarding coverage, quality, and value of the benefits. Overall 
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social spending increased from slightly over 19% of GDP in 2003 to nearly 
31% in 2015. Access to contributory old-age pensions was nearly universal-
ized and the real value of the minimum pension was massively increased. Fam-
ily allowances were extended to children of informal, unemployed, and domes-
tic workers and their real value was raised repeatedly. After a tenfold increase 
in coverage, non-contributory invalidity and motherhood pensions provided 
basic incomes to approximately 1.4 million poor persons of working age, while 
further programs provided allowances to workers in cooperatives and students 
living in low-income households.  
Table 30: Change in social protection for low-income earners, 2002–2015 
Pension policies + Implementation of Pension Inclusion Programs that nearly  
universalized access to pension benefits and disproportionally 
benefited low-income earners 
+ Strong increase of the minimum pension benefit 
+ Reintroduction of an indexation mechanism 
+ Renationalization of the pension system and increase of the  
replacement rate 
Health care policies + Strong increase of expenditure on the universal public health  
system 
+ Provision of basic health insurance to 13 million low-income 
women and children through the programs Plan Nacer and Plan 
Sumar 
+ Extension of social health insurance coverage through increasing 
formality and the extension of pension coverage 
+ Extension of the network of free primary health care centers and 




+ Initially strong expansion of workfare programs (PJJHD), then 
massification of social assistance pensions and subsidies for  
cooperativists 
+ Increasing expenditure on social housing and social infrastructure 
programs 
+ Introduction of broad-based scholarship programs for young 
adults in low-income households 
Family allowance 
policies 
+ Universalization of child allowances, which mainly benefited low-
income households 
+ Important increase of the real value of the benefits 
+ Introduction of an automatic indexation mechanism 
Overall evolution of social protection 
for low-income earners Strong expansion 
The universal public health sector, which served mostly low-income groups, 
was strengthened and expenditure increased from less than 1.9% of GDP in 
2002 to over 3% in 2015 (SPM 2016). In addition, the Plan Sumar provided 
basic health insurance to nearly 13 million uninsured women, children, and 
adolescents.  
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Taken together these measures contributed to a significant improvement 
of social indicators. Between 2003 and 2015, life expectancy rose by over two 
years and infant mortality fell by 37%, reaching a value of 10.3 per 1000 
(World Bank 2018).  
Income inequality measured with the Gini coefficient decreased from 0.53 
in 2003 to 0.41 in 2015 (CEDLAS and World Bank 2018). In the same period, 
the lowest income decile’s share of the national income increased by 73%, 
while the richest decile’s share fell by 30%. According to calculations of Lustig 
and Pessino (2014, 321) and Rofman and Apella (2016, 103), the expansion of 
social protections accounted for a major share of this improvement. Unem-
ployment fell from 16% in 2003 to under 7% in 2015 and informal salaried 
employment from 49% to 33% (CEDLAS and World Bank 2018).  
Figure 12: Evolution of income inequality measured with the Gini-coefficient, 2002–2015 
Sources: CEDLAS and World Bank (2018). 
While pension and family allowance policies underwent important structural 
changes, health care policy was shaped by path dependency. Progressive health 
experts of the governing alliance consciously refrained from proposing struc-
tural health care reform in order to avoid internal conflicts with the union 
movement. Nonetheless, by increasing expenditure on the universal public 
health sector and by expanding primary health care programs, the government 
used the room to maneuver within the existing structure to improve the protec-
tion of low-income groups. The period also left an important legacy out of 
which new path dependencies might emerge. The highly popular universaliza-
tion of family allowances and the introduction of an automatic indexation 
mechanism for both family allowances and pensions will make it politically 
costly for future governments to significantly cut these policies. In the face of 
high inflation rates, former governments carried out retrenchment by simply 
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this option. In addition to that, the enormous extension of coverage means that 
a significantly enlarged share of the electorate benefits from these policies. 
Another type of path dependency is related to workfare and cooperative pro-
grams, which are of crucial interest for unemployed workers’ movements and 
have been fiercely defended in the past. The active support of the government 
has furthermore contributed to the emergence and growth of additional Kirch-
nerist social movements, who have a vital interest in defending their control 
over cooperatives and workfare benefits. 
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5 Analyzing the Structural Bases, Actors  
and Political Mechanisms of Change 
The last chapter has reconstructed the evolution of social protection for low-
income earners in Argentina between 1943 and 2015. To identify and analyze 
the underlying political and structural factors, the period has been divided into 
seven sub-periods. The analysis of each subperiod started with an overview of 
the economic, social, and political context. On this basis, the constellation of 
actors and the distribution of power resources were identified. This, in turn, 
served as a basis for the next step, in which the processes of alliance formation 
and social policy reform were traced during each sub-period. 
This structured analysis facilitated the systematic application of two meth-
odological approaches to identify causal factors and mechanisms underlying 
the extension and retrenchment of social protections for low-income earners. 
The first methodological approach consisted of a longitudinal comparison of 
different sub-periods, which revealed correlations between structural and po-
litical characteristics of different sub-periods and social policy outcomes. In 
the following, the main results will be summarized and discussed. In accord-
ance with the theoretical framework, the focus will be on the constellations of 
actors, the distributions of power resources, the characteristics of governing 
alliances, and the direction of social policy change. 
The second methodological approach applied in this study was process 
tracing. By this means, I was able to reveal not only whether but also how 
underlying configurations—particularly the distribution of power resources—
influenced the formation of governing alliances and subsequent social policy 
reform processes. Furthermore, process tracing enabled me to reveal the im-
portance of different actors’ political strategies for the durability of governing 
alliances and social policy outcomes. In the following the results from the pro-
cess tracing analysis will be summarized and merged with those of the sub-
period comparison.  
5.1 Social Policy towards Low-Income Earners during 
Different Periods: Between Truncated and Inclusionary 
Social Protection 
Since the mid-2000s, it has become a broad consensus among social policy 
researchers that Latin American social policy regimes have historically devel-
oped in a truncated manner, meaning that they cover only one part of the 
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population, namely formal workers and their families, while they largely ex-
clude unemployed and informal workers and their dependents (Barrientos 
2004; De Ferranti et al. 2004; Lindert, Skoufias and Shapiro 2006).187 Barrien-
tos and Santibáñiez (2009) explained the emergence and consolidation of trun-
cated social policy regimes with the ISI development model, which required 
the political support of state employees and the increasingly powerful formal 
working class and hence led to the introduction and expansion of social insur-
ance policies that benefited these sectors but excluded the lower popular clas-
ses. In this line, it has been argued that during the 2000s an important expan-
sion of social assistance policies and the introduction of universalistic cash 
transfer policies in several Latin American countries constituted for the first 
time a significant break with the long-standing history of truncated social pol-
icy regimes on the continent (De Ferranti et al. 2004; Lustig, Pessino, and Scott 
2014). 
In the face of insufficient statistical data to undertake quantitative analyses 
of the redistributive impacts of Latin American welfare states during the ISI 
period, the thesis of a historically stable evolution of truncated welfare states 
in Latin America depended essentially on two assumptions. The first was that 
social policy expansion during the whole ISI period was based on social insur-
ance and the second was that these social insurance programs consistently ex-
cluded informal workers and other low-income groups. Although these as-
sumptions are highly plausible from a theoretical point of view, empirical evi-
dence from the Argentine case suggests that the picture might be much more 
complex. As can be seen in Table 31, social protection for low-income earners 
and informal workers indeed varied significantly during and after the ISI 
model. During some periods, universal and targeted social policies were ex-
panded significantly and access criteria to social insurance programs were 
loosened to such an extent that informal and unemployed workers were able to 
receive generous benefits despite lacking formal work contracts and regular 
social insurance contributions. 
  
 
187  Socialist Cuba constitutes an exception in this regard.  
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Table 31: Patterns of change regarding social protection for low-income earners, 1943–2015 
Period Governing party 
Overall evolution of 
social protection for 
low-income earners Changes in different social policy fields  
1943–1955 Military (1943–45)  
PJ (1946–55)* 
Strong expansion Pensions:  
Health care:  
Social assistance:  
Family allowances: 
Strong expansion  
Strong expansion  
Strong expansion  
No major change 




Strong reduction Pensions:  
Health care:  
Social assistance:  
Family allowances: 
Strong reduction  
Moderate reduction  
Strong reduction  
Moderate expansion 
1973–1976 PJ Strong expansion Pensions:  
Health care:  
Social assistance:  
Family allowances: 
Strong expansion  
Strong expansion  
Moderate expansion  
Moderate expansion 
1976–1983 Military Strong reduction Pensions:  
Health care:  
Social assistance:  
Family allowances: 
Strong reduction  
Strong reduction  
Strong reduction  
Strong reduction 
1983–1989 UCR Moderate expansion Pensions:  
Health care:  
Social assistance:  
Family allowances: 
Ambivalent evolution  
No major changes  
Strong expansion  
No major changes 
1989–2001 PJ (1989–99) 
UCR/FREPASO 
(1999–2001) 
Moderate reduction Pensions:  
Health care:  
Social assistance:  
Family allowances: 
Strong reduction  
Moderate reduction  
Moderate expansion  
No major change 
2002–2015 PJ (2002–03) 
PJ/FPV (2003–15) 
Strong expansion Pensions:  
Health care:  
Social assistance:  
Family allowances:  
Strong expansion  
Moderate expansion  
Strong expansion  
Strong expansion  
* During that period the party was named Partido Peronista. Later it was renamed Partido Jus-
ticialista (PJ). 
The period between 1943 and 1955 was characterized by the rise of Peronism 
and a massive expansion of social protections for low-income earners. Legal 
pension coverage was gradually broadened to finally cover all occupational 
groups. Progressive replacement rates in combination with permissive access 
criteria furthermore enabled most informal and unemployed workers to receive 
a generous pension benefit upon reaching retirement age. Health care expan-
sion was also rapid and despite the consolidation of social health insurance 
programs for certain occupational groups, the vast majority of resources was 
concentrated on the creation and strengthening of a universal and free public 
health care system. At the same time, up to 1% of the GDP was devoted to 
social assistance policies of the Eva Perón Foundation (FEP). 
The following period between 1955 and 1973 was characterized by mili-
tary dictatorships and civilian governments led by the UCR. The latter were de 
facto heavily limited by military interferences. During this period many of the 
most progressive policies were significantly cut and most social policies attain-
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ed a more truncated character. The FEP was dismantled and social assistance 
policies massively reduced. Social health insurance coverage was extended to 
all formal workers and contribution rates increased, but the universal and free 
public health care system was retrenched and therefore most low-income earn-
ers and informal workers suffered a significant deterioration of health care cov-
erage. The progressive replacement rate in the pension system was replaced 
with a uniform rate and the access criteria were restricted in such a way that a 
large portion of low-income earners were de facto excluded from pension ben-
efits. Although family allowances were introduced and expanded during this 
period, they were only provided to formal workers so that coverage among 
low-income earners remained limited. 
Between 1973 and 1976, Peronism returned to the government and social 
policy moved again in a more inclusionary direction. New legislation for the 
agricultural sector first led to a considerable increase in pension coverage 
among rural workers. In 1975 a reform of the access criteria finally completely 
abolished contribution requirements, so that access to pension benefits was de 
facto universalized among low-income earners and informal workers. Further-
more, disproportional increases in the minimum pension benefit meant that 
low-income earners could expect relatively generous benefits. The public 
health care sector was strengthened again and by the mid-1970s it administered 
50% of overall public health care spending (Vargas de Flood 2006, 188). In 
addition, expenditure on social assistance, housing, and family allowances was 
significantly increased. Once again, the Argentine social policy regime at-
tained an inclusionary rather than truncated character. 
In contrast, the military dictatorship between 1976 and 1983 pushed social 
policy back into a decidedly truncated direction. The value of the minimum 
pension was drastically reduced and a requirement of 15 years of contributions 
was introduced. Expenditure on the public health system was cut by 42%, on 
social assistance by 72%, and on social housing by 25%.188 Hence, within a 
few years, social protections for low-income earners and informal workers 
were reduced to a minimum. At the same time, social insurance expenditure, 
which was increasingly limited to formal workers due to stricter access criteria, 
remained largely stable (DAGPyPS 2011; Vargas de Flood 2006, 188). 
Between 1983 and 1989 a UCR government attempted to return to a more 
inclusionary social policy regime but largely failed to do so in the face of a 
difficult economic and political context. Only social assistance policy was sig-
nificantly expanded. In contrast, a universalizing health care reform was 
blocked by political and corporate opposition and the pension system suffered 
from a severe financial crisis. 
Between 1989 and 2001, the Peronist government of Carlos Ménem and 
the UCR/FREPASO government of Fernando De la Rúa implemented a pro-
 
188  Measured as a share of GDP. 
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foundly neoliberal social policy reform agenda, which deepened the exclusion-
ary and truncated character of the social policy regime. The increase of the 
pension contribution requirements to 30 years and the partial privatization of 
the system strongly favored high-income earners and reinforced the exclusion 
of the vast majority of low-income earners from access to pension benefits. 
The decentralization of the public health system furthermore exacerbated re-
gional disparities and the deregulation of the social health insurance system led 
to an increasing concentration of resources on the better-off affiliates. Social 
assistance policy constituted the only social policy area in which social protec-
tions for poor residents were moderately expanded. 
Between 2002 and 2015, social policy again moved in a much more pro-
gressive direction under the Peronist presidents Eduardo Duhalde, Néstor 
Kirchner, and Cristina Kirchner. Social assistance and housing policies were 
massively expanded. The Pension Inclusion Plan nearly universalized access 
to pension benefits while disproportional increases of the minimum pension 
benefit led to a distribution of resources within the system that increasingly 
favored low-income earners. Expenditure on the universal and free public 
health sector was strongly increased and the provision of free pharmaceuticals 
expanded. Furthermore, child allowances were extended to cover children of 
informal and unemployed workers. Taken together, these changes meant that 
social policy became much more inclusionary. 
The comparison of the patterns of change regarding social protections for 
low-income earners during different periods reveals that there have been in-
deed surprisingly stark contrasts in the direction of social policy. Each change 
in direction was followed by high reform intensity; that is, the introduction of 
a significant number of profound changes within a short period. These findings 
question the assumption that the development of truncated social policy re-
gimes in Latin America was a continuous process and directly linked to the ISI 
model. 
In order to shed light on the societal configurations that were related to the 
often abrupt and profound social policy changes between the different periods, 
the following sections extend the comparison and focus on underlying politi-
cal, economic and social factors. 
5.2 Constellations of Actors and Interests in the Argentine 
Politics of Social Protection for Low-Income Earners 
A crucial part of the empirical study was dedicated to analyzing the role of 
different actors in the Argentine politics of social protection for low-income 
earners. The constellations of actors and interests not only proved to be con-
siderably different from that of most of the European experiences that inspired 
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the vast majority of welfare state theories but also varied over time and with 
regard to different areas of social policy. Many of these differences were re-
lated to the specific formation of the Argentine popular classes as political ac-
tors, which was heavily shaped by the emergence of Peronism in the mid-20th 
century. However, a range of other factors also profoundly affected the con-
stellation of actors in Argentine social politics, such as the high level of infor-
mal employment and the creation of vested interests through the introduction 
of union-controlled health insurances. 
The findings largely support my initial assumptions. Actors were much 
more likely to actively demand and support an extension of social protections 
for low-income earners when their ideological orientation was left-of-center. 
Although the formation of political organizations and coalitions was strongly 
shaped by the divide between Peronism and anti-Peronism during the whole 
period of study, within these political camps the left-right divide was crucial 
to understanding why certain organizations and internal currents supported an 
extension of social protection for low-income earners and others opposed it. 
This applied to political parties as well as to trade unions, social movements, 
the church, and the military. 
Actors were also much more likely to propose or support a progressive 
extension of social protections when their social support bases contained parts 
of the lower popular classes. Social policy proved to be an effective means of 
consolidating and enlarging this support. However, as there were also other 
means to mobilize lower popular class support, actors were most likely to pur-
sue progressive social policy agendas when dependence on lower popular class 
support converged with a left-of-center political orientation or at least the 
strong influence of left internal currents. The experience of the trade union 
confederation CTA furthermore indicates that democratic organizational struc-
tures can reinforce the positive effect of lower popular class support by ena-
bling participation in the agenda-setting process. Nevertheless, most political 
coalitions, parties, and organizations were highly hierarchical throughout the 
period and lacked working, institutionalized channels for base-level participa-
tion in the agenda-setting process. The elaboration of progressive social policy 
agendas was most often carried out in top-down processes, in which leaders 
proposed or implemented such policies in order to mobilize and reinforce 
lower popular class support. This also contributed to the fact that social policies 
were often designed in a way that allowed leaders to enhance their control over 
the beneficiaries and the rank and file. In the long run, these control- and co-
optation-mechanisms were detrimental to the evolution of social protections 
for low-income earners, as they also served right-wing governments’ efforts to 
influence, control, and weaken popular class mobilization. 
As assumed in the theoretical framework, the structural context of Argen-
tina’s labor market with its strong formal-informal divide had an important 
impact on the way different segments of the popular classes were able to 
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organize and to participate in the politics of social protection. The dispersion 
of informal workers among small-enterprises, the high proportion of self-em-
ployed and agricultural workers, the short average duration of employment, 
the lack of social protections, and the precarious nature of employment all 
made it more difficult for informal workers to organize in unions or to generate 
alternative forms of workplace organizations. This contributed decisively to 
the fact that union density in Argentina throughout the period of study was 
high among formal workers but low among informal workers. However, in the 
context of the neoliberal economic transformation during the last quarter of the 
20th century, political ties between formal and informal workers strengthened 
as more and more unionists lost their jobs and contributed to the emergence 
and growth of unemployed and informal workers’ movements. 
State intervention and path dependency also shaped the role of actors in 
social politics. The incorporation of the trade unions into the first Peronist gov-
erning alliance was not only accompanied by a massive growth in membership, 
but also by a large-scale removal of communist, socialist, and anarcho-syndi-
calist leaders and their replacement by often much more conservative Peron-
ists. This move towards a more centrist political orientation contributed, to-
gether with their social bases in the formal sector, to an increasing focus on the 
interests of the well-organized formal working class to the detriment of infor-
mal workers’ and other marginalized sectors’ interests. The introduction of a 
system of fragmented union-controlled health insurance funds furthermore cre-
ated strong interests on the part of union leaders in defending the status quo in 
the health sector against both privatizing-regressive and universalizing-pro-
gressive reforms. Although the Peronist government attempted to restructure 
the employer associations as well, it was not able to have a comparable lasting 
effect.  
The empirical findings furthermore support the hypothesis that regime 
type influences the likelihood of actors to pursue progressive social policy 
agendas. Centrist currents of the PJ, the UCR, and the trade union movement 
recognized the need to construct broad-based alliances and to mobilize at least 
some lower popular class support in order to be able to gain control over the 
government during democratic periods and therefore were more open to sup-
port progressive social policies under democratic than under authoritarian or 
semi-authoritarian rule. 
In the following, the role of the most important actors and the factors that 
shaped their evolution will be analyzed in more detail.  
Political Parties 
In general terms, the Argentine case supports the assumption of the power re-
sources approach that left and center-left parties tend to support the extension 
of social protections for low-income earners while center-right and right 
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parties either prefer stratified or market-oriented social policies that benefit the 
better off and exclude or disadvantage low-income earners. However, the dif-
ficulty of the traditional power resources approach in dealing with the Argen-
tine party system resulted from the fact that during the past 70 years both left 
and right parties were comparatively small, had limited influence in the parlia-
ment, and did not win any presidential election until 2015. Instead, two centrist 
parties, the PJ and the UCR, dominated electoral competition during most of 
the period. Both parties have been highly flexible with regard to ideology and 
party program, meaning that their platforms varied significantly over time and 
were much less tied to long-standing policy traditions than is the case of most 
communist, social democratic, Christian democratic, or conservative parties. 
As can be observed in Table 31, this flexibility also found its expression in the 
fact that governments led by both the PJ and the UCR expanded social protec-
tions for low-income earners during some periods and implemented regressive 
reform during others. 
Ideological position nevertheless is a crucial category to understand these 
parties’ social policies. While as a whole they can be described as centrist, their 
activist bases were indeed highly heterogeneous and contained both left and 
right internal currents. During all PJ and UCR led governments that expanded 
social protections, it was the parties’ progressive currents that emphatically 
promoted egalitarian social policies and that pushed the agenda-setting process 
in this direction. The influence of left currents was furthermore reinforced by 
the fact that these governments either depended on a social support base that 
was composed to an important extent of low-income earners or tried to extend 
their electoral appeal to them.  
During the first Peronist government (1946–1955) the creation of the Par-
tido Peronista  involved the absorption of the left-leaning Partido Laborista as 
its strongest organizational pillar. As most Partido Laborista leaders and mem-
bers had socialist, anarcho-syndicalist, or communist backgrounds, this meant 
the constitution of a significant left wing within the Partido Peronista. Perón 
himself was furthermore aware that his electoral victory depended as much on 
massive support from the lower popular classes as it did on the support of or-
ganized labor. This combination of a strong left wing that promoted the exten-
sion of social protections for both political and ideological reasons with the 
pragmatism of Perón himself, who aimed at mobilizing and consolidating the 
support of the lower popular classes, led to the fact that the Peronist Party took 
a decidedly progressive course in social policy.  
A similar constellation can be observed during the second Peronist gov-
ernment (1973–1976). This time the left wing had gained significant influence 
within the PJ party due to the tactical support it had received from Perón during 
his time in exile and due to the significant growth of leftist Peronist youth or-
ganizations. Especially during the early phase of the PJ government under 
President Héctor Cámpora, the party’s left was able to influence the social 
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policy agenda. The project of a universal public health sector was even pro-
moted jointly by left sectors of the PJ and the UCR against the interests of the 
more conservative factions of both parties. Although this project failed due to 
the resistance of the trade union wing of the PJ, the left was nevertheless able 
to push the party’s social policy agenda in an egalitarian direction. The centrist 
wing of the party, including Perón, by and large, supported this direction as it 
effectively served the goal of consolidating the party’s broad base of support 
among the lower popular classes. 
The moderate expansion of social protections for low-income earners un-
der the UCR led government between 1983 and 1989 also took place in a mo-
ment when the social democratic wing of the party dominated the agenda set-
ting and explicitly aimed at broadening its traditionally middle-class support 
base by incorporating additional popular class support. President Alfonsín 
himself belonged to the center-left wing of the party and supported the exten-
sion of social assistance policies and the universalization of health insurances.  
In a similar way the Peronist government between 2003 and 2015, which 
initiated a massive expansion of social protections for low-income earners, was 
led by the left wing of the PJ party in coalition with a range of progressive non-
Peronist politicians and organizations and depended crucially on the lower 
popular class vote. 
In contrast, both the PJ led government of Carlos Menem (1989–1999) and 
the Alianza government led by Fernando de la Rúa (1999–2001) were domi-
nated by the respective right wings of their parties and pursued a highly regres-
sive social policy agenda. In both cases, the respective left wings of the parties 
criticized this direction and elaborated alternative, more egalitarian social pol-
icy proposals, yet were unable to prevail in the agenda-setting process. The PJ 
government of Carlos Menem had the peculiarity that it was led by the party’s 
right and promoted a highly regressive social policy agenda at the same time 
that it continued to depend on the lower popular class vote, which it increas-
ingly tried to retain through a dense network of clientelistic base-level struc-
tures and arbitrary social assistance programs. 
During the UCRI-led government of Arturo Frondizi (1958–1962) and the 
UCRP-led government of Arturo Illia (1963–1966) the left wings of their par-
ties were de facto impeded from having major influence on the social policy 
agenda as the military regularly intervened to block any attempt of signifi-
cantly redistributive or pro-Peronist policies.  
In sum, the left-right divide and the composition of their bases of support 
decisively shaped the positions of the main Argentine parties in the politics of 
social protection. As the two biggest parties can be described as centrist it de-
pended on whether left or right internal currents dominated the agenda-setting 
process concerning social policy. 
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Trade Unions 
Seen from a global perspective, the Argentine trade union movement was an 
important political force in enabling the extension of social protections to low-
income earners. Any government that implemented such change had the trade 
union movement as one of its most important alliance partners. This supports 
the assumption of the power resources approach, that strong trade union move-
ments favor the development of egalitarian welfare states. Nevertheless, the 
role of the Argentine trade union movement has been ambivalent. While some-
times it supported or even promoted progressive reform, at other times it fo-
cused on improving or protecting existing benefits that covered only formal 
workers. In the health care sector, this protection of vested interests even led 
to the blocking of universalizing health care reforms during the 1970s and 
1980s. 
As was the case with the two major Argentine parties, ideological position 
mattered decisively. It was left factions within the union movement, such as 
the CGT de los Argentinos during the late 1960s and the CTA since the early 
1990s, which explicitly promoted universal social policies, defined the work-
ing class in broad terms to include informal, unemployed, and self-employed 
workers, and pushed organizing strategies to reach out to those with the lowest 
incomes. 
It should be remembered that the centrist factions of the union movement, 
which comprised the majority of the union leaders since the first Peronist gov-
ernment, also played an overall supportive role in the processes of social policy 
expansion towards low-income groups. This behavior was linked less to the 
ideological positions of these factions than to strategic and tactical choices. 
One important incentive for these choices was the composition of the social 
bases of the Argentine union movement. The massive state support provided 
to union organization during the first Peronist government led not only to a 
membership growth of more than 300% within only ten years, but also drasti-
cally changed the social composition of their rank and file membership by in-
creasing the number of low-income affiliates working in small companies and 
hitherto unorganized sectors, including also a steep increase in female and mi-
grant worker affiliation. To this day Argentine union membership is character-
ized by the peculiarity that affiliation is widespread in small enterprises with 
fewer than 50 employees and among workers with low levels of education 
(Delfini 2013, 108–111). Therefore, important sections of the formal workers 
organized in unions benefit as much from universal and egalitarian social pol-
icies as they do from social insurance coverage. Although worker-centered so-
cial insurance policies remained the first preference for most centrist union 
leaders, this composition of the rank and file contributed to the fact that uni-
versal and egalitarian policies indeed often constituted an acceptable second 
preference. Another important reason is related to the category of regime type. 
262   
Under authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes, the centrist faction of the 
union movement mainly concentrated on defending and improving social in-
surance policies which benefited primarily the formal working class. The right-
wing of the union movement even repeatedly collaborated with military gov-
ernments on this issue. However, during democratic periods the union move-
ment formed a component of broader political alliances that attempted to reach 
out to informal, unemployed, and self-employed workers in order to win elec-
toral majorities. In this context, the centrist wing of the union movement sup-
ported the expansion of social protections for low-income earners through the 
PJ. Many trade union leaders were at the same time Peronist politicians and 
had concrete electoral ambitions. In most cases, this support was rather passive 
and indirect. However, in some situations, it was also quite active. For exam-
ple, when the CGT had attained hegemony over the Peronist government in 
October 1975, it implemented the de facto universalization of old-age pensions 
by abolishing contribution requirements. 
A particular pattern of union strategy can be observed in the area of health 
care policies. Some unions had started already in the late 19th century to organ-
ize mutual benefit societies that provided health services and holiday facilities 
to their affiliates. During the first half of the 20th century, some of the strongest 
unions were furthermore able to achieve the implementation of state subsidies 
and obligatory employer contributions to finance these services. Between 1943 
and 1955, Perón extended and improved arrangements of this type in order to 
foster union support and finally the military government of Juan Carlos 
Onganía extended the system of sector-specific health insurance to the whole 
formal workforce in an attempt to defuse labor militancy and to co-opt coop-
erative union leaders. While the resulting system was highly inegalitarian and 
comparatively expensive due to high administrative costs, for the unions it con-
stituted an important source of income and an effective tool for the recruitment 
of new members. In contrast to the pension and family allowance funds, most 
of these health insurance funds were directly controlled by the union of the 
respective sector. Not surprisingly, union leaders had therefore an extraordi-
narily strong interest in defending and strengthening these insurance funds. In 
practice, this led to the fact that the trade union movement resisted any attempt 
to significantly reform the sector, no matter whether the reform proposal was 
progressive (1970s and 1980s) or regressive (1990s) nor whether it was pro-
posed by the PJ (1970s and 1990s) or the UCR (1980s). This, however, did not 
prevent the union movement from supporting expenditure increases on the uni-
versal public health sector as long as these did not negatively affect the union-
controlled health insurance system.  
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Social Movements 
Most Argentine social movements were politically left-wing and actively de-
manded or at least supported the extension of social protections for low-income 
earners. In this sense, the empirical analysis confirms the initial hypotheses, 
that social movements that organize disadvantaged or even marginalized 
groups, such as peasants, indigenous communities, women, or unemployed 
and informal workers, tend to support the extension of social protections for 
low-income earners as their struggles are aiming for more equality and their 
bases of support tend to benefit from such policies. Compared to the main po-
litical parties and trade unions, the strength and political influence of social 
movements was generally weaker and varied much more strongly over time. 
Notwithstanding, during some periods, social movements played a crucial role 
in the extension of social protections. 
Until the early 1970s, the political power and influence of autonomous 
lower popular class organizations were relatively limited. The PJ party and 
some leftist trade unions, such as the sugar cane workers’ union, were the main 
entities that organized populations in these social sectors. During the early 
1970s, residents of poor neighborhoods, left-wing Peronist groups and the 
Movement of Priests for the Third World successfully constructed a slum 
dwellers movement, the Movimiento Villero Peronista. By 1973 the movement 
had become capable of mobilizing thousands of low-income earners and sus-
tained base-level structures in 450 slums throughout the country. Together with 
other groups, it constituted part of the progressive wing that pushed for redis-
tributive policies within the broader alliance of the Peronist government. How-
ever, subsequently, the organization declined in the face of brutal right-wing 
repression first through the paramilitary Triple A and then through the military 
dictatorship. With the return to democracy, social movements of this type re-
emerged on a smaller scale and carried out land occupations and founded soup 
kitchens and worker cooperatives. The outreach of these movements remained 
very limited, however, until the mid-1990s when new lower popular class 
movements emerged and within a short time converted into mass movements. 
The rise of these movements was facilitated through several factors. First, 
years of neoliberal policies and social regress had created enormous frustration 
and anger among large parts of the lower popular classes. Second, the massive 
rise of informality and unemployment led to the situation that significant num-
bers of hitherto formal, unionized workers joined the ranks of the lower popu-
lar classes and contributed with their previous experiences to processes of 
base-level organization. Third, the progressive union confederation CTA and 
smaller leftist parties supported these processes of organization. Fourth, by set-
ting up roadblocks they were highly effective in putting pressure on the gov-
ernment and extracting social policy concessions in favor of their members. 
By the early 2000s, the overall membership of these social movements had 
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reached approximately 300,000 and the ideological position of virtually all of 
them was clearly left-wing. Although, at least initially, they were most suc-
cessful in organizing around the issue of unemployment, the majority of them 
also contained branches that organized other segments of the lower popular 
classes, such as peasants, cooperative workers, informal workers, neighbor-
hood activists, and indigenous communities. Against this background, groups 
that were suffering from several intersecting discriminations constituted the 
majority at the base-level: most of the activists were women, lived in impov-
erished and stigmatized neighborhoods and a high percentage had migratory 
or indigenous backgrounds. Not surprisingly, these movements carried out ex-
tensive activism to demand social protections for low-income earners. Most of 
the concrete actions focused on specific benefits for their members, but on the 
more aggregate level, they demanded the universalization of unemployment 
protection schemes and pressured from within and without the Kirchnerist gov-
ernment for an extension of redistributive social policies.  
During the 1970s and 1980s, leftist youth and student movements also 
played a significant role in promoting lower popular class organization and 
social policy expansion. With the global wave of student protests in 1968 and 
the Cordoba-riots in the following year, left-leaning student organizations be-
gan to grow quickly in Argentina. Although different types of Marxist move-
ments emerged throughout the universities of the country, the movements that 
were most effectively able to influence social policy were those with links to 
the Peronist movement or the UCR party. In 1972, various left-leaning Peronist 
youth organizations united and formed the Peronist Youth, which soon con-
verted into one of the main organizational pillars of Peronism, was incorpo-
rated into its national decision-making bodies, heavily influenced the 1973 
electoral campaign, and attained a considerable portion of parliamentary seats 
and public offices. Members and sympathizers of the Peronist Youth subse-
quently used their political positions to promote egalitarian social policies such 
as a unified universal health system and large-scale housing programs. How-
ever, due to brutal repression through the paramilitary Triple A and later the 
military Junta, the Peronist Youth and most of the Marxist student movements 
increasingly weakened and finally disintegrated.  
The less radical center-left youth organizations of the UCR, the Franja 
Morada and the Junta Coordinadora Nacional, suffered considerably less re-
pression and were able to extend their influence within the UCR throughout 
the 1970s and early 1980s. During the electoral campaign of 1983, these youth 
groups actively reached out to mobilize support in working-class and low-in-
come neighborhoods and supported a redistributive social policy agenda that 
had among its aims the universalization of health insurance coverage in favor 
of low-income groups.  
In response to the murder of approximately 30,000 mostly left-wing activ-
ists during the military dictatorship between 1976 and 1983, Argentina devel-
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oped comparatively strong human rights organizations, such as the Madres de 
la Plaza de Mayo, Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo and the Centro de Estudios Le-
gales y Sociales (CELS). All these organizations were politically left-of-center 
and promoted the implementation of social human rights, which included ex-
plicit support for expanding social protections for low-income earners. Never-
theless, their focus remained on the human rights violations of the military 
government and on finding the stolen children of murdered activists, so their 
influence on social policy was rather limited. 
The Argentine women’s movement became increasingly broad and influ-
ential after 1986 when the Encuentro Nacional de Mujeres was established as 
a yearly gathering point for activists. By the mid-2010s participation in these 
gatherings reached over 60,000 and the movement was capable of mobilizing 
several hundred thousand demonstrators throughout the country. The massive 
growth of the women’s movement was to an important extent related to the 
growing participation of women from progressive parties, trade unions, and 
unemployed workers’ organizations so that the movement increasingly at-
tained a popular class and left-of-center base. For most activists, women’s in-
terests also included broader egalitarian social policy reform, because such pol-
icies were considered to contribute to a diminution of both gender and class 
inequalities. The influence of the movement on broader social policy issues 
was nevertheless rather indirect, operating through the egalitarian perspectives 
that activists of the women’s movement promoted in the broader discourse and 
the trade unions, parties, and social movements they were affiliated with, while 
the major campaigns and mass demonstrations focused on the issues of gen-
dered violence and the right to abortion. 
Employers’ Associations 
The main employers’ associations were opposed to all major initiatives to ex-
tend social protections to low-income earners throughout the period of study. 
This supports the initial hypothesis that capital tends to oppose such policies. 
However, whether this resulted in open and aggressive opposition or in mildly 
and implicitly formulated critique depended strongly on the broader political 
context and on the kind of employer association.  
Structural context proved to be an important category for understanding 
employer opposition to social policy expansion. In a context of mostly abun-
dant labor supply, due to an ample reserve army of unemployed or informal 
self-employed workers, most employers felt little need to support processes of 
skill formation and reproduction through extending social protections to low-
income sectors. In contrast, the negative aspects of social policy expansion 
dominated in the view of most employers. The three crucial arguments that 
employers’ associations repeatedly brought forward were that such policies 
would impose considerable fiscal costs and potentially higher tax burdens, that 
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they would foster laziness in the beneficiaries, and that they would inhibit the 
operation of the benign forces of the market and reduce competition among 
wage earners. In this way, the arguments brought forward by the major em-
ployer associations resembled quite strongly the assumptions of the power re-
sources approach, that due to structural reasons, employers had important in-
centives to oppose egalitarian social policy. 
In order to understand the different intensities of resistance to redistribu-
tive policies of different associations, it also proved useful to take into account 
their ideological positions, social bases, and organizational structures. The 
most powerful employer associations in the agricultural (SRA, CRA), financial 
(ABRA, ADEBA), commercial (CAC, BOLSA) and construction sectors 
(CACON) were throughout the period committed to economic liberalism, 
which provided a cognitive and analytical framework from which an expansion 
of social protections appeared harmful for their business activities as well as 
the economy as a whole. Within the strongest industrial sector association 
(UIA), economic liberalism was the dominating perspective during most of the 
period; however, between the 1940s and 1970s significant internal discussions 
took place over the question of whether state-sponsored import substitution or 
liberalism would be the economic policy most favorable for the sector. While 
most of the big companies clearly adhered to the liberal paradigm, many small- 
and medium-sized and national market-oriented enterprises favored ISI poli-
cies that would foster local demand and protect them from foreign competition. 
Although the latter group grew significantly between the 1940s and 1970s, the 
organizational structure of the association allowed a comparatively small 
group of big and rather liberal oriented companies to wield a disproportionate 
and often dominant influence over the political course of the UIA. After eco-
nomic deregulation was initiated by the military junta between 1976 and 1983, 
the liberal economic position became eventually hegemonic within the associ-
ation. Thirty of the most influential and powerful business leaders from differ-
ent sectors furthermore formed the CEA, which represented the top of the Ar-
gentine economic elite and also adhered to a neoliberal economic worldview. 
Although with different intensities, all these associations actively and openly 
opposed redistributive social policies. This involved lobbying, dissemination 
of studies undertaken by employer-financed think tanks, and public criticism 
of or support for certain policies. During military dictatorships and right-wing 
governments, representatives of these organizations regularly occupied crucial 
positions in the cabinet and were able to exercise strong direct influence on the 
direction of economic and social policy. Under progressive governments, sev-
eral of these employer associations pursued aggressive oppositional strategies, 
going at times as far as to promote and support military coups. 
A second group of employer associations was less aggressively anti-redis-
tributive, though much less powerful. In order to unite those employers that 
favored the ISI model, Perón created alternative employer associations for 
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different economic sectors during the early 1950s. The industrial sector asso-
ciation CGI was however the only one of these organizations that was able to 
attract a significant level of employer support. In contrast to the above-men-
tioned associations, the CGI was dominated by small- and medium-size na-
tional market-dependent companies and maintained good relations with the Pe-
ronist governments. Rather than openly confronting the government on social 
policy issues, the CGI preferred to reach compromises in tripartite negotia-
tions. Although the association clearly supported the ISI model with its focus 
on protecting national industries and fostering local demand, it favored a ver-
sion of this model that created demand through investment rather than through 
increasing consumption with redistributive policies. Due to the related fiscal 
costs, the CGI also opposed an expansion of social protections for low-income 
earners. However, in contrast to the associations adhering to economic liberal-
ism, this opposition found its expression mainly in lobbying and negotiation 
activities rather than in public confrontation. With the process of economic 
liberalization during the military junta between 1976 and 1983, the CGI even-
tually declined and lost most of its influence. 
The Military 
The Argentine military constituted an important actor in social politics during 
the first 40 years (1943–1983) of the period of study. Although there existed 
different internal factions, the hegemonic political orientation in the military 
leadership was right-wing authoritarian and its political influence on social 
policy was profoundly regressive, and thus highly detrimental to low-income 
earners.  
In two ways the developments within the military during the 1920s and 
1930s were important to understanding its later involvement in politics. First, 
the coup d’état of 1930 reflected the growing strength of factions within the 
military leadership that were convinced that the armed forces had the duty to 
participate as a major force for order in the political arena. Second, against the 
background of the international economic crises and the rise of Keynesian 
thinking, nationalist currents that favored state-interventionist industrialization 
policies became increasingly influential and started to challenge the dominance 
of economic liberalism within the military elite (Hänsch and Riekenberg 2008; 
Riekenberg 2009; Rock 1993). Although these currents differed from the eco-
nomically liberal currents in the sense that they were more strongly influenced 
by Catholic Social Teaching and assumed that the state should play a certain 
role in welfare provision, their agendas were far from being progressive. Ra-
ther than seeing social policy as a tool for reducing social inequalities, they 
saw it as an effective instrument of cementing existing social hierarchies, con-
trolling and dividing popular class organization, and constructing effective bar-
riers against the influence of communist ideas. In economic terms, these cur-
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rents favored a variant of the ISI paradigm, that, like the developmentalist 
model, put emphasis on investment rather than on redistribution and national 
demand. In contrast, the economically liberal currents within the military fa-
vored a considerably smaller role for the state in the economy as well as in 
welfare provision (Rock 1993; Sikkink 1991). In concrete terms, these differ-
ent orientations found their expression in the fact that state-interventionist cur-
rents tended to prefer centralized, state-led social insurance policies as the 
main social policy instrument, while economically liberal currents preferred 
market-oriented private insurance. However, both currents had in common that 
their social policies were largely regressive and detrimental to low-income 
earners. Both statist and economically liberal military governments radically 
reduced spending on social assistance and universal policies and promoted so-
cial insurance reforms that limited coverage to formal workers and favored 
higher income workers over lower income workers. In the face of a broad in-
formal sector in Argentina, these policies significantly reduced social protec-
tions for low-income earners and thus contributed pivotally to the formation of 
a truncated social policy regime. In political terms, the military elite’s capacity 
to carry out its regressive agenda rested on alliances with other center-right and 
right political forces, such as the conservative leadership of the Catholic 
Church, the majority of the employers’ associations, and right-wing politi-
cians. 
The only major exception to this regressive role of the military was the 
dictatorship between 1943 and 1946. However, even in that case, the extension 
of social insurance policies to hitherto excluded groups was related to Juán 
Domingo Perón’s personal political strategy and his influence through the De-
partment of Labor, not to a general preference for redistributive policies among 
the military elite in general. Perón formed part of the GOU, a group of right-
wing nationalist military leaders that promoted state interventionist industrial-
ization policies and managed to become the dominant force within the military 
government soon after the coup in 1943. From his position as head of the De-
partment of Labor, Perón implemented a range of carrot-and-stick policies 
which included repression and intervention as well as social and labor policies 
to create an increasingly strong political support base within the trade union 
movement. Although his policies mainly covered formal workers, they had 
nevertheless significantly progressive redistributive effects due to the fact that 
the majority of formal workers were still not covered by social insurances and 
that previous labor market regulations had been largely unfavorable to workers 
in general. In order to foster military support for his agenda, Perón argued that 
his policies were necessary in order to eliminate communist influence within 
the labor movement, to establish state control over the working class, and to 
reach a situation of stable class harmony. Notwithstanding these arguments, 
his redistributive agenda soon aroused significant unrest among military lead-
ers and even led to his temporary arrest in 1945. After his election as president 
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in 1946, Perón was initially able to reinforce military loyalty through strong 
increases in military spending and arms production; however, as soon as these 
expenditure increases became difficult to sustain in the face of the economic 
crisis of the late 1940s and early 1950s, the military became an increasingly 
oppositional actor. By 1955 military opposition had become openly aggres-
sive, with both rather statist and economically liberal military leaders attacking 
Perón for his redistributive agenda and his alliance with popular class forces 
(Rock 1993). In September 1955, the military eventually staged a coup d’état 
against Perón’s government. 
Despite the varying influence of economically liberal and more statist in-
ternal factions, all three later military dictatorships (1955–58, 1966–73, 1976–
83) were fiercely right-wing and pursued highly regressive social policy agen-
das that significantly deteriorated social protections for low-income earners. 
Furthermore, between 1958 and 1966 the military intervened any time govern-
ment policy went significantly in a pro-Peronist or redistributive direction. 
Only after the return to democracy in 1983 did military involvement in 
politics decreased significantly. Due to the debacle of the Falklands war, the 
massive human rights violations, and the economic disaster generated by the 
last military junta, the rejection of military involvement in politics had become 
a broad-based societal consensus, which enabled the democratic government 
of Raúl Alfonsín to restrict the autonomy of the armed forces, to reduce mili-
tary expenditure, and to initiate trials against human rights violators. Conse-
quently, the military ceased to be an influential actor in social politics after 
1983. 
The Catholic Church 
The empirical findings largely support our initial hypothesis that due to the 
influence of Catholic Social Teaching, the leadership of the Argentine Catholic 
Church tended to support stratified, status conserving social policies. However, 
during most of the period of study, the involvement of the Catholic Church in 
social politics was rather indirect. Leaders of the church preferred to criticize 
growing individualism, materialism, and inequality in general terms rather than 
to participate in concrete processes of social policy reform. In some cases, such 
as the introduction of the workfare program PJJHD in 2002, the church took 
the role of a mediating force between different contending interests. 
Although the church itself did not actively pursue a regressive social pol-
icy agenda, it nevertheless contributed to the implementation of such policies 
by legitimizing or even openly supporting military and right-of-center govern-
ments. The collaboration with right-wing military dictatorships was related to 
an historically close relationship between right-wing nationalist military lead-
ers and the formal leadership of the Argentine church. Furthermore, both mil-
itary and democratic right-wing governments shared the church’s positions on 
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issues such as divorce, religious education, and abortion. All these issues were 
highly important to the leadership of the church and shaped their patterns of 
political alliance making more than social policy issues. In contrast, the rela-
tionship of the leadership of the church with center-left governments that pro-
moted egalitarian social policies was more conflictive, as these governments 
also promoted policies that strengthened the rights of women and homosexu-
als, liberalized divorce, promoted sexual education, or allowed for discussions 
on the issue of abortion. A peculiar case was the first government of Perón, 
which implemented a progressive social policy agenda while initially enjoying 
strong support from the hierarchy of Catholic Church. This particular constel-
lation had much to do with the fact that Perón was a former military leader and 
that his government reaffirmed the system of religious education that was con-
sidered to be of extraordinary importance by the church’s leadership. As soon 
as the government began to take measures that contradicted the interests of the 
church, such as the introduction of female suffrage and the takeover of Catholic 
social assistance by the Eva Perón Foundation, however, the relationship be-
tween the church and the government increasingly deteriorated. By 1955 the 
church had finally become one of the driving forces behind the coup d’état that 
overthrew the Peronist government. 
Like other organizations, the Argentine Catholic Church was not politi-
cally homogeneous. Again, the left-right divide played an important role in 
understanding the involvement of different internal currents in social politics. 
While conservative currents remained the dominant force at the formal leader-
ship level throughout the whole period of study, progressive base-level move-
ments grew significantly during the 1960s and 1970s. While the former tended 
to support regressive governing alliances, the latter often forged alliances with 
left-of-center organizations and contributed to processes of lower popular class 
organization. This, however, also led to progressive activists of the church be-
coming the targets of brutal paramilitary and state repression during the 1970s 
and early 1980s, which contributed to a restoration of the hegemony of the 
conservative leadership. More progressive currents nevertheless recovered 
some strength during the 1990s with the emergence of new social movements 
and growing resistance to the neoliberal model.  
International Organizations 
The empirical evidence on the role of international organizations in the Argen-
tine politics of social protection for low-income earners largely supports the 
initially formulated hypotheses as well as the findings of Tittor (2012) and 
Deacon (1997, 2005). UN agencies and programs such as the ILO, the WHO, 
and UNRISD generally promoted the expansion of social policy and offered 
technical support for the development and implementation of policies. Interna-
tional Financial Institutions, such as the IMF, World Bank and IADB, in 
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contrast promoted the privatization and retrenchment of social policies follow-
ing the Chilean model in conjunction with the introduction of residual targeted 
social assistance programs. Although these targeted social policies explicitly 
favored low-income earners, their coverage and financing were so limited that 
they were not able to compensate for the loss of social protections for low-
income earners related to the regressive restructuring of social insurance poli-
cies. Hence, despite the promotion of targeted social assistance policies, the 
overall impact of the IFIs on Argentine social policy was highly detrimental to 
low-income earners. 
Over the period of study, the influence of different international organiza-
tions varied as well as the mechanisms through which they participated in the 
policy-making process. Compared to the above described political and eco-
nomic actors on the national level, the impact of international organizations 
was at most times rather indirect and operated mainly through the promotion 
of ideas that shaped the views of both the wider public and the Argentine com-
munity of social policy experts in science and public office. In the 1930s the 
ILO promoted the state-led expansion of social insurance arrangements and 
became increasingly influential in the Argentine social policy discourse. Dur-
ing the 1940s, inspired by, among other things, the Beveridge report, it gradu-
ally shifted towards broader concepts of social security that encompassed non-
salaried parts of the population. The newly founded WHO also took up the idea 
of broad-based universal social security, so that from the 1940s on, both the 
ILO and WHO favored the extension of social protections for low-income 
earners by promoting a favorable discursive environment and by providing 
technical advice and assistance for the development and implementation of 
policies. Ideas promoted by these organizations were important inspirations for 
the initiatives to build a universal health sector and broad-based pension sys-
tem during the 1940s, 1950s, and 1970s in Argentina. However, with the dra-
matic increase of Argentine foreign debts and the rise of neoliberalism between 
the mid-1970s and early 2000s, the influence of the state-centered ILO and 
WHO gradually declined and the influence of IFIs on social policy intensified. 
In contrast to the mostly indirect influence of the UN agencies, the influence 
of the IFIs increasingly rested on more direct mechanisms such as the financing 
of reform programs through the World Bank or the conditionalities imposed 
by the IMF in exchange for the approval of loans. For example, the World 
Bank actively financed regressive and privatizing reforms in the health and 
pension sectors during the 1990s at the same time that the IMF linked financial 
support to the government to the effective implementation of these programs. 
In order to assure the political viability of these reforms and to mitigate some 
of its negative social impacts the World Bank furthermore provided credits to 
finance residual social assistance policies for short periods of time. Finally, 
with the economic collapse of the neoliberal model during the early 2000s, the 
increasing discrediting of neoliberal ideas, and the government’s default on 
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foreign debts, the influence of the IFIs on social policy-making in Argentina 
decreased again. 
5.3 The Distribution of Power Resources and Social 
Protection for Low-Income Earners 
One of the main hypotheses associated with my theoretical framework is that 
the direction of social policy is crucially dependent on the distribution of power 
in the society. I assumed that the extension of social protections for low-in-
come earners is much more likely when the popular classes are powerful. To 
assess the level of popular class power I distinguished four types of power re-
sources: associational, structural, institutional, and discursive power resources. 
In the following I will summarize and analyze the long-term variation of pop-
ular class power resources and its impact on social protection for low-income 
earners. 
The Long-Term Evolution of Popular Class Power Resources 
As can be seen in Figure 13, the overall level of popular class power resources 
has varied significantly over time and thereby provided widely differing frame-
works for social policy reform processes. 
In order to analyze this variation, it is helpful to look at the different types 
of power resources separately. Figure 14 shows the evolution of the levels of 
structural and discursive popular class power resources. As can be seen, both 
remained relatively stable on a medium-high to high level between the mid-
1940s and the mid-1970s. The high level of discursive power resources was 
related to the predominance of the ISI paradigm among the wider public as 
well as expert communities and politicians in Argentina during these years. 
Due to the interventionist and rather demand-oriented logic of the paradigm, 
its popularity provided progressive and popular class actors with a favorable 
discursive environment in which to frame redistributive social policies as being 
benign for the economy and society as a whole. Hence, it facilitated the gener-
ation of mass support for redistributive policies.  
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Figure 13: The evolution of the overall level of popular class power resources 
* The assessment of the level of popular class power resources refers always to the approxi-
mate timeframe within which a new governing alliance was formed at the beginning of a period. 
This timeframe varied with respect to the different alliances. 
Figure 14: The evolution of structural and discursive popular class power resources 
* See figure 13. 
In turn, ISI policies and a favorable international context contributed to the 
growth of the industrial sector and to low levels of unemployment, which 
strengthened labor’s capacity to cause significant economic damage through 
strike activities and therefore contributed to high levels of structural power re-
sources.189 
 
189  Between the late 1940s and the mid-1970s, the industrial sector constituted between 
33% and 41% of the GDP and employed between 30% and 35% of the workforce. Un-











1943–46 1955–58 1973 1976 1983 1989–91 2002–05
1943–46 1955–58 1973 1976 1983 1989–91 2002–05
Structural Discursive
274   
Nevertheless, as can be seen in Figure 14, the discursive and structural 
popular class power resources declined steadily afterward. Political and eco-
nomic crises during the 1970s and 1980s contributed to a growing perception 
that the ISI-paradigm was exhausted and unable to deliver solid solutions for 
the problems of the time. Furthermore, the proliferation of neoliberal em-
ployer-financed think tanks during the military dictatorship (1976–83) in con-
junction with a worldwide trend towards supply-side-oriented economic per-
spectives led to an increasing influence of neoliberalism, which finally became 
the dominant economic paradigm towards the 1990s and significantly reduced 
the level of discursive popular class power resources. Simultaneously, the fre-
quent eruption of profound economic crises since the 1970s as well as the im-
plementation of neoliberal policies led to a steady decline of the industrial sec-
tor, rising unemployment and informality.190 This implied a gradual reduction 
of the popular classes’ structural power resources.  
These crises, however, also led to growing resistance and increasingly 
widespread doubts about the adequacy of the paradigm to serve the interests of 
the majority of the population. Thereby, they provided the ground for the return 
of demand-oriented economic perspectives and a recovery of the popular clas-
ses’ discursive power resources. From the mid-1990s on, this led to a diver-
gence between rising levels of discursive and falling levels of structural popu-
lar class power resources. However, rather than showing a dissociation of the 
two categories, the temporary divergence was in large part a result of their 
close interaction and interdependence. Indeed, the discrediting of the neolib-
eral paradigm and the gradual recovery of the popular classes’ discursive 
power resources was decisively fueled by the dramatic deterioration of the la-
bor market, and hence, by a development that at the same time eroded the pop-
ular classes’ structural power resources. Subsequently, the recovery of discur-
sive power resources in combination with a strengthening of the associational 
power resources of the popular classes enabled the formation of a progressive 
governing alliance and a deep shift in economic policy that provided the bases 
for a gradual recovery of the labor market and thereby of the popular classes’ 
structural power resources.191 Hence, it is precisely their interdependence and 
interaction that explains the delay between the moments when they each began 
to recover. 
All in all, the evolution of structural and discursive popular class power 
resources was marked by relatively long timeframes and gradual changes. Both 
remained on a high level between the mid-1940s and 1970s, then gradually 
 
190  Between 1976 and 2002, the industrial share of GDP declined from 41% to 29% and 
the share of industrial employment fell from 32% to 17%. In the same timeframe, un-
employment increased from less than 5% to nearly 20% and informal salaried employ-
ment from 18% to 44%. 
191  Between 2002 and 2015 unemployment decreased from nearly 20% to less than 7% and 
informal salaried employment from more than 44% to less than 33%. 
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declined and finally began to recover during the mid-1990s, in the case of dis-
cursive power resources, and the mid-2000s, in the case of structural power 
resources. 
Figure 15: The evolution of associational and institutional popular class power resources 
* See figure 13. 
In contrast, the evolution of associational and institutional power resources fol-
lowed quite different patterns, as can be observed in Figure 15. During the first 
half of the 20th century, the Argentine labor movement experienced a gradual, 
yet not linear, process of growth and unification. This process was significantly 
accelerated after 1943 when state policies favored union organization and the 
emergence of a strong popular class-based party.192 By this means, during the 
second half of the 1940s, the associational power resources of the popular clas-
ses had increased to a medium level. Afterward, this level proved to be resilient 
to changing economic and political environments. After the overthrow of the 
Peronist government in 1955, the Peronist Party, the main popular class-based 
party, was prohibited. However, the labor movement had attained unprece-
dented levels of organization, which to a certain degree compensated for the 
decrease of associational power resources generated by the prohibition of the 
Peronist Party.193 Furthermore, the activist structures of the unions provided an 
important space for the continuity of Peronist political activities despite the 
official ban. With the lifting of the ban against the Peronist Party and the emer-
gence of significant leftist student, slum dwellers, and base-level union move-
ments, the associational power resources of the popular classes reached their 
peak with a medium-high level during the early 1970s. During the following 
 
192  The first popular class-based mass party that emerged was the short-lived Partido La-
borista, which was soon replaced by the Partido Peronista. 
193  Trade union density increased from approximately 11% in 1941 to 18% in 1946 and 
43% in 1954. Afterwards it remained stunningly stable at values between 36 and 44% 
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years, severe conflicts within the Peronist movement significantly weakened 
its left wing and led to a temporary paralysis of the union movement. Under 
these conditions, the military seized power in 1976 and carried out brutal re-
pression against all leftist organizations, combative union factions as well as 
progressive intellectuals. This led to a temporary decline of the popular clas-
ses’ associational power resources to a medium-low level during the second 
half of the 1970s. However, the union movement was able to maintain a high 
level of union density and towards the early 1980s also recovered important 
capacities of political action. With the fall of the military dictatorship in 1983 
political parties were able to rebuild their organizational structures, which led 
to a recovery of medium levels of popular class associational power resources. 
While during the following two decades economic crises and neoliberal poli-
cies weakened the union movement, new center-left parties and lower popular 
class organizations emerged, so that the overall level of associational power 
resources remained medium. All in all, the associational power resources re-
mained relatively stable throughout the period of study, despite significant 
qualitative differences regarding the concrete composition and orientation of 
popular class actors over time. 
In stark contrast, the level of institutional popular class power resources 
oscillated strongly between different periods. This was largely due to the fact 
that the institutional power resources of the numerically strong popular classes 
depended most importantly on their capacity to exercise democratic rights and 
to influence the course of governments and parliaments by means of electoral 
participation. Repeated coups d’état therefore led to abrupt and dramatic de-
clines of this type of popular class power resources. As can be seen in Figure 
15, the institutional power resources of the popular classes reached a medium 
level during the second half of the 1940s, when democracy was first reinstalled 
and extended to women but then gradually restricted by the first Peronist gov-
ernment. The coup d’état of 1955 and the following authoritarian and semi-
authoritarian regimes in combination with the prohibition of the main popular 
class-based party eventually led to a dramatic reduction of these power re-
sources to a low level. In 1973, the return to democracy and the lifting of the 
ban against the Peronist Party initiated a short phase of high levels institutional 
power resources, which ended again in 1976 when the military erected a brutal 
authoritarian regime. Only in 1983 was democracy lastingly restored and since 
then there have been medium-high to high levels of institutional popular class 
power resources.  
In sum, the evolution of the different types of popular class power re-
sources showed considerably different patterns. While the levels of associa-
tional power resources remained surprisingly stable, the levels of discursive 
and structural power resources underwent gradual change over longer periods 
of time and the levels of institutional power resources were characterized by 
frequent and dramatic oscillations. Against this background, it becomes evi-
  277 
dent that a focus only on the evolution of the associational power resources, as 
in the traditional power resources approach, would have been insufficient to 
understand the significantly varying directions of social policy reform. This 
underlines the empirical importance of my theoretical extension of the classical 
power resources approach in welfare state research by distinguishing four 
types of power resources. 
The Overall Level of Popular Class Power Resources and its Impact on 
Social Policy Change 
As can be observed in Table 32, the overall level of popular class power re-
sources at the beginning of each period correlates coherently with the subse-
quent direction of social policy change.  
Table 32: Popular class power and patterns of change regarding social protection for low- 
income earners, 1943–2015 
Period 
Overall level of popular class 
power resources* 
Overall evolution of social  
protection for low-income earners 
1943–1955 Medium-High  Strong expansion 
1955–1973 Medium Strong reduction 
1973–1976 High Strong expansion 
1976–1983 Medium-Low  Strong reduction 
1983–1989 Medium Moderate expansion 
1989–2001 Medium-Low  Moderate reduction 
2002–2015 Medium-High  Strong expansion 
* At the beginning of each period. 
At the beginning of the periods 1943–55, 1973–76, and 2002–15, the overall 
level of popular class power resources was medium-high or high and social 
protection for low-income earners expanded strongly during all these periods. 
In contrast, at the beginning of the periods 1976–83 and 1989–2001, the overall 
level of popular class power was medium-low and social protection for low-
income earners was reduced. These coincidences support the main hypothesis 
of the power resources approach that progressive social policy becomes more 
likely when popular class power resources are high. More variable were the 
social policy outcomes during periods at the beginning of which the overall 
level of popular class power was medium. During the period 1955–73, social 
protection for low-income earners was strongly reduced, while during the pe-
riod 1983–89 it was moderately expanded. Again, this fits well with the theo-
retical framework. The level of popular class power resources was not assumed 
to translate linearly into social policy change but to be mediated by politically 
contingent processes. Furthermore, as will be shown in the following, the 
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specific combinations of different types of popular class power resources dur-
ing the two periods had an impact on the respective dynamics of social policy 
change. 
There were two main political mechanisms through which the overall level 
of popular class power resources was causally related to social policy out-
comes. First, the overall level of popular class power determined to an im-
portant degree the capacity of popular class actors to exercise external pressure 
on governments, which hence led governments to use social policy concessions 
as a means to contain protest and strike activity, to divide and control popular 
class forces, or to co-opt union and social movement leaders. Second, the over-
all level of popular class power decisively shaped the formation of different 
types of governing alliances. High levels of popular class power resources at 
the beginning of a period made the formation of progressive and inclusionary 
governing alliances politically viable, while low levels of popular class power 
resources provided a favorable framework for the formation of exclusionary 
and regressive governing alliances. In turn, the evolution of power resources 
within each period was one of the crucial factors determining the sustainability 
of the respective alliance. 
In the Argentine case, the second mechanism, that is the formation of dif-
ferent governing alliances, was empirically much more important in shaping 
the long-term evolution of social protections for low-income earners. Such so-
cial policies were consistently extended by progressive and inclusionary gov-
erning alliances and cut by regressive and exclusionary governing alliances. 
External popular class pressures on exclusionary governing alliances were 
mainly exercised by the trade union movement, with the result that regressive 
governing alliances responded with social policies that benefited the organized 
formal working class but usually excluded the lower popular classes. The ca-
pacities of the lower popular classes to exercise external pressure on regressive 
governments were much more limited during most of the period of study. The 
only major exception constituted the proliferation of lower popular class pro-
tests and movements after the mid-1990s, which led to reiterated social policy 
concessions, particularly in the area of social assistance policies. 
Different Types of Power Resources and the Dynamics of Social Politics 
Table 33 provides a more detailed overview of the distribution of power re-
sources and social policy change by distinguishing different types of power 
resources. Combined with findings from the process tracing analysis, these de-
tails reveal further patterns. As we can observe, not only the overall level of 
popular class power resources differed between periods, but also the combina-
tion of different types of power resources. This variation, in turn, coincided 
with a varying distribution of power resources within the popular classes. Due 
to their high union density and capacity to disturb processes of production, the 
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formal working class’ structural and associational power resources were sig-
nificantly stronger than those of the lower popular classes throughout the 
whole period of study. In contrast, the right to vote and the dominance of eco-
nomic paradigms that were favorable for redistributive policies strengthened 
the institutional and discursive power resources of the popular classes as a 
whole, and hence, increased the relative political weight of the lower popular 
classes. During the periods 1943–1955, 1973–1976, 1983–1989, and 2002–
2015, the levels of both institutional and discursive power resources of the 
popular classes were either medium or high. This contributed not only to over-
all levels of popular class power resources that were medium to high but also 
to a distribution of power resources among and within the popular classes that 
gave more weight to low-income groups and left-of-center currents than during 
other periods. In the theoretical framework, it has been assumed that this com-
bination provided a particularly favorable political framework for progressive 
social policy reform. If we now look at the social policy outcomes of these 
periods, the findings provide strong support for this hypothesis. During all four 
periods, social protections for low-income earners were expanded.  
The historical reconstruction of the processes of social policy reform dur-
ing these periods not only provided further empirical evidence in support of 
this hypothesis but also revealed that there were two main political mecha-
nisms that linked this particular distribution of power resources with egalitar-
ian social policy outcomes. First, as argued earlier, the overall medium to high 
levels of popular class power resources provided a context under which the 
formation of inclusionary and progressive governing alliances was politically 
viable and sustainable. And second, the distribution of institutional and discur-
sive power resources provided governments and political parties with im-
portant incentives to try to mobilize lower popular class support through inclu-
sionary social policy agendas.194 Indeed, the mobilization of the lower popular 
class vote was a crucial prerequisite for the electoral success of any of these 
alliances. Simultaneously, the distribution of discursive power resources pro-
vided actors with capacities to successfully frame policies in favor of the lower 
popular classes as beneficial and desirable for the society as a whole. This, in 
turn, provided a discursive environment under which centrist currents within 
the PJ and UCR as well as the trade union movement were inclined to forge 
alliances with left-of-center and lower popular class forces. 
  
 
194  Such incentives also operated during the regressive governing alliance of President Car-
los Menem in the 1990s. This led to the fact that, despite the overall regressive nature 
of the alliance’s policy agenda, it extended clientelistic social assistance policies in or-
der to slow down the erosion of lower popular class support. 
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Table 33: Four types of popular class power resources and patterns of change regarding social 
protection for low-income earners, 1943–2015 
Period 
Four types of popular class  
power resources* 
Overall evolution of social 
protection for low-income 
earners 































































* At the beginning of each period. 
A closer look at the processes of social policy change shows how these mech-
anisms operated in practice. The first period was initiated with the military 
coup of 1943 and the assumption of Juan Domingo Perón as head of the De-
partment of Labor shortly later. The coup was preceded by decades of gradual 
industrialization and the emergence of the working class as an increasingly 
powerful political actor. The military government responded to these develop-
ments by implementing and expanding redistributive social policies in order to 
foster working-class support and to enhance state control over the union move-
ment. Perón explicitly used the implementation of new pension funds and sub-
sidies for union-controlled health insurance funds to establish alliances with 
some of the most powerful trade unions. At the same time, these policies also 
served as mechanisms through which labor militancy could be contained and 
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defused. The increasing predominance of the ISI paradigm in public opinion 
furthermore provided discursive power resources that enabled Perón and the 
unions to frame these policies as being favorable to the goal of economic de-
velopment, and hence, as being beneficial for the society as a whole. This dis-
cursive context could have provided an environment in which social policies 
in favor of unorganized low-income earners were justified in a similar way, 
but in the face of the low structural, institutional, and associational power re-
sources of the lower popular classes, the political benefits of doing so appeared 
very limited. As a result, until the return to democracy in 1946, social policy 
expansion mainly benefited sectors of the formal working class that had at-
tained significant associational and structural power resources. With the return 
to democracy in 1946 this constellation changed significantly, as the right to 
vote provided the lower popular classes with a significant level of institutional 
power resources. Indeed, neither of the two major electoral alliances during the 
1946 elections was able to win without mobilizing significant low-income 
earner support. At the same time, the particular combination of democracy with 
a high level of discursive popular class power resources enabled political actors 
to mobilize lower popular class support through inclusionary social policy 
agendas without having to renounce formal working-class and middle-class 
support, as the ISI paradigm allowed them to frame these policies as ultimately 
benefiting all social classes. On these grounds, both electoral alliances decided 
to compete with progressive social policy agendas. The Peronist alliance was 
finally more successful in mobilizing popular class support and won the elec-
tions. To consolidate and broaden this support, the Peronist government then 
implemented an inclusionary social policy agenda that benefitted both the for-
mal working class as well as the lower popular classes. While it continued to 
expand social insurance funds that favored formal workers, it combined these 
policies with a massive expansion of social assistance policies, the creation of 
a universal public health sector, and the introduction of highly permissive pen-
sion access criteria. Taken together these policies amounted to a strong expan-
sion of social protections for low-income earners. 
Similar processes can be observed during the Peronist governments in the 
1973–1976 and 2002–2015 periods. Both periods were preceded by several 
years of increasing popular class protests as well as an increase of the overall 
level of popular class power resources, which finally contributed to the decline 
of the respective regressive governing alliances and provided viable options 
for the formation of more inclusionary governments. In both cases, preceding 
developments also led to an increase in the relative political weight of the lower 
popular classes. In 1973, the return to democracy provided the scarcely orga-
nized but numerous lower popular classes with significant electoral weight. 
During the early 2000s, the discrediting of neoliberalism and the increasing 
popularity of a more demand-oriented economic paradigm as well as the suc-
cessful construction of social movements strengthened their discursive and 
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associational power resources. Against these backgrounds, Peronist presidents 
during both periods undertook significant efforts to mobilize lower popular 
class electoral support through the expansion of social protections for low-in-
come earners. In order to justify these policies in the eyes of the wider public, 
these governments took up the prevalent economic paradigms and argued that 
increasing social protections would foster national demand and hence contrib-
ute to creating jobs and economic wealth for everyone. Centrist currents of the 
PJ and the union movement agreed with this claim and took a supportive stance 
towards these policies. At the same time, these measures were combined with 
an improvement of existing social protections for formal workers. As they had 
between 1946 and 1955, formal labor and the lower popular classes constituted 
the main electoral and associational strongholds of these Peronist govern-
ments.  
The operation of the above mentioned three political mechanisms can also 
be observed during the 1983–1989 period, yet the political dynamics were dif-
ferent. Protest activity and popular class power resources increased during the 
last years of the preceding military dictatorship, finally contributing to the re-
turn to democracy and providing options for the formation of more inclusion-
ary governing alliances. Nevertheless, the brutal repression of the military gov-
ernment and the initiation of a process of de-industrialization had lasting neg-
ative effects on the associational and structural power resources of the popular 
classes. Against this background, the overall level of popular class power re-
sources was medium and therefore lower than during the previously discussed 
periods. At the same time, the ongoing popularity of the ISI paradigm and the 
return to democracy in 1983 provided institutional and discursive power re-
sources that favored the lower popular classes in a similar way as in the above 
described periods. In the face of this, both major electoral alliances in the 1983 
elections made efforts to compete for the vote of low-income earners as well 
as formal workers. Although the principal issues during the campaign were 
centered on the restoration of democratic institutions, the dramatic economic 
and social crisis caused by the military junta made it inevitable that social pol-
icy would also be a recurrent issue. While the PJ reached out to the popular 
classes by emphasizing its historic commitment to social justice, the UCR, un-
der the center-left leadership of Raúl Alfonsín, undertook strong efforts to mo-
bilize popular class electoral support through a social democratic agenda that 
included the promise of strengthening the universal public health system and 
extending social assistance policies. Together with a highly professional cam-
paign organization, this enabled the UCR to make significant inroads into the 
traditionally Peronist working-class and lower popular class electorates and 
contributed to Alfonsín’s electoral victory. Through the quick implementation 
of a massive social assistance program, the PAN, the government was able to 
consolidate some of the lower popular class support during the 1985 elections. 
However, in contrast to the previously discussed Peronist governments, Alfon-
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sín was never able to win significant trade union support. The enduring and 
deep-seated Peronist identity of the union movement as well as tactical errors 
led to a highly contentious relationship with organized labor. In combination 
with the deterioration of the economic and social situation after 1985, the PJ 
was soon able to reaffirm its dominant position among the popular classes and 
the governing alliance increasingly lacked the power to implement its original 
policy agenda. 
At the beginning of the periods 1955–1973, 1976–1983 and 1989–2001 
the overall level of popular class power was medium-low or medium, which 
enabled the formation of regressive governing alliances and the deterioration 
of social protections for low-income earners. However, the combination of dif-
ferent types of popular class power resources also differed between these peri-
ods and led to significantly different dynamics and outcomes. 
The gradual disintegration of the Peronist governing alliance and growing 
military, church, and employer opposition during the mid-1950s enabled the 
military to seize power in 1955 and to initiate a period of authoritarian and 
semi-authoritarian exclusionary governing alliances that lasted until 1973. 
Nevertheless, throughout the whole period, the formal working class remained 
capable of mobilizing significant associational and structural power resources 
at the same time that the popularity of ISI paradigm provided discursive power 
resources that enabled popular class and progressive actors to frame social pol-
icy expansion in economically favorable terms. In contrast, the largely unor-
ganized lower popular classes lacked associational and structural power re-
sources and, due to the authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regime types dur-
ing this period, they were also largely deprived of institutional power re-
sources. This meant that while the formal working class preserved significant 
capacities to exert pressure, the lower popular classes suffered from extreme 
political marginalization. Against this background, social protections were se-
verely reduced for the mostly informal and scarcely organized low-income 
earners. In contrast, social insurance programs that covered formal workers 
were strengthened and extended each time the governments felt the need to 
diffuse labor militancy or to co-opt collaborative union leaders. Instead of im-
proving social protections for low-income earners, these concessions to the 
formal working class turned out to be detrimental for the lower popular classes, 
as they were financed in part by reducing expenditure on the universal and free 
public health care system and social assistance and housing policies. 
During the 1976–1983 dictatorship, social policy took an even more re-
gressive direction. During the mid-1970s, violent conflicts within the inclu-
sionary Peronist governing alliance had significantly weakened the political 
left and largely paralyzed the trade union movement. Against the background 
of political and economic crises and the related decline of popular class power 
resources, the military was able to seize power and to form an exclusionary 
governing alliance in 1976. The abolition of democracy and hence the reduc-
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tion of the popular classes’ institutional power resources led again to a nearly 
complete political marginalization of the lower popular classes. This time, 
however, the associational power resources of the trade union movement were 
also significantly weakened, so that the military junta was not only able to rad-
ically cut social protections for low-income earners, such as social assistance 
and public health, but also to reduce social insurance benefits and employer 
contributions, which negatively affected the formal working class. Only to-
wards the late 1970s did the union movement recover parts of its associational 
strength and capacity of action, which caused the dictatorship to refrain from 
its original plan of social health insurance privatization and even led to a sig-
nificant expenditure increase in this area. 
The dynamics of regressive social policy reform during the 1989–2001 
period were again different. The formation of a regressive governing alliance 
was preceded by a decline of the overall level of popular class power resources 
during the second half of the 1980s. This decline was mainly explained through 
the rise of informal employment and unemployment, which led to a reduction 
of the popular classes’ structural power resources, and the increasing influence 
of neoliberal thinking, which led to the decline of discursive popular class 
power resources. At the same time, union density remained relatively high and 
democratic rights provided the popular classes as a whole with significant elec-
toral importance. Against this background, and in contrast to the above de-
scribed authoritarian periods, the preservation of medium-high levels of insti-
tutional popular class power resources in addition to associational power re-
sources motivated the governing alliances to make social policy concessions 
not only to the formal working class but also to the electorally important lower 
popular classes. In practice this meant that labor protests and union represen-
tation in the parliament forced the government to refrain from the complete 
privatization of social health and pension insurance programs and that the need 
to retain at least some level of lower popular class electoral support motivated 
the government to increase social assistance expenditure in order to extend the 
resources available to its clientelistic networks. Nevertheless, these conces-
sions did not compensate for the overall regressive character of social policy 
reform during the period. The fact that regressive governing alliances were 
electorally sustainable with only relatively limited concessions to the numeri-
cally strong popular class electorate can be best understood through the inter-
action of democracy with low levels of discursive popular class power as a 
consequence of the popularity of the neoliberal paradigm. As survey data 
clearly shows, during the early 1990s a sizable proportion of the popular class 
electorate shared the neoliberal worldview and believed that regressive social 
policy, although initially painful, would be in their long-term interest, as it was 
seen to foster economic growth and employment. When, however, during the 
second half of the 1990s, the ongoing deterioration of the social situation more 
and more evidently contradicted this hope for long-term improvements, and 
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hence contributed to the decline of neoliberal thinking in the wider public, the 
Menem government had to significantly increase social assistance measures to 
retain the lower popular class vote. 
5.4 Governing Alliances and Social Protection for Low-
Income Earners 
The formation of different types of governing alliances constituted the most 
important political mechanism that mediated between the distribution of power 
resources and the constellation of actors and interests, on the one hand, and the 
direction of change regarding social protections for low-income earners, on the 
other. Nevertheless, the processes of alliance formation and the achievement 
and preservation of control over the government were historically contingent 
processes. That is, the distribution of power resources and the constellation of 
actors and interests set margins within which these processes took place, but 
different actors’ decisions regarding whether and how to participate in alli-
ances were also subject to their strategic decisions and their pre-existing affin-
ities or animosities, as well as period-specific events, such as economic crises 
and political scandals. Therefore, the concrete compositions and internal dy-
namics of different alliances varied significantly, which in turn also affected 
the social policy outcomes towards low-income earners. 
Distribution of Power Resources, Types of Governing Alliances  
and Policy Outcomes 
Table 34 summarizes the empirical findings regarding four pivotal research 
categories for each period: the overall level of popular class power resources, 
the formation of different types of governing alliances, the strength and unity 
of these alliances, and the direction and intensity of change regarding social 
protection for low-income earners. If we focus our attention first on the relation 
between the overall level of popular class power, the type of governing alliance 
and the resulting social policies, the observed pattern consistently supports our 
initial hypothesis that higher levels of overall popular class power resources 
favor the formation of inclusionary and progressive alliances that extend social 
protection for low-income earners, while lower levels of popular class power 
resources favor the formation of exclusionary and regressive alliances that 
carry out retrenchment.  
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Table 34: Popular class power, governing alliances, and patterns of change regarding social 
protection for low-income earners, 1943–2015 
Period 




Type of  
governing  
alliance 
Strength and unity 
of governing  
alliance** 
Overall evolu-




1943–1955 Medium-High  Inclusionary- 
redistributive 
Strong and united Strong  
expansion 






1973–1976 High Inclusionary- 
redistributive 










1983–1989 Medium Truncated- 
progressive 
Weak and united Moderate  
expansion 
1989–2001 Medium-Low  Broad- 
regressive 




2002–2015 Medium-High  Inclusionary- 
progressive 




* At the beginning of each period. ** At the moment of the formation of the alliance. Strength 
refers to the extent to which the alliance effectively incorporated actors with significant power 
resources. Unity refers to the degree of cooperation and consensus within the alliance. 
In practice, changing distributions of power resources interacted with realign-
ments of important political actors in the rise and fall of governing alliances. 
Industrialization, the growth of the union movement, the increasing popularity 
of the ISI paradigm and the return to democracy towards the mid-20th century 
constituted the bases on which the popular classes became a powerful political 
force in Argentina. This provoked resistance on the part of the landed oligar-
chy, most business representatives , and the political elite. However, at the 
same time, it provided important incentives for centrist and progressive actors 
to consider alliances with popular class forces in order reach and sustain gov-
ernmental power. The first successful attempt to form an inclusionary govern-
ing alliance was led by Juan Domingo Perón in 1946, who was able to win 
support from sectors of the military, the church, and the UCR party as well as 
from the labor movement and the lower popular classes. The inclusionary and 
progressive governing alliances of the periods 1973–1976, 1983–1989 and 
2002–2015 were characterized by both a preceding increase of the overall level 
of popular class power and an alignment of centrist political actors and currents 
with the redistributive project. In turn, the demise of these alliances began with 
internal conflicts related to their social, ideological, and cultural heterogeneity. 
These conflicts finally led to the weakening of the alliances’ bases of support 
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and the realignment of some of its actors with oppositional forces. Together 
with a decrease in the overall level of popular class power resources linked to 
the decline of progressive organizations, changes in the labor market, shifts 
towards neoliberal thinking, or the abolition of democracy, these realignments 
eventually provided the ground from which exclusionary and regressive gov-
erning alliances emerged. Initially, these were sustained by a broad variety of 
political forces, such as representatives of different business sectors, right-
wing military factions, the conservative leadership of the Catholic Church, and 
politicians from different parties. However, over the years, internal tensions 
also tended to grow within these alliances and subsequently led to their gradual 
disintegration. Some business sectors left the alliances because they felt that 
other sectors were benefiting more from their economic policies, the church 
slowly started to criticize the rise of social tensions, statist and neoliberal mil-
itary factions disagreed on how to confront economic crises, and so on. To-
gether with a recuperation of popular class power resources through successful 
processes of organization, industrial expansion, tightening labor markets, a 
shift towards more demand-oriented economic thinking, or the return to 
democracy, these realignments provided the grounds for the renewed for-
mation of inclusionary or progressive governing alliances. 
Contingent Dynamics of Governing Alliances and Intra-Alliance 
Mechanisms of Social Policy Expansion 
A closer look at Table 34 shows that governing alliances differed significantly 
with regard to their composition and unity, their strength to implement social 
policy change, and their durability in years. This meant that the intra-alliance 
mechanisms of agenda setting regarding social protection for low-income earn-
ers varied.  
Two types of governing alliances that implemented a strong expansion of 
social protections for low-income earners can be distinguished: inclusionary-
redistributive governing alliances during the years 1946–55 and 1973–76 and 
an inclusionary-progressive governing alliance during 2003–15. The major 
difference between these two types of alliances consisted in the varying degree 
of influence of left-of-center forces within the respective alliances. While in 
the inclusionary-progressive alliance, left-of-center forces formed the leading 
circle, the inclusionary-redistributive alliances included strong left-of-center 
actors but were led by a politically centrist circle. Although both types of alli-
ances implemented strong social policy expansion, the distinction helps to 
grasp the underlying political dynamics in each case. 
The inclusionary-redistributive alliances were led by Juan Domingo Perón 
and his close circle, who were politically centrist and pragmatic rather than 
left-of-center in their worldview. However, Perón and his close circle were 
also aware that the main political mass basis of his alliance rested on the 
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support of the popular classes, including both the strongly organized formal 
working class and the largely unorganized lower popular classes. The mobili-
zation of these sectors meant also the incorporation of significant left-of-center 
political forces such as the majority of the trade union movement and the labor 
party in 1946 or the Peronist Youth, the combative minority faction of the un-
ion movement, and a left-leaning slum dwellers’ movement in 1973. In con-
trast, Perón’s attempts to mobilize mass support from conservative and em-
ployer sectors were much less successful. On this basis, it was mainly three 
political mechanisms within the governing alliance that favored the setting of 
a redistributive social policy agenda in favor of low-income earners. First, left-
of-center forces within the alliance exerted pressure for inclusionary social pol-
icies that, in accordance with their political ideology, aimed at reducing ine-
qualities and injustices. This mechanism can be observed especially in the 
early phase of the inclusionary-redistributive governing alliances when the left 
within these alliances was relatively strong and autonomous. Second, the fact 
that the sustainability of the government crucially depended on the mass sup-
port of the lower popular classes motivated the pragmatic circle at the top of 
the governing alliance to use inclusionary social policies as a means of gaining 
support and mobilizing voters. Third, social policies were often deliberately 
implemented in such a way that they provided state officials with considerable 
power over the beneficiaries. Hence, they served to enhance control over their 
own base of support. Taken together, these mechanisms led to the setting of a 
political agenda that included a strong expansion of social protections for low-
income earners. 
Perón’s political centrism and multi-class appeal furthermore enabled the 
formation of initially strong governing alliances that brought together a wide 
array of actors. The inclusionary-redistributive alliances won ample majorities 
in both chambers of the parliament, nearly all governorships and most local 
governments, which provided favorable conditions for the sanctioning of a sig-
nificant number of profound social policy changes within a short period. At the 
same time, the breadth of the alliances led to significant internal tensions and 
struggles over the direction of policy between actors with widely differing ide-
ological orientations. During the years 1946–55 the internal political polariza-
tion was, however, significantly less intense than during the 1973–76 period, 
which explains to an important degree why the latter governing alliance disin-
tegrated much more quickly. What was common to the two governments and 
distinguished their legacy from that of the inclusionary-progressive alliance 
was that while taking up demands of left actors within the alliance, the leading 
circle of the alliance also took measures to marginalize the left in political 
terms. In the 1943–55 period, Perón and his close circle dissolved the left-of-
center labor party and replaced many leftist union leaders. In their place he 
promoted the creation of the centrist Partido Peronista and fostered the emer-
gence of rather conservative union bureaucracies. In the 1973–76 period, the 
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leading circle of the alliance politically marginalized the leftist Peronist Youth 
and removed left-leaning Peronists from public offices. In addition, the para-
military Triple-A carried out violent repression and persecution of left-wing 
activists. In the long run, this decisively weakened the Argentine left and pro-
vided therefore a political legacy that was unfavorable to the defense of social 
protections for low-income earners during the following exclusionary govern-
ments. 
The inclusionary-progressive governing alliance between 2003 and 2015 
was led by Néstor and Cristina Kirchner and their close circle, which in con-
trast to Perón, belonged to the center-left wing of the Peronist movement. The 
Kirchners deliberately sought to incorporate a broad range of progressive or-
ganizations into the core of the governing alliance and to build its electoral 
stronghold among the popular classes as well as progressive parts of the middle 
classes. In contrast to the 1940s and 1970s, the array of actors this time in-
cluded several strong leftist unemployed workers’ movements. These new ac-
tors had emerged during the 1990s and early 2000s in opposition to the PJ and 
UCR/FREPASO governments so that most of them were hesitant to join a gov-
erning alliance which included major parts of the PJ. The government had to 
show considerable commitment to the interests of these movements to win 
their adherence, and despite efforts to attract them, several decided to continue 
their activities as left oppositional forces. Against this background, within the 
inclusionary-progressive governing alliance, it was mainly four political mech-
anisms that contributed to the setting of a redistributive social policy agenda 
in favor of low-income earners. First, this time a center-left political current of 
the PJ was heading the government and was able to shape the social policy 
agenda. The weight of the political left within the alliance was furthermore 
reinforced by the incorporation of several left-leaning parties, unemployed 
workers’ movements, and human rights organizations, which thus became able 
to press their demands in the internal agenda-setting process. Second, the ex-
pansion of social protections for low-income earners successfully served to 
create the government’s most reliable electoral stronghold among the lower 
popular classes and to convince unemployed workers’ movements and the left 
union wing to join the governing alliance. Third, the Kirchner governments 
also designed social policies, and in particular social assistance and housing 
programs, in such a way that they served to co-opt and control social move-
ment leaders, lower rank politicians, and beneficiaries. Fourth, the fact that 
several unemployed workers’ movements remained in the opposition and fre-
quently undertook roadblocks motivated the government to use social policies 
as a tool to contain and defuse protest activity. 
Due to the medium-high level of the overall popular class power resources 
and the fact that the governing alliance was able to incorporate a majority of 
the labor, the unemployed workers’ and human rights movements as well as 
the PJ party, the alliance was quite broad and strong, which facilitated the 
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sanctioning of profound social policy reforms within a short time. Although 
there were certain tensions between left and centrist actors as well as between 
Peronist and non-Peronist actors, these tensions were much lower than during 
the 1973-76 period, so that they neither hampered social policy change nor led 
to an early disintegration of the alliance. In contrast to the inclusionary-redis-
tributive alliances, the inclusionary-progressive alliance provided significant 
resources and public offices to center-left and left political actors and thereby 
fostered the growth of these forces within the governing alliance.  
A moderate expansion of social protections for low-income earners was 
undertaken by the truncated-progressive governing alliance during the 1983–
89 period. As in the case of the inclusionary-progressive alliance, the govern-
ment was led by center-left political actors, in this case Raúl Alfonsín and his 
close circle, who represented the social democratic wing of the UCR. The two 
main mechanisms that led to the incorporation of inclusionary social policies 
into the government’s agenda were that the left wing of the UCR attained sig-
nificant influence and that proposals for an extension of social protections were 
part of an attempt to broaden electoral support among the lower popular clas-
ses. This attempt was, however, not very successful, as most of the working-
class and lower popular class electorate maintained their traditional adherence 
to the PJ. In this sense, the alliance remained truncated.  
In contrast to the inclusionary-redistributive and the inclusionary-progres-
sive alliances, the truncated-progressive alliance was weak in political terms. 
Its power rested nearly completely on the UCR party and its predominantly 
middle-class base of support. Furthermore, the alliance never achieved a ma-
jority in the Senate, so that taken together, the possibilities to impose profound 
social policy change were much more restricted. Against this background, the 
main inclusionary reform project, a unified universal health system, failed in 
the face of the opposition of trade unions, the PJ, and employers. The only 
significant expansion of social protections for low-income earners was reached 
through the introduction of new social assistance and unemployment protec-
tion measures. 
During the 1989–2001 period, a moderate reduction of social protections 
for low-income earners was undertaken. The fact that the social situation of the 
lower popular classes deteriorated more profoundly than during other periods 
of retrenchment was related to the confluence of the reduction of social pro-
tections with a dramatic deterioration of the labor market. Except during the 
last two years of the period, the government was sustained by a broad-regres-
sive alliance. The alliance can be described as regressive because the agenda-
setting process was clearly dominated by the conservative-neoliberal wing of 
the PJ, business representatives, and neoliberal think tanks. Nevertheless, the 
alliance was also broad in the sense that, due to historical affinities and the 
proliferation of clientelistic networks, it also included large parts of the trade 
union movement and captured the majority of the working-class and lower 
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popular class vote. Left-leaning sectors of the PJ and the trade union move-
ment, however, occupied a clearly subordinate position in the alliance and had 
little influence on the agenda-setting process. As the social situation deterio-
rated, the dominance of the neoliberal paradigm in the public opinion declined 
and new oppositional popular class actors emerged and grew in strength. 
Against this background, lower popular class support for the governing alli-
ance increasingly eroded. Due to the dependence of the government on at least 
a major share of the lower popular class vote, it responded to the gradual ero-
sion of support and the rise of competing political actors with the extension of 
social assistance policies. It was mainly two mechanisms that characterized 
this response to lower popular class power. One the one hand, most of the so-
cial assistance expenditure was channeled to clientelistic Peronist networks in 
poor neighborhoods. Thereby the government aimed at enhancing its direct 
control over its lower popular class base and at countervailing the gradual em-
igration of low-income earners towards other political forces. On the other 
hand, a smaller share of resources was used to contain and defuse unemployed 
workers’ movements’ protests through directly negotiated concessions. How-
ever, all in all, the increase of social assistance expenditure far from compen-
sated for the dramatic reduction of social protections for low-income earners 
in the fields of pension and health care policies. 
Due to the variety of actors included in the governing alliance and major-
ities in both chambers of the parliament, the alliance was strong and able to 
implement profound social policy changes. Ménem was furthermore highly 
effective in dealing with internal tensions by applying stick-and-carrot tactics 
that led to the alignment of the more cooperative union leaders and the mar-
ginalization of the more combative union factions as well as the minority of 
progressive Peronist politicians. During the second half of the 1990s, the dete-
rioration of the social situation because of the government’s neoliberal policies 
led nevertheless to a gradual erosion of the government’s popular class sup-
port. Against this background, the 1999 elections resulted in the replacement 
of the Peronist government by an alliance of the UCR and the FREPASO. The 
new government was dominated by the neoliberal faction of the UCR and 
largely continued the social policy agenda of the preceding government. Due 
to a considerably smaller base of support, an economic downturn, and growing 
resistance from trade unions and social movements, the alliance was however 
considerably weaker and largely disintegrated within only two years.  
The periods 1955–73 and 1976–83 were characterized by exclusionary-
regressive governing alliances. During both periods, popular class actors were 
de facto excluded from the alliances while right-wing military and business 
leaders gained far-reaching influence on social policy.195 Against this back-
ground, social protections for low-income earners were significantly reduced. 
 
195  The first few months of the Frondizi government in 1958 might be considered the only 
significant exception.  
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Social policy change was particularly regressive during the military dictator-
ships in the years 1955–58, 1966–73, and 1976–83. During the civilian UCR 
governments of 1958–66, the deterioration of social protections for low-in-
come earners was more limited, yet the prohibition of Peronism and the re-
peated military interferences also inhibited significant moves towards inclu-
sionary social policy. While these governments from time to time responded 
to trade union protests with concessions in the area of social insurance that 
benefited formal workers, there were no significant political mechanisms that 
would have led to an expansion of social protections for low-income earners. 
The governing alliances during these periods were medium-strong and be-
side military, employer, and church support also enjoyed some level of support 
from the middle classes and non-Peronist parties. Due to the severe restriction 
of institutional checks and balances, they were able to carry out significant 
social policy change within a short time. However, internal tensions led to re-
peated internal coups and finally the decline of these alliances. 
Table 35 summarizes the main political mechanisms related to the expan-
sion of social protections for low-income earners. As can be observed, the in-
tra-alliance processes of agenda-setting in this respect were consistently related 
to the underlying distributions of power resources within and without the alli-
ance. On the one hand, the distribution of power resources permitted progres-
sive and lower popular class actors a certain level of direct influence on the 
agenda-setting during the progressive-inclusionary, the progressive-truncated 
and to a lesser degree during the inclusionary-distributive governing alliances. 
On the other hand, the leading circles of these alliances responded to the power 
resources of the lower popular classes and progressive actors by proposing and 
implementing social policies that either mobilized and consolidated their sup-
port for the alliance or aimed at controlling or containing their political activi-
ties. The extension of targeted social assistance programs during the broad-
regressive alliance of the 1990s also has to be understood as a response to the 
lower popular classes’ institutional and associational power resources, as they 
aimed at controlling beneficiaries through clientelistic practices and at contain-
ing protests. 
The surprising coherence in the direction of social policies of each gov-
erning alliance despite their often very heterogeneous bases of support was 
related to the generally highly hierarchical structure of governments, organi-
zations, and alliances in Argentina. In practice, presidents and their close cir-
cles possessed sufficient power to control state bureaucracies and lower-level 
political office holders as well as their own parties.196 As a result, top-down 
mechanisms of agenda-setting prevailed during virtually all periods, enabling 
 
196  A variety of factors contributed to this concentration of power, such as the strong con-
stitutional powers of the president, the capacity to exchange bureaucratic personnel, a 
high dependency of lower levels of government on resource transfers from the central 
government, and the de facto weakness of party internal institutions. 
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leading circles to impose their agendas over the objections of dissenting mi-
nority factions within their alliances. 
Table 35: Intra-alliance mechanisms related to the expansion of social protections for low- 
income earners, 1943–2015 
Period 
Type of  
governing  
alliance 
Main intra-alliance mechanisms  
related to the expansion of social 
protections for low-income earners 
Overall evolution 
of social protec-






· Implementation of social policies 
as measures to mobilize lower 
popular class support* 
· Implementation of social policies 
as measures to co-opt and  
control beneficiaries and political 
leaders 
· Influence of progressive actors and 
currents on the social policy agenda 
Strong expansion  
2002–2015 Inclusionary- 
progressive 
· Influence of progressive actors 
and currents on the social policy 
agenda 
· Implementation of social policies 
as measures to mobilize lower 
popular class support 
· Implementation of social policies as 
measures to co-opt and control 
beneficiaries and political leaders 
· Implementation of social policies as 
measures to contain and diffuse 
lower popular class protests 
Strong expansion  
1983–1989 Truncated- 
progressive 
· Influence of progressive actors 
and currents on the social policy 
agenda 
· Implementation of social policies 
as measures to mobilize lower 





· Implementation of social policies 
as measures to co-opt and con-
trol beneficiaries and political 
leaders 
· Implementation of social policies as 
measures to contain and diffuse 
lower popular class protests 
Overall moderate 
reduction with mi-
nor concessions in 
the area of social 





· Absence of significant mechanisms Strong reduction 
* Mechanisms in bold were of particular importance within the respective alliance. 
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6 Conclusions 
The empirical historical analysis of more than seven decades has provided an 
encompassing account of when and why social protections for low-income 
earners have been extended or cut in Argentina. The findings furthermore pro-
vide significant empirical support for the initially developed theoretical frame-
work, as they show both that and how the popular classes’ power resources and 
historically specific constellations of actors and interests shaped the dynamics 
of governing alliance formation and social policy change. The following chap-
ter will offer an overview of the main findings and reflect on their implications 
for welfare state theory.  
6.1 Main Findings: Power, Alliances, and Redistribution 
In congruence with the theoretical framework, the empirical analysis shows 
that high levels of popular class power resources favor the extension of social 
protections for low-income earners while low levels of popular class power 
favor retrenchment. This relationship, however, was not linear and direct but 
depended crucially on historically contingent processes of governing alliance 
formation as the most important mechanism that causally linked the underlying 
distribution of power resources to specific outcomes regarding social protec-
tions for low-income earners. The dynamics of these processes of governing 
alliance formation, in turn, were heavily influenced by historically grown con-
stellations of actors and interests as well as the current social, politico-institu-
tional and economic contexts. In order to provide a more detailed overview of 
the main findings, I will first make a compact assessment of the initial hypoth-
eses, then work out the crucial political mechanisms that shaped processes of 
expansion and retrenchment of social protections for low-income earners and 
finally illustrate in a strongly summarized way how these mechanisms oper-
ated over the whole period of study in Argentina. 
Assessment of the Initial Hypotheses 
Popular class power and redistribution: In accordance with the traditional 
power resources approach (Esping-Andersen [1990] 1998; Huber and Ste-
phens 2001; Korpi 1983) and one strand of Marxist state theory (Poulantzas 
[1978] 2000), I have assumed that the redistributive character of public policy 
can be best understood as the outcome of relations of power. The empirical 
analysis of the Argentinian case provided strong support for this hypothesis. 
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As has been shown in Chapter 5, high levels of popular class power resources 
consistently corresponded with an extension of social protections for low-in-
come earners, while low levels were consistently associated with retrenchment. 
This consistency, however, does not mean that there was an automatic func-
tional fit between the two categories. Rather, the distribution of power re-
sources constituted a framework that enhanced or decreased the chances of 
different actors of imposing their social policy interests at the same time that it 
provided incentives to actors to pursue certain alliance strategies and to make 
social policy concessions to certain sectors and political forces. Within this 
framework, the concrete political dynamics and outcomes remained always 
contingent on the strategies pursued by different actors and a range of events 
specific to the historical moment, such as political scandals, economic crises, 
and so on. 
Distribution of power resources among different popular classes: I fur-
thermore assumed that the expansion of social protections for low-income 
earners becomes more likely when this subsector of the popular classes 
achieves considerable power resources, as this might, (1) enable them to exert 
pressures on policy-makers, (2) enable them to become themselves participants 
in the design and implementation of social policy, or (3) at least provide incen-
tives to political elites to mobilize their support through social policies. This 
hypothesis is strongly supported by the empirical findings. However, in prac-
tice, the three mentioned mechanisms were of different importance. Until the 
mid-1990s, low-income groups, such as peasants or unemployed and informal 
workers, were not well-organized and so their associational power resources 
were comparatively low. Due to their marginalized position in the system of 
production and their high vulnerability on the labor market, their structural 
power resources have also been low throughout the period. This meant that (1) 
their capacity to exercise external pressures and to extract significant social 
policy concessions was severely limited. The weakness of political organiza-
tion meant that (2) a direct influence of lower popular class actors on social 
policy agendas through the active participation in governing alliances was the 
exception. After the mid-1990s, the emergence of lower popular class mass 
movements changed this situation to a certain degree. External pressures 
through these movements and later the participation of some of them in the 
Kirchnerist governing alliance significantly contributed to the extension of so-
cial assistance policies. Nevertheless, seen over the period of study as a whole, 
the most important mechanism that related the power resources of the lower 
popular classes to an expansion of social protections was (3) that institutional 
and discursive power resources provided political elites with significant incen-
tives to mobilize their electoral support and to promote their affiliation to par-
ties and movements associated with the government.  
The necessity of broader alliances: Due to the lack of economic resources 
and the spatial dispersion of low-income earners, I have assumed that the 
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construction of strong lower popular class movements is challenging and hence 
that the extension of social protections usually requires the formation of 
broader alliances with other political forces. I have furthermore assumed that 
governing alliances can influence social policy much more strongly than can 
oppositional alliances. Therefore, relatively limited differences in the distribu-
tion of power resources can be associated with significant differences in social 
policy when they enable the assumption of a different kind of governing alli-
ance. The empirical analysis provides strong support for this hypothesis. Social 
protections for low-income earners were only significantly extended by inclu-
sionary governing alliances that actively sought to incorporate the lower pop-
ular classes as an important electoral and associational support base. External 
pressures by unemployed workers’ and slum dwellers’ movements as well as 
by broad-based oppositional alliances, such as the FRENAPO, had compara-
tively limited direct effects on the level of social protections for low-income 
earners. Although these pressures led to concessions, such as the extension of 
certain social assistance programs, their most significant impact was indirect 
insofar that they contributed to the decline of the respective regressive govern-
ing alliance and to the subsequent formation of an inclusionary alliance, which 
eventually initiated deeper social policy change.  
Actors and social protections for low-income earners: I have assumed that 
the most likely allies for redistributive alliances are left and popular class-
based political parties, trade unions, and social movements. Right political par-
ties, right-wing military leaders, neoliberal IFIs, and employers were assumed 
to pursue retrenchment or inegalitarian types of social policy. As can be seen 
in Table 36, the empirical analysis supports these initial hypotheses, yet also 
shows that the constellations of actors and interests were even more complex 
than expected. 
Table 36: Overview of the constellation of actors and interests regarding the extension of social 




· Center-left political parties 
· Left political parties 
· Left wing of the UCR 
· Left wing of the PJ 
· Left wing of the union  
movement 
· Social movements 
· ILO, WHO, UNICEF 
· Centrist parties 
· Centrist wing of the PJ 
· Centrist wing of the UCR 
· Centrist wing of the union 
movement 
· Catholic church 
· Center-right political parties 
· Right political parties 
· Right wing of the UCR 
· Right wing of the PJ 
· Right wing of the union  
movement 
· Employers’ associations 
· Employer-financed think 
tanks 
· Military 
· International financial  
institutions 
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Due to the politically heterogeneous bases of many political actors, in practice 
different internal currents took distinct positions towards social protections for 
low-income earners. This finding is nevertheless congruent with the power re-
sources approach, as it was the left currents within these actors that consistently 
supported increases in social protection for low-income earners and right in-
ternal currents that opposed them. Furthermore, major factions of the union 
movement and the two biggest parties can be described as politically centrist. 
Over the years these centrist factions oscillated between supporting and oppos-
ing social protections for low-income earners. Whether they inclined to one 
side or another was in practice importantly shaped by the levels of institutional 
and discursive power resources of the popular classes. When these were high, 
the centrist factions inclined towards supporting social protections for low-in-
come earners; when they were low, they tended to oppose them. High levels 
of institutional power resources meant that the numerically strong lower pop-
ular classes attained considerable electoral importance, which provided strong 
incentives for centrist political actors to attempt to mobilize their support. At 
the same time, high levels of discursive power resources provided them with 
capacities to successfully frame inclusionary social policy as being beneficial 
for the society as a whole and thus enabled them to engage in alliances with 
left and lower popular class forces without necessarily renouncing their better-
off and at times more conservative middle-class and formal labor support. In 
practice, this mechanism was of high importance for the politics of social pro-
tection for low-income earners, as during no period were left and lower popular 
class forces able to form a sustainable governing alliance without the support 
of centrist currents and organizations. This fact was reinforced by the cross-
cutting divides that characterize the Argentine political system. On the one 
hand, positions towards redistributive policies were strongly shaped by the left-
right divide. On the other hand, major political actors organized around the 
divide between Peronism and anti-Peronism. This often meant that due to his-
torically grown identities and affinities, political alliances between left and 
non-left Peronist organizations and currents were more likely to emerge than 
between left currents that belonged to Peronist and anti-Peronist political tra-
ditions. 
The development of a truncated welfare state: I have furthermore assumed 
that truncated systems of social policy that provide social protections mainly 
to formal workers and the middle and upper classes result from exclusionary 
and regressive governing alliances that aim to foster middle-class support and 
control trade union agitation. This hypothesis is empirically supported; how-
ever, the findings showed that the development of truncated social policies was 
at times also favored by more progressive governing alliances and actors. 
There were several reasons for why exclusionary and regressive governing al-
liance were particularly prone to promote truncated policies. First, based on 
their rightist ideological orientation, these exclusionary alliances either prefer-
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red highly stratified or market-oriented social policies. Both types of social 
policy were regressive and provided social protection mainly to the better-off 
segments of the society. Second, these exclusionary governments in each case 
inherited a range of social policies that benefitted both the formal working 
class and the lower popular classes. As the latter had lower structural power 
resources and were scarcely organized, and therefore had weaker capacities of 
resistance, social protections for low-income earners were cut quicker and 
more profoundly. The trade union movement, in contrast, was able to actively 
resist the retrenchment of social insurance protections for formal workers and 
at times even able to extract positive concessions. Rightist governing alliances 
furthermore used truncated social insurance policies to contain trade union ag-
itation or to co-opt and divide the popular classes and their organizations. In 
sum, the interplay of these factors led to the outcome that exclusionary gov-
erning alliances pushed the Argentine social policy regime strongly in a trun-
cated direction. Although inclusionary and progressive governing alliances im-
portantly expanded social protections for low-income earners and hence 
pushed the social policy regime in a less truncated and more egalitarian direc-
tion, their policies were not completely coherent in this sense because their 
leading circles also used fragmented and truncated social policies to co-opt 
union leaders and thereby to attain more control over their own social bases.  
Path dependency effects: Finally, I have assumed that inegalitarian social 
policies, especially exclusionary social insurance schemes, tend to create 
vested interests and hence path dependency effects that pose additional diffi-
culties for progressive social policy reform, as the resistance from employers 
and conservatives might be reinforced by popular class actors who benefit from 
the respective policies. The empirical findings support this hypothesis but at 
the same time also indicate that the strength of path dependency effects highly 
depends on the types of vested interests created by a particular policy. For ex-
ample, the system of social pension insurance has been restructured several 
times, while similarly far-reaching change in the area of social health insurance 
was successfully blocked by the trade union movement. This has very much to 
do with the fact that, in contrast to the pension system, most social health in-
surance funds are controlled by trade unions and this creates strong vested in-
terests in these organizations as well as among their members. In practice, this 
meant that the defense and strengthening of the social health insurance funds 
constituted one of the highest political priorities of organized labor. Therefore, 
resistance to reform was more intense in this policy area and governments took 
up the demands of the union movement when they perceived it necessary to 
contain labor militancy or to negotiate union support for reform in other policy 
areas. Nevertheless, even in the case of health insurance, when it comes to the 
possibilities of reform, much depended on the strategy of the government. For 
example, both regressive and progressive governments were able to gradually 
alter the relative amount of resources provided to the universal public health 
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system and the social health insurance funds in one or another direction. In 
addition to this, governments were able to gradually transform the regulations 
regarding affiliation and benefits, which was in practice of high importance to 
the question of how many low-income earners were able to access social health 
insurance and of what quality the coverage was. 
Main Factors and Mechanisms behind Policy Change 
The empirical analysis revealed that the level of social protection for low-in-
come earners underwent strong variation during the 72 years under study. Ra-
ther than being linear, this change was characterized by alternating periods of 
expansion and retrenchment. While the length and reform intensity of the dif-
ferent periods varied, the direction of policy change within each period was 
very coherent. Against this background, it has been possible to undertake a 
twofold methodological approach to identifying the main factors and mecha-
nisms associated with the extension and retrenchment of social protections for 
low-income earners. In a first step, the study traced the processes of policy 
change and thereby reconstructed which actors expanded or retrenched social 
protections for low-income earners under what circumstances and with what 
kind of goal and strategy. In a second step, the different periods of expansion 
and retrenchment were compared in order to achieve a clearer picture of the 
political patterns that were associated with progressive and regressive social 
policy reform cycles. In combination, these two approaches allowed for a quite 
concise identification of the main factors and mechanisms that shaped the pro-
cesses of social policy change towards low-income earners in Argentina. Fig-
ure 16 provides a summarized illustration of the results. 
The main driving forces behind changes in the direction of social policy 
were alterations in the distribution of power resources and in the constellations 
of actors and interests. Any period of expansion of social protections for low-
income earners in Argentina was preceded by national and international struc-
tural changes and political developments that led to an increase of the overall 
level of power resources of the popular classes and a realignment of political 
forces. These realignments were characterized by rising tensions among anti-
redistributive forces, on the one hand, and a growing disposition of centrist 
political forces to forge alliances with left and lower popular class forces, on 
the other. Taken together, these developments generated favorable conditions 
for the formation of inclusionary and progressive governing alliances. In prac-
tice, the concrete processes of alliance formation were different in each period, 
and so were the alliances’ compositions, political orientations, and capacities 
to impose far-reaching policy change. Notwithstanding, in all cases, these in-
clusionary and progressive governing alliances implemented an expansion of 
social protections for low-income earners. Within these alliances it was mainly 
four political mechanisms that shaped the respective agenda-setting processes.  
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First, the leading circles of these alliances used progressive social policies as 
measures to mobilize the electoral and associational support of the lower pop-
ular classes, and hence, to strengthen or consolidate their bases of support. 
Second, left and lower popular class actors and currents within these alliances 
used their power to influence the agenda-setting process in favor of low-in-
come earners. Third, the implementation of inclusionary social policies was 
used to co-opt and control beneficiaries and political leaders, and hence, to 
increase the control of the leading circle over the bases of support of the alli-
ance. Fourth, governing alliances implemented redistributive social policies as 
measures to contain and diffuse lower popular class protests. 
As the Argentine popular classes have been organized in multiple move-
ments and currents with different ideological orientations, inclusionary alli-
ances tended to be strongly heterogeneous. This characteristic was additionally 
reinforced by the fact that the political left was never strong enough to form a 
governing alliance on its own and hence always depended on the collaboration 
of centrist political actors. This heterogeneity, in turn, favored the emergence 
of internal tensions as soon as political or economic difficulties arose and the 
promotion of concrete policies revealed conflicts of interest between some of 
the allied forces. Internal tensions were of varying intensity during the different 
inclusionary governing alliances, but in all cases, they sooner or later led to a 
weakening of the alliance. In parallel, it could be observed that the implemen-
tation of redistributive policies aroused growing resistance from employers and 
right-wing political forces, which gradually contributed to processes of recon-
struction of anti-redistributive alliances. Political and economic crises and a 
subsequent decrease of popular class power resources eventually provided po-
litical opportunities for these alliances to replace the weakened inclusionary 
governments either by military coup or democratic elections. As soon as the 
exclusionary alliances took control of the government, they initiated a series 
of reforms that drastically cut social protections for low-income earners. After 
some time, however, internal heterogeneity and economic crises also produced 
increasing tensions within the exclusionary alliances. Recurring phenomena 
were, among others, that certain sectors of the economic elite started to com-
plain that other sectors would benefit more from state policy, that different 
military factions disagreed on how to deal with popular resistance, and that the 
church started to criticize the rise of social tensions. In combination with a 
recovery of popular class power resources, this allowed for renewed attempts 
to form more inclusionary governing alliances. 
In order to provide a concise overview of the above described pendular 
movements of social politics in Argentina, Figure 17 summarizes the operation 
of the main causal factors and mechanisms over the period of seven decades. 
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In addition to the formation of inclusionary and exclusionary alliances, the ex-
traction of social policy concessions by means of exercising oppositional pres-
sures constituted another mechanism through which different distributions of 
power resources and constellations of actors were causally linked to changing 
levels of social protection.  
Notably, during approximately five of the seven decades under study, this 
mechanism was mainly related to trade union pressures and resulted in conces-
sions regarding social insurance for formal workers. As most low-income earn-
ers lacked social insurance coverage, they hardly benefitted from these con-
cessions. Only after the emergence of strong unemployed workers’ movements 
during the mid-1990s did oppositional pressures lead to significant conces-
sions in the area of social assistance policies and hence become more important 
in influencing the evolution of social protections for low-income earners. 
Considering that social policy reform is commonly characterized by path 
dependencies and gradualism, the extraordinarily stark contrast between the 
strong expansion of social protections for low-income earners during some pe-
riods, and their dramatic reduction during others, appears at first glance sur-
prising. However, the empirical analysis revealed several aspects that explain 
these stark contrasts, some of which were quite particular to the Argentine po-
litical system and culture. First, the period of study was shaped by an extraor-
dinarily strong polarization between inclusionary and exclusionary political 
projects, neither of which was able to lastingly alter the balance of power in its 
own favor. Juan Carlos Portantiero (1973) even referred to this situation as a 
hegemonic tie. The strength of the polarization resulted in large part from the 
aggressively anti-redistributive stances of most of the employers and other 
right-wing forces as well as the populist and confrontational style of Peronist 
politics. Related to this, Argentine politics were characterized by a relative 
weakness of tripartite and other institutional structures that could have pro-
moted compromises and middle ways. Second, most Argentine political organ-
izations, alliances and governments functioned as highly personalistic and hi-
erarchical apparatuses. This, in turn, enabled the leading circles of the different 
governing alliances to impose quite coherent and deep social policy reform 
agendas despite their highly heterogeneous bases of support. So, mechanisms 
that might have promoted the generation of political compromises tended to be 
weak not only outside but also within governing alliances, which, as a side 
product, accelerated the realignment of former allies as opponents on various 
occasions. Third, within all governments, the direction of social policy was 
subordinated to the overriding goals of economic policy and hence depended 
highly on whether a demand-oriented or a supply side-oriented approach was 
adopted. In this regard the inclusionary and exclusionary alliances differed 
consistently. Fourth, as social protections for low-income earners often re-
sulted from top-down strategies to mobilize and control lower popular class 
support, they were often not institutionalized as social rights but implemented 
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as loosely regulated assistance measures that provided political leaders with 
opportunities for the application of clientelistic strategies. The resulting lack 
of solid legal structures and their perception as gifts rather than conquered so-
cial rights made their later retrenchment politically much easier. Fifth, in con-
trast to social protections for formal workers, social protections for low-income 
earners lacked a strong autonomous support basis, as the lower popular classes 
did not develop comparable associational and structural power resources. This 
enabled exclusionary governments to advance much quicker with the disman-
tling of social protections for marginalized groups than with the retrenchment 
of social insurance. 
The Argentine Case in Regional Perspective 
While the extraordinary radicality of changes might be an Argentine particu-
larity, the expansion of social protections for low-income earners often resem-
bled regional trends. When in Argentina the first Peronist governing alliance 
during the 1940s and 1950s massively expanded health care, pension, and so-
cial assistance provision to low-income earners, several other Latin American 
countries incorporated hitherto excluded groups into their social security sys-
tems (Haggard and Kaufman 2008, 79–113; Segura-Ubiergo 2007, 24–76). 
Although not all reforms reached the poor, several countries undertook signif-
icant efforts to expand social protections to the poor. Costa Rica, among other 
countries, approved social insurance legislation during the 1940s that priori-
tized low-income earners and was universal in its aspiration (Huber and Ste-
phens 2012, 91; Rosenberg 1983, 45–104). Uruguay implemented and univer-
salized family allowances and included rural workers and other hitherto ex-
cluded low-income groups into its social security system (Filgueira 1995, 17–
23). In a similar vein, when during the 1970s the second Peronist government 
strengthened the universal public health system, extended low-income earners’ 
access to pensions and raised social assistance expenditures, governments in 
several other Latin American countries pursued progressive social policy agen-
das. Costa Rica advanced towards the de facto universalization of health care 
coverage, expanded access to pensions among the poor, and set into motion 
massive social assistance programs (Martinez Franzoni and Sánchez-Anco-
chea 2013, 20–23; McGuire 2010, 86–87). In Chile, the governments of Edu-
ardo Frei and Salvador Allende strongly strengthened the provision of basic 
health services, education, and housing for peasants and marginalized urban 
sectors (Arellano 1985, 413–414). And finally, when the Kirchnerist govern-
ment universalized pensions and child allowances and expanded housing pol-
icies during the 2000s and early 2010s, the regional political landscape expe-
rienced an unprecedented left turn and social protections for marginalized 
groups were extended in most Latin American countries (Garay 2010; Levitsky 
and Roberts 2011; Lustig 2015; Pribble 2013). Among other countries, Brazil 
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massively expanded targeted cash benefits through the Bolsa Familia program 
(Hunter 2011, 316–318). Chile strongly extended pension coverage among 
low-income earners and Uruguay significantly improved family allowances 
and health care provision for the poor (Pribble 2013, 39–119).  
Interestingly, all mentioned examples have in common that they took place 
after a variety of developments led to a considerable strengthening of the over-
all level of popular class power resources and the formation of inclusionary 
governing alliances. They took place during periods of democracy and in con-
texts where at least one important political force made significant efforts to 
mobilize low-income voters, which increased the institutional power resources 
of the popular classes in general and of the lower popular classes in particular. 
Furthermore, in all examples, social policy expansion took place in contexts 
where pro-redistributive development and social policy paradigms were influ-
ential in the wider public as well as in expert communities, which implied a 
comparatively high level of discursive popular class power resources. Between 
the 1940s and 1970s, the ISI development paradigm became increasingly pop-
ular throughout the region and provided progressive forces with the ability to 
credibly frame social policies in favor of low-income earners as being benefi-
cial for economic development and hence ultimately benefitting all social clas-
ses. At the same time, the universalistic ideas of the Beveridge-model and pro-
gressive “sanitarista” public health expert circles became increasingly influen-
tial in the regional social policy debate. In a similar way, the discrediting of 
neoliberalism and the emergence of a rather more demand-oriented and state-
interventionist economic paradigm during the 2000s, combined with a revival 
of universalism as a guiding social policy idea in regional expert communities 
and international organizations, provided a favorable discursive context during 
the recent phase of social policy expansion. In addition to this, most of the 
mentioned examples took place during periods of comparatively fast economic 
growth and high commodity export prices, which led to a tightening of labor 
markets, and hence, increased the structural power resources of the popular 
classes.197 And finally, all examples were characterized by an increase of the 
associational power resources of the popular classes through a strengthening 
of left parties and currents, social movements, or trade unions. In each case, 
social policy expansion for low-income earners was to an important degree a 
response to these increases of the popular classes’ power resources. In Costa 
 
197  For an overview of economic developments in Latin America during the 20th century, 
see Hofman (2001). For an overview of long-term commodity price developments, see 
Jacks and Stuermer (2016). Costa Rica during the 1940s might be considered an excep-
tion, due to the still very low level of industrialization and a variety of economic diffi-
culties during that decade. Nevertheless, also in this case the considerable expansion of 
banana plantations increased the structural power resources of the popular classes, 
which found its expression in the relative effectiveness of plantation workers’ strikes 
(Hytrek 1999). 
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Rica during the 1940s, the government of Rafael Ángel Calderón Guardia re-
sponded with the incorporation of the communist party and the trade union 
movement into his governing alliance. The legislation of an inclusionary social 
insurance system constituted in this context the outcome of the increased in-
fluence of popular class forces and progressive Catholic currents within the 
alliance and the alliance’s attempt to mobilize lower class support (Huber and 
Stephens 2012, 91–93; Hytrek 1999; Yashar 1997, 101–151). During the 
1970s, social policy expansion under the Presidents José Figueres Ferrer and 
Daniel Oduber was motivated by attempts to deal with an increasingly strong 
left wing in the PLN, intense electoral competition for low-income earners’ 
votes among the PLN, Social Christianism and the left as well as growing chal-
lenges to the PLN’s hegemony among peasants through the growth and mili-
tancy of leftist rural movements (Martinez Franzoni and Sánchez-Ancochea 
2013, 20–23; McGuire 2010, 86–87; Yashar 1995, 85–87). The expansions of 
social protections for low-income earners in Uruguay during the 1940s, 1950s, 
and 2000s constituted responses to tight electoral competition for the votes of 
the lower popular classes, pressures from an autonomous and increasingly 
strong labor movement, and the influence of progressive political currents and 
parties. While progressive politicians mainly operated as currents within the 
two major centrist parties during the 1940s and 1950s, the Partido Colorado 
and the Partido Nacional, during the 2000s they were able to push social policy 
expansion through the governing center-left Frente Amplio party (Filgueira 
1995, 17–23; Pribble 2013, 39–119). In Chile, during the 1960s, 1970s, and 
2000s the strengthening of the popular classes’ power resources found its ex-
pression in a strengthening of left parties, particularly the Partido Socialista de 
Chile, and an increased electoral competition for the votes of labor and the 
lower popular classes. During the 1960s and 1970s, these developments were 
reinforced by growing labor and social movement activism and a strengthening 
of the left wing of the Partido Demócrata Cristiano. This constellation of power 
resources motivated the Christian Democratic government of Eduardo Frei af-
ter 1964 to implement progressive social policies and to incorporate popular 
class forces into his electoral and organizational base of support. Between 1970 
and 1973, social policy expansion was continued by the left government of 
Salvador Allende (Arellano 1985; Huber and Stephens 2012, 90–91). During 
the 2000s, social policy expansion for low-income earners was promoted by 
governing alliances under the leadership of the Partido Socialista de Chile 
(Pribble 2013, 39–119). Similarly, in Brazil, the gradual increase of the popu-
lar classes’ power resources found its expression in a strengthening of peasant 
and labor activism and the formation of governing alliances under the leader-
ship of the center-left Partido dos Trabalhadores, which expanded cash trans-
fers and social services covering the poor (Hunter 2011). In sum, the contextual 
factors, political constellations, mechanisms, and subsequent social policy 
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outcomes were in all examples highly consistent with the theoretical frame-
work developed in the present study.  
Although this brief overview does not constitute anything close to a com-
prehensive regional analysis, it nevertheless strongly suggests that the theoret-
ical approach developed in this study has explanatory power beyond the Ar-
gentinian case and constitutes a fertile perspective to explore the evolution of 
social protections for low-income earners in other Latin American countries. 
6.2 Theoretical Implications 
So far, long-term studies have been predominantly interested in elaborating 
theoretical explications for social spending variation and general welfare re-
gime development in Latin America (Filgueira 2005; Haggard and Kaufman 
2008; Huber and Stephens 2012; Huber, Mustillo, and Stephens 2008; Mesa-
Lago 1978; 1989; Segura-Ubiergo 2007). However, Latin American social pol-
icy regimes and spending have expanded without generating social protections 
for low-income earners at any comparable pace. While this paradox has dra-
matic social consequences, severely limits the life quality and prospects of 
hundreds of millions of Latin Americans, and increases social tension and in-
equality, few studies have focused explicitly on the politics of social protection 
for low-income earners. Those that have focused on this issue cover a relatively 
short timeframe, which inhibits evaluation of the role of major economic, so-
cial, and politico-institutional factors whose impacts become visible only over 
longer periods of time (Garay 2010; Pribble 2013). The most important theo-
retical contribution of the present study was, therefore, the development of the 
first comprehensive, coherent, and specific approach to analyzing the long-
term politics of social protection for low-income earners in Latin America. The 
approach is comprehensive as it goes far beyond single-factor explications and 
instead merges ideas and concepts from different theories and approaches and 
adapts them to the Latin American context and to the issue of social protection 
for low-income earners. The approach is coherent as it does not simply add 
explanatory factors and categories but systematically connects them. It ex-
plains how different economic-structural, institutional, discursive, and polit-
ico-associational factors shape the constellations of power and interest in soci-
ety, and through this, how they provide at times more and at times less favor-
able conditions for the implementation or expansion of social protections. Fi-
nally, the approach is specific as it focuses explicitly on the issue of social 
protections for low-income earners and describes the political mechanisms that 
relate underlying constellations of power and interest to social policy out-
comes.  
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The strongest theoretical influence stemmed from power resources theory 
and hence the empirical analysis produced first and foremost implications for 
that approach. However, due to the discussion and incorporation of ideas and 
concepts from several other approaches and theories, a range of suggestions 
and implications for these can be derived from the analysis as well.  
Implications for Power Resources Theory 
In general, the empirical findings provide strong support for the central theo-
retical claim of the power resources approach that left and working-class forces 
promote broad and redistributive social policies while right and capitalist class 
forces promote retrenchment and regressive reform. Regarding Latin America, 
power resources theorists have furthermore argued that the length of democ-
racy decisively influences the redistributive character of social policy in the 
sense that longer democratic records are related to more redistributive effects 
of social spending (Huber et al. 2006; Huber and Stephens 2012). Again, this 
argument is strongly supported by the empirical findings. All periods of major 
expansion of social protections for low-income earners in Argentina have been 
characterized by democratic rule and the tracing of the processes of alliance 
formation and agenda-setting also showed how and through which mecha-
nisms democracy affected political dynamics and different actors’ strategic de-
cisions. 
At the same time, the findings strongly supported the modifications and 
specifications of the approach made in the theory chapter. These proved able 
to provide empirically sustained explications for the development of social pol-
icy in complex contexts that were difficult to analyze with the original, more 
parsimonious version of the approach. First, the modified approach uses the 
broader concept of popular class power resources instead of working-class 
power resources. This choice for the broader concept turned out to be empiri-
cally important. The lower popular classes such as the peasantry, informal and 
unemployed workers are much larger in Argentina and other Latin American 
countries than in the European countries that constituted the main empirical 
bases for the development of the original power resources approach. In this 
context, a focus on the working class alone would have been too narrow to 
determine when the distribution of power resources was favorable or not for 
the implementation of progressive social policies. Peasants, informal and un-
employed workers were of high electoral importance in practice and their so-
cial movements influenced social policy making through the organization of 
oppositional protests and roadblocks as well as participation in inclusionary 
governing alliances. Indeed, whether social policy reform mainly favored the 
formal working class or also the lowest income groups depended decisively on 
the relative distribution of power resources among the popular classes. Social 
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policy was particularly progressive when a strong overall level of popular class 
power resources coincided with a relative strength of the lower popular classes.  
Second, in order to come to a meaningful assessment of the relative 
strength of the political left it turned out to be insufficient to look at political 
organizations as ideologically homogeneous units. The modified approach 
therefore also considers the political divides and struggles that take place 
within political organizations. In Argentina, neither of the two major parties 
during the period under study, the PJ and the UCR, can be categorized as left 
or right. In order to understand their role in social politics, it was pivotal to 
look inside these parties and to assess the relative strength of left and right 
internal currents and the conditions under which the centrist factions of these 
parties tended to ally with either of the two sides. Based on this modification, 
the study was able to show that the left-right divide was of crucial importance 
even in a party system that was organized mainly around another divide, 
namely between Peronism and anti-Peronism. It was consistently left internal 
currents that promoted and defended social protections for low-income earners 
and right internal currents that favored regressive social policy reform. Similar 
observations were made regarding the trade union movement. While conserva-
tive union factions tended to focus their political demands on social insurance 
benefits that favored exclusively the formal working class, left-leaning union 
factions promoted universalistic and redistributive social policies based on a 
broad definition of the working class that explicitly included informal and un-
employed workers. It seems promising to apply this theoretical modification 
also to the study of regressive social policy reforms undertaken by left and 
social democratic parties during the 1990s and 2000s in several Latin Ameri-
can and industrialized countries. It is likely that in these cases as well the policy 
shift was related to the emergence and increasing influence of right internal 
currents within these parties.  
Third, the empirical findings confirm that considering four instead of only 
one type of power resource can significantly enhance the analytical capacity 
of the power resources approach. Not only the associational strength of the 
popular classes, but also their institutional, structural, and discursive power 
resources were pivotal to understanding the redistributive character of social 
policy reform. Indeed, as has been shown, the level of associational power re-
sources of the popular classes remained relatively stable over the period of 
study while in contrast social protections for low-income earners underwent 
periods of significant expansion and retrenchment. Hence, a focus on associa-
tional power resources alone, as in the traditional power resources approach, 
would clearly have been insufficient to explain social policy change. Yet, if we 
take the four different types of power resources into account, the levels of so-
cial protection for low-income earners and the combined levels of popular class 
power resources developed in a congruent manner. Moreover, the process trac-
ing analysis was able to show why and how variations in the different types of 
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power resources affected processes of governing alliance formation and social 
policy reform. Thus did the rise and fall of democracy, and hence varying lev-
els of institutional power resources, deeply affect the capacities of the popular 
classes and their organizations to take advantage of their numerical strength 
and to influence the formation of governments and their political agendas. In 
practice, the level of institutional power resources interacted closely with the 
level of discursive power resources. When import substitution and post-neolib-
eralism constituted the dominant development paradigms in public opinion, 
left and popular class forces were successfully able to frame redistributive so-
cial policy as being beneficial for the overriding goal of economic develop-
ment, and hence, as being beneficial for the society as a whole. This, in turn, 
enhanced the capacities of pro-redistributive forces to mobilize mass support 
and facilitated the formation of inclusionary governing alliances that united a 
range of different actors with heterogenous social bases. In contrast, when ne-
oliberalism dominated public opinion, mass support for social protections for 
low-income earners was considerably more difficult to attain and centrist ac-
tors were more hesitant to support such policies, as through the neoliberal per-
spective these appeared both economically and morally harmful. Finally, pro-
cesses of industrialization and de-industrialization and varying levels of unem-
ployment and informality affected the capacity of labor to exercise economic 
pressure through the interruption of the process of production, and hence, led 
to varying levels of structural power resources of the popular classes. In prac-
tice, structural power resources interacted closely with associational power re-
sources and constituted an important basis for organized labor to pursue the 
interests of the formal working class. 
In addition to a more adequate assessment of the overall level of popular 
class power resources, the distinction of four types of power resources also 
proved useful to understanding the distribution of power resources between 
different segments of the popular classes and its effects on the dynamics of 
alliance formation and social policy-making. In the Argentine case, during 
most of the period covered in this study, structural and associational power 
resources were highly concentrated on the formal working class while institu-
tional and discursive power resources were more equally distributed among 
the different segments of the popular classes. This meant that the relative po-
litical weight of the lower popular classes, and hence the incorporation of their 
interests into the social policy agenda, was in practice highly dependent on the 
levels of institutional and discursive power resources. Furthermore, organized 
labor was able to defend most of the social protections for formal workers even 
under the conditions of authoritarian regimes and neoliberal public opinion. In 
contrast, under such conditions, social protections for the scarcely organized 
and structurally weak lower popular classes were radically cut. 
And finally, the distinction of different types of power resources also in-
creases the coherence of the power resources approach in welfare state research 
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and therefore constitutes a qualitative contribution. So far, power resources 
studies in the field of welfare state research have considered democracy, ne-
oliberal influence, and globalization as factors that affected social policy out-
comes in addition to the distribution power resources (Esping-Andersen [1990] 
1998; Huber and Stephens 2001; Huber and Stephens 2012). Inspired by the 
debate on labor’s power resources in the discipline of industrial relations198 and 
by feminist policy analysis,199 the theoretical framework of this study has ad-
vanced a more integrated approach. Instead of considering institutional, struc-
tural, and discursive contexts as additional explanatory factors aside from the 
distribution of power resources, my approach looks at these contexts as directly 
influencing the distribution of power resources. The empirical analysis sup-
ported this integration, as it turned out that the main mechanism through which 
these contextual factors influenced the dynamics of governing alliance for-
mation and social policy-making was through altering the capacities of differ-
ent social and political forces to exercise influence. This does not, however, 
mean that the importance of these contextual factors was entirely restricted to 
their impact on the distribution of power resources. They also, for example, 
influence the historically contingent development of the constellations of ac-
tors and interests in the Argentinian political arena.  
Pluralist, Marxist, and Feminist Perspectives on the Role of Actors in 
Social Politics 
The literature review in chapter two has worked out different theoretical per-
spectives on the role of actors in the politics of social protection for low-in-
come earners, distinguishing among pluralist, Marxist, and feminist ap-
proaches.  
According to the pluralist perspective on Latin American welfare states, 
most importantly represented by Carmelo Mesa-Lago (Mesa-Lago 1978; 1992; 
Mesa-Lago, Cruz-Saco, and Zamalloa 1993), the unequal access to social pro-
tection has been the outcome of the influence of different pressure groups, such 
as military men, civil servants, white-collar workers, blue-collar workers, and 
peasants. The weakness of social protections for the lowest income sectors is 
thereby considered the result of a lack of power of low-income groups, such as 
peasants, unemployed and informal workers. The empirical findings of our 
study support this argument of the pluralist perspective to a certain degree. 
Associational and structural power resources were concentrated on formal la-
bor during most of the period, which provided it with more capacities to de-
mand and defend social protections than the lower popular classes. This 
 
198  See e.g., Brinkmann et al. 2008; Dörre 2011; McGuire 2013; Schmalz and Dörre 2013; 
Silver 2003; and Wright 2000. 
199  See e.g., Hobson and Lindholm 1997. 
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constituted indeed one important component of the explication. However, there 
were also other important components, such as the opposition of employers 
and their influence on exclusionary governing alliances. Moreover, the plural-
ist perspective cannot explain why social protections for low-income earners 
were massively expanded during several periods. 
Different approaches based on Marxist premises relate the evolution of 
social protections to the wider and often complex dynamics of class struggle 
(Block 1977; Esping-Andersen [1990] 1998; Huber and Stephens 2001; 2012; 
Offe 1984; Piven and Cloward [1971] 1972; Poulantzas [1978] 2000). The em-
pirical findings largely support the core argument of these approaches that the 
expansion of social protections is an outcome of popular class power and mo-
bilization. In contrast to the pluralist perspective, they assume that capital and 
its political allies play an important anti-redistributive role in social politics, 
which is congruent with the empirical finding that employers repeatedly 
pushed for retrenchment, privatization, and regressive re-regulation. However, 
different approaches based on Marxist premises have emphasized distinct 
mechanisms that relate popular class power to redistributive social policies. 
Piven and Cloward ([1971] 1972) and Poulantzas ([1978] 2000) argued that 
redistributive social policy is primarily the result of popular class mobilization 
and unrest, and hence, the outcome of bottom-up processes. In contrast, Offe 
(1972; 1984) and power resources theorists (Esping-Andersen [1990] 1998; 
Huber and Stephens 2001; 2012) more strongly emphasized top-down mecha-
nisms. Offe assumed that redistributive social policy is in large part a conse-
quence of the necessity of democratic governments to achieve a certain level 
of legitimacy in the eyes of the popular masses. Power resources theorists, in 
turn, emphasized that redistributive social policy is expanded most signifi-
cantly when popular class and left political forces achieve influence in or con-
trol over governments, and hence, are able to introduce policy change from 
above. In practice, all three mechanisms could be observed, however, in the 
case of social protections for low-income earners in Argentina, the strongest 
positive effects were indeed observed when popular class and left forces took 
part in governing alliances, which coincides largely with the emphasis of the 
power resources approach. 
Moreover, the empirical findings support the arguments of Esping-Ander-
sen ([1990] 1998, 67) and Przeworski (1985, 74–75) that working-class organ-
izations are not necessarily focused solely on attaining benefits for specific 
occupational groups, as suggested by the pluralist approach of Carmelo Mesa-
Lago (1978). The findings show that they can also adopt a broad definition of 
the working class that emphasizes common interests with other popular classes 
and promotes inclusionary social protections. In contrast to the pluralist per-
spective, these accounts can hence explain the formation of inclusionary gov-
erning alliances during certain periods that led to the expansion of social 
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protections for low-income earners despite significant disparities in the distri-
bution of power resources between formal labor and the lower popular classes. 
The empirical findings moreover support several arguments of the re-
viewed contributions from feminist social policy research. They support the 
hypothesis that large parts of the women’s movement support the struggle for 
social protections for low-income earners, as such policies tend to reduce gen-
der inequalities (Arza 2012c; Huber 2006; Sainsbury 1996).200 The findings 
also support the argument that the concrete forms and interests of popular class 
actors cannot be derived neatly from their class position, as internal disputes 
over the ideological orientation and processes of non-class boundary drawing, 
that might exclude low-income groups along lines such as gender, race, skill 
or informality, importantly shape their role in politics (Hite and Viterna 2005; 
O’Connor 1998; Orloff 2009; Rose 1997). In the Argentine case, informality 
and unemployment turned out to be important lines along which low-income 
earners have been excluded from trade union organization. Indirectly, this also 
led to the exclusion of many female and migrant workers, as these were dis-
proportionally often affected by informality and unemployment. In terms of 
social policy, this contributed to the fact that social protections for low-income 
earners had low priority in the political agenda of the biggest Argentinian trade 
union confederation, CGT. In contrast, the smaller confederation CTA explic-
itly aspired to organize informal and unemployed workers as well as other op-
pressed groups and was a strong supporter of an expansion of such policies. 
The Role of Social and Economic Structures 
In general, the empirical findings show that economic and social transfor-
mations had important impacts on the political dynamics of social policy 
change. At times, the impact was relatively unambiguous and direct. For ex-
ample, the eruption of social and economic crises consistently led to increasing 
political tensions and a weakening of the incumbent governing alliances. How-
ever, more often, the political effects were rather indirect and contingent on a 
range of further factors. Industrialization enabled the working class to become 
a powerful political actor in Argentina, but the concrete form, political orien-
tation, and strength that the labor movement attained was the outcome of rela-
tively autonomous processes that entailed, among other things, the conse-
quences of strategic choices of the trade unions and their opponents as well as 
the intervention of the state. In a similar vein, the increase of informality and 
unemployment in combination with processes of residential segregation after 
the mid-1970s provided possibilities for the organization of low-income 
 
200  Furthermore, in the Argentine case, the pro-redistributive orientation of the women’s 
movement is also related to its left-of-center political orientation and its strong support 
base among the popular classes. 
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earners based on the territorial dimension. Yet, the how and the when of the 
emergence of unemployed and informal workers’ movements depended on a 
range of further factors, such as the decision of left parties and trade union 
factions to undertake deliberate attempts to organize these sectors as well as 
the particular way the government responded to lower popular class protests 
by handing out social assistance benefits. In line with the arguments of Collier 
and Collier ([1991] 2009), the empirical findings show that major transfor-
mations of the political arena, such as the political incorporation of the labor 
movement during the 1940s and of lower popular class movements during the 
2000s, were enabled by particular social and economic contexts, but became 
then increasingly institutionalized and developed path dependency effects that 
assured their continuity over longer periods of time with considerable auton-
omy from subsequent social and economic transformations.  
Hence, in sum, the empirical findings suggest that for the understanding 
of the Argentine politics of social protection for low-income earners between 
1943 and 2015, social and economic factors were important, yet their impact 
on political dynamics was always shaped by their interaction with other factors 
such as the respective historical, institutional, and discursive contexts. Further-
more, the impact of social and economic factors was mostly indirect, meaning 
that they shaped political processes of alliance formation and social policy re-
form by enabling the emergence and strengthening of certain actors and inter-
ests, which then however interacted with relative autonomy from the social and 
economic structure. 
This indicates that the empirical findings do not support the hypotheses 
which have been derived from structuralist approaches that suppose a direct 
determination of social policy outcomes by structural factors. Neither did so-
cial policy mechanically respond to social and economic transformations, as 
assumed by the Logic of Industrialization approach (Wilenksy 1975), nor did 
they functionally adapt to the needs of capital accumulation as suggested by 
more structuralist Marxist approaches  (e.g., Offe 1972; O’Connor [1973] 
2002) and the Varieties of Capitalism  approach (Iversen and Soskice 2001; 
Mares 2001; Soskice and Schneider 2009). The hypothesis derived from 
PREALC/ILO research, which suggests that the level of social protection for 
low-income earners depends directly on the dual character of Latin American 
economies and the related high levels of informality, is not supported by the 
empirical findings either (Portés and Schauffler 1993, Tokman 1987). Infor-
mality did heavily condition the access of workers to social insurance cover-
age, however, whether government policies attempted to formalize workers or 
to extend social policy coverage also to informal labor cannot solely be ex-
plained by the dual character of the economy. For example, if we observe the 
evolution of pension coverage in Argentina, we can clearly see that inclusion 
or exclusion depended in practice much more strongly on legal changes re-
garding the access criteria undertaken by different governments than on the 
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percentage of the workforce that was informal. Indeed, the pension coverage 
among the elderly became nearly universal due to the Pension Inclusion Plan 
during the mid-2000s despite high levels of informality both at that moment 
and during the preceding decades.  
The empirical findings furthermore contradict the hypothesis that globali-
zation as such renders redistributive welfare states unsustainable (see e.g.; 
Rhodes 2000; Scharpf 2000; Segura-Ubiergo 2007; Strange 2003). In fact, one 
of the strongest phases of expansion of social protections occurred after 2002 
and was paralleled by a strong expansion of foreign trade. Instead, the findings 
show that more than the quantitative aspect of world trade, it was the qualita-
tive nature of the Argentine insertion into the international division of labor as 
primary goods exporter that had important impacts on the political dynamics 
of social policy reform. The findings thereby support several hypotheses that 
can be derived from dependency (e.g., Senghaas 1974; Cardoso and Faletto 
[1969] 1977) and extractivism theory (e.g., Burchardt 2016; Gudynas 2012; 
Peters 2016). As argued by both approaches, the dependence on primary goods 
exports increased the relative social, political, and economic power of the 
landed oligarchy and big agricultural companies and weakened the structural 
power resources of the popular classes by hindering sustainable industrializa-
tion and favoring the persistence of dual labor markets. Hence, the way the 
Argentine economy participated in the international division of labor provided 
a challenging framework for the sustainability of redistributive governing alli-
ances and contributed to the capacity of anti-redistributive elite circles to re-
peatedly install repressive inegalitarian regimes. Moreover, the findings em-
pirically confirm the operation of several of the mechanisms described by au-
thors of the (neo-) extractivism approach that link the dependency on primary 
goods exports to the political dynamics of social policy change. First, due to 
the dominance of primary export products, the oscillation of international com-
modity prices led to a significant external vulnerability of the Argentine econ-
omy and contributed decisively to the frequent eruption of crises. These crises 
usually led to a reshuffling of power resources, disruptive changes in public 
opinion, and realignments of political actors, which in turn provided the ground 
for the rise and decline of strongly differing governing alliances and radical 
shifts in the direction of social policy. Second, in line with the concept of neo-
extractivism, during all three phases of strong expansion of social protections 
for low-income earners (1943–1955, 1973–1976, 2002–2015), inclusionary 
governing alliances initially benefitted from a rise in commodity prices, which 
enabled them to implement legal instruments to capture a part of the primary 
sector profits and to use these resources for redistributive policies that consol-
idated or even strengthened their heterogenous popular class support bases. 
Third, at the same time that the appropriation of primary sector profits enabled 
redistributive policies, it led to a structural dependence of the inclusionary gov-
erning alliances on both national agricultural production and international 
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commodity prices. This meant that any drought or fall in commodity prices 
constituted a significant challenge to the sustainability of the inclusionary pro-
ject. Interestingly, the empirical findings show that in the Argentine case, the 
respective governing alliances did not respond to these challenges by cutting 
or dismantling redistributive social policies. Indeed, in certain social policy 
areas they even tended to deepen the redistributive agenda in favor of low-
income earners. However, at the same time, they tackled fiscal and foreign 
trade balance deficits through measures that induced inflation and a devalua-
tion of the currency and hence decimated the purchasing power of wages, 
which turned out to be catalyzers for alliance internal tensions. These tensions, 
in turn, caused a significant political weakening of the governments’ bases of 
support and hence contributed to their subsequent loss of power. By this 
means, as argued by theorists of (neo-) extractivism, the dependency of inclu-
sionary governments on primary goods exports not only challenged the fiscal 
but also the political sustainability of social protections for low-income earn-
ers.  
The Role of Institutions 
The empirical findings show that institutions had important influence on the 
dynamics of the politics of social protection for low-income earners in Argen-
tina. From a global perspective, the findings support Bob Jessop’s (1990; 1999) 
state theoretical argument that institutions are strategically selective. The his-
torical analysis reveals that this selectivity affected social policy change 
mainly through three mechanisms. First, institutions were selective in the sense 
that they provided some forces with more capacities to influence the policy 
process than others and hence directly affected the distribution of power re-
sources among contending actors. Second, institutions influenced the historical 
formation and evolution of the subjective political interests of different actors 
in social policy. Third, they provided a framework which limited the array of 
potentially successful actions and alliances for the pursuit of their respective 
interests and hence affected the development of strategies of different actors. 
Besides supporting this rather abstract state theoretical argument, the em-
pirical findings have a range of implications for more fine-grained theoretical 
arguments regarding the role of specific institutional structures for social pol-
icy change. In agreement with Segura-Ubiergo (2007), Haggard and Kaufman 
(2008), and Huber and Stephens (2012), among others, the empirical findings 
show that regime type is a decisive institutional factor. Democratic regimes 
provided a much more favorable institutional framework for the extension of 
social protections for low-income earners than authoritarian and semi-authori-
tarian regimes. In practice, three main underlying mechanisms could be ob-
served. First, democracy provided the popular classes with significant electoral 
weight and with civil liberties that facilitated processes of organization, which 
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taken together had a positive effect on the level of power resources of the pop-
ular classes and therefore increased their ability to attain governmental power 
and to influence the social policy agenda. Second, the electoral weight of the 
popular classes provided significant incentives for politicians and governments 
to attempt to mobilize low-income earner support by proposing or implement-
ing an extension of social protections. Third, in line with the arguments of 
Przeworski (1985) and Esping-Andersen ([1990] 1998), democracy motivated 
organized labor to forge political alliances with unorganized low-income 
groups and social movements in order to reach electoral majorities. At the same 
time, the findings also show that the operation of these mechanisms depended 
not only on the prevalent regime type but on further factors. For example, the 
dominance of neoliberal thinking during the early 1990s undermined these 
mechanisms to an important degree, as the dominant world view enabled the 
political right to generate mass support for regressive social policy reform even 
among low-income earners.  
The empirical findings moreover support the hypothesis derived from Im-
mergut (1990; 2010) that the number and strength of institutional veto points 
are inversely related to the velocity of social policy change. In the Argentine 
case, institutional veto points were relatively weak during most of the period 
of study, which contributed to a strong concentration of power in the hands of 
the leading circles of the respective governing alliances and enabled them to 
undertake radical shifts in the direction of social policy and to implement pro-
found change within relatively short timeframes. In line with Levitsky (2003), 
the findings furthermore showed that a meaningful assessment of veto points 
cannot rely solely on formally existing institutional structures but must also 
take into consideration informal structures and political practices that often 
have an important role in shaping policy processes. 
The tracing of successful and failed social policy reform processes also 
provided clear support for the hypotheses that once implemented, inegalitarian 
social policies tend to deepen social and political divides within the popular 
classes, as argued by Abel and Lewis (1993), and to create vested interests that 
make future reform politically more costly, as argued by Huber and Stephens 
(2001) and Pierson (2001). 
The Argentine case does not support the hypothesis derived from Rosen-
berg (1979; 1983) and Martínez-Franzoni and Sánchez-Anconchea (2012) that 
bureaucracies of state apparatuses, and in particular of social insurance insti-
tutions, tend to attain significant influence on the direction of social policy 
change. Due to the highly vertical organization of governments in Argentina 
and the ability of presidents to exchange bureaucratic personnel, bureaucrats 
had little ability to develop significant long-term influence on the direction of 
social policy. Interviews with a former minister and several state secretaries 
showed that even when bureaucrats were able to develop social policy pro-
posals, these were commonly ignored as soon as they diverged from the 
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general line of economic and social policy pursued by the leading circle of the 
governing alliance.  
The Role of Ideas 
Two ideational approaches have been distinguished in the literature review. 
Authors of the first approach stress the importance of policy learning and the 
proliferation of specific ideas about the regulation of social programs through 
national, regional, and global social policy expert communities (e.g., Danani 
and Beccaria 2012; A. Deacon 2000; Martínez Franzoni, Sánchez-Ancochea, 
and Solano 2012; Weyland 2005). The second approach emphasizes the im-
portance of overarching economic paradigms and worldviews, such as Keynes-
ianism or neoliberalism, that provide discursive frameworks through which 
both the wider public and political decision-makers assess different social pol-
icy options (e.g., Blyth 2002; Hall 1993; Hay 2001; Wincott 2011).  
The empirical findings provide support for the arguments of both ap-
proaches—to different degrees, however. The diffusion of specific social pol-
icy recommendations and ideas through international organizations and aca-
demic circles often influenced the way specific social policies were introduced, 
extended, cut, or reformulated. However, the empirical findings suggest that 
the influence of such ideas was strongly limited as soon as these contradicted 
the dominant economic discourse. For example, universalistic social policy 
proposals elaborated by Argentinian academics, the WHO, and several think 
tanks hardly had any impact on social policy outcomes during the 1990s, when 
neoliberal thinking guided policy-making in nearly all areas. In contrast, shifts 
in the prevalence of overarching economic paradigms influenced the general 
direction of social policy towards low-income earners much more profoundly. 
This was mainly due to the fact that broad economic paradigms developed their 
impact on the policy process through a variety of direct and indirect mecha-
nisms. First, as did specific social policy recommendations and ideas, they in-
fluenced the cognitive and analytical perspectives of social policy-makers. 
Second, they also shaped the general political orientation of governments, 
which usually provided clear margins for the development of policies within 
the different ministries and government departments. Third, they had a signif-
icant influence on the perceptions and opinions of the wider public, with the 
result that they shaped the societal distribution of discursive power resources 
and facilitated or hampered the formation of inclusionary governing alliances. 
The empirical findings however also showed that ideational factors do not 
lead to certain policy outcomes in a direct or mechanic way. Instead, they al-
ways interact with other contextual factors and their concrete impact is further-
more dependent on historically specific political processes. For example, the 
prevalence of the ISI paradigm as an overarching economic logic and the spe-
cific policy ideas proliferated by the ILO, the WHO, and academic com-
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munities during the 1960s and 1970s provided a benign ideational context for 
the extension of social protections to low-income earners. However, the fact 
that long periods of these decades were characterized by exclusionary right-
wing dictatorships in Argentina successfully blocked the implementation of 
such policies.  
6.3 Outlook 
With the victory of the center-right neoliberal Cambiemos alliance in the 2015 
presidential elections, a cycle of 13 years of progressive reform ended in Ar-
gentina. Rather than being an isolated phenomenon, this development coin-
cided with a broader swing of the political pendulum to the right and the de-
cline of several inclusionary governing alliances in the Latin American region.  
On the one hand, economic difficulties decisively contributed to the resur-
gence of the right. Against the background of a failure to diversify production 
and export structures, the decline of commodity prices heavily affected growth 
rates in most Latin American countries, generated fiscal pressures and, most 
importantly, intensified distributive conflicts within and without the governing 
alliances. As in Argentina, most progressive governments did not respond to 
sluggish economic growth and declining fiscal revenues by cutting previously 
implemented redistributive social policies. In fact, in many cases, they even 
deepened or extended these programs in order to compensate, with considera-
ble success, the social consequences of the economic downturn. However, in 
a context where it was no longer possible to finance progressive policies by 
distributing the gains from economic growth and commodity export, inclusion-
ary governing alliances had increasingly no other choice than to implement 
measures that seriously affected the interests of one or another societal group. 
In practice, the array of such policies was quite heterogeneous and the empha-
ses varied across different countries, ranging from tax and tariff increases to 
the shifting of funds between different policy areas to indirect financing 
through inflationary policies. Despite considerable differences in the kinds of 
policies implemented, all of them produced winners and losers and hence in-
creased tensions among different groups and interests within the governing al-
liances as well as intensifying oppositional right-wing, upper- and middle-class 
resistance. Taken together, economic difficulties and subsequent political ten-
sions tended to reduce the popularity of the progressive governments, to 
weaken some of their organizations, and to generate doubts about the appro-
priateness of the demand-oriented and state-centered post-neoliberal paradigm 
to deal with the current economic challenges. Eventually, these developments 
provided opportunities for the re-emergence of center-right and right govern-
ing alliances. 
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On the other hand, a more fine-grained look at the political developments 
in the region also indicates that the rise of the political right did not constitute 
an automatic or inevitable outcome of the end of the commodity export boom. 
As the victory of the left MAS-Party in the 2020 presidential elections in Bo-
livia shows, progressive governments cannot only countervail the negative so-
cial impact of the economic downturn but also steer successfully through the 
subsequently arising political tensions. As argued by Anria and Roberts 
(2019), in the Bolivian case, internal alliance mechanisms for participation and 
consensus generation have been of key importance for preserving the cohesion 
and strength of the governing alliance even in times when tensions between 
different factions and interests tended to increase. In a similar way, the analysis 
of the Argentine case suggests that the decline of the Kirchnerist governing 
alliance was as much caused by political errors, corruption scandals, vertical-
ism, and a lack of mechanisms for the generation of effective internal consen-
sus as by the economic downturn. Additionally, the current economic difficul-
ties not only challenge progressive governments but also their conservative and 
neoliberal counterparts. In México, the 2018 elections resulted in a victory of 
the center-left alliance of Andrés Manuel López Obrador. In Argentina, the 
neoliberal policies of the right Cambiemos alliances have pushed the economy 
into an even deeper recession which contributed to the land-slide victory of the 
more inclusionary alliance of Alberto Fernández in the 2019 presidential and 
parliamentary elections.  
The four years of Macri’s presidency furthermore showed that there were 
significant restrictions on cutting social protections for low-income earners. In 
contrast to past experiences of retrenchment, the Cambiemos alliance was nei-
ther able to build on the repressive means that were available to the authoritar-
ian right-wing regimes between 1955 and 1983 nor on the deep-rooted neolib-
eral consensus that enabled the Menem government to mobilize broad-based 
popular support for regressive social policy reform during the 1990s. Together 
with the fact that the Argentine working class and lower popular classes had 
conserved significant associational and structural power resources and capaci-
ties of resistance, this context led the Cambiemos government to embark on a 
rather slow and gradual process of retrenchment, which has left many of the 
popular social policies of the previous government intact. As argued by Levit-
sky and Roberts (2011, 423–424), the Chilean experience of the right Piñera 
government points in a similar direction. 
What are, then, the future political prospects for sustaining or even extend-
ing measures of social protections for low-income earners in Latin America? 
While conservative and neoliberal governments are certainly increasing pres-
sure on such policies, path dependency effects as well as the still relatively 
strong power resources of the popular classes, and hence the capacities of left 
and popular class forces to resist retrenchment or even to regain governmental 
power, constitute considerable counter-pressures. A first superficial analysis 
  323 
suggests that the recent formation of right-wing governing alliances in several 
countries of the region was less due to a significant reduction of popular class 
power resources than to divisions among progressive and popular class actors, 
strategic mistakes, and corruption scandals, on the one hand, and successful 
political strategies as well as an increased unity of the political right, on the 
other. This raises important questions that should be addressed by future stud-
ies: What were the strategies of the political right to achieve governmental 
power and what made them successful in some countries but not in others? 
What structures, constellations of actors, and strategies enabled inclusionary 
governing alliances in some countries to sustain unity even in the face of dif-
ficult economic environments and increasingly fierce oppositional pressures? 
What strategies were most effective in impeding a reduction of social protec-
tions, or even to achieve a further expansion, under conservative governments? 
The modified power resources approach can provide a fruitful theoretical 
framework to explore these questions. 
However, not only the future but also the past of social protection for low-
income earners and state redistribution in Latin America is still less clear than 
often suggested. Influential studies on Latin American welfare states by Bar-
rientos (2004); De Ferranti et al. (2004); Lindert, Skoufias, and Shapiro (2006); 
Mesa-Lago (1978); and others argued that social protection started to expand 
relatively early on the continent but since then excluded or disadvantaged low-
income groups and therefore attained a regressive truncated character. This 
picture of rather constantly and consistently exclusionary social policy regimes 
appears surprising for a region whose newer history is characterized by severe 
social conflicts, the emergence of powerful popular class movements, guerrilla 
wars, uprisings, and even revolutions. In fact, the present study shows of the 
Argentinian case that social policy was anything but constantly exclusionary. 
In practice, phases of strong expansion of social protections repeatedly inter-
changed with phases of radical retrenchment. The ability of the Argentinian 
elite to push the social policy regime in a truncated direction thereby depended 
less on their capacity to pre-empt or avoid the implementation of redistributive 
policies than on their capacity to reverse these progressive changes at a later 
point in time, which not seldom occurred with considerable support from re-
pressive military forces, western governments, international financial organi-
zations, and transnational corporations. As social policy change is strongly in-
fluenced by path dependencies and historically grown constellations of actors 
and interests, understanding the past is crucial for an appropriate understanding 
of present and future processes of political change. Therefore, the application 
of the modified power resources approach to the history of other Latin Ameri-
can countries could contribute significantly to our understanding of redistrib-
utive processes on the continent and enhance our capacities to make sense of 
future change. 
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Finally, one of the crucial strengths of the modified power resources ap-
proach is the fact that it has been specifically adapted to fit the analysis of 
redistributive social policy change in Latin America. The other side of this coin 
is, of course, that the approach in its current form has limitations and cannot 
be neatly applied to explain political outcomes in other policy areas or in other 
world regions. However, these limitations are not due to a general inappropri-
ateness of the approach for such tasks but related to the particular operational-
ization developed in the framework of this study. Associational, structural, in-
stitutional, and discursive power resources as well as historically contingent 
constellations of actors and processes of (governing) alliance formation are all 
likely to constitute pivotal categories for understanding political change in 
other policy areas and geographical regions. However, Import Substitution In-
dustrialization and Neoliberalism, for example, might not necessarily consti-
tute the decisive ideational structures which account for the distribution of dis-
cursive power resources among contending actors when it comes to explaining 
policy outcomes regarding for example gendered violence. Furthermore, the 
array of contending actors is likely to differ significantly as well as the kind of 
institutional and structural power resources that shape their capacities to make 
their voices heard in the political process. Hence, the application of the ap-
proach beyond Latin America and beyond redistributive social policy change 
will require some adaptation. Yet, if such adaptation is carefully undertaken, 
its application might yield significant new insights into political processes 
across different regions and policy areas. 
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